Update

In Allen Dulles and the compromise of OSS codes in WWII I’ve added the information from the Higgs memorandum.

The Higgs memorandum - Compromise of State Department communications by the Finnish codebreakers in WWII

During WWII the US State Department used several cryptosystems in order to protect its radio communications from the Axis powers. For low level messages the unenciphered Gray and Brown codebooks were used.  For important messages four different codebooks (A1, B1, C1, D1) enciphered with substitution tables were available.

Their most modern and (in theory) secure system was the M-138-A strip cipher. Unfortunately for the Americans this system was compromised and diplomatic messages were read by the Germans, Finns, Japanese, Italians and Hungarians. The strip cipher carried the most important diplomatic traffic of the United States (at least until mid/late 1944) and by reading these messages the Axis powers gained insights into global US policy.

Germans, Finns and Japanese cooperated on the solution of the strip cipher. In 1941 the Japanese gave to the Germans alphabet strips and numerical keys that they had copied from a US consulate in 1939 and these were passed on by the Germans to their Finnish allies in 1942. Then in 1943 the Finns started sharing their results with Japan. 

Finnish solution of State Department cryptosystems

During WWII the Finnish signal intelligence service worked mostly on Soviet military and NKVD cryptosystems however they did have a small diplomatic section located in Mikkeli. This department had about 38 analysts, with the majority working on US codes.

Head of the department was Mary Grashorn. Other important people were Pentti Aalto (effective head of the US section) and the experts on the M-138 strip cipher Karl Erik Henriksson and Kalevi Loimaranta.

Their main wartime success was the solution of the State Department’s M-138-A cipher. The solution of this high level system gave them access to important diplomatic messages from US embassies in Europe and around the world. 

Apart from purely diplomatic traffic they were also able to read messages of other US agencies that used State department cryptosystems, such as the OSS -Office of Strategic Services Bern station, Military Attaché in Switzerland, Office of War Information representative in Switzerland, the Foreign Economic Administration, War Shipping Administration, Office of Lend-Lease Administration and the War Refugee Board.

Operation Stella Polaris

In September 1944 Finland signed an armistice with the Soviet Union. The people in charge of the Finnish signal intelligence service anticipated this move and fearing a Soviet takeover of the country had taken measures to relocate the radio service to Sweden. This operation was called Stella Polaris (Polar Star).

In late September roughly 700 people, comprising members of the intelligence services and their families were transported by ship to Sweden. The Finns had come to an agreement with the Swedish intelligence service that their people would be allowed to stay and in return the Swedes would get the Finnish crypto archives and their radio equipment. At the same time colonel Hallamaa, head of the signals intelligence service, gathered funds for the Stella Polaris group by selling the solved codes in the Finnish archives to the Americans, British and Japanese. 

The Stella Polaris operation was dependent on secrecy. However the open market for Soviet codes made the Swedish government uneasy. In the end most of the Finnish personnel chose to return to Finland, since the feared Soviet takeover did not materialize. 

The Higgs memorandum

In September 1944 colonel Hallamaa met with L. Randolph Higgs, an official of the US embassy in Sweden and told him about their successes with US diplomatic codes and ciphers.

This information was summarized in a report prepared by Higgs, dated 30 September 1944.

The report can be found in the US National Archives - collection RG 84 ‘Records of the Foreign Service Posts of the Department of State’ - ‘US Legation/Embassy Stockholm, Sweden’ - ‘Top Secret General Records File: 1944’.

(Google Drive link)

Higgs met with colonel Hallamaa on September 29 and the OSS officials Tikander and Cole were also present during their discussion.

Hallamaa stated that he was an administrator, not a cryptanalyst and about 10-12 of his men worked on US diplomatic codes.

His unit had solved the US codes Gray, Brown, M-138-A strip cipher and enciphered codebooks (probably the A1, B1, C1).

The high level M-138-A system had been solved mostly by taking advantage of operator mistakes such as sending strip cipher information on other systems that had already been broken or sending the same message in different strips one of which had been broken.

The strip cipher was considered a strong encryption system and had been adopted by the Finns for some of their traffic.

Important diplomatic messages from the US embassies in Switzerland, Sweden and Finland were read by the Finnish codebreakers.

Regarding Bern, Switzerland most of the messages dealt with intelligence matters:

‘Replying to my request for information regarding the contents of the messages from our Legation in Bern to the Department, Col. Hallamaa said the great bulk of them were intelligence messages dealing with conditions in Germany, France, Italy and the Balkans. He spoke in complimentary terms about ‘Harrison’s’ information service’.

Regarding Helsinki, Finland Hallamaa stated that thanks to the decoded diplomatic traffic they were always informed of current US policy initiatives:

‘Col. Hallamaa said that they always knew before McClintock arrived at the Foreign Office what he was coming to talk about’.

Hallamaa revealed a lot of confidential information to the Americans and volunteered to have some of his experts interviewed. 

The interview was conducted on friendly terms with Higgs stating; ‘Col. Hallamaa was most pleasant and seemed to be entirely frank and open regarding the matters discussed’.

Additional information: In November 1944 the US cryptanalysts Paavo Carlson of the Army’s Signal Security Agency and Paul E. Goldsberry of the State Department’s cipher unit interviewed Finnish officials regarding their work on US codes. Their report can be found here.

Staff Study on OSS Cryptographic Plan - January 1945

Recently I posted reports on OSS codes and ciphers from 1943 and 1944.

Another document that has information on the OSS crypto systems is ‘Staff Study on OSS Cryptographic Plan’, available from the US National Archives - collection RG457- Entry 9032 - NR 3280 ‘Staff Study on OSS Cryptographic Plan’.

The report is also available from the journal ‘Cryptologia’, vol13, no.3:

 SECRET

HEADQUARTERS, ARMY SERVICE FORCES

OFFICE OF THE CHIEF SIGNAL OFFICER

WASHINGTON 25, D.C.

  SPSIC-6                                                                                            8 January 1945

MEMORANDUM for Assistant. Chief of Staff, G-2

Subject: Staff Study on OSS Cryptographic Plan

The enclosed staff study is forwarded for your consideration and comment,

For the Chief Signal Officer:  

                                                                                      W, Preston Corderman

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          Colonel, Signal Corps

                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     Chiefs Signal Security Branch

1. Incl

Study on OSS Cryptographic Plan

STAFF STUDY ON OSS CRYPTOGRAPHIC PLAN 

PROBLEM PRESENTED

1. How may the need of OSS for a high grade, high speed cryptographic system be satisfied?

FACTS BEARING ON THE CASE

2. OSS has a requirement for a high grade, high speed cryptographic system for the encipherment and decipherment of secret traffic.

3. At the present time OSS is using the Converter M-134-A (short title SIGMYC) to satisfy this requirement.

4. Prior to 5 April 1944, eight (8) SIGMYC were issued to OSS.

5. The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, authorized the issue of twenty-six (26) SIGMYC to OSS by memorandum for Col. Corderman from Col. Clarke dated 5 April 1944, to meet the expanding needs of that organization.

6. Since 5 April 1944, twenty-one (21) SIGMYC have been delivered to OSS. That organization now holds twenty-nine (29) machines; five more are available for issue.

7. In the past OSS has used one universal set of rotors with SIGMYC. These rotors were replaced once.

8. In September 1944 OSS requested two new sets of rotors, one set to be used in Europe and the other set in the Far East. Thirty-eight (38) sets of rotors SIGRHAT (for use in the Far East) have been issued in compliance with that request.

9. Twenty-five (25) sets of rotors SIGSAAD (for use in Europe) have also been issued.

10. Instructional documents associated with SIGMYC are "Operating Instructions for Converter M-134 and M-134-A (Short title SIGKOC and ‘photographs and Drawings of Converter M-134-A (short title SIGVYJ). No copies of these publications are available for issue. This situation was caused by the destruction of the instructional documents when Converters M-134-A were turned in by Army holders.

11. Requests are received for spare parts with each request for the issue of a SIGMYC. The spare parts list always include rotor stepping solenoids. There are no rotor stepping solenoids on hand in this agency. Three requests for these items have not been fulfilled.

12. In accordance with authorization of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, 27 July 1944, one SIGTOT room circuit was furnished OSS in Washington. Authorization did not extend to the issuance of tapes for use with this equipment. Additional SIGTOT circuits have been made available to OSS in Europe. That organization is procuring additional tape punching equipment to meet the increased demand for tape. OSS requested the loan of such equipment until they are prepared to fulfill their own needs for tape. This branch is supplying OSS with sufficient tape until that organization is self-supporting in this respect.

13. Four (4) SIGCUM have been issued to OSS with the approval of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, 28 April 1944. These machines were sent to OSS in North Africa to replace four (4) SlGCUM which were loaned to OSS by NATO and subsequently recalled by the latter organization.

14. Within the past six (6) months the communications requirements of OSS have markedly increased. The cryptographic requirements have expanded proportionately. The rapid expansion is vividly illustrated by the strip cipher requirements of that organization. In June 1944 SSA requested OSS to furnish a monthly quota of desired material in order to adjust production schedules here. The monthly quota of strip cipher systems needed is now larger than the total number of strip systems issued to OSS over a period of twenty (20) months.

15. It is believed that the OSS will request the five (5) remaining SIGMYC of the authorized allotment of twenty-six (26) machines. Instructional documents are not available for issue with these converters. The reprinting of these documents presents a major reproduction job.

16. OSS encounters an ever present maintenance problem since the machines are constantly breaking down. It is believed that the time is not far distant when it will be impossible to maintain the machines adequately,

17. In order to provide new rotors in the future it will be necessary to have rotors returned from the field by OSS for rewiring. Thus, a rotation process will be established to meet new demands for rotors which will result in the wearing out of the rotors within a relatively short time. It is noted that it would take between one to two years to procure new rotors.

18. OSS is now trying out a modification of the standard --text deleted -- device, which utilizes -*- --text deleted--. That organization is contemplating an increase in the distribution of these --text deleted – to include the standard --text deleted – held by OSS, thus, permitting inter-communication between the two machines. The cryptographic principle involved his been approved by the Signal Security Agency. OSS plans to utilize the -*- --text deleted-- for secret radio transmissions.

19.  The question arises as to what other means are available. The following items of equipment are considered:

a. SIGTOT 

This system provides adequate security but the scarcity of equipment and the difficultly of providing sufficient quantities of one-time tape render its use impracticable. In addition SIGTOT is not at present adapted to multi-holders of a common system, which is an operational requirement

b. SIGABA

 Under present policy, it would be necessary to assign a crypt team with each machine in order to make them available to OSS. This presents a problem of securing sufficient personnel which appears insurmountable at the present time. Furthermore, the use of SIGABA as a solution to this problem is not generally regarded with favor.

c. SIGCUM

The communications and cryptographic problems of OSS are developing rapidly in the Far East where traffic is transmitted largely by radio. Since SIGCUM may not be employed for secret traffic transmitted by means of radio the use of this machine would not provide a solution to the problem, Although SIGCUM would be a satisfactory substitute for SIGMYC in Europe, a revision of the cryptographic facilities of OSS in that area is not considered feasible at this time.

d. SIGFOY

This converter provides adequate security to fulfill the need for a high grade cryptographic system and is well adapted to multiple holders of a common system. Since it is not a high speed system, it would not fulfill this requirement.

e. SIGLASE

This system would provide adequate security and speed to meet the outlined requirements. However, since SIGLASE is still in the development stage and the expected date of issue is unknown it is not the immediate answer to the OSS problem.

20. From the point of view of this branch the problem could be most acceptably solved by making Army facilities available to OSS. It is realized that the latter organization would probably not be favorably disposed toward such a solution,

CONCLUSIONS

21. The continued use of SIGMYC by OSS in the Far East will present maintenance and 

distribution problems which will be virtually impossible to solve.

22. A replacement for SIGMYC is needed.

23. SIGABA, SIGCUM and SIGTOT are not completely acceptable substitutes.

24. SIGFOY and SIGLASE would be a solution to the problem but since it will require from six to nine months to manufacture the SIGLASE, it cannot be considered an immediate solution.

25. It appears that the only immediate solution to the problem is for OSS traffic to be handled by Army cryptographic facilities.

RECOMMENDATIONS

26. That OSS be requested to utilize Army cryptographic communications facilities where such exist.

27. That OSS use its own cryptographic communications facilities where Army facilities do not exist.

28. That, at such time as the equipment referred to in paragraph 27 becomes unserviceable, service be maintained by those Army cryptographic facilities and/or equipments as may then be available.

A report dated 8 February 1946 (found in SRH-366 ‘The history of Army strip cipher devices’) has more information on the implementation of the aforementioned OSS cryptographic plan.

Joint Chiefs of Staff evaluation of Office of Strategic Services ciphers

In 1943 and 1944 the US Joint Chiefs of Staff evaluated the cryptosystems used by the various US government agencies.

For example the report on State Department codes and ciphers for 1943 can be found in the NSA website and the report of 1944 is in the US national archives, in collection RG 457- Entry 9032- box 1384 - 'JCS Ad hoc committee report on cryptographic security of government communications'.

The ciphers of the Office of Strategic Services were also evaluated and there is some information on this topic in the US national archives, specifically Record Group 226 - Series: Correspondence Files, 1942 – 1946 - File Unit: 17) Cryptographic Security:

Unfortunately there are no detailed reports on the subject but from the information presented above it seems that even as late as 1944 OSS communications were sent on vulnerable cryptosystems (double transposition and M-138-A cipher).

Intelligence operations in Switzerland - Hans von Pescatore, Captain Choynacki and General Barnwell R. Legge

In WWII Poland fought on the side of the Allies and suffered for it since it was the first country occupied by Nazi Germany. In the period 1940-45 the Polish Government in Exile and its military forces contributed to the Allied cause by taking part in multiple campaigns of war. Polish pilots fought for the RAF during the Battle of Britain, Polish troops fought in N.Africa, Italy and Western Europe and the Polish intelligence service operated in occupied Europe and even had agents inside the German High Command. 

Although it is not widely known the Polish intelligence service had spy networks operating throughout Europe and the Middle East. The Poles established their own spy networks and also cooperated with foreign agencies such as Britain’s Secret Intelligence Service and Special Operations Executive, the American Office of Strategic Services and even the Japanese intelligence service. During the war the Poles supplied roughly 80.000 reports to the British intelligence services (1), including information on the German V-weapons (V-1 cruise missile and V-2 rocket) and reports from the German High Command (though the agent ‘Knopf’) (2). In occupied France the intelligence department of the Polish Army’s General Staff organized several resistance/intelligence groups tasked not only with obtaining information on the German units but also  with evacuating Polish men so they could serve in the Armed Forces (3).

Compromise of Polish codes

Poland’s role in WWII is well known, especially the success of Marian Rejewski, Henryk Zygalski and Jerzy Różycki during the 1930’s in solving the Enigma cipher machine, used by the German Armed forces. It is important to note that countries with large cryptologic staffs such as France and Britain had not managed to solve this device, in that time period.

Although the Poles were successful in the offence they neglected their defense. Their diplomatic, military attaché, resistance movement and intelligence service codes were read by the Germans during the war. Especially important for the Germans was the solution of the cipher used by Major Szczesny Choynacki, Polish deputy consul in Bern, Switzerland.

The telegrams of Major Choynacki

Choynacki regularly communicated with the Polish intelligence service in London and transmitted valuable reports from his agents/contacts in Switzerland and throughout occupied Europe. 

His cryptosystem consisted of an enciphered codebook. The codebook contained 4-figure groups and was enciphered with a version of the British Stencil Subtractor Frame. The codebreakers of the Signal Intelligence Agency of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces - OKW/Chi (Oberkommando der Wehrmacht/Chiffrier Abteilung) were able to solve this system in late 1942-early 1943 and from then on his voluminous traffic to London was continuously decoded (4).

Details about the content of these messages are available from the postwar interrogations of German intelligence officers, specifically Willy Piert and Hans Von Pescatore (5). They were both members of the German Legation in Bern and they conducted intelligence operations against the Allied agencies and even the Swiss IS.

The decoded messages revealed that Choynacki had well placed agents numbered in the 500 series.

According to the Germans the most damaging agent was No 594, Isidore Koppelmann, a Jewish banker living in Basel. One of Choynacki’s decoded messages was used to uncover his identity.

It is up to historians to research this case further and identify the full extent of the damage caused to the Polish networks from the compromise of their communications.

The German spy in the US embassy and the messages of General Legge

Another interesting German operation, mentioned in the interrogations of Piert and Pescatore, was one directed against the US embassy in Bern, Switzerland. In 1941 the Germans were able to recruit a Swiss national who worked in the US embassy. This person, named Fuerst, had access to the office of the US military attaché General Barnwell R. Legge and he was able to take documents plus the used carbon paper and give it to the Germans. These documents revealed some of Legge’s sources:

Although Fuerst was apprehended in March 1942 the information he provided, coupled with decodes of US traffic (6), gave the Germans an insight into the sources and operations of the US intelligence agencies.

Notes:

(1). Journal of U.S. Intelligence Studies article: ‘England's Poles in the Game: WWII Intelligence Cooperation’

(2). War in History article: ‘Penetrating Hitler's High Command: Anglo-Polish HUMINT, 1939-1945’

(3). ‘War Secrets in the Ether’, p230-1

(4). Polish Stencil codes and secret agent ‘’Knopf’’, Major Choynacki’s Ace: the Solution to an Old Puzzle of Wartime Intelligence, KV 2/1329 ‘Willy PIERT / Hans Von PESCATORE’

(5). KV 2/1329 ‘Willy PIERT / Hans Von PESCATORE’

(6). The compromise of the communications of General Barnwell R. Legge, US military attache to Switzerland

Acknowledgments: The credit for locating the very interesting Piert/Pescatore report goes to Craig McKay, author of Major Choynacki’s Ace: the Solution to an Old Puzzle of Wartime Intelligence.

The compromise of the State Department’s strip cipher – Things that don’t add up..

During WWII the US State Department used several cryptosystems in order to protect its radio communications from the Axis powers. The main systems used were the unenciphered Gray and Brown codebooks along with the enciphered codes A1, B1, C1, D1 and the new M-138 strip cipher. 

In the period 1940-1944 German, Japanese and Finnish codebreakers could solve State Department messages (both low and high level) from embassies around the world. The M-138-A strip cipher was the State Department’s high level system and it was used extensively during that period. Although we still don’t know the full story the information available points to a serious compromise both of the circular traffic (Washington to all embassies) and special traffic (Washington to specific embassy). In this area there was cooperation between Germany, Japan and Finland. The German success was made possible thanks to alphabet strips and key lists they received from the Japanese in 1941 and these were passed on by the Germans to their Finnish allies in 1942. The Finnish codebreakers solved several diplomatic links in that year and in 1943 started sharing their findings with the Japanese. German and Finnish codebreakers cooperated in the solution of the strips during the war, with visits of personnel to each country. The Axis codebreakers took advantage of mistakes in the use of the strip cipher by the State Department’s cipher unit.

Apart from purely diplomatic traffic the Axis powers were also able to read some of the messages of other organizations that were occasionally enciphered with State Department systems, such as the Office of Strategic Services, the Office of War Information and the Military Intelligence Service.

The OSS Bern station and the compromise of State Department codes in WWII

In the course of WWII both the Allies and the Axis powers were able to gain information of great value from reading their enemies secret communications. In Britain the codebreakers of Bletchley Park solved several enemy systems with the most important ones being the German Enigma and Tunny cipher machines and the Italian C-38m. Codebreaking played a role in the Battle of the Atlantic, the North Africa Campaign and the Normandy invasion. In the United States the Army and Navy codebreakers solved many Japanese cryptosystems and used this advantage in battle. The great victory at Midway would probably not have been possible if the Americans had not solved the Japanese Navy’s code.

On the other side of the hill the codebreakers of Germany, Japan, Italy and Finland also solved many important enemy cryptosystems both military and diplomatic. The German codebreakers could eavesdrop on the radio-telephone conversations of Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill, they could decode the messages of the British and US Navies during their convoy operations in the Atlantic and together with the Japanese and Finns they could solve State Department messages (both low and high level)  from embassies around the world.

The M-138-A strip cipher was the State Department’s high level system and it was used extensively in the period 1941-44. Although we still don’t know the full story the information available points to a serious compromise both of the circular traffic (Washington to all embassies) and special traffic (Washington to specific embassy) in the period 1941-44. In this area there was cooperation between Germany, Japan and Finland. The German success was made possible thanks to alphabet strips and key lists they received from the Japanese in 1941 and these were passed on by the Germans to their Finnish allies in 1942. The Finnish codebreakers solved several diplomatic links in that year and in 1943 started sharing their findings with the Japanese. German and Finnish codebreakers cooperated in the solution of the strips during the war, with visits of personnel to each country. The Axis codebreakers took advantage of mistakes in the use of the strip cipher by the State Department’s cipher unit.

Apart from diplomatic messages their success against the strip cipher also allowed them to read some OSS -Office of Strategic Services messages from the Bern station. The compromise of OSS traffic did not remain secret for long. In 1943 Allen Dulles (head of the OSS Bern station) received word from Admiral Canaris and General Schellenberg that his communications had been compromised and in addition the German officials Hans Bernd Gisevius and Fritz Kolbe showed him actual decoded US messages. It’s not clear what measures the US authorities took to protect their communications but the diplomatic traffic continued to be read by the Germans and the Finns in the period 1943-44. It seems that the US authorities attributed the German success to physical compromise (probably a spy in the embassy) and thus didn’t realize that their ciphers could be solved cryptanalytically. They would realize how wrong they were in late 1944 when more information became available on the compromise of State Department codes and ciphers.

In September 1944 Finland signed an armistice with the Soviet Union. The people in charge of the Finnish signal intelligence service anticipated this move and fearing a Soviet takeover of the country had taken measures to relocate the radio service to Sweden. This operation was called Stella Polaris (Polar Star). In late September roughly 700 people, comprising members of the intelligence services and their families were transported by ship to Sweden. The Finns had come to an agreement with the Swedish intelligence service that their people would be allowed to stay and in return the Swedes would get the Finnish crypto archives and their radio equipment. At the same time colonel Hallamaa, head of the signals intelligence service, gathered funds for the Stella Polaris group by selling the solved codes in the Finnish archives to the Americans, British and Japanese.

The Finns revealed to the American representatives that they had solved several State Department codes and could read the messages from a number of embassies including Berne (Carlson-Goldsberry report). Obviously the OSS leadership was interested in finding out whether OSS communications passing over diplomatic links were also read.

 

Unfortunately the relevant files in the OSS collection do not reveal the final outcome of this investigation.

It seems that during the same period the OSS received more concrete evidence regarding the compromise of the communications of the Bern embassy. In the US National Archives and Records Administration, RG 226 ‘Records of the Office of Strategic Services’ - Entry 123 there are intelligence reports from Bern received in late 1944. Some of them contain summaries of decoded US messages of the Bern embassy that must have come from German reports given to the OSS by members of the German Resistance (probably Gisevius and Kolbe). For example:

 

Looking at these files it seems that the OSS leadership shouldn’t have been so surprised by the Finnish disclosures. They already had enough information from their German sources to conclude that some of their traffic was read by the Axis powers. It’s not clear if this material was shown to other US agencies, as there is no mention of them in postwar reports dealing with the compromise of US codes (European Axis Signal Intelligence in World War II volumes).

Sources: NARA-RG 226-entry 123-Bern-SI-INT-29 -Box 3-File 34 ‘German intelligence, Hungary’, ‘Hitler, the Allies, and the Jews’

The compromise of the communications of General Barnwell R. Legge, US military attache to Switzerland

In the course of WWII both the Allies and the Axis powers were able to gain information of great value from reading their enemies secret communications. In Britain the codebreakers of Bletchley Park solved several enemy systems with the most important ones being the German Enigma and Tunny cipher machines and the Italian C-38m. Codebreaking played a role in the Battle of the Atlantic, the North Africa Campaign and the Normandy invasion. In the United States the Army and Navy codebreakers solved many Japanese cryptosystems and used this advantage in battle. The great victory at Midway would probably not have been possible if the Americans had not solved the Japanese Navy’s code.

On the other side of the hill the codebreakers of Germany, Japan, Italy and Finland also solved many important enemy cryptosystems both military and diplomatic. The German codebreakers could eavesdrop on the radio-telephone conversations of Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill, they could decode the messages of the British and US Navies during their convoy operations in the Atlantic and together with the Japanese and Finns they could solve State Department messages (both low and high level)  from embassies around the world.

The State Department made many mistakes in the use of its cipher systems and thus compromised not only US diplomatic communications but also the messages of other organizations that were occasionally enciphered with State Department systems, such as the Office of Strategic Services and the Office of War Information. Another similar case concerns the communications of General Barnwell R. Legge, US military attache to Switzerland during WWII.

Who was source 206?

During WWII the US Office of Strategic Services station in Bern, Switzerland (headed by Allen Dulles) recruited agents in occupied Europe and transmitted intelligence reports back to Washington. Dulles collaborated in intelligence gathering activities with Gerald Mayer, local representative of the Office of War Information and General Barnwell Legge, US military attaché to Switzerland.

Some of these reports were decoded by the Germans and the Finns and we can see that they mention specific agents.

For example message No. 73 Bern-London of 4/4/1943, by General Legge lists several German divisions stationed in France and says that the information came from Source 206. Who was this mysterious agent?

The wartime adventures of Prince Max Hohenlohe

During WWII the military forces of the Allies and the Axis battled in Europe and Asia but behind the scenes there were efforts to negotiate some sort of compromise peace. These efforts however never amounted to much since both sides distrusted each other and the military situation made it clear that the Allies could win the war through military force alone.  

Since the 1930’s a segment of German society that opposed the National-Socialist regime had tried to establish contact with foreign countries in order to topple Hitler. During the war the same groups contacted US and British officials in neutral countries and tried to gain their support in order to remove the NS regime from power. The Western Allies were aware of these efforts but they did not offer material support to the members of the German resistance.

At the same time elements of the NS regime came to realize that the war was lost and thus made cautious attempts to contact Allied officials that could promote some sort of compromise peace. Heinrich Himmler was leader of the SS security service and thus one of the most powerful men in Nazi Germany. Yet by 1943 he was beginning to realize that hopes for a successful conclusion of the war were slim. His subordinate General Walter Schellenberg, head of the foreign intelligence department of the Sicherheitsdienst, had many talks with Himmler on the need for a compromise peace and in 1943 he was able to make the first attempts at contacting Allied officials.

The Germans knew that Allen Dulles was in charge of the OSS-Office of Strategic Services station in Bern, Switzerland and they chose to contact him through people associated with the German resistance.

In early 1943 Prince Max Hohenlohe (working on behalf of the Sicherheitsdienst) was given permission to travel to Switzerland and meet Dulles. Unfortunately it doesn’t seem like their meeting remained a secret for long. In the Finnish national archives one can find the decoded version of message No 2.181 of April 7, 1943, giving an overview of their discussion.

 

The original is available from the US National Archives and Records Administration - collection RG 59.

Both the German resistance (through Admiral Canaris) and the Sicherheitsdienst (through Schellenberg) had warned Dulles that his communications were compromised but it doesn’t seem like he acted on this information. These efforts for a compromise peace were probably doomed from the start (especially since the Germans seemed to have overestimated the influence of Dulles) but even so without secure communications the talks could not have remained secret for long.