Amount of Lines that Invalidate a Document

The Gemora asks: And how much is the space that disqualifies a document?

Rav Yitzchak ben Elozar said: As much space as would be required for the writing of “lecha, lecha” above each other. [The “lamed” is a tall letter, and that should not touch the “end of chaf,” whose leg hangs low.] This indicates that he is of the opinion that the limit is two written lines and four blank spaces (for each of those words needs a blank space above for the “lamed” and a blank space below it for the “end of chaf”).

Rav Chiya bar Ammi said in the name of Ulla: As much space as would be required for the writing of a “lamed” on the top line and an “end of chaf” on the lower line. This indicates that he is of the opinion that the limit is two written lines and three blank spaces (for there is no “lamed” on the bottom line, and there is no “end of chaf” on the upper one).

Rabbi Avahu said: As much space as would be required for the writing of “Baruch ben Levi” on one line. Evidently he holds that the limit is one written line and two blank spaces (one space above for the “lamed,” and one space below for the “end of chaf”).

The commentators ask on Rabbi Avahu’s opinion: How can he maintain that the document is invalidated with one line of text and two spaces (one above and one below it) when the Gemora above clearly ruled that it is a space of two lines of text that invalidate a document!?

Some Rishonim answer that Rabbi Avahu disagrees with Chizkiyah and hold that the amount of space needed to disqualify the document is not measured according to the handwriting of the witnesses; rather, it is based upon the handwriting of the scribes. Accordingly, it is sufficient with one line of text and two empty spaces, for the scribe may manage to use the space for two lines of text with an empty space between them. According to this explanation, Rabbi Avahu agrees with the braisa above, which ruled that a space of two lines of text invalidates a document.

Tosfos Ri”d answers that Rabbi Avahu maintains that the space of two lines of text which invalidate a document is without any space above them or below them; it is referring just to the lines of text and the space between them (not like Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak). According to this interpretation, Rabbi Avahu’s amount and the ruling of the braisa are precisely identical, for one line of text with two spaces is exactly the same as two lines of text with one space between them.

The Ritv”a writes that Rabbi Avahu holds that the two lines mentioned above that invalidate a document refer to two blank spaces surrounding one line of text.

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Invalidated Contracts and Gaps in Sechach

Last Line of the Contract

Rabbi Yochanan says that a contract must review its content in the last line, and Rav Amram explained that this is because we disregard anything in the last line before the signatures.

The Rishonim explain that we fulfill this by writing vkanina – and we (the witnesses) received authorization regarding everything stated above.

The Rosh rules that if a contract does not summarize its content at the end, it does not conform to the required format of a contract, and is invalid.

The Ramban rules that it is valid, but we disregard whatever is written in the last line.

The Shulchan Aruch (HM 44:1) rules like the Ramban.

The Rishonim state that our custom is to fill in the last line with the phrase “v’hakol sharir v’kayam” - and all of this is in force and validated.

The Rashbam says that this phrase is a form of validation, and gives the line above it full legal force.

Other Rishonim disagree and state that even with our contracts, the last line has no legal validity.

Rabbeinu Tam explains the form of a get, in which we write the following last 2 lines:
v’dain etc. – this should be a contract of divorce
k’das moshe v’yisrael – as instituted by Moshe and Yisrael
Rabbeinu Tam says that the first of these lines is an integral part of the get, and not just a review of the earlier text. The last line takes the place of the validation of sharir v’kayam, and gives the preceding line legal validity.

The Rosh says that nowadays we require a contract to end with sharir v’kayam, and any contract without it is invalid. We therefore give all the preceding lines full legal validity.

The Shulchan Aruch (HM 44:9) rules like the Rosh.

See Shach (10-12, 21) for a deeper discussion of the rationale and ruling regarding sharir v’kayam.

The Gemora explains that a contract with two blank lines is invalid, since we are concerned that one will put false information in one of the blank lines.

The Ramban explains that on a contract with more than one blank line, we are concerned that there may have been more than two blank lines, and the last lines are false.

The Ri Migash says that even if we see nothing that would indicate that (no content at the end to the advantage of the creditor), the contract is invalid, since he could have forged part of the contract.

The Rema says that this is a fine on the holder of the contract, since he made forgery accessible.

1 ½ lines

The Gemora discusses whether a contract with 1 ½ blank lines before the signatures is valid or not, and resolves that it is not.

Tosfos (162b iba’ya) debates what was the case that the Gemora was discussing. Tosfos says that if the contract finished in the middle of a line, and the remainder of that line, in addition to the next line, was left blank, such a contract is clearly invalid, since the holder of the contract can fill in the space after the text of the contract. The other option is a case where the contract ended at the end of a line, a blank line was left, and the witnesses started signing half way through the next line. Tosfos says that such a case should clearly be valid, since the only line that can be filled in is the one before the signatures, and we disregard that line. Tosfos concludes that the Gemora’s question was a width of 1 ½ lines, similar to the measure of one and two lines, discussed in the braisa.

Filling in with Relatives

The Gemora cites Chizkiyah’s statement that if one filled in blank space in a contract with witnesses that are relatives to the parties, the contract is still valid.

The Rishonim debate in what context Chizkiyah made his statement. Rabbeinu Chananel says that Chizkiyah is referring to a get kereyach – a bald contract, i.e., a closed contract (mekushar), which is missing witnesses. Such a contract must be signed by three witnesses on each of its enclosures. Chizkiyah is saying that if one used relatives for the extra signatures necessary, the contract is valid.

The Mishna in Gittin (81b) records a dispute between Rabbi Akiva and Ben Nanas about this case and Chizkiyah is ruling like Rabbi Akiva, who only allows relatives to fill in the necessary signatures.

The Rashbam challenges this position, since Chizkiyah, an Amora, would not need to rule or discuss a case that was already discussed in a Mishna, nor would he need support from a braisa, since he is supported by Rabbi Akiva in a Mishna.

Rather, the Rashbam says that Chizkiyah is discussing the case of our Gemora, i.e., a contract that had too much blank space before the signatures, and is stating that if one filled in this space with related witnesses, the contract remains valid.

The Mishna in Makkos (5b) states that if a group of witnesses testify, and one is found to be invalid, the whole testimony is invalidated.

Tosfos (162b nimtza) cites different opinions regarding how to reconcile this Mishna with Chizkiyah’s statement, validating a contract in which relatives signed to fill in blank space.

The Rambam (Edus 5:6) rules that a contract with two valid witnesses is assumed valid, even if the remaining witnesses are not valid. If the witnesses are available, or if others were there, we investigate whether they signed together. If they signed together, the contract is invalid, but it is otherwise valid.

Rav Chaim Brisker explains that the Rambam considers witnesses on a contract to have two parts to their testimony – the witnessing, which takes place at signing, and the testimony, which occurs when the contract is brought to court. When a contract is brought to court, the Gemora says that witnesses signed in a contract are considered to be fully examined and accepted, and they therefore exist independently, and the invalid witnesses do not affect the valid ones’ testimony. However, if they signed together, they have joined together in their witnessing, and therefore fall under the ruling in Makkos, invalidating the contract they signed.

Invalid Schach and Gaps

Chizkiyah cites the rules for gaps in s’chach, and invalid s’chach, as a precedent for his ruling that invalid witnesses can be better than blank space in a contract.

Tosfos explains that the measures given for invalid s’chach (4 tefachim) and gaps (3 tefachim) are only in a case where these areas go from one end of the sukkah to the other, and thereby make the valid s’chach not be surrounded by three walls, or when there isn’t the minimum area of valid s’chach (7 x 7 tefachim). However, if the valid s’chach surrounds these areas, or if these areas are in a location where the valid s’chach has 3 walls around it, and there is at least 7 x7 tefachim of valid s’chach, they do not invalidate the sukkah, but only their location itself.

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Get Mekushar Bizman Hazeh

The Mishna states: A plain document - its witnesses are inside it (on the bottom). And a tied one - its witnesses are on the reverse (between one fold and the next). [They began by wring a single line or a number of lines of the essence of the document, and they folded the written part upon the part below and sewed them together. Another line or lines were written, and again the parchment was sewn down, and the procedure was repeated until the last fold. Each such fold was known as a kesher, and that is why it is called a get mekushar. The Gemora explains that the tied document type was ordained by the Rabbis primarily for gittin. They instituted it for the hot-tempered Kohen who might in a fit of anger decide to divorce his wife. Unlike any other Jew, a Kohen may not marry a divorcee, including his own ex-wife. They therefore instituted the tied deed which cannot easily be written quickly in order to allow time for the Kohen’s temper to cool. As this document type was ordained for divorce, the Rabbis also instituted it for other documents, for bills of indebtedness as well as for bills of sale so that one may choose the tied document, so as not to differentiate between bills of divorce and other documents.] A plain one whose witnesses signed on its reverse and a tied one whose witnesses signed inside it - both are invalid. Rabbi Chanania ben Gamliel says: A tied one whose witnesses signed inside it is valid, because he can make it a plain one (by not sewing the knots; and even though there are spaces between one line and the next, one need not be concerned about that, as there are many unskilled scribes who leave considerable space between one line and another). Rabban Shimon ben Gamliel says: All is in accordance with the custom of the place. A plain document requires two witnesses, while a tied document requires three witnesses. If a plain document contained one witness or a tied document contained two witnesses, they are both invalid.

According to the Ramban, the Tannaim of the Mishna disqualified even a shtar where the witnesses signed on both sides – underneath the body of the shtar as in a plain document, and on the opposite side, in the manner which is done in a tied document. The reason for this is because the “ba’al hashtar” – the owner of the document – is particular as to how the shtar should be written. If he instructed them to write it as a plain document, the signatures of the witnesses on the back side of the shtar will ruin its “openness”; and if his instructions were to make it a tied document, their signatures on the front side remove the document from being called a tied document.

The Nimukei Yosef infers that according to the Ramban, there could be room to validate a tied document nowadays. This is because it is not the custom at all to make a tied document, and it does not enter the mind of the ba’al hashtar to instruct them to make it opened and not tied.

However, he says, according to other Rishonim’s explanation of the Mishna, it would still be invalid. They explain that the reason that a plain document is invalid when the witnesses sign their names on the back is because it was not done in the manner that the Chachamim instituted; it has nothing to do with the ba’al hashtar’s instructions. Accordingly, nowadays, a document where the witnesses signed on the back will be invalid, for it is not being done according to the established practice of the Chachamim.

The Rem”a (42:1) cites both opinions regarding this.

The Shac”h understood that the Rem”a, at least in one opinion, is validating a shtar that was completely made like a tied document – meaning, the witnesses signed only on its back side. The Shac”h disagrees and holds that this would be disqualified according to everyone, for it was not done according to the established practice of the Chachamim.

The Tumim writes that this was never the intention of the Rem”a. He was only referring to a case where the witnesses signed on both sides – underneath the body of the shtar as in a plain document, and on the opposite side, in the manner which is done in a tied document.

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An Ignorant Person’s Recognition

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The Mishna had stated: If an agent (who was bringing a get) lost the get and found it immediately, it is still valid. However, if he found it after some time, it cannot be used (for we are concerned that it fell from someone else and it is not the get which he lost). If he found the get in a chafisah or in a deluskema (types of containers), or if he recognizes the get, it is valid.

Rashi explains that if the agent himself found the get (not in a container) and he recognizes it, the get is valid.

Other Rishonim understand the Mishna to mean that the get is valid if he recognizes the container.

The Rashba writes that the get will be valid if the agent found it and claims that he recognizes it. This is true even if the agent is an ignorant person. That which the Gemora says below that an ignorant person cannot be trusted that he recognizes the get is only true when someone else found it and the agent is trying to claim it from him. There, we suspect that he is lying. However, if he himself found the get, he is trusted that he recognizes it, for he has a migu (believe me what I am saying, for if I would want to lie, I could have said a better lie); he could have said that he never lost it in the first place. (The Ritva seems to say that the ignorant person is believed even without the migu.)

The Ramban writes that it is only with respect to a lost article that we do not trust an ignorant person when he claims that he recognizes it. However, with regards to a get, which is a prohibitory matter, he is trusted. (The Magid Mishnah explains that this is because one witness is believed with respect to prohibitory matters.)

There are two glaring questions on the Ramban. Firstly, the Gemora below states explicitly that to return it to someone who claims that he recognizes it by sight, it is only to a Talmudic scholar who would be trusted, but not any ordinary person!? Secondly, a get should be regarded as a davar she’b’ervah, a matter with respect to relations, and two witnesses are required for testimony involving such matters!?

The Toras Gittin answers the first question as follows: When the Gemora states that an ordinary person will not be trusted that he recognizes the get, that is only with respect to the monetary issues of the get; however, with respect to the prohibitions stemming from the get, he will be trusted.

The Maharam Schick answers the second question: The halacha is if a father said, “I accepted a kiddushin for my daughter, but I do not know from whom,” and a fellow comes to us and says that it was him, he is believed and she is married to him. The Ran explains that although ordinarily, a davar she’b’ervah requires two witnesses, here it doesn’t, for his testimony is not in contrast with any preexisting status quo; it is merely a clarification as to whom the father accepted the kiddushin from. One person is sufficient for this. So too, here, the one witness is not testifying on the divorce; rather, he is clarifying for us as to who this get belongs to.

The Oneg Yom Tov answers this question by saying that the concern for two Yosef ben Shimon’s in the same city is only a Rabbinical one, and therefore, although it is a davar she’b’ervah, only one witness is required.

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Validity of Signatures

The Mishna had stated: The witnesses sign the get to benefit the public.

The Gemora asks (Daf Yomi: Gittin 36a) : Do the witnesses only have to sign on the Get because of “Tikun Ha’Olam” – “benefiting the world?” This is a Torah law! This is evident from the verse, “And it should be written in a document and signed!”

Rabbah says: The Mishna’s statement is needed according to Rabbi Elozar, who holds that the witnesses for the giving of the document cause the document to take effect. Even according to him, Chazal instituted that witnesses should also sign the Get because of tikun ha’olam. This is because there are times when the witnesses of the giving of the Get might have died or went overseas (and at least the witnesses signed will be able to contradict the ex-husband in case he claims that he did not divorce her).

Rav Yosef says: Even according to Rabbi Meir (who holds that the witnesses for the giving of the document cause the document to take effect), they decreed that witnesses should specify their names in a Get, due to tikun ha’olam. This is as the braisa states: Originally, people would sign, “I, So-and-so (without writing his name), have signed as a witness.” If there was a different document with the same handwriting that was verified to be authentic, this document would also be valid. If not, it is not valid. Rabban Gamliel said: They made a great decree when they instituted that witnesses should specify their names in a Get, due to tikun ha’olam.

The mefarshim ask on the Rambam in Hilchos Edus (3:4), who states that the requirement for witnesses to sign on a document is only mi’divrei sofrim (a Rabbinical obligation). The Gemora expressly states that this is a Biblical requirement!?

The Megillas Sefer answers that when the Gemora states that it is Biblically required, it is not being completely accurate, for the verse where this obligation is derived from is a verse in Yirmiyah. The Gemora only meant to ask that from the Mishna it would seem that the witnesses sign only because of Rabban Gamliel’s decree, when in truth, this was established generations beforehand!

The Pnei Yehoshua answers that it is only a Biblical requirement according to Rabbi Meir, who holds that the witnesses who sign the document are those who render it effective. However, the Rambam rules in accordance with Rabbi Elozar, who holds that the witnesses who observe the delivery of the document are those who render it effective. Therefore, the Rambam writes that the signatures are only a Rabbinical requirement.

The Nesivos Hamishpat, Chasam Sofer and others answer that the Rambam is only referring to proof documents, since the witnesses are obligated to testify in Beis Din so that the judges will have the ability to cross examine them. Testimony is valid only from the mouths of the witnesses, but not on the basis of any documents or writings. However, regarding a document that is made to affect something, either a marriage, divorce, sale etc., the Rambam will agree that the signatures of the witnesses are Biblically required.

Reb Chaim Brisker adds that a document, like a get, which later will be used as proof that the woman got divorced can still be Biblically valid. For once the document rendered an effect, it is as if it has been investigated in Beis Din, and would not any longer be disqualified because of the rule that testimony must come from their mouths and not from their writings.

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Rashi's Retraction

The Mishna states: If one says, “Give a get to my wife,” or he says, “Give an emancipation document to my slave,” and he died, the documents should not be given after his death.

Rashi notes that our Mishna should not read, “Give this get to my wife,” or “Give this emancipation document to my slave,” rather, he merely said, “Give a get to my wife,” or “Give an emancipation document to my slave.” He instructed the agents to do so, but he did not actually give them the document. If he would have handed the document to the agents, the Chachamim would hold that the emancipation is effective immediately, for they maintain that it is advantageous for a slave to gain his freedom and the agents can acquire the document for him.

Tosfos (9b) points out that here, Rashi, is retracting from a position he took above. Rashi had stated that when the agents acquire the document for the slave, the slave does not gain his freedom at that time. He becomes free when the document is delivered into his hands. The acquisition of the document accomplishes that the master may not retract any longer. Here, Rashi says that if the agents would acquire the document, the slave’s emancipation would be effective immediately.

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Migu with an Impaired Document

The Mishna (Kesuvos 87a) had stated: If a woman impairs her kesuvah (she admitted that a portion of it was paid), she can only collect the remaining portion if she takes an oath that the complete kesuvah has not been paid.

The Shitah Mekubetzes cites Rabbeinu Yonah, who asks the following question: Why is it necessary for her to take an oath? Shouldn’t she be believed with a migu; “Believe me that I was only paid in part, for if I would want to lie, I could have said that I wasn’t paid at all”?

He answers: There is a principle that we do not believe someone with a migu to extract money from someone else. Secondly, we do not apply the principle of migu to exempt someone from taking an oath.

The Ketzos Hachoshen (82:10) asks: There are several Rishonim who maintain that we do apply the principle of migu to extract money in cases when a legal document is present; since her kesuvah document is intact, let us use the migu to collect the remaining portion of her kesuvah?

He answers: Since the woman admitted that the kesuvah is impaired, she will no longer be allowed to collect from encumbered properties (even from the portion that has not been collected). Only a valid document that has the ability to collect from encumbered properties can assist a migu to extract money. This document will not help her in this respect and therefore, she is compelled to take an oath.

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