Speech: Dutch Minister of Defence on European defence cooperation

Speech by the Minister of Defence, J.A. Hennis‐Plasschaert, at the European Parliament (SEDE) on 5 November 2013

Dear MEPs,

Dear former colleagues,

It is a great pleasure to be here today. As some of you know, I was a member of this house for six years. I left the European Parliament in 2010. Being here again brings back fond memories.

Long before my time as an MEP, I spent a few years in Riga (Latvia) as a civil servant of the European Commission. Latvia was still a candidate member state at the time. A country struggling to make the transition. And living in Latvia made me realize – more than ever before – that liberty, security and prosperity can never be taken for granted. I came to the conclusion that a free and safe environment – such as the one I grew up in – is never self‐evident. That it is worth fighting for, every single day.

Years later, that understanding struck me even more on one of my trips to Belarus to visit the opposition. Let me rephrase that: I went to Belarus in an attempt to visit the opposition, for as soon as I arrived I was interrogated and denied entry by Lukashenko and his people. This incident strengthened my belief that Europe has a key role to play in securing and defending democratic values in other countries. I sincerely hope that your committees are still actively supporting the fight for democracy in Belarus.

Stability and democracy in countries such as Belarus not only benefit the citizens of those countries, they are also very much in Europe’s interest.

For by now, we all surely agree that events in other parts of the world (close to our boarders or far away) have a direct impact on our own security and prosperity.

Clearly, European involvement in conflict regions serves not only to curb terrorism, but also to secure our trading routes, for example, as well as access to raw materials that are vital to our industry. So, for this reason too, Europe cannot afford to turn its back on the fires burning in other regions.

And fires are indeed burning around the world, ladies and gentlemen, constantly shifting and taking us by surprise as the wind abruptly changes direction or speed. The global geopolitical landscape is in a state of flux: the balance of power is shifting, and new actors are gaining influence. As a result, the world has become more complex and less predictable. I would go so far as to say that nowadays, uncertainty is the most important feature in international relations.

And I am convinced that in this complex global setting, Europe can only deal with current and emerging threats if we work together. The need for a more active, more coherent and more capable European Union in the field of security and defence is urgent. We must carry our share of the burden, including the risks. This would also send a clear signal to the United States, our indispensable partner in European security for over 65 years.

In the past, there were those who argued that a strong Europe in the field of security and defence would harm NATO. I am convinced, however, that a strong Europe will only benefit NATO and reinforce the transatlantic bond. Obviously, we should not aim for duplication of what is being done effectively under NATO. Nor should we strive to decouple ourselves from the US. We need to ensure complementarity, cooperation and coordination.

And that is why our Heads of State and Government must not miss the opportunity to send a strong message at December’s European Council meeting that security and defence do matter! We must position Europe to become a credible provider of security, in its immediate region and beyond.

Today, just weeks away from that important European Council meeting, we have to ask ourselves whether or not we are on the right track. I believe we are. But at the same time I would like to emphasize the need for stepping up our efforts.

It is time to take our cooperation to the next level.

And this holds in particular for our military cooperation. Given that financial austerity will remain an issue for all of us in the years to come, it makes sense to join forces to achieve the economies of scale that will enable us to boost our military effectiveness. Besides, we should always spend our taxpayers’ money wisely.
But most importantly, Europe’s military shortfalls – identified by NATO as well as the EU – can only be fixed if we develop joint approaches. And this means closer political cooperation. EU Member States should not be counteracting each other, but rather complementing each other. If we want to enhance our ability to act, this is the only way to do it. Only then can we say that we are truly committed to the Common Security and Defence Policy. Only then can Europe become a credible provider of security. And only then will Europe be a reliable and capable ally.

This is not the prelude to a European army, nor a NATO army. Member States or combinations of Member States will have to provide Europe with the military means to act. This means that each and every European nation is both indispensable to and responsible for European security. As the famous quote goes, it is “All for one and one for all”.

The next steps we need to take are outlined in Lady Ashton’s recent report, which reflects the consensus that has emerged on the areas, or clusters, we need to focus on in order to further strengthen the CSDP. The report rightly notes that Europe still lacks the capabilities as well as the coherence to take on more responsibility.

Another good thing about the report is that it is pragmatic and concrete, making optimal use of mechanisms that are already in place. And I wholeheartedly agree with such an approach. Let me be frank: we do not need more headquarters, more civil servants or more bureaucracy. What we do need is leadership, long‐term commitment and courage. A pragmatic bottom‐up approach enabled by top‐down guidance.

Now let me comment on some aspects of the report.

To start with, the comprehensive approach. The Netherlands strongly supports the call for a more coherent use of the various EU instruments. This is the only way to secure sustainable peace and stability in failing states. I hope the High Representative and the Commission will come up with the expected Joint Communication very soon.

Moving on to the EU Battle Groups. I have repeatedly stated: use them or lose them. Of course, the Battle Groups have been – and still are – instrumental in helping to reinforce the interoperability and effectiveness of Member States’ armed forces. However, they have yet to be deployed.

I am convinced the EU Battle Groups are not been used to their full potential. They could, for instance, be deployed at the beginning of an EU Training Mission, providing force protection. Why not use forces that are well‐trained and available for EU operations?

Decision‐making is cumbersome and takes too long. This can be remedied by holding regular political consultations in which emerging crises and likely scenarios are discussed. Such consultations would help prepare the ground for swift decision‐making when needed.

The five countries contributing to this year’s UK‐led EU Battle Group are Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Sweden and, obviously, the UK. These countries recently made a number of suggestions to speed things up. These include holding exercises in EU‐wide political decision‐making, a regular Battle Group certification process as well as fixed planning scenarios.

I truly hope that we can arrive at some clear conclusions during the Defence ministers’ meeting in mid‐November. And I would welcome specifics on this in the Council’s Conclusions.

Now, the enhancement of capability development should, in my view, be considered the centrepiece of the report. I repeat: Europe’s military shortfalls can only be fixed by developing joint approaches.

Lady Ashton’s report very rightly states that Member States should share their capability plans. And that also means breaking new ground with respect to planning, acquisition, training and logistical support. It means that we must align our collective requirements and national priorities. If we are serious about preventing further gaps in essential military capabilities in Europe, we should end the current practice of making military investments in splendid national isolation.

I firmly believe European cooperation in the field of capability development is no longer a choice or a nice‐to‐have but a necessity. It is therefore also important that Member States act in line with the Code of Conduct on Pooling & Sharing and commit themselves to the delivery of key capabilities through major cooperative projects. This would allow us to create capabilities in an efficient manner
while increasing military effectiveness at the same time. And of course, we need to remain fully interoperable – not only with European allies and partners but also with the US.

Should the 28 Member States always act in unison? My answer would be no. As I have said, a bottom‐up approach enabled by top‐down guidance is the way forward.

As noted in Lady Ashton’s report, it is natural that cooperation is deepening in smaller groups. This will yield faster results than initiatives involving all 28 Member States. The good thing is that the capabilities developed in smaller groups can be used at the European level and can inspire other Member States to undertake similar initiatives. The cooperation achieved by smaller groups could also be opened up to other Member States at a later stage.

My country’s cooperation with Belgium, for example, has resulted in fully integrated navies. The Netherlands is also cooperating with Germany in a joint German‐Netherlands Army Corps with a permanent headquarters. And there is much more to come. Last week I signed a letter of intent with my Belgian counterpart on integrated air policing, including Quick Reaction Alert and national Renegade tasks. Now that is a perfect example of broadening cooperation in the area of defence by pooling and sharing resources. And there is also the UK‐NL amphibious force. These are just a few examples from a long list of cooperation initiatives.

Dear Members of the European Parliament,

A crucial aspect of closer European cooperation is the understanding that such cooperation can only be effective if partner nations are trustworthy and predictable in their responses. Saying ‘yes’ to military cooperation means saying ‘yes’ to military participation. Reliable partners do not pull back their shared capabilities at the last minute. It would create political havoc and could threaten military partnerships.

This understanding, however, has yet to be generally accepted. It is therefore essential that the members of this house but also the members of our national parliaments become truly engaged in this debate.

And this is where your committees could play an important role, for example by facilitating regular political consultations between parliaments. I am convinced that a structural dialogue will be of added value to political decision‐making in the EU Member States.

When it comes to enhancing our strength, to maximizing the use of our capabilities and to optimizing our joint operations…all of us should feel ownership. And for continued public support, all of us should be ‘on message’.

However, closer military cooperation is still perceived by many as a constraint on sovereignty and national control. And as a result, we are all too often undermining our efficiency and effectiveness. The bottom line is that if we want to protect our sovereignty through military means, cooperation is indispensable. And when we consider our armed forces working effectively within the EU and within NATO, enhancing our ability to act in times of crises…we can only conclude that closer European cooperation is not a constraint but rather an enhancement of our sovereignty and security.

In closing, I would point out that our armed forces are well aware that there is a strong case for greater European cooperation in the field of security and defence. They understand the need for Europe to become a credible provider of security, in its immediate region and beyond. It is at the political level that we find obstacles to closer cooperation. But I repeat, the need for a more active, more coherent and more capable EU in the field of security and defence is urgent.

So let us act accordingly. And I do hope that this house will spread the word too.

Thank you!

(NLD ministry of Defence, 5 November 2013)

Beyond the Post-Cold War World

Stratfor
By George Friedman
Founder and Chairman

An era ended when the Soviet Union collapsed on Dec. 31, 1991. The confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union defined the Cold War period. The collapse of Europe framed that confrontation. After World War II, the Soviet and American armies occupied Europe. Both towered over the remnants of Europe's forces. The collapse of the European imperial system, the emergence of new states and a struggle between the Soviets and Americans for domination and influence also defined the confrontation. There were, of course, many other aspects and phases of the confrontation, but in the end, the Cold War was a struggle built on Europe's decline.

Many shifts in the international system accompanied the end of the Cold War. In fact, 1991 was an extraordinary and defining year. The Japanese economic miracle ended. China after Tiananmen Square inherited Japan's place as a rapidly growing, export-based economy, one defined by the continued pre-eminence of the Chinese Communist Party. The Maastricht Treaty was formulated, creating the structure of the subsequent European Union. A vast coalition dominated by the United States reversed the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.

Three things defined the post-Cold War world. The first was U.S. power. The second was the rise of China as the center of global industrial growth based on low wages. The third was the re-emergence of Europe as a massive, integrated economic power. Meanwhile, Russia, the main remnant of the Soviet Union, reeled while Japan shifted to a dramatically different economic mode.

The post-Cold War world had two phases. The first lasted from Dec. 31, 1991, until Sept. 11, 2001. The second lasted from 9/11 until now.

The initial phase of the post-Cold War world was built on two assumptions. The first assumption was that the United States was the dominant political and military power but that such power was less significant than before, since economics was the new focus. The second phase still revolved around the three Great Powers -- the United States, China and Europe -- but involved a major shift in the worldview of the United States, which then assumed that pre-eminence included the power to reshape the Islamic world through military action while China and Europe single-mindedly focused on economic matters.

The Three Pillars of the International System
In this new era, Europe is reeling economically and is divided politically. The idea of Europe codified in Maastricht no longer defines Europe. Like the Japanese economic miracle before it, the Chinese economic miracle is drawing to a close and Beijing is beginning to examine its military options. The United States is withdrawing from Afghanistan and reconsidering the relationship between global pre-eminence and global omnipotence. Nothing is as it was in 1991.

Europe primarily defined itself as an economic power, with sovereignty largely retained by its members but shaped by the rule of the European Union. Europe tried to have it all: economic integration and individual states. But now this untenable idea has reached its end and Europe is fragmenting. One region, including Germany, Austria, the Netherlands and Luxembourg, has low unemployment. The other region on the periphery has high or extraordinarily high unemployment.

Germany wants to retain the European Union to protect German trade interests and because Berlin properly fears the political consequences of a fragmented Europe. But as the creditor of last resort, Germany also wants to control the economic behavior of the EU nation-states. Berlin does not want to let off the European states by simply bailing them out. If it bails them out, it must control their budgets. But the member states do not want to cede sovereignty to a German-dominated EU apparatus in exchange for a bailout.

In the indebted peripheral region, Cyprus has been treated with particular economic savagery as part of the bailout process. Certainly, the Cypriots acted irresponsibly. But that label applies to all of the EU members, including Germany, who created an economic plant so vast that it could not begin to consume what it produces -- making the country utterly dependent on the willingness of others to buy German goods. There are thus many kinds of irresponsibility. How the European Union treats irresponsibility depends upon the power of the nation in question. Cyprus, small and marginal, has been crushed while larger nations receive more favorable treatment despite their own irresponsibility.

It has been said by many Europeans that Cyprus should never have been admitted to the European Union. That might be true, but it was admitted -- during the time of European hubris when it was felt that mere EU membership would redeem any nation. Now, Europe can no longer afford pride, and it is every nation for itself. Cyprus set the precedent that the weak will be crushed. It serves as a lesson to other weakening nations, a lesson that over time will transform the European idea of integration and sovereignty. The price of integration for the weak is high, and all of Europe is weak in some way.

In such an environment, sovereignty becomes sanctuary. It is interesting to watch Hungary ignore the European Union as Budapest reconstructs its political system to be more sovereign -- and more authoritarian -- in the wider storm raging around it. Authoritarian nationalism is an old European cure-all, one that is re-emerging, since no one wants to be the next Cyprus.

I have already said much about China, having argued for several years that China's economy couldn't possibly continue to expand at the same rate. Leaving aside all the specific arguments, extraordinarily rapid growth in an export-oriented economy requires economic health among its customers. It is nice to imagine expanded domestic demand, but in a country as impoverished as China, increasing demand requires revolutionizing life in the interior. China has tried this many times. It has never worked, and in any case China certainly couldn't make it work in the time needed. Instead, Beijing is maintaining growth by slashing profit margins on exports. What growth exists is neither what it used to be nor anywhere near as profitable. That sort of growth in Japan undermined financial viability as money was leant to companies to continue exporting and employing people -- money that would never be repaid.

It is interesting to recall the extravagant claims about the future of Japan in the 1980s. Awestruck by growth rates, Westerners did not see the hollowing out of the financial system as growth rates were sustained by cutting prices and profits. Japan's miracle seemed to be eternal. It wasn't, and neither is China's. And China has a problem that Japan didn't: a billion impoverished people. Japan exists, but behaves differently than it did before; the same is happening to China.

Both Europe and China thought about the world in the post-Cold War period similarly. Each believed that geopolitical questions and even questions of domestic politics could be suppressed and sometimes even ignored. They believed this because they both thought they had entered a period of permanent prosperity. 1991-2008 was in fact a period of extraordinary prosperity, one that both Europe and China simply assumed would never end and one whose prosperity would moot geopolitics and politics.

Periods of prosperity, of course, always alternate with periods of austerity, and now history has caught up with Europe and China. Europe, which had wanted union and sovereignty, is confronting the political realities of EU unwillingness to make the fundamental and difficult decisions on what union really meant. For its part, China wanted to have a free market and a communist regime in a region it would dominate economically. Its economic climax has left it with the question of whether the regime can survive in an uncontrolled economy, and what its regional power would look like if it weren't prosperous.

And the United States has emerged from the post-Cold War period with one towering lesson: However attractive military intervention is, it always looks easier at the beginning than at the end. The greatest military power in the world has the ability to defeat armies. But it is far more difficult to reshape societies in America's image. A Great Power manages the routine matters of the world not through military intervention, but through manipulating the balance of power. The issue is not that America is in decline. Rather, it is that even with the power the United States had in 2001, it could not impose its political will -- even though it had the power to disrupt and destroy regimes -- unless it was prepared to commit all of its power and treasure to transforming a country like Afghanistan. And that is a high price to pay for Afghan democracy.

The United States has emerged into the new period with what is still the largest economy in the world with the fewest economic problems of the three pillars of the post-Cold War world. It has also emerged with the greatest military power. But it has emerged far more mature and cautious than it entered the period. There are new phases in history, but not new world orders. Economies rise and fall, there are limits to the greatest military power and a Great Power needs prudence in both lending and invading.

A New Era Begins
Eras unfold in strange ways until you suddenly realize they are over. For example, the Cold War era meandered for decades, during which U.S.-Soviet detentes or the end of the Vietnam War could have seemed to signal the end of the era itself. Now, we are at a point where the post-Cold War model no longer explains the behavior of the world. We are thus entering a new era. I don't have a good buzzword for the phase we're entering, since most periods are given a label in hindsight. (The interwar period, for example, got a name only after there was another war to bracket it.) But already there are several defining characteristics to this era we can identify.

First, the United States remains the world's dominant power in all dimensions. It will act with caution, however, recognizing the crucial difference between pre-eminence and omnipotence.

Second, Europe is returning to its normal condition of multiple competing nation-states. While Germany will dream of a Europe in which it can write the budgets of lesser states, the EU nation-states will look at Cyprus and choose default before losing sovereignty.

Third, Russia is re-emerging. As the European Peninsula fragments, the Russians will do what they always do: fish in muddy waters. Russia is giving preferential terms for natural gas imports to some countries, buying metallurgical facilities in Hungary and Poland, and buying rail terminals in Slovakia. Russia has always been economically dysfunctional yet wielded outsized influence -- recall the Cold War. The deals they are making, of which this is a small sample, are not in their economic interests, but they increase Moscow's political influence substantially.

Fourth, China is becoming self-absorbed in trying to manage its new economic realities. Aligning the Communist Party with lower growth rates is not easy. The Party's reason for being is prosperity. Without prosperity, it has little to offer beyond a much more authoritarian state.

And fifth, a host of new countries will emerge to supplement China as the world's low-wage, high-growth epicenter. Latin America, Africa and less-developed parts of Southeast Asia are all emerging as contenders.

Relativity in the Balance of Power
There is a paradox in all of this. While the United States has committed many errors, the fragmentation of Europe and the weakening of China mean the United States emerges more powerful, since power is relative. It was said that the post-Cold War world was America's time of dominance. I would argue that it was the preface of U.S. dominance. Its two great counterbalances are losing their ability to counter U.S. power because they mistakenly believed that real power was economic power. The United States had combined power -- economic, political and military -- and that allowed it to maintain its overall power when economic power faltered.

A fragmented Europe has no chance at balancing the United States. And while China is reaching for military power, it will take many years to produce the kind of power that is global, and it can do so only if its economy allows it to. The United States defeated the Soviet Union in the Cold War because of its balanced power. Europe and China defeated themselves because they placed all their chips on economics. And now we enter the new era.

Beyond the Post-Cold War World is republished with permission of Stratfor.

(Stratfor, 2 April 2013)

Dutch Defence Minister: The EU Must Take the Initiative

“Not only must we tackle the pirates at sea, when they are ready to strike, but also on land, where their criminal networks are based. In that way, we – and not the pirates – will gain the initiative”, argued Minister of Defence Hans Hillen in Brussels during a meeting with his European Union counterparts on 22 March 2012.

The EU-ministers were meeting to receive an update on Operation Atalanta, the counter-piracy mission off the coast of Somalia. The operation has been extended to the end of 2014 and the Netherlands is considering making a further contribution. A letter on the matter will be sent to the House of Representatives in the near future.

Private security
The Minister expressed his concerns to his colleagues regarding the discussion about allowing private security teams on board merchant ships. “It is my firm conviction that the armed protection of commercial shipping off the coast of Somalia is a matter for the armed forces.” For that reason, the Minister has assigned the Royal Netherlands Navy the task of protecting between 50 and 100 ships per year. “That is a large enough number to cover the protection of vulnerable ships sailing under the Dutch flag. The armed forces can certainly do it and it is one of the government’s core tasks. The navy was originally established to guarantee freedom of the seas, and it is still capable of doing so. Giving up the monopoly on the use of force and allowing privatisation of this task is a recipe for disaster.”

More tanker aircraft
The talks in Brussels centred on the progress of European Defence cooperation, so that the EU will be able to present a concrete contribution at the NATO summit, to be held in Chicago in May.

The talks also moved onto the shortage of tanker aircraft, which was recently highlighted during the conflict in Libya. The European fleet currently numbers about 40 of such aircraft, whereas the US has approximately 650 tanker aircraft at its disposal. France and the European Defence Agency took the initiative for European cooperation in this matter, which affords the prospect of a future role for European Air Transport Command at Eindhoven Air Base. The Netherlands fully wishes to participate, also in view of the fact that 2 Dutch tanker aircraft could be replaced after 2020.

Combined field hospital
Mr Hillen also signed a declaration of intent for the development of a rapidly deployable field hospital. 12 countries are participating in the project, which is under Italian leadership. The Netherlands is also prepared to play a bigger part in a forensic laboratory, to be set up in Afghanistan under French command. The laboratory will be used to gather intelligence on the use of IEDs, which will in turn be used to uncover and disrupt the networks supporting the bomb makers.

(Ministry of Defence, The Netherlands,  29 March 2012)

EU Operations Centre to support CSDP missions in the Horn of Africa

The Council today activated the EU Operations Centre in support of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions in the Horn of Africa. This is the first activation of the EU Operations Centre.

The Operations Centre will coordinate and increase synergies between the three CSDP actions in the Horn of Africa. The EU is currently conducting two military operations – EUNAVFOR Atalanta, which fights piracy off the Somali coast, and EUTM Somalia, which contributes to the training of Somali security forces. It has also started operational planning for a civilian mission to strengthen maritime capacities in the region (RMCB).

The Operations Centre will provide direct support to the operations commander for the planning and conduct of the RMCB mission and facilitate coordination between EUTM and Operation Atalanta and their interaction with Brussels-based structures. If requested, it will also support strategic planning for CSDP missions and operations in the Horn of Africa.

The Operations Centre will not have command responsibility, but will fully respect the existing chains of command. It will include some EU military staff, the Brussels-based support cell for the EU training mission in Somalia, the liaison team of Operation Atalanta in Brussels as well as staff seconded by member states.

The head of the EU Operations Centre will be Captain Ad van der Linde (Netherlands).The Operations Centre, which was created in 2003, will be active for an initial duration of two years. Its activities and financing will be regularly reviewed.

(bron: Raad van de Europese Unie, 23 maart 2012)