Showing posts with label global price fixing conspiracy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label global price fixing conspiracy. Show all posts

Tuesday, July 10, 2012

Jury Finds Toshiba Conspired to Fix Prices for TFT-LCD Panels

This posting was written by Jeffrey May, Editor of CCH Trade Regulation Reporter.

A federal jury in San Francisco on July 3 found Toshiba Corporation liable for participating in a global price fixing conspiracy in the market for Thin Film Transistor Liquid Crystal Display (TFT-LCD) panels. An $87 million verdict in favor of direct purchasers of TFT-LCD panels was entered against the company.

The private class action followed a Department of Justice Antitrust Division investigation into the industry. A number of TFT-LCD producers have pleaded guilty to federal antitrust charges, and many have settled the class action claims. The U.S. government has not charged Toshiba with any antitrust violations. TFT-LCD panels are used in a number of products, including but not limited to computer monitors, laptop computers, and televisions.

Toshiba issued a statement on July 4, saying that it “believes that the jury’s verdict is in error as to the finding of wrongdoing on Toshiba’s part.” The company has consistently maintained that there has been “no illegal activity on its part in the LCD business in the United States.” The statement noted that, given credits for settlements by other defendants, Toshiba did not expect to pay any damages as a result of the verdict, even after trebling, which would amount to $261 million.

According to Richard Heimann of Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein, LLP, co-lead trial counsel for plaintiffs, settlements had been reached with ten other defendant manufacturers for a combined value of $430 million. Toshiba was the only defendant to proceed to trial.

A special verdict asked the jury to unanimously determine whether the plaintiffs proved by a preponderance of the evidence:


• That Toshiba knowingly participated in a conspiracy to fix prices of TFT-LCD panels;

• That the conspiracy involved TFT-LCD panels and/or finished products (notebook computers, computer monitors and televisions containing TFT-LCD panels) imported into the United States;

• That the conspiracy produced substantial intended effects in the United States;

• That the conspiracy involved conduct which had a direct, substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect on trade or commerce in the United States; and

• That members of the two separate classes of direct purchasers were injured as a result of the conspiracy and the amount of damages suffered as a result of that injury.
The case is In re: TFT-LCD (Flat Panel) Antitrust Litigation, MDL No. 1827.

Wednesday, February 08, 2012

Classes Certified to Pursue Antitrust Claims Against Chinese Vitamin Makers

This posting was written by Jeffrey May, Editor of CCH Trade Regulation Reporter.

The federal district court in Brooklyn, New York, has certified two classes of vitamin C purchasers to pursue claims against Chinese manufacturers for conspiring to fix prices and limit the output of vitamin C exported to the United States.

A proposed class of at least 139 entities that purchased vitamin C directly from the manufacturers was certified to seek treble damages. In addition, a class including both direct and indirect purchasers of vitamin C was certified under Rule 23(b) (2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to seek injunctive relief.

Common Issues

The manufacturers did not deny that the alleged conspiracy's existence and effect were the chief issues in the case and could be demonstrated through generalized proof. The court rejected the manufacturers’ arguments that common issues did not predominate because a class representative—an assignee of a direct purchaser of vitamin C—had "many individual issues not shared with other members of the class."

A plaintiff’s status as an assignee did not prevent it from representing the direct-purchaser damages class. Although the assignee never bought any vitamin C, it purchased the antitrust claim from a direct purchaser for $100. Contrary to the manufacturers’ assertion, there was no rule prohibiting the assignment of class membership. Antitrust claims were generally assignable, the court noted. In addition, an assignee of an antitrust claim stood before the court ""in the shoes of" its assignor."

Although the assignee’s lawyers also represented the class seeking injunctive relief, the assignee could still represent the damages class. The interests of the two classes did not conflict, and the assignee’s lawyers would not have to choose between them. The court also rejected as irrelevant the manufacturers’ arguments that the assignee was atypical of the class because it never purchased any vitamin C and because the company whose claim it was pursuing had been out of the vitamin C business for years.

A company that purchased vitamin C from a wholly-owned subsidiary of one of the defendants rather than a defendant itself could not represent the direct-purchaser damages class, the court ruled. A class representative was not "adequate" unless it was a member of the class it purported to represent.

The fact that the subsidiary was wholly owned did not permit the plaintiffs to invoke the "ownership or control" exception to the Illinois Brick direct purchaser doctrine. In an earlier ruling, the court dismissed the claims against the subsidiary, because the subsidiary never became a party to the conspiratorial agreements at issue.

Injunctive Relief

The court rejected the manufacturers’ arguments that there were debilitating conflicts of interest that prevented certification of an injunctive relief class. The class representative’s past and prospective purchases of vitamin C at artificially inflated prices constituted antitrust injury regardless of whether it could recoup the overcharge by passing it along to remote purchasers. The artificially increased prices caused by the alleged price fixing amounted to a "common impact" to warrant certification under Rule 23(b)(2).

Membership in the Rule 23(b) (2) class did not bar the indirect purchasers' subsequent claims for damages. The right of the indirect purchasers to maintain their damages claims in subsequent proceedings was expressly reserved notwithstanding their participation in the injunction class, the court noted.

Foreign Sovereign Compulsion Defense

Because the manufacturers’ price fixing was not compelled by Chinese law, dismissal of the claims on comity grounds was not justified, the court ruled. Abstention on comity grounds may be warranted where foreign sovereign compulsion creates a true conflict. The fact that a foreign government compels certain activity ordinarily indicates that the activity implicates its “most significant interests.”

However, an assertion in an amicus brief of compulsion by the Ministry of Commerce of the People's Republic of China—the highest authority in China authorized to regulate foreign trade—appeared to be a post-hoc attempt to shield the manufacturers' conduct from antitrust scrutiny rather than a complete and straightforward explanation of Chinese law.

Although the Ministry encouraged the cartel, those policy preferences did not establish that Chinese law “required” the manufacturers to follow their anti-competitive predilections. The manufacturers did not meet the burden of proof for the foreign sovereign compulsion defense, and their motion for summary judgment based upon that defense and the related doctrines of comity and act of state were denied.

The case is In re Vitamin C Antitrust Litigation, 2012-1 Trade Cases ¶77,779; ¶77,780; ¶77,781.

Monday, December 05, 2011

Seventh Circuit to Rehear Potash Price Fixing Conspiracy Claim

This posting was written by Jeffrey May, Editor of CCH Trade Regulation Reporter.

The U.S. Court of Appeals in Chicago, sitting en banc, will rehear a case brought by purchasers of potash, alleging a global price fixing conspiracy among producers.

A three-judge panel of the court had rejected the claims on the ground that the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act (FTAIA) applied to bar the suit (2011-2 Trade Cases ¶77,611). The panel’s opinion and judgment were vacated on December 2.

The panel had concluded that the assertion that the defendants “conspired to coordinate potash prices and price increases so as to fix, raise, maintain, and stabilize the price at which potash was sold in the United States at artificially inflated and anticompetitive levels” was wholly conclusory and insufficient to satisfy the pleading standards established by the U.S. Supreme Court in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly (2007-1 Trade Cases ¶76,785).

The complaint purportedly described anticompetitive conduct aimed at the potash markets in Brazil, China, and India—not the U.S. import market.

The rehearing order is Minn-Chem, Inc.v. Agrium Inc., December 2, 2011.

Twombly-Iqbal Standard “a Mess”

In a posting on the Wolters Kluwer Antitrust Connect blog, Christopher L. Sagers, Professor at Cleveland-Marshall College of Law, wrote that there is a growing consensus that the Twombly-Iqbal standard “is a mess,” having destabilized the our entire system of civil litigation and adopting a pleading system foreign to fundamental procedural principles.

The en banc order in this case is very welcome, wrote Sagers, since the three-judge panel’s opinion exempted from antitrust challenge a conspiracy “that was alleged to have caused billions of dollars in consumer injury, even while acknowledging plaintiffs had adequately alleged a worldwide conspiracy to inflate potash prices, had supported their claims with elaborate plus-factors pleading, and had alleged that contemporaneously with the conspiracy potash prices in the United States increased by six hundred percent.”

The blog posting appears here on the Antitrust Connect blog.

Wednesday, October 05, 2011





Global Price Fixing Conspiracy Claim Barred by Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act

This posting was written by Darius Sturmer, Editor of CCH Trade Regulation Reporter.

Federal antitrust claims asserted by direct and indirect purchasers of potash—alleging a global price fixing conspiracy among producers—were beyond the subject matter jurisdiction of a federal court in Illinois, the U.S. Court of Appeals in Chicago has ruled.

The Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act (FTAIA) applied to bar the suit regardless of whether the FTAIA was construed to state a jurisdictional requirement or an element of the plaintiffs’ Sherman Act claim. A federal district court’s refusal to dismiss the suit on jurisdictional or pleading grounds was vacated and remanded.

Import Commerce, Direct Effects

The lower court found that FTAIA’s "import commerce" exception applied because the defendants’ importation of potash and purported conspiracy to fix the price of potash globally created a sufficiently tight nexus between the alleged illegal conduct and the defendants’ import activities.

The lower court’s reasoning essentially conflated the FTAIA’s "import commerce" exception and its "direct effects" exception, the appellate court explained. If foreign anticompetitive conduct were deemed to involve U.S. import commerce even if directed entirely at markets overseas, then the "direct effects" exception would be effectively rendered meaningless.

Reading the FTAIA to mean that a foreign company doing any import business in the United States would violate the Sherman Act whenever it entered a joint-selling arrangement overseas—regardless of its impact on the American market— "would produce the very interference with foreign economic activity that the FTAIA seeks to prevent," according to the appellate court.

The complaint contained no factual allegations to support application of the import commerce exception, the appellate court said. Its specific allegations described anticompetitive conduct aimed at the potash markets in Brazil, China, and India—not the U.S. import market.

The general assertion that the defendants "conspired to coordinate potash prices and price increases so as to fix, raise, maintain, and stabilize the price at which potash was sold in the United States at artificially inflated and anticompetitive levels" was wholly conclusory and insufficient to satisfy the pleading standards established by the U.S. Supreme Court in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly (2007-1 Trade Cases ¶75,709) and Ashcroft v. Iqbal (2009-2 Trade Cases ¶76,785).

Overseas, Domestic Prices

Moreover, the connection asserted in the complaint between the alleged cartelized prices of potash overseas and the domestic price of potash was too speculative and indirect to state an actionable claim under the FTAIA’s "direct effects" exception, the court stated. The complaint’s general allusion to a link between the prices in the Brazilian, Chinese, and Indian markets and American potash prices was insufficient on its own to permit a plausible inference of direct effects.

The "cryptic" chain-of-events allegation offered by the plaintiffs relied on too many intervening variables to support application of the direct effects exception.

The decision is Minn-Chem, Inc. v. Agrium Inc., 2011-2 Trade Cases ¶77,611.