Cryptography-Digest Digest #617, Volume #9 Sat, 29 May 99 12:13:04 EDT
Contents:
Re: What good is hushmail? (Bruce Stephens)
Re: alt.timestamp (Frank Meerkoetter)
Faster Exponentiation with data compresssion techniques ("Pedro F�lix")
Re: Review of Scottu19 (Thomas Pornin)
Re: The BRUCE SCHNEIER Tirade (Anonymous)
RSA Cryptography Today FAQ (1/1) ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
Re: 8Bit encryption code. Just try and break it. (Nicol So)
Re: Best algorithm combination? ("Matthew Bennett")
Re: Authenticating identity? ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
FREE HARDCORE XXX SEX PICTURES! 9238 ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
Re: alt.timestamp ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
Re: The BRUCE SCHNEIER Tirade (SCOTT19U.ZIP_GUY)
Re: Review of Scottu19 (Casper H.S. Dik - Network Security Engineer)
Re: Review of Scottu19 (Casper H.S. Dik - Network Security Engineer)
Re: The BRUCE SCHNEIER Tirade (John Kennedy)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
From: Bruce Stephens <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: What good is hushmail?
Date: 29 May 1999 11:06:08 +0100
[EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
> > The problem is that they've had to limit themselves to current
> > web browsers using Java 1.1. This ties their hands a little bit
> > as they have no access to the local machine for storage.
> So where is secret key being kept? I hope not at their server.
Yes, I think so. It's never stored unencrypted at the server (or sent
to and from the server unencrypted), of course.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Frank Meerkoetter)
Crossposted-To: alt.config
Subject: Re: alt.timestamp
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Sat, 29 May 1999 12:27:17 +0200
On 28 May 1999 13:50:55 -0700, Brian Queen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
[...]
>The newsgroup would provide a timestamp in the following manner:
>a user would send a digital signature of the electronic document to the
>newsgroup.
>The digital signature gets propagated throughout Usenet and archived and
>indexed
>according to the extent of the current and future search engine
>capabilities.
>Future claims regarding the date of a document may be resolved by
>finding the digital signature in one of the archives.
Someone could try to cancel the message befor it is indexed by an
searchengine. This could also be automated with an cancel-bot.
[...]
Frank
--
What a strange game. The only winning move is not to play.
-- WOP, "War Games"
------------------------------
From: "Pedro F�lix" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Faster Exponentiation with data compresssion techniques
Date: Sat, 29 May 1999 12:09:16 +0100
I've been reading the paper
[1] "Exponentiation in finite fields: theory and practice" by J. von sur
Gathen et all.
This reference discusses a couple of algorithms for the contructions of word
chains with a minimal number of steps, using dictionary techniques from data
compression, namely the ones proposed by 1) Yacobi and 2) Bocharova &
Kudryashov.
In this context I would like to read the papers:
I. Bocharova and B Kudryashov,"Fast exponentiation in cryptography", ...
I. Bocharova and B Kudryashov,"Fast exponentiation based on data
compression"
Unfortunately I don't have acess to any of the sources.
Does any one knows of electronically available copies of any of these
papers.
Any extra information on this subject would be welcomed, namely more recent
results.
In the context of [1] I'm implementing the algorithms
Brauer (another name for the m-ary method), Yacobi, Bocharova and lookback
for the construction of the dictionary D and word chain W' for D given a
word chain w in D*. The main purpose is the evaluation of these algorithms
in specific contexts (word lengths, probability distributions of the sourse,
...)
I'm doing it in C++ using STL containers and algorithms, so it is rather
simple to read.
I would be happy to share it with any one interested.
Thanks
P. Felix
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Thomas Pornin)
Subject: Re: Review of Scottu19
Date: 29 May 1999 11:13:09 GMT
According to SCOTT19U.ZIP_GUY <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
> When I had access to a SUN it took quit awhile to mode the C code
> to get scott16 to work. If I ever get access again to a SUN with a GNU C
> compiler how does one set the option bits to make it act like a PC?
It must be set into the MMU, therefore you need to modify the kernel to
provide such functionnality. It is rather unlikely that you have access
to the Solaris kernel sources, but under Linux it is possible.
I don't have all the details but David Miller (the sparclinux god) said
it was really easy, and that he once did wrote the requested patch. You
might ask on [EMAIL PROTECTED] if you are interested in
getting a Linux kernel on a Sun, that supports this functionality (quite
cleanly supposedly, with correct interaction with shared memory).
You might as well perform memory access with a byte-swapping macro,
something like that:
/* swap(x) byteswaps its 32-bit argument */
#define swap(x) ((((x) & 0xff000000UL) >> 24) | \
(((x) & 0x00ff0000UL) >> 8) | \
(((x) & 0x0000ff00UL) << 8) | \
(((x) & 0x000000ffUL) << 24))
Or, to avoid undesirable side-effect of macros, you might also use an
inline function.
If you use a good compiler (such as the Sun Workshop Compiler 4.2 or
above), this will result in a very efficent code. And, anyway, the main
cost in your algorithm is the memory access (cache-miss...), not any
byte-moving operation you may afterwards perform.
--Thomas Pornin
------------------------------
Date: Sat, 29 May 1999 13:37:26 +0200 (CEST)
From: Anonymous <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: The BRUCE SCHNEIER Tirade
Crossposted-To: alt.privacy,talk.politics.crypto
A fool once wrote:
" Actually Bruce stuck his foot in his mouth. He should now better than to
spout the BS about a OTP since it is PROVABLE SECURE and Bruce
knows it. Maybe he thought he was only addressing congressmen who
know nothing about encryption so that he figured he could just snow and
mislead everyone like the NSA does. After all many see him as a god
incapable of making a mistake. So he can spout whatever he wants and
the Hamitons of the world will whorship his word as holy writ."
Good. Since you are obviously so superior to Bruce Schneier in
cryptographic wizardry yourself, I have sent this encrypted death
order on your head to my hit man. Fortunately, for your benefit I
have only used Bruce's own worthless AES candidate. You DID say
that they are worthless, didn't you?
=====BEGIN PGP MESSAGE=====
Version: TWOFISH
jAwECgEDjrgKsHCrX63JwCdhT2pJ30laInmbqTREqmhHHkI3C6aNhCogkEXYFZx7
ey/haJq5fRAr8n7oHbn5Y8oCovlehDEw3eI0mrOMS/h8BYcJBhG5sX+dnQsjmhDQ
xejLQEQiUeBq0Vvuco2aw5WibtdQQH9lmMAqaYJsCgzTZu7gN6uJjl+KBzzIpd/R
/IEk3K79AlasvU0rAm2u/k2xAs01Ko6jv4UhRQ6hczbpi9f9frmTFuLFhxMw4vF2
n7H4BhDTdWI+Mv4A2k+nbUaaZ4HiDEq3T161sCnncmkTweC4PdBv/FdO7cM0/0aE
fJDiSuYaACE=
=15tx
=====END PGP MESSAGE=====
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Crossposted-To:
talk.politics.crypto,alt.security.ripem,sci.answers,talk.answers,alt.answers,news.answers
Subject: RSA Cryptography Today FAQ (1/1)
Date: 29 May 1999 13:03:09 GMT
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Archive-name: cryptography-faq/rsa/part1
Last-modified: 1997/05/21
An old version of the RSA Labs' publication "Answers to Frequently Asked
Questions about Today's Cryptography" used to be posted here until May
1997. These postings were not sponsored or updated by RSA Labs, and
for some time we were unable to stop them. While we hope the information
in our FAQ is useful, the version that was being posted here was quite
outdated. The latest version of the FAQ is more complete and up-to-date.
Unfortunately, our FAQ is no longer available in ASCII due to its
mathematical content. Please visit our website at
http://www.rsa.com/rsalabs/ to view the new version of the FAQ with your
browser or download it in the Adobe Acrobat (.pdf) format.
RSA Labs FAQ Editor
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
------------------------------
From: Nicol So <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: 8Bit encryption code. Just try and break it.
Date: Sat, 29 May 1999 08:12:31 -0400
Phoenix wrote:
>
> thanks for trying to break my code. If you decrypt it ignore the
> contents of the message it was typed awhile back.
>
> [ciphertext deleted]
I'm not sure what you meant by "8Bit encryption code". Is that the name
of your algorithm? Or did you mean the size of the key? If it is the
latter, it is not a fair characterization of the difficulty (or
simplicity) of your challenge.
Since you didn't supply the algorithm, uncertainty about the algorithm
itself is greater than 8 bits! For all we know, your algorithm could
have a sizable built-in table. Using it to encrypt just one sample
plaintext while keeping the algorithm secret could have the effect of
using a one-time pad!
If your goal is to learn more about your algorithm and how it might be
broken, you need to supply more details than that.
Nicol
------------------------------
From: "Matthew Bennett" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Best algorithm combination?
Date: Sat, 29 May 1999 13:11:38 +0100
Bruce Schneier wrote in message <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>...
<snip>
Wow... Bruce Schneier himself!
/me gets his autograph book out :)
I'm using Blowfish myself for a company's specialised encryption
application.. ~much~ faster than what I was originally using.
Matt
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: Authenticating identity?
Date: 29 May 1999 05:59:25 -0700
In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, Medical says...
>
>Gregory G Rose wrote:
>> I'm afraid the protocol is almost useless. Some
>> people would say, based on the false sense of
>> security, that it is *worse* than useless.
>
>All he asked was that the message was authentic,
>not that it was useful :-)
Exactly. I'm aware of the replay type attacks (and would
use some sort of timestamp to reduce the effect), but I'm
just looking for the 'outermost' envelope - anything that
doesn't contain the correct cookie can be discarded unread.
(Denial of service is as much an issue as authentication -
if you can discard the vast majority of forgeries without
having to run an expensive signature verification algorithm
that saves cycles to do relay work...)
The contents of that envelope can (and should) still be
signed or encrypted using any of the normal tools (PGP,
probably, at least until Q4 2000...).
>To change the subject, you mentioned time stamps.
>In the US we have WWV, a set of frequencies that send
>a clock signal from the NIST atomic clock. I think
>Canada has the same thing, do most other countries
>broadcast something similar? I would think it's easy
>to incorporate that as part of a security protocol.
You can get dedicated receivers, which work pretty well,
but a $100 GPS receiver will be nearly as good.
Using xntp (a pure software solution) to query one of the
tier two ntp servers may give you millisecond accuracy too,
certainly better than a few tens of milliseconds.
http://tycho.usno.navy.mil/ctime.html
Cheers,
Steve
--
-- Steve Atkins -- [EMAIL PROTECTED]
------------------------------
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Date: 29 May 1999 12:22:18 GMT
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------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Crossposted-To: alt.config
Subject: Re: alt.timestamp
Date: 29 May 1999 06:19:33 -0700
In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
[EMAIL PROTECTED] says...
>
>On 28 May 1999 13:50:55 -0700, Brian Queen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>[...]
>
>>The newsgroup would provide a timestamp in the following manner:
>>a user would send a digital signature of the electronic document to the
>>newsgroup.
>>The digital signature gets propagated throughout Usenet and archived and
>>indexed
>>according to the extent of the current and future search engine
>>capabilities.
>>Future claims regarding the date of a document may be resolved by
>>finding the digital signature in one of the archives.
>
>Someone could try to cancel the message befor it is indexed by an
>searchengine. This could also be automated with an cancel-bot.
And probably would be. It's a binary, and binaries are nuke-on-sight
outside binaries groups.
It's also a gross misuse of usenet. Huge.
Just setup an email autoresponder that takes each incoming message,
appends a timestamp, signs the whole thing with PGP and sends it back
to the originator. The originator now has proof that that document
was signed at that time, as long as you trust the timestamping service
and PGP.
http://www.itconsult.co.uk/stamper.htm is one example.
And I trust them *far* more than I trust dejanews...
Cheers,
Steve
--
-- Steve Atkins -- [EMAIL PROTECTED]
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (SCOTT19U.ZIP_GUY)
Crossposted-To: alt.privacy,talk.politics.crypto
Subject: Re: The BRUCE SCHNEIER Tirade
Date: Sat, 29 May 1999 15:00:59 GMT
In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, Anonymous <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
wrote:
>A fool once wrote:
>" Actually Bruce stuck his foot in his mouth. He should now better than to
>spout the BS about a OTP since it is PROVABLE SECURE and Bruce
>knows it. Maybe he thought he was only addressing congressmen who
>know nothing about encryption so that he figured he could just snow and
>mislead everyone like the NSA does. After all many see him as a god
>incapable of making a mistake. So he can spout whatever he wants and
>the Hamitons of the world will whorship his word as holy writ."
>
>Good. Since you are obviously so superior to Bruce Schneier in
>cryptographic wizardry yourself, I have sent this encrypted death
>order on your head to my hit man. Fortunately, for your benefit I
>have only used Bruce's own worthless AES candidate. You DID say
>that they are worthless, didn't you?
>
I did not say that I could break Bruce's (or the NSA's) worthless AES
candidate. I do think that some ways as I have shown that they
are in some situations much weaker than my own encryption methods
your death threat is a common response to idots who are afraid to see
the truth. It must make you feel big to threaten some ones death just
becasuse they exposed there god as imperfect. I am sure Bruce has
more crypto knowledge than me however he is more apt to use it to
keep his pocket lined with cash. Mine is free and you can try to make
a contest like I did for scott19u to see how weak the AES candidates
are in this case. You can wave your hands and what ever but it is obvious
a Hamilton might even have the resources and brain power to test it out.
By the way I am sure even if the NSA intercept your message they
would not interfer since I am not a high offical. But they might interfer
if someone like Bruce was sent a death threat like you have sent me
since this country really does not practice the same justice for all.
Don't get me wrong I don't think anyone should be sent a death threat
and maybe your crypto god would have the courage and honesty to say
such a threat is wrong but I am not sure how honorable a man in really
is.
David A. Scott
--
SCOTT19U.ZIP NOW AVAILABLE WORLD WIDE
http://www.jim.com/jamesd/Kong/scott19u.zip
http://members.xoom.com/ecil/index.htm
NOTE EMAIL address is for SPAMERS
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Casper H.S. Dik - Network Security Engineer)
Subject: Re: Review of Scottu19
Date: 29 May 1999 14:32:18 GMT
[[ PLEASE DON'T SEND ME EMAIL COPIES OF POSTINGS ]]
[EMAIL PROTECTED] (SCOTT19U.ZIP_GUY) writes:
> When I had access to a SUN it took quit awhile to mode the C code
>to get scott16 to work. If I ever get access again to a SUN with a GNU C
>compiler how does one set the option bits to make it act like a PC?
There are none; on UltraSPARC< it is possible to set the default
address space to little endian, but you can't use the libraries when doing
so.
Write portable code instead or use "endian load macros".
Casper
--
Expressed in this posting are my opinions. They are in no way related
to opinions held by my employer, Sun Microsystems.
Statements on Sun products included here are not gospel and may
be fiction rather than truth.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Casper H.S. Dik - Network Security Engineer)
Subject: Re: Review of Scottu19
Date: 29 May 1999 14:47:38 GMT
[[ PLEASE DON'T SEND ME EMAIL COPIES OF POSTINGS ]]
[EMAIL PROTECTED] (Thomas Pornin) writes:
>According to SCOTT19U.ZIP_GUY <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
>> When I had access to a SUN it took quit awhile to mode the C code
>> to get scott16 to work. If I ever get access again to a SUN with a GNU C
>> compiler how does one set the option bits to make it act like a PC?
>It must be set into the MMU, therefore you need to modify the kernel to
>provide such functionnality. It is rather unlikely that you have access
>to the Solaris kernel sources, but under Linux it is possible.
The Solaris UltraSPARC kernel supports little endian loads; the trick
is to use the little endian address space identifier; (using the load
from alternae instructions)
lda [%o1]ASI_PL,%o2
(ASI_PL is the "primary little endian" address space; it accesses the
primary address space but in little endian mode)
Running programs completely in little endian mode would require complete
runtime support (including libraries w/ little endian data structure;
instructions are always fetched big-endian)
Casper
--
Expressed in this posting are my opinions. They are in no way related
to opinions held by my employer, Sun Microsystems.
Statements on Sun products included here are not gospel and may
be fiction rather than truth.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (John Kennedy)
Crossposted-To: talk.politics.crypto,alt.privacy
Subject: Re: The BRUCE SCHNEIER Tirade
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Sat, 29 May 1999 15:22:47 GMT
On Fri, 28 May 1999 19:08:22 GMT, [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Jim
Dunnett) wrote:
>On Fri, 28 May 1999 10:28:05 GMT, [EMAIL PROTECTED] (John
>Kennedy) wrote:
>
>>On Thu, 27 May 1999 21:21:43 -0400, "Eric W Braeden"
>><[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>>
>>>Anthony Stephen Szopa,
>>> The rules are simple: Your system, like ALL others, is
>>>just so much crap until you put all your cards on the table
>>>so that, if you are lucky, after YEARS, if pros want to do
>>>the analysis, your system MY be considered OK.
>>> Your so-called Tirade just removed you from any
>>>consideration from the pros. This is cool because now
>>>no one has to waste time looking at your system.
>>> Get a job...in a field where you have talent...if you
>>>have any.
>>
>>I don't see anything wrong with asking why a true one time pad is
>>supposed to be unusable.
>
>It's not supposed. It IS unbreakable provided the key
>is random and only ever used once.
Non sequitor. I asked why it's *supposed* to be _unusable_ and you
reply that it *is* _unbreakable_.
>
>Try every possible key and you end up with every
>possible plaintext of the length of the cryptogram.
>
>Most will be garbage, but if the cryptogram is long
>enough, you will come up with every possible text of
>that length. And you're better off because you will
>never know which is the genuine plaintext.
>
>In practice the problems with OTP are: you need masses
>of key. One byte of key for each byte of plaintext sent,
>which can only be used once. You have to distribute
>sufficient key to any or all your correspondents by
>secure means.
Which does not make it unusable.
>
>--
>Regards, Jim. | If you want a picture of the future,
>olympus%jimdee.prestel.co.uk | imagine a boot stamping on a human
>[EMAIL PROTECTED] | face for ever.
>dynastic%cwcom.net |
>nordland%lineone.net | - George Orwell 1903-1950.
>Pgp key: pgpkeys.mit.edu:11371
--
John Kennedy
--
The causal world imposes a nonarbitrary distinction between detecting in one's visual
array
the faint outline of a partly camouflaged stalking predator and not detecting it
because of
alternative interpretative procedures. Nonpropagating designs are removed from the
population, whether they believe in naive realism or that everything is an arbitrary
social
construction.
(Tooby and Cosmides, in _The Adapted Mind_, Barkow,
Cosmides and Tooby, editors )
=======
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========
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