Cryptography-Digest Digest #635, Volume #12 Fri, 8 Sep 00 01:13:00 EDT
Contents:
Re: RSA patent expiration party still on for the 20th (Ed Kubaitis)
Re: ExCSS Source Code (Chris Rutter)
Re: Carnivore article in October CACM _Inside_Risks (Paul Rubin)
Re: Free Upgrade PGP Personal Privacy 6.5.8 - how? ("Rob Felt")
Re: RSA patent expiration party still on for the 20th (Rich Wales)
Re: security warning -- "www.etradebank.com" ("Harvey Rook")
Re: RSA patent expiration party still on for the 20th (Ed Kubaitis)
Re: Free Upgrade PGP Personal Privacy 6.5.8 - how? (-)
Re: Carnivore article in October CACM _Inside_Risks (Dave Mundt)
Re: Carnivore article in October CACM _Inside_Risks (Larry Kilgallen)
Re: could you please tell me how this calculation has been obtained ? (LMB)
Re: could you please tell me how this calculation has been obtained ? (Your Name)
Re: Known Plain Text Attack (Mack)
Re: Carnivore article in October CACM _Inside_Risks ("Trevor L. Jackson, III")
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
From: Ed Kubaitis <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: RSA patent expiration party still on for the 20th
Date: Thu, 07 Sep 2000 20:27:52 -0500
Bill Unruh wrote:
>
> In <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> [EMAIL PROTECTED] (S. T. L.) writes:
>
> >/*You would only be able to use RSA after Sept 20 on stuff that
> >was not developed befor that date either. You would have violated the
> >patent if you had used ( developed) before that date.*/
>
> >What if you wrote something before Sept. 6 (or 20), but never gave it to anyone
> >else but yourself? Would that prevent one from releasing it publicly after
> >Sept. 6 (or 20)?
>
> We are getting into the wild blue yonder here. It depends on why you wrote it. If you
> could argue that it was for "research" purposes, then I believe that the patent law
>by
> precedent allows such use. (After all patents are published precisely to allow
>others to
> improve on them). However if it was for commercial or non-commercial use ofthe
>patent,
> then they could take you to court. They would have to prove that you so made use of
>it
> befor that date. Thus writing dates on the code from befor Sept x, in the released
> commercial code would be strong evidence that you did use it. Of course one would
>then
> have to assess damages, and they presumably would be small. Would MIT actually go
>after
> you for such a violation? The answer to that question I leave as an exercise for the
> reader.
Hmm. I shouldn't post because I'm a lurker and a novice, but my reading
of the RSA press release wording wrt *when* things were developed was
Hey - this announcement does not constitute a get-of-jail-free
card for anyone known to have infringed on our patent prior to
September 6. Based on evidence we have either now or perhaps later.
Thus, in the usa I read this as saying go ahead and build OpenSSL
without RSAref -- that's ok! As long as we never find evidence that you
did so before 9/6/00.
/ejk
------------------------------
From: Chris Rutter <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: ExCSS Source Code
Date: Fri, 8 Sep 2000 00:54:06 +0100
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> This is source code describing the algorithm to decode the Content
> Scrambling System. It's written in Standard ML and is purely functional
> and machine-independent.
Which leads ne wondering; can you force thousands of Usenet posters to
break copyright laws or otherwise violate various licences by posting
appropriate material to Usenet?
I wouldn't generally imagine that the ensuing (and in practice non-
existent) court case would hold up, but I'm not utterly convinced of
that, given what some incomprehensibly braindead courts have upheld
as of late.
Perhaps it's an uninteresting question anyway. It's off-topic, apart from
peripherally: you could presumably arrange strong encryption and/or
patented algorithms to feature in there somewhere. The trick is putting
the burden of law-breakage on the downloader, as opposed or in addition to
the poster.
c.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Paul Rubin)
Crossposted-To: comp.security.misc,alt.security,talk.politics.crypto
Subject: Re: Carnivore article in October CACM _Inside_Risks
Date: 8 Sep 2000 01:36:21 GMT
In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
Roger Schlafly <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>Paul Rubin wrote:
>> That appears to be true of smart cards, but certainly not of more
>> sophisticated modules. Crypto modules these days can be made immune
>> to any type of passive attack (i.e. any attack that doesn't involve
>> physical tampering). If you have to drill holes in a device to access
>> internal signals, that's no longer a side channel.
>
>Aren't we talking about signing devices that might be put in
>everyone's PC, such that the user himself cannot get the private
>key? If so, I cannot see putting a steel vault on all motherboards.
The signing device can be put in a sealed capsule.
See http://www.ibutton.com/ibuttons/java.html
for info about an inexpensive device of this type.
------------------------------
From: "Rob Felt" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Crossposted-To: alt.security.pgp,comp.security.pgp.discuss
Subject: Re: Free Upgrade PGP Personal Privacy 6.5.8 - how?
Date: Fri, 08 Sep 2000 01:44:32 GMT
get a bigger pipe.....
--
R-
"-" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote in message
news:[EMAIL PROTECTED]...
> On Thu, 07 Sep 2000 09:15:21 GMT, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
> >one short phrase:
> >
> >ftp://zedz.net
> >
> Is the "retail version" on that page (10435KB) gratis, or should one
> download the "Personal Privacy" file (8695KB)?
>
> It's too big of a download at 28.8 to download the wrong one.
>
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Rich Wales)
Subject: Re: RSA patent expiration party still on for the 20th
Date: 8 Sep 2000 01:54:19 -0000
Ed Kubaitis wrote:
> Thus, in the usa I read this as saying go ahead and
> build OpenSSL without RSAref -- that's ok! As long as
> we never find evidence that you did so before 9/6/00.
Does development of a product, using patented technology, during
the validity period of the patent, count as an infringement (under
US law) if the product is kept strictly internal and is not put to
any actual productive use until after the patent has expired?
Rich Wales [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.webcom.com/richw/
PGP 2.6+ key generated 2000-08-26; all previous encryption keys REVOKED.
RSA, 2048 bits, ID 0xFDF8FC65, print 2A67F410 0C740867 3EF13F41 528512FA
------------------------------
From: "Harvey Rook" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: security warning -- "www.etradebank.com"
Date: Thu, 7 Sep 2000 19:01:59 -0700
I am about to say something that will scare the bejeses out of the real
paranoids in this group.
Yes there are security holes in the password reset policy of most major
banks and brokerages, but so what? You don't always need perfect security.
Yes thieves can gain access to my account by tapping my phone line, but so
what? It will only slow them down. At least they won't be dumpster diving
for credit card receipts and check stubs.
The time it takes for a thief to dig up some personal information about
myself, (or not, I can lie about my mother's maiden name. In fact, some
banks encourage that) and call the bank up to reset my password, is eons
longer than what it takes to scare up a hundred or so good credit card
numbers.
Balance that with the fact very bad things will happen if my account locks
up (Either because I've forgot my password, or a hacker has tried too many
passwords, and the account freezes) My bills, my mortgage, will go unpaid. I
will not be able to sell that one stock and thus accrue thousands of dollars
of losses.
Plus, banks have insurance to cover these sort of things.
So, the password reset policy, while not perfect, is acceptable for ordinary
consumer use.
BTW, look for things to improve in the future. The American Express "Blue"
credit card comes with computer chip and a PC credit card reader. Now there
is something physical to hang the security off of. Although I'm going to
reserve judgement until a few good hackers have partied all over this little
piggy and found at least 10 weird things you can do with it.
Harv
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote in message
news:[EMAIL PROTECTED]...
> I have interspersed some comments...
>
> "Harvey Rook" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> >Why is 6 chars unacceptable? We are not talking about a piece of
unguarded
> >data that your opponent has unlimited access to. Consider...
> >
> >-The accounts lock up after 3 wrong tries.
>
> Good
>
> >-Reactivation requires you to call in.
>
> Is someone tapping the line?
>
> >-When you call in you must know some personal information
> >(SSN/Address/Mothers Madden Name/Amount of last deposit or withdrawal )
>
> Every mother's maiden name is available information via a copy of the
> parent's marrage certificate OR in some countries is public information
> (Iceland is one example...) Address and SSN are both also BAD choices.
> Address is easy to obtain, and SSN is not supposed to be used for this
> purpose. And, of course, you are limiting this to the US, while I am in
> Canada and MAY not even have a SSN (I do, but that is another story...)
>
> >-After you've presented the personal information, you get to pick a new
> >password, any password you want.
>
> And if 'you' are NOT you? (Sniffer, tapping the line, etc.)
>
> >-After reactivation, the account holder is sent a piece of snail mail
> >informing them of the recent password change.
>
> Again, what if someone is tapping the line?
>
> >This policy is not uncommon-- every online bank or brokerage that I have
> >looked at, follows it.
>
> And all have the above problems...
>
>
> >The vulnerability is not a small password space. So, 6 chars is
acceptable.
>
> If HTTPS is being used yes, if not, NO...
>
> >Harvey Rook
> >[EMAIL PROTECTED]
>
------------------------------
From: Ed Kubaitis <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: RSA patent expiration party still on for the 20th
Date: Thu, 07 Sep 2000 21:14:37 -0500
Rich Wales wrote:
>
> Ed Kubaitis wrote:
>
> > Thus, in the usa I read this as saying go ahead and
> > build OpenSSL without RSAref -- that's ok! As long as
> > we never find evidence that you did so before 9/6/00.
>
> Does development of a product, using patented technology, during
> the validity period of the patent, count as an infringement (under
> US law) if the product is kept strictly internal and is not put to
> any actual productive use until after the patent has expired?
>
Hmm. IANAL but I would guess "No" -- as long it was never deployed/sold
(in the case of the RSA patent) prior to 9/6/00. But IANAL, so if you
think it's important, get your company's lawyers into the decision loop
soonest.
/ejk
> Rich Wales [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.webcom.com/richw/
> PGP 2.6+ key generated 2000-08-26; all previous encryption keys REVOKED.
> RSA, 2048 bits, ID 0xFDF8FC65, print 2A67F410 0C740867 3EF13F41 528512FA
------------------------------
From: - <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Crossposted-To: alt.security.pgp,comp.security.pgp.discuss
Subject: Re: Free Upgrade PGP Personal Privacy 6.5.8 - how?
Date: Thu, 07 Sep 2000 21:16:21 -0500
On Fri, 08 Sep 2000 01:44:32 GMT, "Rob Felt" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
wrote:
>get a bigger pipe.....
I live in a rural area that is served by that joke of a company that
used to be called GTE. They are the worst freakin' telephone company I
have ever had in any state I've ever lived in. They don't have a
"bigger pipe." My only way out is satellite access, and for the amount
of time I spend on the net, I'd have to be millionaire to afford the
extra hours. GTE's symbol is not that of a roadrunner, but rather that
of a turtle on crutches.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Dave Mundt)
Crossposted-To: comp.security.misc,alt.security,talk.politics.crypto
Subject: Re: Carnivore article in October CACM _Inside_Risks
Date: Fri, 08 Sep 2000 02:12:43 GMT
Greetings and Salutations..
Well, I was on a civil jury a few years ago (and gave away a
million bucks of Kmart's money...but that is beside the point). As
for the notes...we were instructed that we could TAKE notes, but, we
could not SHARE them with the other jurors.
As for asking questions...Legally, we COULD have asked questions
directly of any of the witnesses. However, we were (carefully, I
think) NOT told this until the END of the trial...so there were many
points that got skimmed over that we did not discover until WELL
after the trial..For what it is worth, though, the facts left out of
the information presented us would have made essentially NO difference
in the outcome of the case.
Not that it mattered, because the judge, as "13th juror" decided
he "did not like some of the things that went on" and overturned our
verdict and award. Shucks, if we had known up front that our point of
view held so little weight, we would have saved ourselves a LOT of
agony and argument by simply flipping a coin. It was my opinion then,
and, still is my opinion that this was not right, or just, and that if
Kmart had a problem with the verdict they simply should have appealed
it. About the only personal good that came from it was that pretty
much EVERY lawyer in town knows that trial, and, to get dumped off the
list, I simply have to say that I was on the jury.
Regards
Dave Mundt
Barry Margolin <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
>Roger Schlafly <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>>Taking notes is also bad because the notes may have errors and
>>the lawyers do not have opportunities to challenges. Also, if
>>1 juror out of 12 takes notes, the other 11 might assumes that
>>he knows what is going on and give his opinion undue weight.
>>
>>(Yes, I know how wacky all this sounds.)
>
>Pretty wacky. After all, if they don't take notes, they end up going by
>their memory instead, don't they. Isn't that likely to have *more* errors?
>And the lawyers still can't challenge it.
>
>I guess the courtroom transcript is available, so maybe they assume that
>the jurors will use that if they can't take notes. But a person with notes
>can still refer to the transcript as well, and I think it's a pretty wild
>assumption to expect most jurors to do this rather than go by their
>memories just because they couldn't take notes.
>
>--
>Barry Margolin, [EMAIL PROTECTED]
>Genuity, Burlington, MA
>*** DON'T SEND TECHNICAL QUESTIONS DIRECTLY TO ME, post them to newsgroups.
>Please DON'T copy followups to me -- I'll assume it wasn't posted to the group.
Remove the "REMOVE_THIS_" from my email address to get to me...
I hate Cullers who gather from newsgroups
Visit my home page at http://www.esper.com/xvart/index.html
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Larry Kilgallen)
Crossposted-To: comp.security.misc,alt.security,talk.politics.crypto
Subject: Re: Carnivore article in October CACM _Inside_Risks
Date: 7 Sep 2000 23:36:28 -0500
In article <LOTt5.38$7w2.587@burlma1-snr2>, Barry Margolin <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
> Larry Kilgallen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>>As I understood the discussion, we were merely trying to prove the
>>identity of a machine. What it has is that chip, which is sufficient
>>if we are content with it not being duplicated (it can be moved, but
>>not duplicated).
>
> OK, now I understand. Yes, an embedded authentication box would serve that
> purpose.
>
> I was responding to the message that suggested that the processor serial
> number, like the ID that Intel put in Pentiums last year, could be used for
> this. This is not the case -- it has to be a black box that just computes
> a digital signature based on an embedded secret.
Certainly Intel technically could have built a much stronger device.
Based on the market reaction to what they did produce, I am not sure
they could have done it in a politically acceptable fashion. I like
to think a prominent user-accessible on/off switch would do, but
after the public reaction to the non-feature they _did_ produce,
I am not so sure.
------------------------------
From: LMB <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Crossposted-To: alt.security.pgp
Subject: Re: could you please tell me how this calculation has been obtained ?
Date: Thu, 07 Sep 2000 20:13:35 -0700
On Thu, 7 Sep 2000 20:43:32 -0400, Lronscam
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>And if there are only 1 million keys on the public key servers then you
>know that there are less people using PGP. How many people have only one
>key?
And I am sure there are MANY people who use PGP as I do, privately on
their own computer and with, and among, a small circle of friends. In
my "group" there are eleven of us who use PGP on a daily basis. None
of us has EVER had a key on a public key server. I suspect there are
millions of PGP users in the same status.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Your Name)
Crossposted-To: alt.security.pgp
Subject: Re: could you please tell me how this calculation has been obtained ?
Date: Fri, 08 Sep 2000 03:43:11 GMT
On Thu, 7 Sep 2000 20:43:32 -0400, Lronscam
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>And if there are only 1 million keys on the public key servers then you
>know that there are less people using PGP. How many people have only one
>key?
And, how many people use PGP but have never put a key on a server?
Me, for one.
Rich Eramian aka freeman at shore dot net
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Mack)
Subject: Re: Known Plain Text Attack
Date: 08 Sep 2000 04:51:53 GMT
>Hi,
>
> Is there any possibility to use known plain text attack for the
>following situation : a have a file in the original form and the
>encrypted one and I also have the password. What else do I need? I need
>to find out the method it was use to encrypt the original file with
>this key (probably a hash was substract from this key). Where can I
>find some algorithms for known plain text attacks ?
>
>Thank you,
>John D.
>
>
>Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
>Before you buy.
Note that if a chining mode requiring an IV like PCBC is used
you need that IV in addition to the key. Also the problem
is insoluble if an unknown proprietary algorithm is used.
In this case lets assume it is a published algorithm.
First check the file type. Certain programs use different
types for the files. Next check to see if the encryption
program left an ID in the first few bytes. Bad ones do,
Good ones don't (IMHO). Then check the file date obviously
algorithms developed after that date weren't used.
After that it is trial and error. Depending on the file
size you may be able to tell if some algorithms were used.
Ie. if it is a multiple of 8 bytes it is probably a 64 bit algorithm.
If it is a multiple of 16 bytes it may be either a 64 or 128 bit
algorithm. If it isn't a multiple then look at common
chaining modes. Finally there is simple brute force.
Use all possible algorithms, with all possible preprocessing
of the key in all possible chaining modes.
Figure about 200 possible algorithms, about 100 possible
methods of preprocessing, and 100 chaining modes gives
a difficulty of 2*10^6 or about 2^21.
Not a really difficult problem.
Mack
Remove njunk123 from name to reply by e-mail
------------------------------
Date: Fri, 08 Sep 2000 01:09:00 -0400
From: "Trevor L. Jackson, III" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Crossposted-To: comp.security.misc,alt.security,talk.politics.crypto
Subject: Re: Carnivore article in October CACM _Inside_Risks
Roger Schlafly wrote:
> "Trevor L. Jackson, III" wrote:
> > > 1. Jurors are not allowed to ask any questions, and so would
> > > not have the opportunity to flesh out their theories.
> >
> > This is changing. Several states have changed the rules so that jury
> > members can takes notes and even ask questions.
>
> Ask questions live?
No.
> I doubt it. I have heard of cases where jurors
> were permitted to submit some questions to the judge who then
> rewords them, permits both parties to objects, and eventually
> asks the witness.
Yes. Point is that the jurors often ask the most telling questions. I.e.,
they seek answer upon which to hang their decision.
>
>
> Live questions are considered dangerous because they might be
> considered prejudicial or allude to inadmissable. Normally the
> lawyers are instructed not to ask certain sorts of questions,
> but the jurors are not even supposed to know which questions
> are off-limits.
>
> Taking notes is also bad because the notes may have errors and
> the lawyers do not have opportunities to challenges. Also, if
> 1 juror out of 12 takes notes, the other 11 might assumes that
> he knows what is going on and give his opinion undue weight.
All superstitions why notes were forbidden, and still are in most
jurisdictions. But case complexity keeps increasing. Jurors take notes on
parts of the testimony and evidence that they want to review. It turns out
that notes help jurors understand the case. Understanding the case leads
to a better decision.
Specific rebuttals include, "the dullest pencil is sharper than the
sharpest memory." Would you rather rely upon a jurors memory or their
notes?
Also, those other 11 jurors would probably be right to pay attention to the
juror who took notes during the trial. Reductio: is the opinion of the
juror who slept through the trial to be given equal weight with that of the
juror who was paying attention (took notes)? Hardly.
>
>
> (Yes, I know how wacky all this sounds.)
------------------------------
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