Cryptography-Digest Digest #396, Volume #9 Thu, 15 Apr 99 13:13:03 EDT
Contents:
Re: discreate logarithm problem ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
Re: discreate logarithm problem ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
New Challenge ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
Re: Comments to DOJ re NICS (ELVA)
Re: Adequacy of FIPS-140 (Jim Felling)
Re: discreate logarithm problem (David A Molnar)
Re: AES Round 1 deadline: 15th April 1999 (Matthias Bruestle)
Re: True Randomness & The Law Of Large Numbers ("Douglas A. Gwyn")
Re: PGP 6 is JUNK (John Savard)
Re: discreate logarithm problem ("Trevor Jackson, III")
Re: Adequacy of FIPS-140 (R. Knauer)
Re: Adequacy of FIPS-140 (Patrick Juola)
Twofish among the top 5 ?! (Daniele Finocchiaro)
Re: KL-43? (Richard Herring)
Re: AES Round 1 deadline: 15th April 1999 (John Savard)
Re: Adequacy of FIPS-140 (Jim Gillogly)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: discreate logarithm problem
Date: Thu, 15 Apr 1999 12:15:24 GMT
In article <7f3301$1lm$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> Here is my solution.
>
> How about you answer the original question, so I and the poster can learn
> something. Obviously I need to learn more about the DL problem.
I thought that I had answered the question.
The Number Field Sieve solves the DL problem with time complexity
exp( (c+o(1)) (log n)^1/3 (loglog n)^2/3)
with c = (64/9)^1/3
I *know* I had posted the above answer! What I left out was:
and space complexity equal to sqrt(time complexity)
One does not solve DL problems by direct search.
Start by reading the discussion in the HAC.
============= Posted via Deja News, The Discussion Network ============
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------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: discreate logarithm problem
Date: Thu, 15 Apr 1999 12:20:55 GMT
In article <7f3301$1lm$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> Here is my solution.
>
> How about you answer the original question, so I and the poster can learn
> something. Obviously I need to learn more about the DL problem.
I thought that I had answered the question.
The Number Field Sieve solves the DL problem with time complexity
exp( (c+o(1)) (log n)^1/3 (loglog n)^2/3)
with c = (64/9)^1/3
I *know* I had posted the above answer! What I left out was:
and space complexity equal to sqrt(time complexity)
One does not solve DL problems by direct search.
Start by reading the discussion in the HAC.
============= Posted via Deja News, The Discussion Network ============
http://www.dejanews.com/ Search, Read, Discuss, or Start Your Own
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: New Challenge
Date: Thu, 15 Apr 1999 09:23:09 GMT
Here is a new challenge:
http://www.cie-signaux.fr/security/index.htm
Tell me how I could help...
============= Posted via Deja News, The Discussion Network ============
http://www.dejanews.com/ Search, Read, Discuss, or Start Your Own
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (ELVA)
Crossposted-To: talk.politics.guns
Subject: Re: Comments to DOJ re NICS
Date: Thu, 15 Apr 1999 13:03:01 GMT
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Hello,
Reading the ideas exchanged about NICS signature we might have a
solution to answer the problem.
Our company named ELVA Inc, an holding based in Florida, which has its
headquarter based in France in
Paris, has created a new identification smart card, called VocaliD,
which allows On Line identification.
This identification smart card, fully compatible with ISO 7816
standards (Smart card standards), has :
-an embedded acoustic interface to work with a standard phone,
-a micromodule compatible with standard smart card readers,
-a magnetic stripe also compatible with standard magnetic card
readers.
Both the acoustic interface and the micromodule can send the same
identification message, over a standard phone or through electronic
means.
The identification message permits to identify the user.
This message contains an Id number (The user Id) and a Cryptogram
generated by a random number
algorithm. The cryptogram is changed each time the user wants to make
a new connection/identification.
Due to this one way function using a unique key per user and a random
number generator, an hacker which try to record an identification
sequence an replay it will be rejected.
In addition to the identification message a Pin Code (Personnel
Identification number) can be used to reinforce
The security of the process.
Both VocaliD and the Server /Host have the needed information and keys
to be in synchronization.
An important exhibition, about smart cards, will be held next May 11th
till 14th in Chicago. We encourage you
to visit this exhibition.
Elva will participate to this exhibition (exhibit booth # 832) an will
be pleased to present you its VocaliD product.
We also have a representative in the USA who can meet the end user(s).
I hope this will help.
Jean Garrot
Director of sales
On Wed, 07 Apr 1999 16:41:01 -0700, Philip Peake <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
wrote:
>Eric Williams wrote:
>
>> Any hackers want to poke holes in my counter-proposal before I send it
>> off to the FBI? Comments are due by June 1.
>
>The biggest problem that I see is that of having the FFL write down a long
>string of random letters and numbers accurately.
>
>Digital signaures are fine with electronic exchange, or even with a fax, but
>by voice, over the phone ???
>
>So what happens when either the Fed providing the number, or the FFL makes
>an error, and later the signature is found to be "false" ?
>
>I'm as much against this illegal extension of NICS as you are, but I really
>don't see this as being practical. Unless you want to insist that the FFL
>has to have a fax to receive the NICS approval, which would probably not be
>acceptable to many of them.
>
>Philip
>
------------------------------
From: Jim Felling <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: Adequacy of FIPS-140
Date: Thu, 15 Apr 1999 09:58:15 -0500
"R. Knauer" wrote:
> On Wed, 14 Apr 1999 01:39:26 -0600, [EMAIL PROTECTED] (wtshaw) wrote:
>
> >I take it that he understands the law of diminishing returns, something
> >very basic to expert analysis.
>
> Quantum computation is not a matter of any dimishing returns - it is a
> fundamentally different way to go about computation.
>
> And it provides for the calcualtion of true random numbers, not just
> "nearly" random numbers.
Your QC may well produce random results. But what about: the methods used to
read its state -- they can change it and/or lead to correlation. What about
outside phenomena such as Magnetic fields, or EM radiation both can mess
with quantum state transitions. What about other such phenomena? You cannot
consider the QC all alone. The system has potential points of failure and
therefore is NOT provably random.
>
>
> Bob Knauer
>
> "I read a funny story about how the Republicans freed the slaves. The
> Republicans are the ones who created slavery by law in the 1600's.
> Abraham Lincoln freed the slaves and he was not a Republican."
> - Marion Barry, Mayor of Washington DC
------------------------------
From: David A Molnar <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: discreate logarithm problem
Date: 15 Apr 1999 12:13:36 GMT
Trevor Jackson, III <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> *SIX* copies of this? Nasty stutter.
he's discussing DL algorithms. as noted, they take a substantial amount
of space to compute. even on a quantum computer, oddly enough. except
there substantial = 3 registers. :-)
-David
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Matthias Bruestle)
Subject: Re: AES Round 1 deadline: 15th April 1999
Date: Thu, 15 Apr 1999 09:36:04 GMT
Mahlzeit
wtshaw ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) wrote:
> In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
> [EMAIL PROTECTED] (John Savard) wrote:
> > David Crick <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote, in part:
> > >Just a reminder (as if one's needed) that the deadline for comments
> > >on Round 1 of AES is 15th April 1999.
> >
> > Like the Bulwer-Lytton Contest, they chose a day easy for Americans to
> > remember...
> >
> It is also the date of the pre-cattlecall meeting, two years ago.
What is so special about April 15th?
Mahlzeit
endergone Zwiebeltuete
--
PGP: SIG:C379A331 ENC:F47FA83D I LOVE MY PDP-11/34A, M70 and MicroVAXII!
--
Five inches from happyness.
------------------------------
From: "Douglas A. Gwyn" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: True Randomness & The Law Of Large Numbers
Date: Thu, 15 Apr 1999 15:56:18 GMT
"R. Knauer" wrote:
> On Thu, 15 Apr 1999 05:55:29 GMT, "Douglas A. Gwyn" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
> wrote:
> >It's not circular reasoning, and you don't seem to understand what
> >modeling is about.
> You are sure of that, eh. You know everything about my understanding
> of modeling, eh.
I have to go by the available evidence, namely what you yourself
say on the matter.
> >Actual systems
> >may behave in a way that is close to models for them, or not.
> What are you babbling about, you poor man. I mean, take a look at what
> you just wrote - it is complete nonsense.
I didn't expect you to understand my explanation, but my hope is
that other readers appreciated it.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (John Savard)
Subject: Re: PGP 6 is JUNK
Date: Thu, 15 Apr 1999 15:32:48 GMT
[EMAIL PROTECTED] (Paul Rubin) wrote, in part:
>Could someone be forging posts in Charles's name in order to hassle him?
>That would explain why the phone number was also posted.
Come to think of it, that would be a more logical explanation for these
posts...or, there could be something in PGP 6.0 that somehow led him to
this mistaken conclusion.
Come to think of it, PGP 6.0 uses Diffie-Hellman, not
Rivest-Shamir-Adleman. So even if it did use only 10^9 different prime
moduli ... or even just one ... for _that_ algorithm, it would still be
secure.
John Savard (teneerf is spelled backwards)
http://members.xoom.com/quadibloc/index.html
------------------------------
Date: Thu, 15 Apr 1999 21:43:22 -0400
From: "Trevor Jackson, III" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: discreate logarithm problem
*SIX* copies of this? Nasty stutter.
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
> In article <7f3301$1lm$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
> [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> > Here is my solution.
> >
> > How about you answer the original question, so I and the poster can learn
> > something. Obviously I need to learn more about the DL problem.
>
> I thought that I had answered the question.
>
> The Number Field Sieve solves the DL problem with time complexity
>
> exp( (c+o(1)) (log n)^1/3 (loglog n)^2/3)
>
> with c = (64/9)^1/3
>
> I *know* I had posted the above answer! What I left out was:
>
> and space complexity equal to sqrt(time complexity)
>
> One does not solve DL problems by direct search.
>
> Start by reading the discussion in the HAC.
>
> -----------== Posted via Deja News, The Discussion Network ==----------
> http://www.dejanews.com/ Search, Read, Discuss, or Start Your Own
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (R. Knauer)
Subject: Re: Adequacy of FIPS-140
Date: Thu, 15 Apr 1999 16:25:39 GMT
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
On 15 Apr 1999 08:53:07 -0400, [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Patrick Juola)
wrote:
>If you're pulling the text off the web, *and the cryptanalyst knows it*,
>then it's not secret as he has the same access to the Web that you do.
OK, to keep this subthread going, I will reply by asking how he would
find the source - by exhaustive search? If so, how many resources must
be employed to accomplish the task of discovering the "secret"?
>Even if the cryptanalyst doesn't know it, he's likely to guess that
>the most likely source of a large block of text is *somewhere* on the
>Web. So he fires up AltaVista....
You make it sound too easy.
What keywords would you use? Hell, you are lucky to find what you want
using AltaVista with ordinary keywords. For instance, see how much of
a hassle it is to find out the manufacturer of an automotive chemical
product called "casite". Anybody who has putzed around with cars knows
about Casite. Use that as the keyword in AltaVista and you will get
all sorts of nonsense before you finally discover Hastings is the
manufacturer.
The web is so vast and so diverse, you would be better off looking for
a needle in a haystack. If the resources you must commit to this
search is excessive, it would be essentially impossible - like trying
to do a brute force attack on a 128-bit IDEA cipher.
Here, for example, is a text-key-based stream cipher (totally made up
for purposes of illustration):
fo@kh*ga%rg!qe^pr^tgj$gas@hafj
Please tell us how, in principle, you would mount an attack on that
cipher using the web.
Bob Knauer
"I read a funny story about how the Republicans freed the slaves. The
Republicans are the ones who created slavery by law in the 1600's.
Abraham Lincoln freed the slaves and he was not a Republican."
- Marion Barry, Mayor of Washington DC
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Patrick Juola)
Subject: Re: Adequacy of FIPS-140
Date: 15 Apr 1999 12:50:57 -0400
In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
R. Knauer <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>On 15 Apr 1999 08:53:07 -0400, [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Patrick Juola)
>wrote:
>
>>If you're pulling the text off the web, *and the cryptanalyst knows it*,
>>then it's not secret as he has the same access to the Web that you do.
>
>OK, to keep this subthread going, I will reply by asking how he would
>find the source - by exhaustive search? If so, how many resources must
>be employed to accomplish the task of discovering the "secret"?
If need be, he can employ an exhaustive search technique. There are,
after all, probably fewer than a trillion documents on the Web; this,
in turn, is about 2^40 documents, which is too small a keyspace (40 bits)
for people to feel comfortable with.
>>Even if the cryptanalyst doesn't know it, he's likely to guess that
>>the most likely source of a large block of text is *somewhere* on the
>>Web. So he fires up AltaVista....
>
>You make it sound too easy.
Of course. And chance are he wouldn't be able to use AltaVista; instead
he would want to write his own custom SpiderBot that would index
documents by some cryptographic property instead of by keyword.
Not a difficult task; I'd feel comfortable assigning one of my undergraduates
to index the Web according to a particular hash scheme.
-kitten
------------------------------
From: Daniele Finocchiaro <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Twofish among the top 5 ?!
Date: Thu, 15 Apr 1999 18:13:54 +0100
I think this is funny... today the AES Round 1 closes... but it seems that at
Barnes&Noble Bookstore they already know who will go into Round 2...
Look at the description of the book "The Twofish Encryption Algorithm" (recently
published by Wiley):
"This book contains all the details about Twofish, a new
information scrambling security code invented by a team led by
Bruce Schneier. Twofish is among the top 5 of 15 sophisticated
^------------------------------^
encoding formulas being considered by the U.S.
Department of Commerce National Institute of Standards and
Technology (NIST) to replace the current standard DES (Data
Encryption Standard), which is too weak and slow for today's
computing power. The winning method will become the new
U.S. security standard for the 21st century [...]"
[from www.barnesandnoble.com]
Also, claiming that DES is "slow for today's computing power" is a bit funny.
* Daniele Finocchiaro
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Richard Herring)
Subject: Re: KL-43?
Date: 15 Apr 1999 14:44:43 GMT
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, David Ross ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
wrote:
> On Fri, 09 Apr 1999 15:22:23 GMT, [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> (John Savard) wrote:
> >Dan <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote, in part:
> >>Does any one know what ecryption the KL-43 uses??
> >
> >Probably no one who is allowed to tell you...that sounds like a designation
> >used by the U.S. military for a current or recent encryption device.
> No telling just how (or in what sequence) the NSA comes up with KL-
> & KY- nomenclature.
Security through obscurity...
I expect they generate a Truly Random Number ;-)
--
Richard Herring | <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (John Savard)
Subject: Re: AES Round 1 deadline: 15th April 1999
Date: Thu, 15 Apr 1999 15:28:17 GMT
"Lassi Hippel�inen" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote, in part:
>> > David Crick <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote, in part:
>> > >Just a reminder (as if one's needed) that the deadline for comments
>> > >on Round 1 of AES is 15th April 1999.
>> > Like the Bulwer-Lytton Contest, they chose a day easy for Americans to
>> > remember...
>The date didn't ring a bell in my head, so I checked
>http://www.historychannel.com/today/
The Bulwer-Lytton contest invites people to submit hypothetical bad opening
sentences for imaginary novels; their deadline, April 15, is identified as
the date of "another painful submission", which it is for Americans, as it
is the date by which their annual tax returns must be submitted by.
John Savard (teneerf is spelled backwards)
http://members.xoom.com/quadibloc/index.html
------------------------------
From: Jim Gillogly <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Adequacy of FIPS-140
Date: Thu, 15 Apr 1999 10:07:38 -0700
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
wtshaw wrote:
>
> In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, Jim Gillogly <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> >
> > While Shannon's estimate was one bit per letter for a meaningful English
> > passage, I would expect it to be even less for text pulled off the Web.
> > His experiment was "Given everything up until this letter, guess the
> > next." Moving that to the Web, guessing the next letter could be
> > disastrously simple in many cases using standard search engines.
>
> I surely am ready to demonstrate keys that you could try to reverse to
> text. I would even be willing to start with something fairly redundant if
> you want.
I have no doubt that you of all people could generate keys using all
kinds of interesting transformations that I couldn't reverse engineer.
As you recall, I did reverse some of your low-round ones a few years
ago, but with sufficient mucking about a hash is going to be tough or
impossible to reverse.
However, the question is whether the text on the Web can be considered
to have the same amount of redundancy as the text in Shannon's experiment.
As I indicated, the existence of search engines suggests that it has
fewer bits per character than sensible English constructed on the fly,
such as (superficially) this paragraph, which didn't exist until now.
But using this paragraph as key later loses, since from a phrase or
two it can be recovered with DejaNews.
> Abstracting randomness is fairly easy, and there are a number of methods
> to do it from text. It also matters what you do with the results, as keys
> are simply used by some algorithms, and better used in more complex ways
> by others.
Those methods become part of the key, of course, since you can't tell
the cryptanalyst what page you're looking at and what you're doing to it.
> Applying some simple cryptological manipulation to text could foil a
> possible search-engine attack. A good means of distributing material on
> the web that is not going to be searchable is to use hidden directories
> and obscure file names.
And those become part of the secret key also. In the end you may have
more secret bits in the key you're constructing (page and algorithm)
than you're extracting from the page itself!
> Then, there is the news: Given who knows how many messages out there, you
> could easily mix and mingle randomness from a selected few of them. One
> problem with the news is that service may be rather spotty, not all
> messages going to all servers.
And the selection and mixing algorithms constitute the key; the passage
itself doesn't contribute any more than the pointers to it.
--
Jim Gillogly
24 Astron S.R. 1999, 16:57
12.19.6.1.19, 8 Cauac 7 Pop, Third Lord of Night
------------------------------
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