Cryptography-Digest Digest #578, Volume #9 Sat, 22 May 99 04:13:04 EDT
Contents:
Re: HushMail -- Free Secure Email (Chem-R-Us)
Re: Reasons for controlling encryption (Boris Kazak)
Re: HushMail -- Free Secure Email (Terry Ritter)
Re: Symmantic question (Boris Kazak)
Have you seen this code? (Nicholas Landau)
Re: Symmantic question (Matthew Skala)
Re: HushMail -- Free Secure Email (Chem-R-Us)
public/private key authentication? (revisited) (Phil Howard)
Re: QQ: Exporting SHA from the USA? (Phil Howard)
Re: RC4 based hash (Bauerda)
Re: DSA (Digital Signature Standard) and the Schnorr Patents ("Roger Schlafly")
Re: HushMail -- Free Secure Email ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
Re: HushMail -- Free Secure Email ("Roger Schlafly")
Re: Biprime Cryptography, Part II (kurt wismer)
Re: Biprime Cryptography, Part II (John Savard)
Re: HushMail -- Free Secure Email (John Savard)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
From: Chem-R-Us <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: HushMail -- Free Secure Email
Date: Fri, 21 May 1999 21:03:59 -0700
Terry Ritter wrote:
>
> I then went back through these pages looking at source. Their main
> page does have a JavaScript routine, which appears to be checking for
> MSIE version, since the system will not work on early browsers. That
> routine may not need to execute at all.
>
> So we see that having JavaScript off is *not* a problem for *my* poor
> little Win95 system.
Or that the Javascript isn't really disabled. The Unix version of
netscape is compiled from source code and then installed. Win95/98
is downloaded as an executable. Are you so sure that disabling
Javascript performs as advertised? Or is it just another windoze
'anomaly' to be patched at an undisclosed future date?
--
Chem-R-Us
------------------------------
From: Boris Kazak <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Reasons for controlling encryption
Date: Fri, 21 May 1999 21:14:54 -0400
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Greg Bartels wrote:
>
> (*********)
> then find anyone who persues an advanced degree in numerical analysis,
> and throw them in jail to protect the rest of the public.
>
> Greg
==================
Actually, nothing new or out of ordinary in this idea. In 1933-35
Joseph Stalin arrested and put into Russian hard labor camps everybody
who could read Arabic, from simple village mullahs to university
professors. The objective was to make the Moslem culture and history
unaccessible to the population of Central Asia, which was at the time
occupied and made part of Soviet Union. Thereafter Russian was being
taught to these people at schools, together with Communist ideology,
and the result has been so successful, that these folks have now big
problems reintegrating back into Moslem world, several generations
were completely isolated from these traditions.
Needless to say that practically all Arabists died in Gulag.
Best wishes BNK
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Terry Ritter)
Subject: Re: HushMail -- Free Secure Email
Date: Sat, 22 May 1999 04:36:04 GMT
On Fri, 21 May 1999 21:03:59 -0700, in <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
in sci.crypt Chem-R-Us <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>Terry Ritter wrote:
>>
>> I then went back through these pages looking at source. Their main
>> page does have a JavaScript routine, which appears to be checking for
>> MSIE version, since the system will not work on early browsers. That
>> routine may not need to execute at all.
>>
>> So we see that having JavaScript off is *not* a problem for *my* poor
>> little Win95 system.
>
>Or that the Javascript isn't really disabled. The Unix version of
>netscape is compiled from source code and then installed. Win95/98
>is downloaded as an executable. Are you so sure that disabling
>Javascript performs as advertised? Or is it just another windoze
>'anomaly' to be patched at an undisclosed future date?
I think it is clearly your problem. The real issue may have nothing
to do with JavaScript.
In a message in another newsgroup (which my ISP does not carry -- this
is from Deja at http://www.deja.com):
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: Encrypted Web-Mail
Date: 19 May 1999 00:00:00 GMT
Message-ID: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
NNTP-Posting-Date: Wed, 19 May 1999 17:43:14 CDT
Newsgroups: xmission.general
"We at Team Hush would like to address the caveats of Mr. Knarr:"
"Our system uses Java, not Javascript...."
I'm not saying this is the best possible system, or the best possible
security. Almost anything is going to be compromised to some extent
by Windows itself. But for easy-to-install, fairly-intuitive, and
apparently fairly secure end-to-end encryption, this is clearly a big
step up for most people. It is free and easy to use. If this is the
thing that popularizes cryptography to the masses, I can hardly wait.
If they someday start charging for it, we can look for something else.
I am nervous about the keys. If the public key process really is
end-to-end (not just a secret key), I would like to have the ability
to validate the public key from the other user with a signature. The
way it is now, maybe every key is inherently a man-in-the-middle,
re-enciphered at the server for the receiving party. They say not,
but maybe. But the basic concept is not inherently bad.
This is actually similar to PGP, as far as I know, for I doubt that
one PGP user in 50 actually certifies they public keys they use.
---
Terry Ritter [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.io.com/~ritter/
Crypto Glossary http://www.io.com/~ritter/GLOSSARY.HTM
Free Encrypted Email www.hushmail.com [EMAIL PROTECTED]
------------------------------
From: Boris Kazak <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Symmantic question
Date: Fri, 21 May 1999 21:45:47 -0400
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
John Savard wrote:
> (*********)
> Doubling the key length squares the time required for an exhaustive
> keysearch attack.
>
> John Savard ( teneerf<- )
> http://members.xoom.com/quadibloc/index.html
==================
Will you be so kind to explain, how are you going to square the
time, and what will be the meaning of the result?
IOW, how sec^2 or year^2 will be applicable to exhaustive key search?
Thankful in advance BNK
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Nicholas Landau)
Subject: Have you seen this code?
Date: 21 May 1999 23:51:48 -0400
Hi. I am anything but a cryptologist, but I have a question for
those in the profession. I have noticed that the white supremacists
on the net post in some kind of code. They are long strings of
nonesense sentences using English words. They often post several
messeges one after the other (because only some of the words are
used? )
Does this code sound familiar? I'm not crazy about racists, and
I would love to frustrate them by spreading the key to their code.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Matthew Skala)
Subject: Re: Symmantic question
Date: 21 May 1999 17:54:35 -0700
In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
John Savard <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>Doubling the key length squares the time required for an exhaustive
>keysearch attack.
There's a dimension problem with that; I think you mean it squares the
number of keys in the keyspace. Squaring the "time" would give you an
answer measured in "seconds squared", which don't see very useful.
--
Free laser networking and other crazy ideas @
http://www.islandnet.com/~mskala/netfree.html
------------------------------
From: Chem-R-Us <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: HushMail -- Free Secure Email
Date: Fri, 21 May 1999 22:08:40 -0700
Terry Ritter wrote:
>
> I think it is clearly your problem. The real issue may have nothing
> to do with JavaScript.
It certainly is some kind of problem. Whose problem is a subject of
useless debate.
IF I enable both Java and Javascript (netscape 4.5 on Linux), the
sign-in process goes without a flaw, as does accessing and reading
email. If I disable Java or Javascript, then the screen just turns
purplish and dies (ala NT's BSOD - which is very disconcerting).
Re-enabling both is the only way to get the site to work.
Which leads us to some computing fundamentals "All software sucks,
just some sucks worse than others. The same goes for hardware."
The site does claim to be in beta, so a little latitude should be
allowed for growing pains. However, since this is crypto (the domain
of the security conscious to the irrationally paranoid), exactly how
much anamolous behavior is considered allowable?
Their effort may one day be laudable, but for now is little more
than laughable, because, as you point out:
> I'm not saying this is the best possible system, or the best possible
> security. Almost anything is going to be compromised to some extent
> by Windows itself. But for easy-to-install, fairly-intuitive, and
> apparently fairly secure end-to-end encryption, this is clearly a big
> step up for most people. It is free and easy to use. If this is the
> thing that popularizes cryptography to the masses, I can hardly wait.
> If they someday start charging for it, we can look for something else.
>
> I am nervous about the keys. If the public key process really is
> end-to-end (not just a secret key), I would like to have the ability
> to validate the public key from the other user with a signature. The
> way it is now, maybe every key is inherently a man-in-the-middle,
> re-enciphered at the server for the receiving party. They say not,
> but maybe. But the basic concept is not inherently bad.
>
> This is actually similar to PGP, as far as I know, for I doubt that
> one PGP user in 50 actually certifies they public keys they use.
I too am nervous about the keys. With PGP I can call and verify a
fingerprint or key ID, or read them from a website. I've even done
it via snail mail. With keys I cannot touch, but am simply assured
are there, how can I be sure that it is nothing more than a
yahoo.com or hotmail.com masquerading as a secure system.
--
Chem-R-Us
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Phil Howard)
Subject: public/private key authentication? (revisited)
Date: Sat, 22 May 1999 05:43:49 GMT
It seems my news provider has already discarded the thread I started.
They claim 30 day retention but a post 11 days ago isn't there. I'll
have to question them about it.
Anyway, I found some replies made to my original posting on Dejanews.
John Savard suggested because of my ham radio call, I was looking for
a solution that didn't violation ham radio regulations. Well, that
might in fact be a valid pursuit and I would even be interested in it.
However, it wasn't why I posted the question in the first place.
What I want is a means to strongly authenticate a connection over the
network that does not need any encryption to hide anything, without
using any form of encryption for reasons of both US export restrictions
as well as possession restrictions in other places (like France).
That's why instead of:
D(k',E(k,m)) -> m
I'm really looking for:
A(k',m,S(k,m)) -> 1 (authentication passes) or 0 (fails)
The essential requirements are:
1. No ability for any observer to impersonate the sender.
2. No ability for the recipient to impersonate the sender.
3. No man-in-the middle attack.
Number 2 sort of rules out shared secret. If that were not a requirement,
then I could simply hash (such as with RIPEMD-160) the message and secret
together, send the hash and message to the other end, and there hash the
message with the supposed same shared secret and compare received hash with
the stored hash. But in order to meet #2 I'd have to have N*N-N secrets
for N parties and provide for N*N-N secret channels to exchange keys. It
would be better to have a public private key scheme like PK crypto has.
So if I can generate k and k' and publish k' and then generate a hash with
k that can be authenticated with k' (doesn't matter if it can also be
authenticated with k) that would be what I am looking for.
That would allow me to post a message to the public and allow everyone to
authenticate the message, and not just one recipient. So it might well be
good in ham radio, too, for this reason.
Any algorithms?
--
Phil Howard KA9WGN
[EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED]
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Phil Howard)
Subject: Re: QQ: Exporting SHA from the USA?
Date: Sat, 22 May 1999 05:59:23 GMT
On 17 May 1999 16:34:13 -0000 iLLusIOn (Use-Author-Address-Header@[127.1]) wrote:
| just a quick question, is it possible/allowed to
| export a program using the SHA from the USA
| (the program i'm talking about only uses SHA,
| and no encryption algorithms with keysizes bigger
| 40 bits)?
IMHO, yes, as long as there is no code at all in there that is,
or can be used as, encryption. I've posted a RIPEMD-160 library
at http://phil.ipal.org/freeware/rmd160 that has no crypto in it.
--
Phil Howard KA9WGN
[EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED]
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Bauerda)
Subject: Re: RC4 based hash
Date: 20 May 1999 23:08:23 GMT
>If you used the RC4 key schedule as a compression function (using the
>message as the key), then the RC4 RNG as the actual hash output
>wouldn't that a neat basis?
Yes, I have writen a program which does just this. To prevent problems with
the ends of inputs or short inputs, my function stores the last 256 bytes of
the message in a circular buffer and then runs the key setup over that again.
It then discards 256 more bytes. If you want to slow down searches (and
hashes) then discard more bytes at the end: this can be done much faster than
encoding. A hash of this nature has the advantage that it is very fast for
large inputs, because is does a lot of computing at the end.
>
>Some things though, such as messages longer then the key schedule,
>possibly repeat the key schedule? There are only 2^1684 possible
>combinations of the deck however, Would a restriction have to be
>imposed?
Not unless you are outputting a 1685 bit hash.
David Bauer
------------------------------
From: "Roger Schlafly" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Crossposted-To: talk.politics.crypto,alt.security.pgp,comp.security.pgp.discuss
Subject: Re: DSA (Digital Signature Standard) and the Schnorr Patents
Date: Fri, 21 May 1999 22:27:44 -0700
Vin McLellan wrote in message <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>...
[long discussion of Schnorr, DSA, etc. snipped]
Several points in response ...
* Claus Schnorr is a brilliant man, but he is not an expert in US patent
law.
* Schnorr sold his patent rights to Siemens and RSADSI, so his
opinion is irrelevant. Others are enforcing the patent.
* RSADSI does NOT claim that practice of the DSA infringes
Schnorr's patent. RSADSI lawyers have specifically repudiated
such coverage in open court. Anyone who thinks that there is some
nonzero chance that the Schnorr patent covers DSA is uninformed.
* Yes, DSS was intended for authentication, not confidentiality.
Most crypto people have now come around to the view that
encryption and signature keys should be separate.
* Although DSA does not explicitly give a confidentiality method
(encryption or key agreement), the closely related Diffie-Hellman
methods are well-known and widely used. Use of DSA does not
inhibit confidentiality.
* We may soon find out whether historians will find that patents
contributed to the spread of strong crypto. The MIT/RSA patent
runs out in Sept. 2000. My guess is that use of strong crypto will
go up at that time, not down.
* All this spook conspiracy talk belongs in the X-files. The specs
for Fortezza have been declassified. Sure, the NSA has some
GAK-related motives, but these grand conspiracy theories just
haven't panned out.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: HushMail -- Free Secure Email
Date: Sat, 22 May 1999 06:36:20 GMT
Uhm, I didn't so far see the remark that
hushmail ONLY sends encrypted mail to other
hushmail addressess. That's how far the encryption goes.
Other than that, it is of great importance (and the only real way of
being sure that hushmail is what it's pretending to be) that their
source is analysed COMPLETELY.
Greetz
------------------------------
From: "Roger Schlafly" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: HushMail -- Free Secure Email
Date: Sat, 22 May 1999 00:01:21 -0700
Terry Ritter wrote in message <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>...
> http://www.hushmail.com/
>
>Encryption is end-to-end and occurs locally by downloading a public
>key Java applet. Source is available. The company is outside the US.
According to Internic,
Domain Name: HUSHMAIL.COM
Hush Communications USA, Inc. 2002 Guadalupe St. #133
Austin, TX 78705 US
Even if they have some offshore servers, they could be subject to US
laws if it is owned by some Texans.
------------------------------
From: kurt wismer <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Biprime Cryptography, Part II
Date: Sat, 22 May 1999 02:42:16 GMT
Matthias Bruestle wrote:
>
> Mahlzeit
>
> kurt wismer ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) wrote:
>
> > i don't know... asymetric key cryptography may be a little more
> > descriptive...
>
> But it should be a name for RSA and not also ElGamal, DH, DSA, ...
context has been snipped... i responded to a plea not to change the term
public key cryptography... all public key algorithms are asymmetric
algorithms... you can't decrypt a message with the same key you
encrypted it with...
--
"close your eyes and bow your head
i need a little sympathy
cause fear is strong and love's for
everyone who isn't me"
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (John Savard)
Subject: Re: Biprime Cryptography, Part II
Date: Fri, 21 May 1999 22:24:25 GMT
David A Molnar <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote, in part:
>Note that RSA would still work if you had a modulus that was of the form
>p^k * q, p and q prime. In fact, you get a possible speedup that way
>by using the Chinese Remainder Theorem to compute modular exponentiations
>over each of the small p s and the q independently before combining 'em
>together.
If the p's are small, doesn't that make factoring the modulus very
easy?
John Savard ( teneerf<- )
http://members.xoom.com/quadibloc/index.html
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (John Savard)
Subject: Re: HushMail -- Free Secure Email
Date: Fri, 21 May 1999 22:23:15 GMT
[EMAIL PROTECTED] (Terry Ritter) wrote, in part:
>Most people on sci.crypt should probably check out the new free
>encrypted email web site:
> http://www.hushmail.com/
>Encryption is end-to-end and occurs locally by downloading a public
>key Java applet. Source is available. The company is outside the US.
Recently, I tried the HotJava browser, and found it quite slow. Since
public-key encryption is computationally-intensive, I'm a bit worried.
Also, the way they say to just create an account, choose a user name
and "Jiggle your mouse to create a random set of keys" ... I hope I
don't do that *on their web site*, but on my computer later. Doubtless
I'm misunderstanding the description.
Yes, an encryption program more convenient to use than PGP will
increase the popularity of encryption. Since they're using their own
"patent-pending technology", and are asking users to register, I
expect this is going to be tied into a later commercial offering of
some type.
John Savard ( teneerf<- )
http://members.xoom.com/quadibloc/index.html
------------------------------
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