Cryptography-Digest Digest #604, Volume #9 Thu, 27 May 99 17:13:03 EDT
Contents:
Re: The Sterling Approximation as it relates to OAP-L3 encryption ("Douglas A.
Gwyn")
Re: What good is hushmail? ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
Re: A question on congruential algebra (Medical Electronics Lab)
evaluation cryptographic algorithms (Andreas / Detlef Stieger)
Re: AES tweaks (David Crick)
Re: request opinion/info : 1.5 Mbits/s public key scheme (David A Molnar)
Re: Why would a hacker reveal that he has broken a code? (David A Molnar)
Re: 3-DES test vectors (DJohn37050)
Re: DSA (Digital Signature Standard) and the Schnorr Patents ("Roger Schlafly")
Re: non-computerized cryptography (Jim Dunnett)
Re: Oriental Language Based Encryption (Patrick Juola)
Re: NSA proves banks use poor crypto (Jim Dunnett)
Re: Best algorithm combination? (SCOTT19U.ZIP_GUY)
Re: Why would a hacker reveal that he has broken a code? (Patrick Juola)
Re: NSA proves banks use poor crypto (SCOTT19U.ZIP_GUY)
Re: What good is hushmail? (Bruce Stephens)
Any way to decrypt .PWL windows password files? (Claude Martel)
Re: AES tweaks (SCOTT19U.ZIP_GUY)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
From: "Douglas A. Gwyn" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Crossposted-To: talk.politics.crypto
Subject: Re: The Sterling Approximation as it relates to OAP-L3 encryption
Date: Thu, 27 May 1999 18:04:04 GMT
Anthony Stephen Szopa wrote:
> Sterling's Approximation for factorials: ...
It's Stirling, not Sterling.
> ... there are three randomly sequenced sets of these 3,628,800
> permutations used to generate random numbers using this software,'
What software are you talking about?
> Since three such files are used the statistical possibilities of
> arranging these 10,886,400 permutations is about 1E66,000,000.
There is nothing statistical about that.
> This is where the claim that there may be as many as approximately
> 1E66,000,000 possible OTPs generated using this software comes from.
So what? Similarly huge numbers of possibilities have been cited
in the past for cryptosystems that were readily broken.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: What good is hushmail?
Date: Thu, 27 May 1999 18:37:48 GMT
On Thu, 27 May 1999 05:26:43 GMT, [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Terry Ritter) wrote:
>The basic idea of good end-to-end security independent of whatever is
>in between seems almost within their grasp, but it still needs to be
>completed to deliver on the promise. Maybe that will never happen.
>Maybe somebody else will take their idea and do it right.
The point is that right now, absent applet validation and end to end
key validation by some neutral entity, hushmail's security is to some
extent dependent on the absence of concerted gov interest in
particular users.Of course you could say that of every communications
medium. But hushmail is making claims for its relative security that
need to be analyzed carefully.
------------------------------
From: Medical Electronics Lab <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: A question on congruential algebra
Date: Tue, 25 May 1999 12:30:58 -0500
Manuel Pancorbo wrote:
>
> I would like to know how difficult (Polinomial, Non-Polinomial time
> requiered) is to solve the following problems about congruences and their
> most proper solving algorithm.
>
> 1) Given 'y' and the prime modulus 'n' find 'x' that fullfils
>
> n^2 mod n = y
y = 0. do you mean x^2 mod n? then it's simple, polynomial time.
> 2) Given a prime modulus 'n' and given also the fact that the problem, for
> this given 'n', has solution, find any 'a', 'b'
>
> (a^2 + b^2) mod n = 0
a^2 = -b^2 = n - b^2 > 0 so you can find a = sqrt(n-b^2) in polynomial time.
Patience, persistence, truth,
Dr. mike
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Andreas / Detlef Stieger)
Subject: evaluation cryptographic algorithms
Date: Thu, 27 May 1999 20:09:07 +0200
Hi everyone.
I always wondered how cryptoscientists evaluate their algorithms.
I think it is dangerous just to look at the number of possible keys and to
calculate how long it would take to check all the keys if all computers in
the world would join calculation power 24 hours a day, seven days a week.
("Exhaustionsmethode")
How must an encryption algorithm be so that it can be evaluated as "strong"
(besides that is has to have a large number of possible keys) I heard of
assymetric keys and so on...
I would also like to know what, providing that an algorithm is "strong", can
make him "weak"?
(publicating the source code, attack algorithms, new and faster
computers...)
===
An old anglosaxon proverb:
Qebbema J. Lmui Ufmciuximvi: 2l .yv. .zyt. 2l
--
Andreas Stieger: mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]
------------------------------
From: David Crick <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: AES tweaks
Date: Thu, 27 May 1999 20:07:33 +0100
=====BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE=====
"SCOTT19U.ZIP_GUY" wrote:
>
> It is not that all block ciohers are inherently weak it is just
> that so much focus on them limits the amout to testing groups like
> the NSA have to do when something encrypted is encountered. So
> people should be working on other types as well.
> But as a proof of weakness in the chaining methods and a proof
> that the chaining methods in use suck big time.
The pros and cons of the various chaining methods have been
documented by varius people and bodies. If you have come up with
a new attack/weakness, then this would be interesting.
> Taka a long file of your chioce but many thousands of bytes in
> length use any AES candidate and use CBC with an IV of your
> choice. Now btye swap the file ( I have reverse at my site in the
> compression section) now pick any other or the SAME AES candidate
> pick a new IV and new key and encrypt the file again. Take this
> resultant file hex edit it change ine bit in the middle of the
> file. Now reverse the encryption with last method used. reverse
> file and decrypt with the first method used. You know have a file
> that matches exactly the original file except for a few blocks in
> the area of where you twiddled the bit. For laughs you can do the
> same thing again but use the wrong IV's for the decryption this
> time besdies the same area where the bit was twiddled the front
> and back few block are messed up. This is because the crypto gods
> want people to use methods where only a small portion of a file
> needs to be examined and studied for a break to occur.
> This allows for easy attack if you start your files the same or use
> stuff like woud where Mr gates can easily place small streches of
> plain text to help the NSA.
If you think you have discovered a new and significant attack which
works particularly well on some of the AES candidates, then I suggest
you post it to the discussion forums on the NIST web site.
I'm sure the algorithm designers would be interested in genuinely
exploitable (or even plain "academic") attacks, and that you should
submit an official comment to NIST if this really is the case.
David.
--
+-------------------------------------------------------------------+
| David Crick [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://members.tripod.com/vidcad/ |
| Damon Hill WC96 Tribute: http://www.geocities.com/MotorCity/4236/ |
| M. Brundle Quotes: http://members.tripod.com/~vidcad/martin_b.htm |
| PGP Public Keys: 2048-bit RSA: 0x22D5C7A9 4096-DH/DSS: 0x87C46DE1 |
+-------------------------------------------------------------------+
------------------------------
From: David A Molnar <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: request opinion/info : 1.5 Mbits/s public key scheme
Date: 27 May 1999 19:00:17 GMT
Karel Wouters <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> I'm a mathematician too, but my opinion is that Prof Moh has overlooked
> some problems in his scheme. The basis of the scheme looks very strong,
> but the scheme in its present shape could be compromised. (easily, I
> suspect)
Do tell. Well, actually, I'll wait to read your report. Do consider that
if you can break it, though, then the report is probably interesting
enough to warrant publishing wherever it is that Dr. Moh first published
his original scheme. Nothing wrong with getting something in print
if you do that kind of work.
Hey, if you can find a safe version of the scheme, you may even have
something for an upcoming CRYPTO. :-)
> I'll post the URL of my report when it's finished. (if ever :-)
Thanks much; looking forward to it.
-David Molnar
------------------------------
From: David A Molnar <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Why would a hacker reveal that he has broken a code?
Date: 27 May 1999 19:04:54 GMT
Paul Schlyter <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Much more, unless that PC is equipped with dedicated DES hardware.
>
> To do an exhaustive search in 1000 years, one would have to try
> some 2 million DES keys every second. That's probably too much
> for even the latest fastest Pentium.
>
I'll have to see if I can convince my distributed.net client to
crack some dummy DES keys. Right now it's pounding out about 1M
RC5-64 keys per second. (I have a P3/500 -- yes, condolences, yes)
After all, this is the one benchmark I actually care about. :-)
-David Molnar (who remembers 236,400 or so RC4 keys/sec on old HPUX in '95)
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (DJohn37050)
Subject: Re: 3-DES test vectors
Date: 27 May 1999 19:53:29 GMT
The ANSI X9 TDES Validation tests do. However, they cost money (some, not a
lot).
Don Johnson
------------------------------
From: "Roger Schlafly" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Crossposted-To: talk.politics.crypto
Subject: Re: DSA (Digital Signature Standard) and the Schnorr Patents
Date: Thu, 27 May 1999 11:48:16 -0700
Vin McLellan wrote in message <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>...
> While making no claim to be a patent scholar, my point was only that
>Claus Schnorr's claims -- and/or either his US, European, or Japanese
>patents -- was credible enough that it profoundly influenced vendor
>adoption of the DSS, and that, in turn, had an serious impact on both
>US policy (as well as the relative security of US federal agencies.)
>
> I don't mean to suggest that the Schnorr patents were the only factor
>-- or even one of the most important factors -- in blocking ESS,
>Fortezza, required key-escrow or key recovery, etc. I only claim that
>the Schnorr patents became, briefly, very important in that struggle
>when they helped derailed the DSS bandwagon.
This I deny. The patent situation, on balance, worked in favor of DSS,
not against it. NIST declared DSS patent-free. Even to the extent
patents might have worked against DSS, the Schnorr patent was
not even the main patent problem. The Diffie-Hellman and Hellman-
Merkle patents had much more credible claims against DSS.
Both of those patents had claims which arguably read on DSS.
After all, those inventors discovered (1) public key cryptography,
(2) use of one-way functions for cryptography, (3) public keys
which are powers mod p, (4) digital signatures. Their patents
had broad claims in these areas.
OTOH, Schnorr claims do not read on DSS.
It is axiomatic in patent law that a patent claim is an expression
of what the inventor regards as his invention, and that the scope
of the patent is limited to what is actually claimed in the claims.
Schnorr apparently now thinks he invented the idea of using a
subgroup to make an ElGamal-like signature scheme more
efficient. Whether this is true or not, I don't know. At any rate, it
is not what he claimed in his patent. It is not what the patent
office examined when the patent office compared his application
to the prior art. From a legal point of view, it is not what Schnorr
regarded as his invention at the time.
> It is still hard to believe the hubris of the NSA officials who
>decided that they could turn the tide and displace PKC with GAKed
>technology, simply by managing the standards process and federal
>purchasing.
I think you are still mixing up GAK with DSS. Do you likewise object to
SHS (SHA, SHA-1)? There is no GAK in SHS or DSS. The GAK is
in EES. You can use DSS without GAK, and most people do.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Jim Dunnett)
Subject: Re: non-computerized cryptography
Date: Thu, 27 May 1999 19:05:32 GMT
Reply-To: Jim Dunnett
On Thu, 27 May 1999 00:35:28 -0400, "HypSoft" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
wrote:
>What would the military non-computerized codes actually be? Does anyone
>know of any web sites which cover this topic?
When I was in the military it was developments of the
Typex machine for off-line.
On-Line used a machine implementation of a stream
cipher. Before that one-time tape equivalent to an OTP.
--
Regards, Jim. | If you want a picture of the future,
olympus%jimdee.prestel.co.uk | imagine a boot stamping on a human
[EMAIL PROTECTED] | face for ever.
dynastic%cwcom.net |
nordland%lineone.net | - George Orwell 1903-1950.
Pgp key: pgpkeys.mit.edu:11371
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Patrick Juola)
Subject: Re: Oriental Language Based Encryption
Date: 27 May 1999 15:37:29 -0400
In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
Mok-Kong Shen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>Patrick Juola wrote:
>>
>> My understanding :
>>
>> I replace all words in an English text (it doesn't really have to be
>> a dictionary) with sort of opaque symbol, then diffuse the symbols
>> around via some sort of transposition cypher, and then you ask what
>> I can get out of this?
>>
>> Answer : probably plenty.
>
>Perhaps you could comment a bit more if I tell you what a telegraphic
>code for Chinese is. The code book contains 10000 commonly used
>Chinese words and assign to each word a four digit numberical number.
>If you do the same for 10000 English words, then the frequencies
>of the original English alphabet don't get reflected in the frequencies
>of the digits of the numerical code. Let's consider an imaginary
>(untrue) case that these 10000 words are used with the same frequency.
>Then one should, if one counts the characters, obtain a fairly
>non-uniform distribution, say the one that one commonly finds in tables
>about frequencies. But the counterpart, the frequency distribution of
>the digits of the corresponding code words, is clearly uniform. As I
>said, the above is a unrealistic case simply chosen to aid
>argumentation but I suppose you can nevertheless get my point.
And unfortunately, the unrealism is exactly the assumption whose
negation I rely upon in order to break the system.
The statistics of word frequency are rather well understood as a
general model for all languages -- you can look it up under the
keywords "Zipf's Law," after George K. Zipf who first identified
the distribution (in English). In any realistic example, most
reasonably-large sized samples of text will follow a Zipf distribution
reasonably closely in terms of word frequency. This also means that
your telegraph-code numbers will *also* follow a Zipf curve fairly
closely, and I can use the match between the telegraph code and the
actual words of Chinese to discover and refine which (high frequency)
words are assigned to which numbers.
So you are correct that you will by this method be hiding letter frequency
information -- but you will be preserving the strongly informative
*word* frequency information. And in the hands of a competent linguist,
this is just as revealing, perhaps more so.
-kitten
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Jim Dunnett)
Crossposted-To: talk.politics.crypto
Subject: Re: NSA proves banks use poor crypto
Date: Thu, 27 May 1999 19:05:33 GMT
Reply-To: Jim Dunnett
[EMAIL PROTECTED] (SCOTT19U.ZIP_GUY) wrote, in part:
>
>"Newsweek magazine reports
>...
>Clinton has authorized
>...
>the National Security Agency to meddle with Milosevic's international bank accounts."
>
If his spooks can do that, perhaps he can discover
how much Milosevic donated to our Tory party two or
three years ago.
--
Regards, Jim. | If you want a picture of the future,
olympus%jimdee.prestel.co.uk | imagine a boot stamping on a human
[EMAIL PROTECTED] | face for ever.
dynastic%cwcom.net |
nordland%lineone.net | - George Orwell 1903-1950.
Pgp key: pgpkeys.mit.edu:11371
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (SCOTT19U.ZIP_GUY)
Subject: Re: Best algorithm combination?
Date: Thu, 27 May 1999 21:26:38 GMT
In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, Kiril Kesarev <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>Several ciphers can be combined to increase security. One
>scheme would look as follows:
>
>1. Split the message into N shadows by XORing it with bits
>from a true RNG. Each shadow has the same length as the
>original message and all shadows are required to reconstruct
>the original message (OTP-style).
>
>2. Each shadow is encrypted separately with different
>secret-key ciphers using different keys for each of them.
>
>3. The resulting ciphertext will consist of all the
>encrypted shadows.
>
>In order to break the scheme, a cryptoanalyst must be
>able to break all the secret-key ciphers used in the scheme.
>
>If a paranoid person wishes to encrypt his email using
>several secret-key algorithms in parallel, what combination
>of ciphers should he use?
>
>Is it wise to bet on one type of ciphers, eg. encrypt
>using 3DES, IDEA, and BLOWFISH, or use a diverse combination
>like: BLOWFISH, some LFSR-cipher, RC4, and a strong PRNG such as the
>BBS-generator?
>
>Any ideas on the "best" combination of ciphers?
>
The problem with many of the ciphers you mention above that with out the
usual weak chaining you may have different length files unless you specify
files of certain specific multiples. I would prefer SCOTT19U alone or at least
in combination with any of the above since it handles files of various lengths
so the file will not have to be a multible of 56bit or 64bis or what other
size your methods default to.
David A. Scott
--
SCOTT19U.ZIP NOW AVAILABLE WORLD WIDE
http://www.jim.com/jamesd/Kong/scott19u.zip
http://members.xoom.com/ecil/index.htm
NOTE EMAIL address is for SPAMERS
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Patrick Juola)
Subject: Re: Why would a hacker reveal that he has broken a code?
Date: 27 May 1999 16:12:58 -0400
In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, Terry Ritter <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>On Thu, 27 May 1999 14:19:00 GMT, in
><[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, in sci.crypt
>[EMAIL PROTECTED] (John Savard) wrote:
>
>>[...]
>>I'm not trying to say that everything must be insecure, although I
>>acknowledge the validity of Terry Ritter's point on the other hand:
>>even when a cipher _is_ secure, it's very hard to *prove* that it is,
>>since somebody could have an analytic method of attack of a kind that
>>we hadn't even begun to think of.
>
>I think everybody agrees with that, but in cryptography there seems to
>be some sort of peculiar need to go *beyond* what science and logic
>can deliver.
>
>Not only does the collective experience of cryptanalysis not rise to
>the level of proof, it is not even "evidence" of what others can do.
>
>
>>It's sort of like trying to predict what mathematicians will discover
>>next year.
>
>Notice that what mathematicians work on and fail to find this year is
>*not* treated as "evidence" of a limit on what math dabblers could do,
>what other groups might already have done, or what will happen next
>year.
Obviously from someone who's never either written or reviewed budget
plans for a mathematically-intense group.
Hint : if a lot of people have pounded on a problem for a while with
minimal impact, most bean-counters will regard that as "evidence of
a limit" and will pull the plug on your funding.
-kitten
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (SCOTT19U.ZIP_GUY)
Crossposted-To: talk.politics.crypto
Subject: Re: NSA proves banks use poor crypto
Date: Thu, 27 May 1999 21:32:13 GMT
In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, Squitter Shivwits <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>SCOTT19U.ZIP_GUY wrote:
>>
>> In article <Za%23.5637$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, "Steven Alexander"
> <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>> >Even though this story comes from a respected source, it is highly
>> >questionable. Foreign countries would have a serious problem with a U.S.
>> >government agency attacking foreign banks. Also, if such an order were
>> >given it would be highly classified. It would only be known to top military
>> >and intelligence officials. I'm fairly confident that it wouldn't be likely
>> >to fall victim to a press leak.
>> >
>> >my $.02
>> >
>> >-steven
>
>Press leak? No, more likely it is a planted story. The CIA works that
>way, pretending to let a story leak out about banks being targetted
>for a crypto break in. The goal may be to get the banks to change
>their crypto Al Gorisms and protocols so their agents can help to
>sometimes insert preferred algorisms. The more often the banks change
>their crypto, the more opportunity there is for the agents, who are
>posing as crypto consultants, to recommend alGorisms that they can
>break.
No I am afraid that it is not a planted story. The other guy is right banks
already use weak crypto. Bankers are not the brightest lot when it comes
to encryption. And most managers are to stupid to change. However if
they did change you are correct in that they would go with the HYPE and
pick a shity method. The next time banks make a major change it will
be to the over hyped AES winner.
David A. Scott
--
SCOTT19U.ZIP NOW AVAILABLE WORLD WIDE
http://www.jim.com/jamesd/Kong/scott19u.zip
http://members.xoom.com/ecil/index.htm
NOTE EMAIL address is for SPAMERS
------------------------------
From: Bruce Stephens <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: What good is hushmail?
Date: 27 May 1999 22:02:25 +0100
[EMAIL PROTECTED] writes:
> At least in some foreign countries we all know, It's pretty easy for
> the relevant gov. agency to get your friendly neighborhood isp to
> redirect the DNS entry for hushmail to a "clone" site that looks
> just like it...so if you really need to protect yourself against Big
> Brother and the Holding Company, clearly this ain't the way....sorry
> suckers.
Also, although the Java source for the applets are available (so I can
check that), how do I know that the bytecode that my browser
automatically downloads actually corresponds to that source?
Do browsers typically let me compile my own Java sourcecode and use
that in preference to the class files a web page references? I don't
remember such an option, but perhaps I've just missed it?
------------------------------
From: Claude Martel <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Any way to decrypt .PWL windows password files?
Date: Thu, 27 May 1999 20:52:34 GMT
Greetings,
My friend, who is kind of lost sometimes, changed his password lately
and is unable to remember it. I fixed it easily by bypassing the loosy
win95 security and replacing his pwl file, but I was wondering if there
is a way/program to decrypt the PWL file?
Claude Martel
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (SCOTT19U.ZIP_GUY)
Subject: Re: AES tweaks
Date: Thu, 27 May 1999 21:20:56 GMT
In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>, David Crick <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>"SCOTT19U.ZIP_GUY" wrote:
>>
>> It is not that all block ciohers are inherently weak it is just
>> that so much focus on them limits the amout to testing groups like
>> the NSA have to do when something encrypted is encountered. So
>> people should be working on other types as well.
>> But as a proof of weakness in the chaining methods and a proof
>> that the chaining methods in use suck big time.
>
>The pros and cons of the various chaining methods have been
>documented by varius people and bodies. If you have come up with
>a new attack/weakness, then this would be interesting.
>
>> Taka a long file of your chioce but many thousands of bytes in
>> length use any AES candidate and use CBC with an IV of your
>> choice. Now btye swap the file ( I have reverse at my site in the
>> compression section) now pick any other or the SAME AES candidate
>> pick a new IV and new key and encrypt the file again. Take this
>> resultant file hex edit it change ine bit in the middle of the
>> file. Now reverse the encryption with last method used. reverse
>> file and decrypt with the first method used. You know have a file
>> that matches exactly the original file except for a few blocks in
>> the area of where you twiddled the bit. For laughs you can do the
>> same thing again but use the wrong IV's for the decryption this
>> time besdies the same area where the bit was twiddled the front
>> and back few block are messed up. This is because the crypto gods
>> want people to use methods where only a small portion of a file
>> needs to be examined and studied for a break to occur.
>> This allows for easy attack if you start your files the same or use
>> stuff like woud where Mr gates can easily place small streches of
>> plain text to help the NSA.
>
>If you think you have discovered a new and significant attack which
>works particularly well on some of the AES candidates, then I suggest
>you post it to the discussion forums on the NIST web site.
>I'm sure the algorithm designers would be interested in genuinely
>exploitable (or even plain "academic") attacks, and that you should
>submit an official comment to NIST if this really is the case.
>
> David.
>
Dave I just think they are a bunch of stuffed shirts wearing clown suits
why should I kiss there ass. I am sure they are aware of such weakness
they just really don't give a damn. And did you try the above test or like
most you just dismess this with out giving a dam too. No wonder the
Chinese are wiping our asses.
David A. Scott
--
SCOTT19U.ZIP NOW AVAILABLE WORLD WIDE
http://www.jim.com/jamesd/Kong/scott19u.zip
http://members.xoom.com/ecil/index.htm
NOTE EMAIL address is for SPAMERS
------------------------------
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