Cryptography-Digest Digest #262, Volume #10 Sat, 18 Sep 99 06:13:03 EDT
Contents:
Re: Example of a one way function?
Re: Okay "experts," how do you do it? (SCOTT19U.ZIP_GUY)
Re: Exclusive Or (XOR) Knapsacks (David Wagner)
Re: 3des? (Anton Stiglic)
Re: 3des? ("Richard Parker")
Re: Okay "experts," how do you do it? (David A Molnar)
Re: Crypto 3.5
Re: The good things about "bad" cryptography
Re: peekboo needs help :( (David A Molnar)
Re: What is XOR? (Anton Stiglic)
Re: Q: Is this key-exchange OK? (Thomas Wu)
Re: Okay "experts," how do you do it? (John Savard)
Re: peekboo needs help :( (Eric Lee Green)
Re: SCOTT19U.ZIP_GUY/Questions Please (Johnny Bravo)
Re: Analogues to ECC over higher dim. abelian groups (Robert Harley)
Re: Performance benchmarks ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
Re: Okay "experts," how do you do it? ("Trevor Jackson, III")
Re: Exclusive Or (XOR) Knapsacks ("Trevor Jackson, III")
Re: SCOTT19U.ZIP_GUY/Questions Please ("Trevor Jackson, III")
Re: Second "_NSAKey" ("Trevor Jackson, III")
Glossary of undefineable crypto terms (was Re: Ritter's paper) ("Trevor Jackson,
III")
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] ()
Subject: Re: Example of a one way function?
Date: 18 Sep 99 04:37:02 GMT
I. Michael Mandelberg ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) wrote:
: or is this specific to DES?
No, it isn't. But it isn't useful for communicating a key, although it
would be useful for generating a pseudorandom one.
John Savard ( teneerf<- )
http://www.ecn.ab.ca/~jsavard/crypto.htm
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (SCOTT19U.ZIP_GUY)
Subject: Re: Okay "experts," how do you do it?
Date: Sat, 18 Sep 1999 06:09:50 GMT
In article <u6vN4wWA$GA.268@cpmsnbbsa03>, "Joseph Ashwood" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>> he's paranoid but not totally wrong. just an example.
>> an unknown designs a new cypher A and coppersmith, rivest and shamir
>> design a another new cypher B. Will you read both papers with the
>> same 'open mind' ?
>
>I see no reason not to, one paper is likely to be very interesting, while
>the other is likely to involve a large body of comedic work.
>
>> if yes, that's mean you read all the cypher descriptions posted sci.scrypt
>> and elsewhere and study them as much as you study any AES proposal.
>> in fact i hope you don't because it is obviously a waste of time.
>
>With an AES candidate it is unlikely to find a break no matter how much time
>one spends, however the cypher A is likely to be broken (or at least
>suspected) by the time the reading is finished.
>
>As a side note I find it rather odd that Scott19u fails compilation due to
>non-standard headers, which basically means that although I am willing to
>dig through his source code (which last time I went over it was poorly
>documented, and wouldn't compile on any of the 7 compiler/machine
>combinations I tried it on). I may not be one of the crypto gods but even I
>won't waste my time trying to read it, and I didn't even get past the
>#include's.
> Joseph
Actually a german guy got scott16u to compile with Visual C the main error
was the one with the Dimension statement. He put that in and a few other minor
changes and it worked. But scott19u does compile under DGJPP GNU C
and with few modifaction work in Lunix. Which will be on the next machine I
get.
>
>
David A. Scott
--
SCOTT19U.ZIP NOW AVAILABLE WORLD WIDE
http://www.jim.com/jamesd/Kong/scott19u.zip
http://members.xoom.com/ecil/index.htm
NOTE EMAIL address is for SPAMERS
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (David Wagner)
Subject: Re: Exclusive Or (XOR) Knapsacks
Date: 17 Sep 1999 22:16:36 -0700
In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
Douglas A. Gwyn <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Gary wrote:
> > What if the matrix wasn't square?
>
> That's a different problem. Use SVD, which should work for GF(2)
> so far as I can see at a first glance.
I think you (and another poster) misread his question.
You're thinking of the case where the number of elements in the set
is _less_ than the length of the bitvectors, but I believe he asked
for the case where you have _more_ elements.
Extra elements don't hurt you; Gaussian elimination still works.
------------------------------
From: Anton Stiglic <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: 3des?
Date: Fri, 17 Sep 1999 16:58:56 -0400
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> Anton Stiglic wrote:
>
> > Where in the world did you read that? What do you mean by man in the middle
> > attack on DES. Are you talking about 3DES?
>
> By mitm, it means Meet in the Middle. 3DES calls for:
> C = Ek1(Dk2(Ek3(c)))
>
Yes, I know about this attack for 3DES, but he was talking about simple DES, with a
different sized key (that is, different from 56 bits that DES usualy uses...).
------------------------------
From: "Richard Parker" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: 3des?
Date: Fri, 17 Sep 1999 18:28:39 GMT
> If using DES with 768-bit keys provides no better resistance (and no less)
> to iterative attacks but allows a key strength of 384 bits (because of the
> mitm attack), why not use that instead of 3des?
Tom,
Biham and Shamir investigated this question in their paper
"Differential cryptanalysis of DES-like cryptosystems." Here is what
they had to say:
"The full DES with independent subkeys (i.e., with 16 * 48 = 768
independent key bits) is breakable within 2^61 steps. As a result,
any modification of the key scheduling algorithm cannot make DES
much stronger."
-Richard
------------------------------
From: David A Molnar <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Okay "experts," how do you do it?
Date: 18 Sep 1999 05:36:04 GMT
Trevor Jackson, III <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Sure it is. "Very tough" does not describe the Halting Problem, Godel's
> Theorem, or incrementing from one to 2^googol. Those problems cannot be
> "solved", and we can prove it.
The output of incrementing from one to 2^googol is finite and unique,
therefore the problem is solvable. I know at least one person who really
does think this way.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] ()
Subject: Re: Crypto 3.5
Date: 18 Sep 99 05:29:50 GMT
JPeschel ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) wrote:
: [EMAIL PROTECTED] () writes:
: >I didn't see any obvious indications that it was snake oil; it used
: >Blowfish, which is secure. However, I see there is now another thread
: >about it having been cracked. What subtle indications did you pick up on?
: John, the work is not mine but Casimir's. Casimir enjoys hunting for
: and breaking snake-oil.
I can see that from the other thread, which starts with one of your posts.
I should have made my question clearer. I might have misinterpreted your
original post in this thread, but it seemed to me that you were implicitly
claiming that there was something one could see - just by going to the web
site, without doing the actual cryptanalytic work that Casimir did - that
would give one reason to be suspicious of that program.
Perhaps its author had produced something in the past that I was
unfamiliar with, but was well known. Or there was some erroneous claim on
the page that I missed.
Or the smiley at the end of the post could have meant something else -
that the site looked like it was about a secure program, but that was
about to be shown as not being the case.
John Savard
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] ()
Subject: Re: The good things about "bad" cryptography
Date: 18 Sep 99 05:33:24 GMT
Patrick Juola ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) wrote:
: Why do you question the judgement of the professional
: mathematicians, but not the professional neurologists?
I should also point out that I said "most" block ciphers, not all. A
discovery that weakens *one* block cipher, even one in which there is
quite a bit of confidence, is _not_ considered nearly impossible.
That most of the small handful of well-known block ciphers might turn out
to have an unexpected common design flaw is not *that* far-out.
John Savard
------------------------------
From: David A Molnar <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: peekboo needs help :(
Date: 18 Sep 1999 05:40:41 GMT
Anonymous <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>>It supports RC5/Cast/Blowfish/RC4 and
>>Twofish (good varierty)
> For a really good *variety* add Leapfrog or Diamond2
> (not designed by the cabal!)
uh, what is Michael Paul Johnson doing these days, anyway?
------------------------------
From: Anton Stiglic <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: What is XOR?
Date: Fri, 17 Sep 1999 14:40:55 -0400
>
OR is usualy V, and AND is /\
It's easy to remember it you think of /\ as an A for AND....
Another way of thinking of XOR (or an idea to compute it),
is to say that A XOR B is A+B mod 2.
Anton
------------------------------
From: Thomas Wu <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Q: Is this key-exchange OK?
Date: 17 Sep 1999 12:11:58 -0700
"Douglas Clowes" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> Are these key-exchanges OK or do I need something else?
>
> I want two terminals to practice secure communications after an algorithm
> negotiation and key exchange phase. I want to mutually authenticate the
> parties.
>
> The pair will initially either share a secret, which may be a
> password/phrase, or they will have public key certificates signed by a
> trusted CA. The messages in the key exchange phase are authenticated by
> HMAC-SHA1-96 or SHA1 with RSA signature, as appropriate.
>
> The question is: can I do this in a two pass exchange, or do I need a
> challenge-response after DH exchange?
>
> The message exchange for passwords (HMAC authenticated) is:
>
> 1:A->B: Id_a, Id_b, Time_a, Rand_a, DH_a, Algorithms_a, HMAC
> 2:A<-B: Id_b, Id_a, Time_b, Rand_b, DH_b, Algorithms_b, HMAC
>
> The message exchange for certificates is the same, but includes the sender's
> certificate (which can be checked by the receiver) and is signed with the
> private key associated with the certificate.
It's not clear from your description where all these extra private keys
and certificates come from. Earlier you said there was just a shared
passphrase.
> After message 1, B can ensure that the message came from A, and the DH_a is
> A's.
>
> The same is true for A after message 2.
>
> Is this OK?
>
> Possible variations would include using the HMAC function on the password
> and DH exchange secret to create the key used in future communications, as a
> further assurance that each has the password. Similarly for the certificate
> case, B could encrypt DH_b with B's private key, and then A's public key -
> for A to recover it, DH_b must be decrypted with A's private key (proving
> A's possession) and B's public key (proving B's possession of the private
> key).
>
> Does this help and it is needed?
>
> Does a challenge-response exchange following add anything except overhead?
>
> Is this open to attack? If so, how do I secure it?
These are all slower and less secure than established password methods
like SRP, SPEKE, and EKE. Read up on them at:
http://srp.stanford.edu/srp/
http://www.integritysciences.com/~dpj/
--
Tom Wu * finger -l [EMAIL PROTECTED] for PGP key *
E-mail: [EMAIL PROTECTED] "Those who would give up their freedoms in
Phone: (650) 723-1565 exchange for security deserve neither."
http://www-cs-students.stanford.edu/~tjw/ http://srp.stanford.edu/srp/
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (John Savard)
Subject: Re: Okay "experts," how do you do it?
Date: Fri, 17 Sep 1999 19:21:06 GMT
Anton Stiglic <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote, in part:
quoting me:
>> Even very tough mathematical problems can eventually be solved.
>that is actually not true. There are theories (set of axioms) which
>contain true statements that cannot be prooven to be true in that
>set of axioms.
>From context, it ought to be obvious that I meant in that instance
for any toughness T, there exists a mathematical problem of toughness
>= T that is soluble
and not
every mathematical problem can be solved, regardless of how tough it
is.
John Savard ( teneerf<- )
http://www.ecn.ab.ca/~jsavard/crypto.htm
------------------------------
From: Eric Lee Green <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: peekboo needs help :(
Date: Sat, 18 Sep 1999 00:09:50 -0700
> Anonymous <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> >>It supports RC5/Cast/Blowfish/RC4 and
> >>Twofish (good varierty)
>
> > For a really good *variety* add Leapfrog or Diamond2
> > (not designed by the cabal!)
While I'm thinking of it: RC5 is encumbered in the US (RSAI somehow
managed to patent one of the mathematical operations in RC5, hmm, how
can you patent mathematics? I dunno, but the Patent Office had no
problem with it!), so he probably wants to yank that out unless he wants
to get a few Yanks in trouble. If you're wanting to put a cipher into it
that wasn't written by "one of the Cabal", you may want to try Rijndael,
one of the AES candidates. Someone that I respect a bit likes RC5/RC6
because of their sheer elegance, but has his doubts about their security
and thinks that Rijndael is a good compromise between the elegance of
RC5/6 and the ugliness of Blowfish/Twofish. Like Blowfish/Twofish, it is
unencumbered.
--
Eric Lee Green http://members.tripod.com/e_l_green
mail: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
There Is No Conspiracy
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Johnny Bravo)
Subject: Re: SCOTT19U.ZIP_GUY/Questions Please
Date: Sat, 18 Sep 1999 03:20:04 GMT
On Sat, 18 Sep 1999 03:17:16 GMT, "Douglas A. Gwyn" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
wrote:
>"Trevor Jackson, III" wrote:
>> "fortified"? I think that's a media exaggeration.
>
>Certainly part of the compound (underground bunker built around an old
>school bus) was fortified. Remember, those people believed that some
>day somebody like the government would come and try to annihilate them.
And you also had 80+ people living in a wooden multistory building
in the middle of tornado country. I'd be building an underground
shelter as well. Burying a bus seems a quick way to provide a bunch
of seats in an enclosed space without having to build something
yourself and then install seats in it. :)
Johnny Bravo
------------------------------
From: Robert Harley <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Analogues to ECC over higher dim. abelian groups
Date: 18 Sep 1999 09:19:12 +0200
Alex <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> He's not counting the number of points on the curve, but the number of
> points in its Jacobian over F_p. Since the curve is genus two, that's
> going to be on the order of the square of the number of points on the
> curve, I think.
Yes, that's exactly right.
In fact if you want to count the points on the curve the fastest way
is to start by counting the Jacobian even though it is much bigger.
This is because it has a group structure (whereas the curve itself
doesn't) and the structure is necessary for fast algorithms.
In the elliptic case the Jacobian and the curve are the same thing so
you don't have to worry about this aspect.
Bye,
Rob.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: Performance benchmarks
Date: 17 Sep 1999 19:54:47 GMT
Not quite what you're looking for, but hope it's useful:
Here are benchmarks for a ton of different algoritms using Crypto++
http://www.eskimo.com/~weidai/benchmarks.html
------------------------------
Date: Sat, 18 Sep 1999 05:34:10 -0400
From: "Trevor Jackson, III" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Okay "experts," how do you do it?
jerome wrote:
> On Fri, 17 Sep 1999 17:25:39 -0700, Joseph Ashwood wrote:
> >> he's paranoid but not totally wrong. just an example.
> >> an unknown designs a new cypher A and coppersmith, rivest and shamir
> >> design a another new cypher B. Will you read both papers with the
> >> same 'open mind' ?
> >
> >I see no reason not to, one paper is likely to be very interesting, while
> >the other is likely to involve a large body of comedic work.
>
> so you cryptanalyze all the cyphers described by beginners ?
> i can easily write a feistel network which -seems- not too
> bad in 2hours.
> after that, how resistant it is... even against known attack, it is
> another matter. to find out you have to crypanalyze it and try
> at least the most common attacks (linear, differential, key realated).
>
> my cypher will likely be very weak but to find out that, you have
> to spend much more than 2 hours.
>
> so either you have a lot of time, either you don't.
>
> >> if yes, that's mean you read all the cypher descriptions posted sci.scrypt
> >> and elsewhere and study them as much as you study any AES proposal.
> >> in fact i hope you don't because it is obviously a waste of time.
> >
> >With an AES candidate it is unlikely to find a break no matter how much time
> >one spends, however the cypher A is likely to be broken (or at least
> >suspected) by the time the reading is finished.
>
> im not that efficient even on a simple cypher :)
This is the reason that a large number of ciphers is an attractive idea. It is
possible for a large organization to spend more human effort on cryptanalysis
than the designers of a single cipher can spend. When that ratio grows the risk
of finding an exploitable flaw grows with it. OTOH, it is hard to maintain a
high ratio of attack effort vs design effort in the face of a large number of
ciphers.
This assessment is based on the assumption that the design effort for a single
cipher scales poorly. Some situations may even experience diseconomy of scale
(too many cooks). But the attack effort scales much better, although probably
much less than linearly due to duplication. I'd expect the design effort for
multiple ciphers to scale well, almost linearly.
------------------------------
Date: Sat, 18 Sep 1999 05:40:06 -0400
From: "Trevor Jackson, III" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Exclusive Or (XOR) Knapsacks
rosi wrote:
> Dear Gary,
>
> Thanks for the post.
>
> 1. Have to be sure if you were asking the 'complete' question or the
> 'incomplete'
> one. I.e. When the problem is given, is it known for sure that X is a subset
> sum?
> Theoretically, the two are the same. However, in practice (or in
> cryptographical
> sense), they have a subtle difference IMHO.
>
> 2. About 'square'. It does not matter in a special sense. To be a bit
> concrete,
> to ask the 'complete' question (meaning X may or may not be a subset sum),
> is NP-complete in the general sense if solution unique (complexity unknown
> but 'the hardest', i.e. in terms of reducibility). If solution not unqiue
> 'in the true
> sense', beyond NP-complete. (But not unique in the true sense, by the way,
> is
> useless to cryptography).
Does the non-unique case permit extension to the point that uniqueness may be
provided by additional information? I.e., could a "key pair" be created such
that the "public" portion is non-unique, perhaps in pathologically so, while the
"private" portion determines the unique solution?
> To be concrete a bit more, if you are referring to
> cryptographic properties, the 'non-square' fashion IS possible but need to
> be in
> such a way that you can invert (with the trapdoor information). As far as I
> know,
> there is no known way of solving this efficiently and the O(n^3) is just a
> joke,
> maybe a bad one. :)
>
> I can be wrong.
>
> My 0.2 cent if that can be picked up. :)
>
> --- (My Signature)
>
> P.S.
> About 'It does not matter'. The characteristics or description (informal
> here) of
> the problem determines this. E.g. if the problem can have an equivalent
> zero-one
> set, lattice (spanned) is obviously a threat. In addition, if the solution
> is unique
> 'under the attack model', "more than the bits" may not matter as much as one
> wants (and this is, IMO, open question about density). Hope this makes
> sense.
> Sorry can't do any better. But thanks again for your post.
>
> Gary wrote in message ...
> >What if the matrix wasn't square?
> >In particular if the number of elements were larger than the bit size.
> >
> >David Wagner wrote in message
> ><7rrgb0$7vd$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>...
> >>In article <%_8E3.290$gE.6812@stones>, Gary <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> >>> Problem:
> >>> Given an n bit number X and a set {B1,B2,...,Bn} of n bit numbers;is
> >there a
> >>> subset whose elements collectively XORed give X?
> >>>
> >>> Can the general problem be solved easily?
> >>
> >>Yes. Gaussian elimination will solve it in O(n^3) time.
> >
> >
------------------------------
Date: Sat, 18 Sep 1999 05:41:43 -0400
From: "Trevor Jackson, III" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: SCOTT19U.ZIP_GUY/Questions Please
Douglas A. Gwyn wrote:
> "Trevor Jackson, III" wrote:
> > "fortified"? I think that's a media exaggeration.
>
> Certainly part of the compound (underground bunker built around an old
> school bus) was fortified. Remember, those people believed that some
> day somebody like the government would come and try to annihilate them
> > The existence of missing audio tapes may be the rest of the
> > evidentiary iceberg.
>
> Maybe. Since among compound members only the "mole" (possibly) knew
> that it was bugged, their supposedly private conversations ought to be
> strong evidence as to whether they were victims or criminals. The
> only audio tapes I heard were purported to show that the BDs were
> preparing to set fire to themselves, but it sure didn't sound like it
> to me.
I meant the tapes of the government's conversations, not those of the
victims.
>
>
> Hm, we seem to have strayed completely off topic here.
True.
------------------------------
Date: Sat, 18 Sep 1999 06:00:02 -0400
From: "Trevor Jackson, III" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Second "_NSAKey"
Douglas A. Gwyn wrote:
> "Trevor Jackson, III" wrote:
> > In "http://www.microsoft.com/security/bulletins/backdoor.asp"
> > Microsoft(tm) claims that they have not given either key to anyone,
> > particularly not the NSA. Thus, according to Microsoft(tm), the second
> > key labeled _NSAKEY is purely a disaster prevention mechanism.
>
> Thanks for the URL. Unfortunately, it doesn't really answer the
> *obvious* questions: How could MS possibly "lose" the primary key
> (yet retain the backup key)? We're talking about data here, that
> can readily be copied and backed up in various physical locations,
> including wherever they keep the "backup key". Also, what do they
> mean by saying "The keys in question are the ones that allows us
> to ensure compliance with the NSA's technical review."? Does that
> mean exactly what I described in my previous posting (which was
> based on a separate statement from Microsoft staff)? MS wouldn't
> actually have to *hand over* the NSAkey to NSA for the "technical
> review", but they would still want to use that key, not their
> primary CSP-signing key, for the technical review process.
It is clear that Microsoft(tm) has, in addition to their crupto problem, an
on-going communication problem (public relations). It may be that they are
simply incompetent in both realms, crypto and communications. I think not.
As for the process of technical review requiring a second key, WTF? Are we
to assume that they were afraid to give NSA the public portion of the primary
key? AFAI can tell, there is no explanation of what the second key could do
that the primary key could not do. Yet the only sinsible reason I can find
for creating a second key is that it manages some capability that the primary
key does not.
As an example, there may be some aspect of the "technical review process"
that required inspection privileges that would not be granted to ordinary
reviwers. The second key might have those privileges. Yet if this were the
case, Microsoft(tm) could simply say so. They haven't. Thus there must be
some reason they want to hide the actual capabilities of the second key.
I doubt that the NSA is the cause of their reluctance. The second key as
backup instead of copy of primary as backup is stupid to the point of
lunacy. It smacks of a cover story with holes in it. This is why I
disbelieve their public statements.
> It was interesting to see that there is a third key in the test
> versions of Win2K.
I found this to be the only credible claim in their statement.
------------------------------
Date: Sat, 18 Sep 1999 06:06:56 -0400
From: "Trevor Jackson, III" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Glossary of undefineable crypto terms (was Re: Ritter's paper)
rosi wrote:
> Trevor Jackson, III wrote in message <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>...
> [SNIP]
> >Usually this means as secure/hard as X where X is "thought to be secure"
> >or "thought to be hard". Hardly a convincing manner of proof.
> >
>
> Thought I alone had the semantics problem. Long live 'provably secure'!
>
> (Even) As hard as???
>
> (Can't help kidding a bit. :)
>
> Thanks Trevor.
> --- (My Signature)
There are lots of poorly defined or undefined terms in this NG, after all it's
mostly English language which is pretty slippery. But there are a several
terms that may be undefinable. Like putting a superfluid in an open container
or picking up dropped mercury with your fingers, it just doesn't work.
I nominate the above described phrase "provably secure" to accompany the
classic "truly random" as not possible to define precisely.
Are there any other nominations?
------------------------------
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