Cryptography-Digest Digest #625, Volume #12 Wed, 6 Sep 00 20:13:01 EDT
Contents:
Re: Ciphertext Randomness/Statistical Tests (Tim Tyler)
Re: RSA in public domain ("Paul Pires")
Re: RSA in public domain (Future Beacon)
Re: RSA in public domain (Bill Unruh)
<no subject> (Ali Salah-eddine)
Re: RSA patent expiration party still on for the 20th (Paul Schlyter)
Re: RSA patent expiration party still on for the 20th (Bill Unruh)
Re: RSA patent expiration party still on for the 20th (S. T. L.)
Re: question on book selection (Ernest Dumenigo)
Re: Carnivore article in October CACM _Inside_Risks (Matthew Montchalin)
could you please tell me how this calculation has been obtained ? (jungle)
Re: RSA in public domain (JD)
Re: ISO9796 signature format implementation ("Tor Rustad")
Re: ISO9796 signatur format implementation ("Tor Rustad")
Re: Ciphertext Randomness/Statistical Tests (SCOTT19U.ZIP_GUY)
Re: ISO9796 signatur format implementation ("Tor Rustad")
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
From: Tim Tyler <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Ciphertext Randomness/Statistical Tests
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Wed, 6 Sep 2000 21:56:34 GMT
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
: Could someone please quantify the statement in the "Cryptography FAQ"
: that states a cryptosystem is "strong" if its ciphertext appears
: random to "all statistical tests"?
That's close to being a mis-representation of what it says. From
http://www.faqs.org/faqs/cryptography-faq/part03/
``A strong cryptosystem will certainly produce ciphertext which appears
random to all standard statistical tests [...]
If a system passes all the tests mentioned above, is it necessarily
strong? Certainly not. [...]''
This is saying that strength implies randomeness - not that randomness
implies strength, as you appear to be suggesting.
Strength doesn't "certainly" imply randomness of the cyphertext - a strong
system could repeatedly produce non-random outputs - indeed this is
sometimes desirable, as can be seen from some steganographic techniques.
The FAQ appears to be mistaken on this point.
--
__________ Lotus Artificial Life http://alife.co.uk/ [EMAIL PROTECTED]
|im |yler The Mandala Centre http://mandala.co.uk/ Namaste.
------------------------------
From: "Paul Pires" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: RSA in public domain
Date: Wed, 6 Sep 2000 15:14:25 -0700
Bill Unruh <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote in message
news:8p5ubp$ovu$[EMAIL PROTECTED]...
> In <lgrt5.1248$[EMAIL PROTECTED]> "Dave Foulger"
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
>
> ]BEDFORD, Mass., September 6, 2000 -- RSA Security Inc. (NASDAQ: RSAS) today
> ]announced it has released the RSA public key encryption algorithm into the
> ]public domain, allowing anyone to create products that incorporate their own
> ]implementation of the algorithm. This means that RSA Security has waived its
> ]rights to enforce the patent for any development activities that include the
> ]RSA algorithm occurring after September 6, 2000.
>
> ?? They do not own the patent. They cannot release it unless MIT agrees.
> It is MIT that owns the patent, unless things have changed recently. I
> suspect that MIT would agree, but doe it actually state that MIT has
> released it? Or are they simply placing RSAREF into the public domain.
>
>
>
> ]Represented by the equation "c = me mod n," the RSA algorithm is widely
> ]considered the standard for encryption and the core technology that secures
> ]the vast majority of the e-business conducted on the Internet. The U.S.
> ]patent for the RSA algorithm (# 4,405,829, "Cryptographic Communications
> ]System And Method") was issued to the Massachusetts Institute of Technology
> ](MIT) on September 20, 1983, licensed exclusively to RSA Security and
> ]expires on September 20, 2000.
>
> As they state here. While they may be the exclusive licensor, they still
> do not own the patent and cannot unilaterally abrogate someone else's
> rights.
You can't resolve this without knowing what the (currently in force) license
agreement says. If MIT agreed to terms which enable RSA to do XYZ then
RSA can do it even if it does sound a little strange. License agreements, as
with most sensitive business information, are generally kept secret so you
might have a hard time finding out. Anyways, it becomes moot in two weeks
so who cares?
As far as the early grant goes, that's a no brainer. They are trying to look
confident in the face of no monopoly. Personally, I think it's kinda silly but
you never know what these PR types are going to float.
Paul
------------------------------
From: Future Beacon <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: RSA in public domain
Date: Wed, 6 Sep 2000 18:17:34 -0400
On Wed, 6 Sep 2000, Douglas A. Gwyn wrote:
> Future Beacon wrote:
> > Could it be that they knew then how to crack it?
>
> Nope.
Do they know now?
Jim Trek
Future Beacon Technology
http://eznet.net/~progress
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Bill Unruh)
Subject: Re: RSA in public domain
Date: 6 Sep 2000 22:40:12 GMT
In <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Future Beacon
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
]On the line I have marked with ************************
]you say "d is from de = 1 mod(p-1)(q-1)."
]What is the apparently special meaning of de? Does one
]need to know about it? It doesn't seem necessary to the
]algorithm, so it must be a term everybody knows about.
]No?
It is absolutley crucial. de means d times e. This states that d times e
must be one greater than some multiple of (p-1) times (q-1). This also
states that e must be relatively prime to both p-1 and q-1 (it does not
have to be prime itself, but can have no factors in common with p-1 and
q-1).
]> e=prime
Not necessary but usual. The requirement is that e have no factors in
common with p-1 or q-1.
]> p=prime
]> q=prime
]> d is from de = 1 mod(p-1)(q-1) ************************
]> public key = (e,pq)
]> private key = (d,p,q) or (d,pq)
]> encryption of M
]> X = (M^e) mod pq
]> decryption
]> M = (X^d) mod pq
Note that d is used here
]> where ^ is exponentiation
]>
]> The other considerations are choosing your primes carefully, and choosing
]> big enough primes (500+ bits each is more than sufficient). And of course
]> speeding it up.
]> Joe
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Ali Salah-eddine)
Subject: <no subject>
Date: 7 Sep 2000 00:41:41 +0200
How can I post messages?
__________________________________________________
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------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Paul Schlyter)
Subject: Re: RSA patent expiration party still on for the 20th
Date: 6 Sep 2000 23:36:01 +0200
In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
Anonymous <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>In a press release at
>http://www.rsasecurity.com/news/pr/000906-1.html, RSA Security
>announced:
>
>--------------------------------------------------------------------
>BEDFORD, Mass., September 6, 2000 -- RSA� Security Inc.
>(NASDAQ: RSAS) today announced it has released the RSA public
>key encryption algorithm into the public domain, allowing anyone to
>create products that incorporate their own implementation of the
>algorithm. This means that RSA Security has waived its rights to
>enforce the patent for any development activities that include the
>RSA algorithm occurring after September 6, 2000.
>
>[snip]
>--------------------------------------------------------------------
>
>Let's see - I have to use their implementation, and only on stuff
>that hasn't been developed already?
No -- you're allowed to use their implementation, but you're also
free to use other implementations if you like.
--
================================================================
Paul Schlyter, Swedish Amateur Astronomer's Society (SAAF)
Grev Turegatan 40, S-114 38 Stockholm, SWEDEN
e-mail: pausch at saaf dot se or paul.schlyter at ausys dot se
WWW: http://hotel04.ausys.se/pausch http://welcome.to/pausch
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Bill Unruh)
Subject: Re: RSA patent expiration party still on for the 20th
Date: 6 Sep 2000 22:45:24 GMT
In <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Anonymous
<[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
]In a press release at
]http://www.rsasecurity.com/news/pr/000906-1.html, RSA Security
]announced:
]--------------------------------------------------------------------
]BEDFORD, Mass., September 6, 2000 -- RSA Security Inc.
](NASDAQ: RSAS) today announced it has released the RSA public
]key encryption algorithm into the public domain, allowing anyone to
]create products that incorporate their own implementation of the
]algorithm. This means that RSA Security has waived its rights to
]enforce the patent for any development activities that include the
]RSA algorithm occurring after September 6, 2000.
][snip]
]--------------------------------------------------------------------
]Let's see - I have to use their implementation, and only on stuff
]that hasn't been developed already? Uh, thanks but no thanks - the
]party is on for the 20th . . .
I read "their own" as refereing to the "anyone". Ie, anyone may code up
RSA and use it in any product. They may not use RSA Security code (eg
BSAFE, RSAREF,...) as those are still copyright and they are not giving
those up. You would only be able to use RSA after Sept 20 on stuff that
was not developed befor that date either. You would have violated the
patent if you had used ( developed) before that date. This gives you an
extra two weeks.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (S. T. L.)
Date: 06 Sep 2000 22:53:43 GMT
Subject: Re: RSA patent expiration party still on for the 20th
/*You would only be able to use RSA after Sept 20 on stuff that
was not developed befor that date either. You would have violated the
patent if you had used ( developed) before that date.*/
What if you wrote something before Sept. 6 (or 20), but never gave it to anyone
else but yourself? Would that prevent one from releasing it publicly after
Sept. 6 (or 20)?
-*---*-------
S.T.L. My Quotes Page: http://quote.cjb.net
Book Reviews Page: http://sciencebook.cjb.net
Turbo-nifty interlaced interpolated PNG demo: http://interpng.cjb.net
Optimized pngcrush exectuable now on my site! Long live pngcrush!
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Ernest Dumenigo)
Subject: Re: question on book selection
Date: 6 Sep 2000 22:59:29 GMT
Jim Gillogly ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) wrote:
: Ernest Dumenigo wrote:
: Not quite. Barnes & Noble are selling Callimahos I part 1, Callimahos I
: part 2, Callimahos II part 1 and Callimahos II part 2. Get all four.
: Then get Friedman III and IV. If you're curious about Callimahos III,
: go check it out at the National Cryptologic Library near Fort Meade --
: nobody's selling it yet, because there's not enough content that hasn't
: been blacked out.
: --
: Jim Gillogly
: Mersday, 15 Halimath S.R. 2000, 20:21
: 12.19.7.9.9, 11 Muluc 12 Mol, Ninth Lord of Night
Thanks so much, after I had posted I went to check and see if I ordered
correctly and figured that out.
Thanks again.
--
=====
Ernest
------------------------------
From: Matthew Montchalin <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Crossposted-To: comp.security.misc,alt.security,talk.politics.crypto,or.general
Subject: Re: Carnivore article in October CACM _Inside_Risks
Date: Wed, 6 Sep 2000 16:03:35 -0700
On Wed, 6 Sep 2000, Trevor L. Jackson, III wrote:
|> >One thing a sniffer CAN NOT DO WITH CERTAINTY is be positive the
|> >packet came from the address that it claims to have come from...
|> >Don't waste your breath telling me about MAC addresses. MAC's can
|> >be changed by the Administrator of the system.
|>
|> Someone would have to do that intentionally,
Not all intentions are rational. Many people that do things
intentionally have irrational reasons for doing so.
|> which would require that they know they're being monitored.
|
|Knowledge is not required, mere suspicion is an adequate motivation.
Or just plain paranoia, or a sense of humor.
------------------------------
From: jungle <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Crossposted-To: alt.security.pgp
Subject: could you please tell me how this calculation has been obtained ?
Date: Wed, 06 Sep 2000 19:22:09 -0400
hi mike,
in the recent [ 25 aug ] ap article by peter svensson, he is writing,
wallach said, that pgp is used by 7 million people ...
could you please tell me how this calculation has been obtained ?
how accurate this number is ?
--
thanks, richard
------------------------------
From: JD <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: RSA in public domain
Date: Wed, 06 Sep 2000 23:41:05 GMT
> > Future Beacon wrote:
> >
> > > Can anybody recommend a good on-line tutorial or clear document
> > > disclosing the released RSA algorithm?
You can find an electronic copy of CRC Press Handbook of Applied
Cryptography at http://www.cacr.math.uwaterloo.ca/hac/ where it
is free for personal use. You will find what you want in Chapters 8
and 4.
Sent via Deja.com http://www.deja.com/
Before you buy.
------------------------------
From: "Tor Rustad" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: ISO9796 signature format implementation
Date: Thu, 7 Sep 2000 01:48:33 +0200
"David Hopwood" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote in message
>
> Tor Rustad wrote:
> > Hello,
> >
> > I'm looking for a (source code) implementation of ISO9796 padding and
> > formating.
>
> Bear in mind that ISO 9796-1 padding has been broken (with about 3000
> chosen signatures for a 1025-bit modulus); see
>
> Don Coppersmith, Shai Halevi, Charanjit Jutla,
> "ISO 9797-1 and the new forgery strategy,"
> Working draft, August 23 1999.
>
> (I think this was on the P1363 web site, somewhere around
> http://grouper.ieee.org/groups/1363/P1363/index.html)
Thanks for this info, I had already noticed that there was a problem with this
signature format from a news letter and I did want to look into it. However, I
have problems locating the paper by Don Coppersmith et al, perhaps its removed
from the ieee site?
I didn't know that it was as bad as 3000 chosen...plain texts? Shit! But, its
only that bad for ISO9796-1, right?
We are currently using the signature format in production, but as far as I
remember we only use ISO9796-2, anyway we are hashing with SHA-1, so this
complicates the job with generating those 3000 chosen messages.
I don't have the source code of what we are using internally...
--
Tor
------------------------------
From: "Tor Rustad" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: ISO9796 signatur format implementation
Date: Thu, 7 Sep 2000 01:52:16 +0200
"David A Molnar" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote in message
> Ulrich Kuehn <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> > This turned out to be necessary due to attacks published last year. If
> > you wish I can dig out the references.
>
> "ON the Security of RSA Padding" Coron and Stern CRYPTO '99, I think.
> Plus some extensions at the rump session and another extension announced
> here on sci.crypt .
>
> The other possible reason I can think of for asking for ISO-9796 source
> code is in order to test the attacks. (the first is to use it in some
> application). Which is it?
I have a black-box implementation of ISO9796 in production, I need to look into
this problem...
--
Tor
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (SCOTT19U.ZIP_GUY)
Subject: Re: Ciphertext Randomness/Statistical Tests
Date: 6 Sep 2000 23:54:48 GMT
[EMAIL PROTECTED] (Tim Tyler) wrote in <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>:
>[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
>: Could someone please quantify the statement in the "Cryptography FAQ"
>: that states a cryptosystem is "strong" if its ciphertext appears
>: random to "all statistical tests"?
>
>That's close to being a mis-representation of what it says. From
>http://www.faqs.org/faqs/cryptography-faq/part03/
>
>``A strong cryptosystem will certainly produce ciphertext which appears
> random to all standard statistical tests [...]
>
> If a system passes all the tests mentioned above, is it necessarily
> strong? Certainly not. [...]''
>
>This is saying that strength implies randomeness - not that randomness
>implies strength, as you appear to be suggesting.
>
>Strength doesn't "certainly" imply randomness of the cyphertext - a strong
>system could repeatedly produce non-random outputs - indeed this is
>sometimes desirable, as can be seen from some steganographic techniques.
>
>The FAQ appears to be mistaken on this point.
It is not the only thing that the FAQ is wrong about. But that's
another story.
However an example of strong encryption "not passing the random
tests" would be use a strong method. The OTP or whatever you belive
is strong. Then use my conditonal static huffman uncompress with a tree
using the desired frequences for each letter. Then break it up into
words. This will look like a strange writting and it is highly
unlikely one would guess what you did.
To decrypt it you would have to use the conditional static huffman
compress with the correct conditional file. And then decrypt it with
the original encryption method.
David A. Scott
--
SCOTT19U.ZIP NOW AVAILABLE WORLD WIDE
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Scott rejected paper for the ACM
http://members.xoom.com/ecil/dspaper.htm
Scott famous Compression Page
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**NOTE EMAIL address is for SPAMERS***
I leave you with this final thought from President Bill Clinton:
"The road to tyranny, we must never forget, begins with the destruction
of the truth."
------------------------------
From: "Tor Rustad" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: ISO9796 signatur format implementation
Date: Thu, 7 Sep 2000 02:02:25 +0200
"Ulrich Kuehn" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote in message
> Tor Rustad wrote:
> >
> > Hello,
> >
> > I'm looking for a (source code) implementation of ISO9796 padding and
formating.
> >
> Sorry for not answering your request, but there is some information you
> should know:
>
> ISO/IEC 9796 (also known as ISO/IEC 9796-1) is redrawn (or in the
> process to be withdrawn) due to decurity reasons. So If you can avoid
> using it, do so.
> ISO/IEC 9796-2 is currently under revision, there is the Probabilistic
> Signature Scheme PSS by Bellare and Rogaway being incorporated into it.
Its not that simple to change a production system, which communicate with other
parties, I need to investigate the problem first before we deside what to do.
Not all theoretical attacks are practical, so I don't like rushing this.
There has been some problems with PKCS#1 aswell.
> This turned out to be necessary due to attacks published last year. If
> you wish I can dig out the references.
That could be very useful.
--
Tor
------------------------------
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