Cryptography-Digest Digest #478, Volume #13 Tue, 16 Jan 01 13:13:01 EST
Contents:
Re: New X9.68 Certificates ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
Re: multiple anagramming? (Richard Heathfield)
Re: =?iso-8859-1?Q?t=FCrk=E7e?= ("Tony T. Warnock")
Re: NSA and Linux Security ("Douglas A. Gwyn")
Re: NSA and Linux Security ("Douglas A. Gwyn")
Re: Any good source of cryptanalysis source code (C/C++)? ("Douglas A. Gwyn")
Re: Comparison of ECDLP vs. DLP (DJohn37050)
Re: Comparison of ECDLP vs. DLP (John Myre)
Re: Comparison of ECDLP vs. DLP (Roger Schlafly)
Re: Any good source of cryptanalysis source code (C/C++)? ([EMAIL PROTECTED])
Re: Any good source of cryptanalysis source code (C/C++)? (Tom St Denis)
Re: Any good source of cryptanalysis source code (C/C++)? (Richard Heathfield)
Re: A Special Deck of Encryption Cards (John Savard)
Re: Comparison of ECDLP vs. DLP (Paul Rubin)
Re: A Special Deck of Encryption Cards (John Savard)
Re: future trends in asymmetric cryptography (Francois Grieu)
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: New X9.68 Certificates
Date: Tue, 16 Jan 2001 16:17:14 GMT
In article <92sugd$2es$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> Can anyone give me a link to a reference work about
> this certificate type?
>
> It is e.g. used in the context of WTLS security for
> wap. In the WTLS spec. I've found there the name but
> no reference...
>
> thx Rudolf
>
> Sent via Deja.com
> http://www.deja.com/
>
Get have a look at this spec: 'Wireless Application Protocol Wireless
Transport Layer Security Specification' (WTLS-20000218-p.pdf)
You can find it on the 'wapforum.org'
Tim.
Sent via Deja.com
http://www.deja.com/
------------------------------
Date: Tue, 16 Jan 2001 16:17:43 +0000
From: Richard Heathfield <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: multiple anagramming?
Mok-Kong Shen wrote:
>
> Richard Heathfield wrote:
> >
> > Mok-Kong Shen wrote:
> > >
> > > I am sorry to express some opinions concerning your original
> > > post that would certainly displease you. If all books are
> > > freely available on the internet (or in whatever form), don't
> > > you think that the motivations of (at least plenty of) authors
> > > to write books and that of (all) publishers to publish them
> > > would disappear? Why do there exist copy rights? Most libraries
> > > attempt to cope with the needs of those who couldn't/wouldn't
> > > buy books for financial reasons. But because their bugets are
> > > limited, they can only satisfy the desire of a subset of
> > > the target population and even that only partially.
> >
> > Benjamin has not argued that people should not write books, nor does he
> > argue that they should give those books away. He has merely asked
> > whether anyone is aware of on-line material that would meet his needs.
>
> That's o.k. But he appeared to be quite annoyed when others
> gave him book titles instead.
I think "frustrated" might be closer (or, at least, kinder) than
"annoyed", although I don't insist on it.
Proof by analogy is fraud, but here's an analogy anyway:
You are in a shopping mall. You ask a random stranger if he happens to
know the way to the park. He gives you firm and clear directions to the
library. Wouldn't you be at least a little disgruntled?
> I guess that John Savard, who
> offered him a book title, meant that the book is fairly
> good for the topic and is (assumed to be) easily available
> (it's a Dover book and shouldn't be very expensive) and
> (implcitly) also that there is no (or no good) URL for
> that according to his knowledge.
Hmmm - stop being so reasonable. ;-)
<snip>
> > > To help
> > > them, one should consider donating to the local libraries
> > > one's own books that one no longer needs for instant access
> > > at home and that are not present there for use by other people.
> >
> > A worthy cause indeed. Regrettably, I am emotionally incapable of
> > parting with books.
>
> There are books that one has only a very small probability
> of usage in the future and that only take away spaces on the
> shelves.
I perceive books in a different way, I'm afraid. I don't see them as
piles of paper taking up shelf space, but as valued and trusted sources
of reference information. And I know when I'll next need that
information - the day after I give the book away!
> If you were ever in the position of Mr. Goldberg,
> badly needing a book that the library doesn't have, and
> someone else in town has that book but keeps it only as
> a piece of decoration of his living room, you would give the
> issue a second thought, I believe.
I'd phone him up and ask if I could use his study for an hour. :-)
--
Richard Heathfield
"Usenet is a strange place." - Dennis M Ritchie, 29 July 1999.
C FAQ: http://www.eskimo.com/~scs/C-faq/top.html
K&R Answers: http://users.powernet.co.uk/eton/kandr2/index.html
------------------------------
From: "Tony T. Warnock" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: =?iso-8859-1?Q?t=FCrk=E7e?=
Date: Tue, 16 Jan 2001 09:31:31 -0700
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> t�rk�e yaz��mak iteyan var m�?
>
I agree. But what about the key to the sawmill?
------------------------------
From: "Douglas A. Gwyn" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: NSA and Linux Security
Date: Tue, 16 Jan 2001 15:38:20 GMT
Shawn Willden wrote:
> Not much pre-WWII. Heck, for most of the period between WWI and WWII the
> U.S. didn't even spy on its *enemies* communications, much less its
> citizens, that being an "ungentlemanly" thing to do (what is that quote
> from The Black Chamber?).
The Black Chamber was dissolved by Stinson, putting an end
to most diplomatic communications monitoring, but military
intelligence activities continued unabated. Thus, Yardley's
disclosures, which had the effect of causing lots of foreign
governments to change their cryptosystems, caused serious
damage to US intelligence efforts.
------------------------------
From: "Douglas A. Gwyn" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: NSA and Linux Security
Date: Tue, 16 Jan 2001 15:42:53 GMT
Greggy wrote:
> ... FDR and the congress technically, legally declared the citizens
> of the US enemies of the US so that we could be regulated just like
> our enemies were - by the president. According to a 1973 US Senate
> report on this issue, since 1933 (FDR coming to power), we have never
> lived under constitutional rule, but emergency rule which allows us
> to be regulated under maritime authority by the president ...
If you really believe all that you must be pretty stupid.
What evidence is there that that is the way that our
government actually operates? And even if some president
attempted such a feat, the fact that it is clearly
unconstitutional would render it null and void.
------------------------------
From: "Douglas A. Gwyn" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Any good source of cryptanalysis source code (C/C++)?
Date: Tue, 16 Jan 2001 15:49:23 GMT
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> The man in question might not have as much time to search the web as
> you. Why re-invent the wheel when some people already know the answer. A
> simple answer with a few links and no rudeness would be enough.
> David Schwartz <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > Actually, the question is a waste of time and bandwidth. If the
> > response helps to minimize future wastes of time and bandwidth, then
> > it doesn't waste anything.
Actually DS is right. It was a stupid question, and look how
much bandwidth it has already wasted. What *everybody* should
have done was to ignore the question in the first place, or
respond privately to the original poster. Maybe then he would
have thought about what his problem *really* is and perhaps
ask a more intelligent question next time.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (DJohn37050)
Date: 16 Jan 2001 16:52:06 GMT
Subject: Re: Comparison of ECDLP vs. DLP
David Wagner said:
"
DJohn37050 wrote:
>How does the encrypter know the RSA public key represents
>a hard problem? Well, if the key is invalid, it could very well be an easy
>problem to invert. Now Bob, uses the private key and discovers that the
>encrypted message from Alice is garbage and that something is wrong, but it is
>too late, Alice already sent it.
I don't understand. Alice already has to trust Bob anyway,
so why would she be worried that Bob might have maliciously
chosen an invalid key?
Let's back up for a minute. How does Alice know that Bob
won't decrypt her secret message and then broadcast it to
the world?
Answer: She can't know. She must trust the recipient not
to kiss and tell.
This is fundamental. And, since you already must trust the
recipient not to disclose the plaintext, we might as well trust
the recipient not to maliciously generate invalid keys.
Hence, there seems to be little need for Alice to verify the
validity of Bob's key; she just needs to verify that it came
from Bob, and she needs to trust Bob.
Do you agree? Or, what did I miss?"
I agree what you say is a common response, it is just in this case to think a
little more on it. Yes, Alice needs to trust Bob to not reveal and Bob can
always choose to reveal. What is the result in this case? Bob shows he
cannot keep a secret and is untrustworthy. Eventually, Bob will not be told
any secrets, at least by Alice. This models the real world.
But there are 2 more cases to consider:
1) What if Bob had an error during key gen but does not know it? Bob is
innocent, just like a user of the Intel HW bug is innocent but got the wrong
results sometimes in a spreadsheet. Now good guy Bob certainly WANTS his
public key to be valid and Alice certainly WANTS Bob's public key to be valid,
but what assurance do they have that it IS valid, that it meets the specs?
Unless SOMEONE does some checking, they just HOPE there was no calculation
error. Note this will often be the case, but rarely they might be an error,
for who knows what reason. A basic principle of good system engineering
practise (and accounting) is to check your calculations. This is typically
done in a cost/benefit way, you check when the risk is high enough to justify
or the value is high enough to justify the cost of checking. It depends on the
risk/value and depends on the cost. If a lot of fraud is going on, the risk
has gone up and so you do more checking, this is all basic principles of risk
management, outside of crypto and inside too.
Here is my basic assertion: A certificate where PKV has been done has more
assurance than a certificate where PKV has not been done, where it is just hope
and expectation that the public key is valid. The former has less risk and is
therefore to be preferred.
Don Johnson
------------------------------
From: John Myre <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Comparison of ECDLP vs. DLP
Date: Tue, 16 Jan 2001 09:46:54 -0700
David Wagner wrote:
<snip>
> I don't understand. Alice already has to trust Bob anyway,
> so why would she be worried that Bob might have maliciously
> chosen an invalid key?
<snip>
Besides malice on Bob's part, there's competence to
worry about, and insider attacks at Bob, Inc. In the
real world, it can be insufficient to treat "trust"
as a binary value. So it could be reasonable to
guard against certain possible attacks, even if it
isn't obvious how those attacks could be carried out
in practice.
I'm not convinced either way. It seems reasonable for
Alice and Bob to agree on some publicly verified
software that only produces good keys (and trust each
other to use the software, correctly), but I am not
really familiar with the breadth of possible cases.
JM
------------------------------
From: Roger Schlafly <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Comparison of ECDLP vs. DLP
Date: Tue, 16 Jan 2001 08:57:42 -0800
David Wagner wrote:
> DJohn37050 wrote:
> >How does the encrypter know the RSA public key represents
> >a hard problem? Well, if the key is invalid, it could very well be an easy
> >problem to invert. Now Bob, uses the private key and discovers that the
> >encrypted message from Alice is garbage and that something is wrong, but it is
> >too late, Alice already sent it.
> I don't understand. Alice already has to trust Bob anyway,
> so why would she be worried that Bob might have maliciously
> chosen an invalid key?
> Let's back up for a minute. How does Alice know that Bob
> won't decrypt her secret message and then broadcast it to
> the world?
> Answer: She can't know. She must trust the recipient not
> to kiss and tell.
I agree. I think the only problem is that there may have been a
bug in the RSA key generation.
> This is fundamental. And, since you already must trust the
> recipient not to disclose the plaintext, we might as well trust
> the recipient not to maliciously generate invalid keys.
> Hence, there seems to be little need for Alice to verify the
> validity of Bob's key; she just needs to verify that it came
> from Bob, and she needs to trust Bob.
The argument for DH key validation is that Bob could send an
invalid key and induce you to mixing your private key with the
invalid key. In this case, Bob doesn't care about your message
but wants your private key. If you are not careful, Bob can
use invalid keys to trick you into revealing info about your
private key.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: Any good source of cryptanalysis source code (C/C++)?
Date: Tue, 16 Jan 2001 16:52:49 GMT
> Brice, you are correct in the general case but Tom has a point in this
> special case. The rules of the forum expect mewbies to read the FAQ.
> It seems clear that the question to which Tom responded was posted by
> a newbie looking for magic.
I can understand that. However, i think the rudeness of the reply by Tom
was un-necessary which is the point i am trying to put across. Maybe
there should be a rule about people's behaviour as well.
In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> >
> > Tom,
> >
> > When will you learn not to reply to posts if you aren't willing to
help.
> > This kind of answer is wasting people's time. So you either help or
keep
> > quiet because how annoyed you are is your business only and isn't of
any
> > interest to anyone else.
>
> Brice, you are correct in the general case but Tom has a point in this
> special case. The rules of the forum expect mewbies to read the FAQ.
> It seems clear that the question to which Tom responded was posted by
a
> newbie looking for magic.
>
> >
> > Regards,
> >
> > Brice.
> >
> > In article <9408jr$i47$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
> > Tom St Denis <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > > In article <94077c$blqps$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
> > > "Haider Ali" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > > > Hi.....
> > > >
> > > > I am looking for any good cryptanalytic attacks on block
ciphers,
> > programmed
> > > > in C/C++ (I need the source code).....
> > >
> > > Keep looking.
> > >
> > > This question is asked like 50 times a day here... For #### sake
> > > cryptanalysis is not some magic wand. Get a grip and read papers!
> > >
> > > Tom
> > >
> > > Sent via Deja.com
> > > http://www.deja.com/
> > >
> >
> > Sent via Deja.com
> > http://www.deja.com/
>
Sent via Deja.com
http://www.deja.com/
------------------------------
From: Tom St Denis <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Any good source of cryptanalysis source code (C/C++)?
Date: Tue, 16 Jan 2001 17:04:01 GMT
In article <941u8s$tj3$[EMAIL PROTECTED]>,
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
> > Brice, you are correct in the general case but Tom has a point in this
> > special case. The rules of the forum expect mewbies to read the FAQ.
> > It seems clear that the question to which Tom responded was posted by
> > a newbie looking for magic.
>
> I can understand that. However, i think the rudeness of the reply by Tom
> was un-necessary which is the point i am trying to put across. Maybe
> there should be a rule about people's behaviour as well.
Maybe people should use their heads before posting? A lot of times if the OP
just used a web search they would find their answers...
It's laziness to the max, man.
Tom
Sent via Deja.com
http://www.deja.com/
------------------------------
Date: Tue, 16 Jan 2001 17:18:26 +0000
From: Richard Heathfield <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Any good source of cryptanalysis source code (C/C++)?
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
> > Brice, you are correct in the general case but Tom has a point in this
> > special case. The rules of the forum expect mewbies to read the FAQ.
> > It seems clear that the question to which Tom responded was posted by
> > a newbie looking for magic.
>
> I can understand that. However, i think the rudeness of the reply by Tom
> was un-necessary which is the point i am trying to put across. Maybe
> there should be a rule about people's behaviour as well.
How about the behaviour of the OP? Two wrongs don't make a right[1], but
OPs have a responsibility for good manners too (such as reading the
FAQ), do they not?
Of course, in an ideal world, complaints about topicality would be sent
via email (or, better still, would not be necessary) - but, for such
complaints to be effective, there would have to be a tacit agreement
within the newsgroup for many people to send such complaints, and that's
uncomfortably close to mailbombing, which is itself antisocial.
[1] Do three? ;-)
--
Richard Heathfield
"Usenet is a strange place." - Dennis M Ritchie, 29 July 1999.
C FAQ: http://www.eskimo.com/~scs/C-faq/top.html
K&R Answers: http://users.powernet.co.uk/eton/kandr2/index.html
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (John Savard)
Subject: Re: A Special Deck of Encryption Cards
Date: Tue, 16 Jan 2001 17:26:06 GMT
On Tue, 16 Jan 2001 14:27:49 +0800, Dido Sevilla <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
wrote, in part:
>I get the distinct feeling that a cipher scheme similar to what
>John is proposing may in fact have been used by Medieval occultists to
>hide information from the Inquisition or the uninitiated...
If so, that would be surprising, since even Jefferson's invention of
the 'wheel cipher' was very early, and polyalphabeticity is not
believed to have originated until the Renaissance.
John Savard
http://home.ecn.ab.ca/~jsavard/crypto.htm
------------------------------
From: Paul Rubin <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: Comparison of ECDLP vs. DLP
Date: 16 Jan 2001 09:44:54 -0800
Roger Schlafly <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:
> The argument for DH key validation is that Bob could send an invalid
> key and induce you to mixing your private key with the invalid
> key. In this case, Bob doesn't care about your message but wants
> your private key. If you are not careful, Bob can use invalid keys
> to trick you into revealing info about your private key.
Is there an example or reference for this? Thanks.
------------------------------
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (John Savard)
Subject: Re: A Special Deck of Encryption Cards
Date: Tue, 16 Jan 2001 17:44:49 GMT
On Tue, 16 Jan 2001 14:27:49 +0800, Dido Sevilla <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
wrote, in part:
>The Fool - Aleph
That is the ordering used with the Waite deck, which we owe to the
Golden Dawn. Eliphas Levi used a different ordering, with Aleph
corresponding to The Magician, and with The Fool placed between
Judgement and The World, standing for a mysterious missing card,
according to Mouni Sadhu.
However, the association between the Tarot deck and occult studies
seems to have begun pretty much with Court de Gebelin, in the 18th
Century, with even the use of the Tarot for divination not being more
than a hundred years older.
While Tarot occultism certainly draws heavily on the Neoplatonism
which was the basis for many Mediaeval occult studies, it does not
appear that the Tarot was actually used during that period.
John Savard
http://home.ecn.ab.ca/~jsavard/crypto.htm
------------------------------
From: Francois Grieu <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: Re: future trends in asymmetric cryptography
Date: Tue, 16 Jan 2001 18:58:01 +0100
> any good ideas?
Standards (P1363A).
Systems with security "proof", that is demonstrated reducibility
to basic intractable problems; for example signature systems formerly
in use, like RSA with formatting specified in ISO/IEC 9796(-1):1991,
ISO/IEC 9796-2:1997, PKCS#1 V1.5, or P1363, have been shown to be
weaker than the basic RSA problem, and there is a quick move to
sounder systems.
Shorter cryptograms (for example thru the use of Elliptic Curve
cryptosystems).
Smart Cards as cryptographic tokens.
Francois Grieu
------------------------------
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