Green Baggins

The first issue in chapter 8 of Mathison’s book (on theological issues in Van Til) has to do with VT’s relationship to historic Reformed theology, generally speaking. Here I might point out that if Van Til was confessional, then he wasn’t “saying that his definition of Reformed theology should be the standard by which all other Reformed theologians (including the theologians of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries) should be judged” (p. 173). VT agreed with both the WS and the 3FU. The fact that he disagreed with many Reformed theologians on particular issues related to classical apologetics doesn’t change this. It is only on certain issues. Mathison might be qualifying the statement when he mentions VT’s presuppositional apologetic methodology, but this could be made much more clear. Did VT think he was tweaking the Reformed tradition? He thought that his views were well within confessional boundaries, and he also saw Bavinck and Kuyper, in particular, as his antecedents. Yes, he did think that a more thorough-going Reformed apologetic could be forged, and he attempted to do that. But it is not clear at all that he thought he was dreaming up a completely new methodology.

It is not clear who Mathison has in mind when he says, “Van Til’s statements about the early Reformed theologians forces the Reformed Christian to ask himself or herself why Van Til should be viewed as the standard by which all Reformed theology is defined” (173). There is no qualification or disclaimer of rhetorical exaggeration in the context. Have Van Til’s followers done this? I think the most that could be said is that some of VT’s followers have made him the standard on apologetics. I don’t know of anyone who has made VT the standard by which all Reformed theology is defined. As an aside, in most places in the book, you can see Mathison struggling with might and main to be fair. On a few occasions, such as this one, you can see his frustration show through a bit.

On the possibility of natural theology, Mathison puts the issue in a roughly similar category to the “true knowledge” issue. Van Til rejects the possibility of natural theology as done by unregenerate man, but then acknowledges that fallen man knows God exists. That is, I believe his position is that an unregenerate person will inevitably distort the created realm in his own understanding, thus resulting in a distorted view of the God he knows exists. Let me be clear: to say anything else is surely a denial of the noetic effects of the Fall, is it not? My question, though, is this: is Van Til denying the possibility of natural theology for all people, or only for unregenerate people? On page 123 of A Survey of Christian Epistemology, the very place Mathison references here, Van Til notes that regeneration changes everything. Once a person’s eyes have been corrected, they can see things properly again. This is thoroughly in line with Calvin, who sees the Scriptures as spectacles by which we can have our errant eyesight corrected. Calvin says, “Bright, however, as is the manifestation which God gives both of himself and his immortal kingdom in the mirror of his works, so great is our stupidity, so dull are we in regard to these bright manifestations, that we derive no benefit from them” (Inst. I. 5. 11). This in a long discourse on the power of natural revelation, but our inability to interpret it correctly. Natural theology is only really possible for regenerate humanity. Before the Fall, we would have done just fine interpreting natural theology correctly. Mathison gives the impression that he thinks Van Til believes there is no possibility of doing natural theology under any conditions whatsoever. This is patently not true, even on the very pages Mathison cites.

The first chapter of Mathison’s critique starts with the question of exegesis. Van Til acknowledged, as many have noted, that he did not do much exegesis in his works to try to establish his apologetical method. Mathison aims to prove that some of VT’s distinctives are not only unsupported by biblical exegesis, but actually contrary to the Bible. I will aim to show that Mathison is mistaken on these points.

Mathison’s first point is that VT’s doctrine of knowledge is contrary to Scripture (123ff). Specifically, that VT’s doctrine is read into Scripture, not read out of it, which causes VT to distort Scripture’s teaching. In order to demonstrate this, Mathison starts with the fact that God communicates with humans (125) and that believing humans communicate with unbelieving humans. Here, I think, is where Mathison’s artificial expansion of VT’s categories gets him into trouble (see part 4). Mathison appears to be saying that VT believes nonbelievers cannot know anything, because they cannot know it truly. As I have attempted to show, however, VT believes that “truly” means “in line with God’s knowledge.” This does not mean unbelievers are ignorant of 2+2=4 or of the meaning of human language, to use the example Mathison tries to use. Mathison seems to be over-emphasizing the epistemological difference between believers and unbelievers in VT while under-estimating the metaphysical all-things-in-common that VT also posits. If it is the same universe we inhabit, then it is the same language, the same math, the same science. The question is this: are the facts isolated, or are they all interconnected with each other with God’s knowledge forming the archetype? Mathison appears to be saying that VT doesn’t believe unbelievers can even communicate. This is a fallacious extension and distortion of what VT believes. I have a hard time believing VT would have a problem saying that believers and unbelievers can meaningfully communicate. Doesn’t the image of God in humanity provide a foundation for this communication? Scripture does not rule out the absolute antithesis at all, as long as this absolute antithesis is not expanded to include more in it than VT did. Common grace restraining unbelief is not necessary to refute Mathison here.

Mathison then goes to the Scriptures that tell us that unbelievers will know certain things about God (128). Mathison thinks VT cannot account for these phenomena of Scripture. Again, Mathison’s examples are in the metaphysical realm wherein believers and unbelievers have all things in common. The metaphysical realm includes things God has revealed through his creation and providence. It is the context of these things about which there is no agreement between believer and unbeliever.

Mathison calls VT’s epistemology “humanistic post-Enlightenment philosophical lenses” (130). Given the similarity between VT and the scholastic distinctions both between archetypal and ectypal knowledge, and between true and false knowledge, I think we can put to rest the idea that VT had “humanistic post-Enlightenment philosophical lenses.” Furthermore, VT’s attention given to epistemological matters is hardly new. Cartesianism in the scholastic era inspired entire books to refute it (especially van Mastricht). This was an epistemological issue, as well. The modern era of post-Kant is not the only one to study epistemology.

Mathison seeks to use Psalm 19 and Romans 1 to refute Van Til as well. But Van Til doesn’t ever reject natural revelation. And just because something is revelationally clear doesn’t mean fallen humanity will see it as clearly as it is revealed. This is the point Mathison misses in his exegesis. Fallen humanity is without excuse because of the clarity of natural revelation (though even that is qualified in Van Til, as Mathison points out, though not so distorted as to grant unbelievers an excuse again). But, fallen humanity has made itself incapable of seeing the true (and by “true” here, I mean “in accordance with God’s knowledge”) meaning of that natural revelation. Fallen humanity will always try to achieve autonomy through his interpretation of the natural world.

Lastly, Mathison asserts that there are no biblical passages whatsoever that support Van Til’s apologetic methodology (134). I beg to differ. The entire book of Ecclesiastes does precisely this. Ecclesiastes is a much-controverted book, of course. However, the author retained his wisdom in pursuing what fallen humanity wants (laughter, pleasure, building, wealth, ch. 2) while retaining his wisdom (2:3). The controverted phrase is “under the sun.” I believe it means “as if God did not exist.” Under this presupposition, everything is hebel. But when one sees the end of the matter (chapter 12), nothing is hebel if God is back in the picture. I will treat of the remaining Scriptural arguments (135ff.) in the next post.

The place Mathison starts is the place Van Til usually starts: with the doctrine of God. Mathison notes that Van Til is a confessionally Reformed theologian (35) and that “The doctrine of the Triune God is the cornerstone of Van Til’s apologetic thought” (38). Mathison, in my opinion, rightly keys in on knowledge as a basic aspect of VT’s system. God’s knowledge is foundational for human knowledge. It is not the only architectonic feature of VT (the Triune God, the self-attesting authority of Scripture, and maybe a couple of other doctrines) are also vital to what VT is attempting to do.

Mathison also brings out the Trinitarian nature of VT’s theology, noting the “God is a person” language, and seemingly (at least at this point) getting VT correct here (45), that VT is saying the essence of God is personal. I will come out right now and say that I believe two things are correct about VT’s language on “God is a person”: 1. I am utterly convinced that VT is orthodox in what he means (see Lane Tipton’s work to see how this is true). 2. I am also utterly convinced that this isn’t the best language for a normal person in the pew to hear. The essence of God is personal, as in tri-personal. This seems perfectly adequate for avoiding the kinds of problems VT saw. One thing I think Mathison has missed, though, is that VT is also describing how we normally speak about God. If we say, “God revealed himself in nature and in Scripture,” we are talking about God as a single person in our language. Our normal language uses singular and personal pronouns to refer to God quite often. This kind of language does not threaten the doctrine of the Trinity, as it is all over Scripture. As Mathison points out later in the book, the normal, orthodox version of describing the Trinity has safeguards in place to avoid describing God’s essence as an impersonal force, and thus, the traditional language was not really broken. As we will see, however, even though Mathison here acknowledges what VT was trying to do, and even though, in a later chapter, he seems to grant that VT was not unorthodox in what he said, Mathison still winds up accusing VT of “teaching dangerously false doctrines” (188). Even though he seems to grant that VT is orthodox, he ends the paragraph with something that takes with the left hand what he granted with the right. I think Mathison is committing a bit of a word-concept fallacy here. VT did not teach false doctrine on the Trinity. At worst, he used less than clear language to teach correct doctrine on the Trinity. And, when properly understood and explained, even VT’s language can be said to be clear. I would not use VT’s language myself on this point, but only because I am a bit lazy, and VT’s language requires WAY too much explanation (Lane Tipton spent two hours explaining it in his MARS lectures) in order to achieve clarity. However, I would also say VT did not teach error on the Trinity. VT liked to be provocative on occasion. Mathison did the same thing with his title “Christianity and Van Tillianism,” did he not?

The last issue for this post is that of knowledge. I am going to state that I think VT’s position on knowledge (especially as interpreted by Mathison) has a many-layered irony to it. But first, what I think VT is saying (and not saying!). VT is saying that God’s knowledge is not only quantitatively different from ours, but also qualitatively different, because of the Creator-creature distinction. This should not be controversial, either in terms of what VT is actually saying or on an evaluation of what he said. This is precisely the same thing as the archetypal/ectypal distinction in the Reformed scholastics (see, for example, Johannes a Marck’s Medulla, 1.7-8). How does the following quotation grab you? “[I]t is evident that God knows HImself most completely, and so no one is a more perfect theologian, Matthew 11:27, neither in this particular is the Holy Spirit inferior to the Father or the Son, 1 Corinthians 2:10, 11. It is no less certain that God has decreed to communicate some knowledge of Himself with Creatures, 1 Corinthians 2:7. Neither will any of our Theology be able to be described as true, which does not correspond to that Knowledge of God concerning Himself and divine things, which Knowledge He decreed to be manifested to us in one way or another.” Van Til, right? No, Bernhardinus De Moor’s Perpetual Commentary on a Marck, vol 1, p. 93, in Dilday’s translation. I am rather astounded that Mathison did not even bring up the archtypal/ectypal distinction in theology. Here is the many-fold irony: Van Til typically verbally rejected the scholastic theologians. However, his view of knowledge is very much in line with the archetypal/ectypal distinction, which earlier theologians surely got from the scholastics. I do not know if VT ever used the terms “archetypal” and “ectypal.” He certainly does not seem to know where this distinction in knowledge comes from in the tradition. Mathison critiques VT on his doctrine of knowledge as if it is a departure from Reformed theology, but which happens to be in line with the scholastics, whom Mathison likes!

The problem with Mathison’s treatment of VT on the point of knowledge comes down to the definition of the word “true.” In the quotations in which VT uses this word in connection with having to know everything in order to know anything, it seems to me that he is using this word “true” to mean almost the equivalent of “archetypal.” He certainly means “exhaustive.” However, in other places, he seems to be using the word “true” to mean “opposite to false.” These are not the same at all! Mathison doesn’t make any distinction between these different uses. VT cannot be meaning that unless one knows absolutely everything, then one can know nothing truly as opposed to falsely. Elsewhere he is quite clear that a Christian’s analogical re-interpretive knowledge is NOT false, and that even in the case of unbelievers, common grace can allow them to know many true (as opposed to false) things. But the unbeliever can never know anything truly, if by “truly” we mean either “archetypal” or even “in line with the archetypal knowledge in a creaturely way”. Instead, VT must be hammering away at the Creator-creature distinction when he says that to know anything one must know everything.

In yet another irony, the categories of knowledge that the scholastics used can be quite useful in understanding VT. True knowledge is divided first into archetypal/ectypal. Then the ectypal is typically divided into the knowledge of union (Christ’s knowledge as the God-man), the knowledge of vision (the blessed in heaven as well as the angels), and the knowledge of pilgrims (redeemed Christians “on the way”). Then, there are various false knowledges associated with unbelief. The scholastic categories may not precisely correspond to VT’s categories. VT is quite clear on the Creator-creature distinction being qualitative. But the analogical knowledge of the redeemed is true (as opposed to false) but not true, if one means Creator knowledge.