Clear and focused thinking is important for progress when working on a task, such as understanding a situation. One brings to bear whatever one has deduced from previous encounters with a similar situation, as well as whatever one has learned from study of books — history or worked problems, as appropriate. Yet clear and focused thinking is also very closely related to delusional thinking. Clarity and focus can also prevent one from including important information that might bear upon the matter. Another person, observing one’s reasoning, might categorize such a problem formulation or investigative framework as delusional.

For instance, Freeman Dyson, recalling his work in the Operational Research Section of the British RAF Bomber Command during the second world war, tells how his and colleagues’ inability to go beyond operational dogma was a contributing factor to their failure to deduce the existance of a German fighter anti-bomber weapon system: “Schräge Musik”. This weapon involved guns pointing upward from the fighter at an angle of about 60 degrees from the horizontal. The fighter could fly underneath the bomber, observe its outline against the night sky, and shoot up at it; without the bomber crew being aware of an impending attack.

Dyson’s words: “I later applied the same method of analysis to the question of whether experience helped crews to survive. Bomber Command told the crews that their chances of survival would increase with experience, and the crews believed it. They were told, After you have got through the first few operations, things will get better. This idea was important for morale at a time when the fraction of crews surviving to the end of a 30-operation tour was only about 25 percent. I subdivided the experienced and inexperienced crews on each operation and did the analysis, and again, the result was clear. Experience did not reduce loss rates. The cause of losses, whatever it was, killed novice and expert crews impartially. This result contradicted the official dogma, and the Command never accepted it. I blame the ORS, and I blame myself in particular, for not taking this result seriously enough. The evidence showed that the main cause of losses was an attack that gave experienced crews no chance either to escape or to defend themselves. If we had taken the evidence more seriously, we might have discovered Schräge Musik in time to respond with effective countermeasures.
Source URL: https://www.technologyreview.com/s/406789/a-failure-of-intelligence/ (Dyson, 2006)

Another illustration, which is similar in nature, is inherent in some post-war comments by the German general Siegfried Westphal:
“Propaganda must be flexible, although it must not be forgotten that the tune cannot be changed from day to day. Under certain circumstances it can be a very dangerous poison since it may influence or frustrate the decisions of its propagators against their will. Examples of this can be found on both the German and Allied sides during the war and also after it.” (S. Westphal, “The German Army in the West”, Cassell & Co, 1951, page 16).

We can observe numerous illustrations of such delusional behaviour, believing one’s own propaganda, nowadays.

The risks of clarity and focus are not restricted to military or political situations. Scientific investigation, and organizational structure, are also worth considering in the context of the clarity – delusion – focus model.

Best wishes,
Ken Roberts
10-Feb-2016