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by adam nossiter

the new york times

march 31, 2021

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KABUL, Afghanistan ~ The Taliban’s swagger is unmistakable. From the recent bellicose speech of their deputy leader, boasting of “conquests,” to sneering references to the “foreign masters” of the “illegitimate” Kabul government, to the Taliban’s own website tally of “puppets” killed ~ Afghan soldiers ~ they are promoting a bold message:

We have already won the war.

And that belief, grounded in military and political reality, is shaping Afghanistan’s volatile present. On the eve of talks in Turkey next month over the country’s future, it is the elephant in the room: the half-acknowledged truth that the Taliban have the upper hand and are thus showing little outward interest in compromise or of going along with the dominant American idea, power-sharing.

While the Taliban’s current rhetoric is also propaganda, the grim sense of Taliban supremacy is dictating the response of a desperate Afghan government and influencing Afghanistan’s anxious foreign interlocutors. It contributes to the abandonment of dozens of checkpoints and falling morale among the Afghan security forces, already hammered by a “not sustainable” casualty rate of perhaps 3,000 a month, a senior Western diplomat in Kabul said.

The group doesn’t hide its pride at having compelled its principal adversary for 20 years, the United States, to negotiate with the Taliban and, last year, to sign an agreement to completely withdraw U.S. troops from Afghanistan by May 1, 2021. In exchange, the Taliban agreed to stop attacking foreign forces and to sever ties with international terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda.

The Biden administration has yet to definitively say whether it will meet that deadline.

“No mujahid ever thought that one day we would face such an improved state, or that we will crush the arrogance of the rebellious emperors, and force them to admit their defeat at our hands,” the Taliban’s deputy leader, Sirajuddin Haqqani, said in a recent speech. “Fortunately, today, we and you are experiencing better circumstances.”

Nearly every day, the Taliban’s website features reports of purported defections to its side, though the details are probably exaggerated, just as both the Taliban and the Afghan government exaggerate each other’s casualties. “59 enemy personnel switch sides to Islamic Emirate,” read one recent headline.

Having outlasted the all-powerful Americans, the rest is child’s play, in the Taliban’s view. The game is essentially over.

“They think they have beaten the Americans, so they can beat the other Afghan forces as well, and get control over the country,” said Jawed Kohistani, an Afghan analyst and former security official in Kabul.

The Taliban, who governed most of the country from 1996 to 2001, are not interested in true power-sharing. Mr. Kohistani said, “They are planning to restore their Islamic emirate,” he added, “and they will punish all those involved in corruption and land grabbing.”

Antonio Giustozzi, a leading Taliban expert, disputed the idea that the Taliban are necessarily bent on reimposing a similarly hard-line Islamic regime. “As long as they can get to power through a political agreement, between establishing the emirate and democracy, there are options,” he said. “The aim would be to become the dominant power.”

The Taliban know that Afghanistan, an aid-dependent state, 80 percent of whose expenditures are funded from international donors, cannot afford the isolation of that era, analysts say.

Just as the Taliban have become increasingly sophisticated in their use of social media, online propaganda and a pugnacious English-language website ~ though they still often ban smart-phones in areas they control ~ so has their language evolved to reflect the current moment.

With the decisive shift in their military fortunes, their words have become assertive and victorious, a posture that would have been impossible a mere three years ago, analysts say.

The corollary to such posturing is the Afghan government’s insistence that it expects a deadly endgame with the insurgency. Government officials rarely claim that they and not the Taliban are the victors, because they can’t. Evidence of Taliban ascendancy, in the insurgents’ steady offensive in the countryside, their systematic encroachment on cities and their overrunning of military bases, is too prevalent.

American negotiators are pushing ideas of compromise and power-sharing, but government officials are largely resistant to them ~ in part because any interim government would most likely require Afghanistan’s president, Ashraf Ghani to step down, He has steadfastly refused to even consider it.

Instead, the government employs back-to-the-wall language indicating that the bloody struggle will only intensify. This month, a senior official told reporters inside the intensively guarded presidential palace complex that a compromise, coalition government ~ recently proposed to both sides by Zalmay Khalilzad, the American peace envoy ~ would merely be used by the Taliban as a “Trojan horse” for the seizure of power.

It was “totally unrealistic” to think the insurgents would agree to it, “knowing their psychology,” the official said. “I am not promising a better situation in the future. But we will continue fighting.”

Mr. Ghani sounded a largely pessimistic note in remarks to the Aspen Institute in January. “In their eschatology, Afghanistan is the place where the final battle takes place,” he said of the Taliban.

We “hope for the best, but prepare for the worst,” he said.

The Ghani administration’s bleak outlook also reflects the insurgent group’s territorial gains. In December, nearly 200 checkpoints in Kandahar, the Taliban’s historical stronghold, were abandoned by Afghan security forces, according to the U.S. government’s Afghanistan watchdog.

“I think they are 90 percent right,” said Mr. Giustozzi, of the insurgent group’s claims of victory. “Clearly the war has been lost. Clearly things have gone in the wrong direction. Things have worsened under Ghani. The trend is in their favor.”

Some analysts caution that while the Taliban may think they have won, other armed actors in the Afghan equation will make a forced takeover difficult. That was the experience 25 years ago, when the Taliban had to battle warlords principally in the north and east, and failed to gain total control over the entire country.

A militia in central Afghanistan led by Abdul Ghani Alipur, a local warlord, has already inflamed hostility with the government in recent months. And longtime power brokers in the country’s west and north have rallied fighters to defend against the Taliban, if necessary.

Meanwhile, the Taliban rely on fear to keep local populations in rural areas quiescent. An effective tool is the insurgents’ hidden network of ad hoc underground prisons where torture and punishment are meted out to those suspected of working for or with the government.

But the Taliban are also viewed by some as being less corrupt than Afghan officials. The group’s judges adjudicate civil and property disputes, perhaps more efficiently than the government’s faltering institutions.

In some areas under Taliban control, they have permitted schools for girls to continue operating. Thomas Ruttig, co-director of the Afghanistan Analysts Network, pointed out in a recent paper ~ though, he notes, this may be driven more by political imperative than a softening of ideology.

Elsewhere, the Taliban’s increasingly confident messaging has penetrated deep into its rank-and-file, in large part because events have borne it out.

“People said that it is not possible to fire on U.S. forces,” said Muslim Mohbat, a former Taliban fighter from Watapor District in Kunar Province. “They would say the barrel of the rifle would bend if you open fire on them, but we attacked them, and nothing happened.”

“Then we kept attacking them and forced them to leave the valley,” said Mr. Mohabat, who fought in some of the most violent battles of the war with the United States.

In the insurgents’ view, their advances will inexorably lead to the end of the Kabul government.

“On the battlefield there is a sense that, ‘We’re stronger than ever,'” said Ashley Jackson, a Taliban expert at the Overseas Development Institute. “Power-sharing and democracy, these are anathema to their political culture.”

(copyright new york times 2021)

old timer editor ~

rawclyde

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by susannah george & dan lamothe

the washington post

november 27, 2020

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KABUL, Afghanistan – The United States has closed at least 10 bases across Afghanistan since the signing of a deal with the Taliban in February, according to Afghan and U.S. officials, part of a drawdown process so murky that many here say they are uncertain of what’s to come despite a fast-approaching deadline.

The base closures are part of the complete withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan outlined in the deal.  An Afghan official and a U.S. official confirmed the closure of the bases, several of which were previously unreported.  The officials, like others in this story, spoke on the condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to discuss base closures with the media.

Of the more than 10 bases closed to date, the shuttering of five was required by the U.S.-Taliban deal during the first 135 days after the signing.  During that time, the United States also withdrew thousands of troops, bringing force levels down from roughly 12,000 in February to 8,600 by July.

Those initial bases included Tarin Kowt in Uruzgan province, Bost in Helmand, Gamberi in Laghman and Lightning in Paktia.  Others closed this year include Jones in Kunduz, DeAlencar in Nangahar, Shaheen in Balkh, Bishop in Kabul, Maymana in Faryab and Qalat in Zabul.

Little is known about what remains of those bases, many in Afghanistan’s most volatile provinces where U.S. support for Afghan operations has been critical in pushing back the Taliban.  Some have been completely handed over to Afghan security forces.  Others may have been vacated and left in place in a way in which they could be occupied again in the future if U.S. and Afghan officials consider it necessary.  It is also unclear how much equipment – more difficult to move than people – is left at each of the closed installations.

In interviews, half a dozen former and current U.S. and Afghan officials said uncertainty still surrounds the plans to bring down troop numbers from 5,000 to 2,500 by Jan. 15, days before President Trump leaves office.  The abrupt announcement of the drawdowb last week has forced decision-making on a shortened timeline.

A second U.S. official familiar with ongoing discussions around the drawdown said details are still being worked through on what equipment – ranging from spare vehicle parts to ammunition – needs to be sent back to the United  States and what can be turned over to the Afghan government.

The official spoke on the condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the situation.

Despite the drawdown in people and equipment, the second U.S. official said, the United States will retain the ability to carry out airstrikes against the Taliban in defense of Afghan forces.  U.S. troops will also remain able to carry out some counterterrorism strikes against the Islamic State, the official said.

A third U.S. official with knowledge of ongoing discussions said that a number of significant decisions are to be made or finalized over the next two weeks, including which other bases will close, what equipment will be turned over to the Afghan government, and how U.S. equipment will be ticketed to leave.

There were hundreds of bases and outposts at the height of the military’s surge a decade ago, and dozens in recent years as the military shrunk its presence over time.

Analysts and Afghan officials say further closures show that the United States is collapsing its forces in Afghanistan back into its bigger military installations to save on the large number of troops needed to secure the perimeter of multiple small outposts.  The move also brings U.S. troops closer to medical facilities as the American footprint in Afghanistan shrinks, and would make it easier to evacuate the country rapidly if security disintegrates.

It is unclear how many bases remain open in Afghanistan, in part because the total number of military sites has not been made public.  Even the bases that were once the largest in the country, like Kandahar Air Field and Jalalabad Air Base, now only house a handful of U.S. troops, according to Afghan officials.

The only U.S. troops left in Nangahar, a province that has been a focus of U.S. counterterrorism operations in Afghanistan, occupy a small corner of Jalalabad airport, according to an Afghan defense official stationed there.

The official said he still speaks to U.S. advisors on a daily basis, but that his counterparts are now at Bagram air base more than 100 miles away and they communicate via WhatsApp or FaceTime.

Some Afghan officials concerned by the swifter withdrawal point to violence already rising across Afghanistan since the signing of the U.S.-Taliban deal, fearing that pulling more troops out faster will only further embolden the Taliban.  Many of the places where the United States has closed bases or reduced troop levels have witnessed a spike in targeted killings or in some cases deadly Taliban offensives.

“With fewer U.S. bases within (Afghan army) bases, there is less of a safety net” for Afghan forces, said one Afghan official.  Without the presence of U.S. forces nearby to provide support like medical evacuations or airstrikes, Afghan ground forces will be less likely to launch operations, allowing the Taliban to become stronger, he said.

A reduction of 2,500 troops now is also not the preferred option of senior military officers.  Former defense secretary Mark T. Esper recommended in a classified memo to the White House early this month that the conditions on the ground did not merit cutting deeper than 4,500.  He cited the best military advice of senior U.S. commanders, said two senior U.S. defense officials with knowledge of the dicussion.

One of the concerns raised by senior military officials focuses on how much support and security the remaining U.S. service members can provide to the State Department, U.S. intelligence agencies and aid organizations, two other U.S. officials said.

Trump’s decision to continue withdrawing troops from Afghanistan despite its potential to undermine ongoing negotiations with the Taliban is “clearly such an ego and timeline-driven mood,” said Jason Dempsey, a senior adjunct fellow with the Center for a New American Security who served as an infantry officer in Afghanistan.

Dempsey, who has frequently criticized the U.S. military’s efforts in Afghanistan, said he believes the Afghan government is being “hung out to dry” by the administration with the manner in which it is withdrawing.

“I don’t think we have a path to solid victory,” he said.  “But I’d like to think that we had an obligation as we withdrew to our Afghan partners to at least leave them in the best position possible.”

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lamothe reported from washington.  the washington post’s aziz tassal and sharif hassan in kabul and shane harris in washington contributed to this report.

copyright 2020, the washington post

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found in stars & stripes by old timer editor rawclyde

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