Reality and Its Reflection/ The face in the Mirror

 

The reflection of a face in a mirror is different from face.  As it imitates the mirror.  The face which does not depend on the mirror (for its existence) is also different from its reflection.  Similarly, the reflection of the Self in the ego is alsoregarded (as different from the pure Self) like that of the face which is different from the face.  The pure Self is considered to be different (from Its reflection) like the face (which is different from its own (reflection)).  In fact, however, the Self and Its reflection  are free from (real) distinction (between each other  like the face and its reflection).

This is a master  analogy that in itself can become a bone of contention  and interpretation as though it were a real attempt at ontology and not a focus on a very  narrow aspect  of a difficult subject in an attempt to clarify it.  I call it a master analogy in that it is like a universal key that lays out the lineaments of a problem for its explication.

The key words therefore are regarded and considered.  These modifiers are what the last sentence refers to.  The mirror analogy on one level can give a sense of the distinction between Self and ego, the error of the  ego being regarded as the Self when it is merely a reflection of the Self.  On the other hand when we go past the level of analogies to ultimate,neti neti ,reality we adhere to the non-dual unity of being.

As I mentioned this analogy is used by the controvertor to deflect and distract.

(Objection).  Some say that the reflection in the ego (as distinct from the Self) is the individual soul. (But if one asks how the reflection which is not a reality can experience anything at all, the objector answers that) the reflectionisa reality as the shadows of things are known to be realities according to the Smriti.  Not only so, there is another reason also (why a shadow should be regarded as a reality).  For a man in a shadow feels refreshingly cool.

(Other Objections).  Some say that the individual soul is a part of Pure Consciousness.  Others hold that it is a modification of the same.  Still  others are of  opinion that the ego  together with the reflection of Pure Consciousness in it is the individual soul.  Others again think that it is the independent ego (neither a part nor a modification,) which is the experiencer of this mundane existence.

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Excuse this long citation which serves to demonstrate the error of taking a device for a description.  A device is useful as a way of clarifying the relationship of the parts of a faculty psychology; mind, ego, intellect etc.  Inneti neti, reality this ‘naming of parts’ is transcended.

To summarize: whereas we  can easily distinguish between the face in the mirror, a reflection, and our face which continues apart from the mirror, the reflection of the Self in the ego is not so distinguished.  We take the reflection as the primary  reality.  This is the natural thing to do or seems to be so.  We are in fact alienated from our true nature, the unity of being - sat cit ananda.  The mystical breaks that spell.  Our faith is that our real condition must break out as a natural irruption or as a permanent condition.  This shraddha or faith is described by Shri Aurobindo as:

"the soul's belief in the Divine's existence, wisdom, power, love, and grace"

Theories of Self in Sanskrit philosophy in the 9th.Century (from Sankara's Commentary on Brahma Sutras)

 

Sankara’s commentary on the Brahma-Sutra Bhasya I.i.1

Opponent : If Brahman be well known in the world as the Self, then It being already known, there arises the difficulty again that It is not to be deliberated on. 

Vedantin : No, for there is a conflict about Its distinctive nature. Ordinary people as well as the materialists of the Lokayata school recognize the body alone to be the Self possessed of sentience. Others hold that the mind is the Self. Some say that it is merely momentary consciousness. Others say that it i~void. Still others believe that there is a soul, separate from the body, which transmigrates and is the agent (of work) and the experiencer (of results). Some say that the soul is a mere experiencer and not an agent. Some say that there is a God who is different from this soul and is all-knowing and all-powerful;others say that He is the Self of the experiencing individual. Thus there ar emany who follow opposite views by depending on logic, texts and their semblances. If one accepts any one of these views without examination, one is liable to be deflected from emancipation and come to grief. Therefore starting with the presentation of a deliberation on Brahman, here is commenced an ascertainment of the meaning of the texts of the Upanisads with the help of reasoning not opposed to the Upanisads themselves, for the purpose of leading to emancipation (through knowledge).

There you have it, an itemisation of the known theories of the Self and Self-Knowledge in the sphere of Sanskrit philosophy in the 9th.Century. Note that many of its topics did not become salient in Europe until much later.  Momentary consciousness (Annica) a Buddhist doctrine had to wait for Hume and his bundle of perceptions/series of conscious states, theory.  I have written about this at length previously. Follow the topics.

The vijnanavada subjective idealism is akin to that of Kant’s thing in itself and its unknowability.  The whole question of the ‘external’ world and what we really are directly aware of is give a thorough examination by Sankara in the commentary on the Brahma Sutras. (B.S.B. II.ii.28)

Materialism is mentioned and so forth and so on.  Suffice it to say that Sankara was not a mere theologian, an idea that is often encountered in academic circles.  He wants to test those theories using rational means to uncover contradictions and fallacies.  His critiques are well worth an examination by readers who have chiefly focused on the Western canon.

Thou art That #155, #156, #157

 

It has been said before that the benefit derived from (the proximity of) the Self is that it appears conscious like the former.  Being a revealer the intellect, like light and so on, pervades objects such as jars etc.

Just as a jar placed in the sun may be said to be brought to light, so, an object in the intellect may be said to be brought under its cognizance.  This bringing to cognizance is nothing but being pervaded by the intellect.  Objects become pervaded by the intellect one after another.

The intellect pervades an object (and assumes its form) when the object is revealed through the help  (i.e., the reflection) of the Self.  Like time and space the all-pervading Self can have no order or succession (in pervading objects).  (#155, 156, 157 Chap. XVIII ‘Thou art That’ Upadesa Sahasri)

Pervasion being an action must be performed by the intellect.  As previously noted the intellect has action but no consciousness.  That is supplied by the Self which due to its closeness to the intellect reflects consciousness on to it.  Thus the intellect appears to be conscious and directed towards an object.  As the individual subject (Jiva) is located in the material universe of space and time its attention flows sequentially.

In these expressions of the subject/object nexus the analogy of reflection is required to do a lot of work.  The core truth for advaita is that everything is within Consciousness.  There is the tantric saying ‘what is here is there, what is not here is not anywhere’.

Thou art That #141, #142, #143

 Please tell us (Idealists)  what benefit you derive by holding that knowledge depends on other things.  If it is contended that dependence (of knowledge) on the knower is desirable (we reply that) the knower also, according to us, is nothing but Knowledge.

The intellect itself, though indivisible, is looked upon by deluded people as consisting of the division of the knower, knowing, and the known.

Action, agents etc. consist, according to us, (Idealists) of knowledge only.

(Reply from advaitin). You must accept an agent of this knowledge, if you admit its existence and destruction (every moment).   (#141, #142,  #143 Chap. XVIII Upadesa Sahasri)

The locus classicus for a thoroughgoing refutation of Buddhist Idealism (Vijnanavada) is of course Bsb.Bh. II.ii.28.  It is ironic that what is called British Empiricism shares the same view that what we are in contact with is a state of consciousness and anything further is an inference of some kind or native faith.  In other words we perceive perceptions.

Sankara in this comment on Vijnanavada impugns the annica/annata (no-self/momentariness) aspect since the topic of the chapter is the Self.  Holding that there in no knower only knowing implies that the agent of knowing is created and destroyed in every moment.  Thereby they (Buddhist Idealists) contradict themselves.

Thou art That #136/7

 “Does substantiation mean being known, being endowed with existence, or anything else?  You should remember the two alternatives spoken of in the previous verse if it means ‘being known’.

As it is well-known that all things come in to existence from their causes no effort ( by way of the application of an evidence ) is necessary for substantiation.”  (#136/137 Chap. XVIII Upadesa Sahasri)

This is a puzzling if not somewhat gnomic verse.  What I understand from it is that the Self is self-evident, ‘pratibodha videtam’ known with every state of awareness and therefore substantiation in the received sense of established by the use of evidence does not apply.

Thou art That #135

 “If the conscious Self Itself is taken to be ignorant an evidence is necessary  in order that It may know Itself to be so.  It is surely necessary in knowing the Self if one  (i.e. the ego) other than It be regarded as ignorant” (# 135 Chap. XVIII Upadesa Sahasri)

The Self is taken to be changeless and as knowledge arising out of the activity of knowing or cognition implies a change the Self is not a knowing subject.

“The intellect has no consciousness and the Self no action.  The word ‘knows’ can, therefore, reasonably be applied  to neither of them.”  (#54 Chap. XVIII Upadesa Sahasri)

The evidence for the Self comes via its reflection in the intellect.  The Body/Mind/Intellect complex is inert matter seeming to be conscious due to its pervasion by the Self.

“The intellect, being transparent and next to the self, easily catches the reflection of the intelligence of the Self.  Therefore even wise men happen to identify themselves with it first..”

“It (the Self) thinks as it were:  By illumining the intellect, which does the thinking, through its own self-effulgent light that pervades the intellect, the Self assumes the likeness of the latter and seems to think.....”   (Brh.Up. IV.iii.7 Sankara’s commentary)

Thou Art That # 134

 #134:  Is the Self also substantiated by means of an evidence or not?  Though the Self Itself is independent of evidence, evidence is necessary in order to know It.

Evidence is necessary to know it.  Must that be the case because there are so many theories of the Self some argument must place some evidence, some chain of reasons above the others, more cogent than the others.  How else are we to be persuaded or convinced.  What does evidence mean in this case?  Could you miss it?  It’s all there, all that is to be known but you have missed something, a factor that you have discounted perhaps.

What are the means of knowledge (pramanas) that can precipitate some evidence, some knowledge.  There is the dog that didn’t bark in the night time, the non-apprehension of existence.  Is it something like that, an inference maybe from the immediacy of memory  My memory now is of my experience then.  That indicates the apperceptive unity of experience but not I think the Self in Vedanta.

Sankara is being as usual very condensed, an inspiration to ‘atma vichara’ (inquiry into the Self) and not offering solid answers that give us full marks without true insight.  Substantiation for instance, does that mean establishing that the Self exists?  Our intuition is that the Self is self-evident but is it, so to speak, free standing?  Can the knower be known, can the hand grasp itself?

More anon on #135 etc.

Who Adheres to the Anatman Doctrine?

Any answer is a retorsion.

A Question which is strictly unanswerable is hardly a question.

But,

To, ‘Is there anybody at home?’, shouted through the letter box.

No answer is an answer.

Self-identity

Is our impression of continuity the source of continuity or is it the point of departure for an analysis of self-identity? What I mean by self-identity here is the feeling of the continuance of a self and not the empty expression implying that there is a self that is identical to itself.

First of all the analysis of personal identity into synchronic and diachronic may be unsustainable as it is obvious that traits and abilities require time for their expression. A closed and suspicious person will require less time to be disabused of a new acquaintance than an open and trusting one but both traits will require time to unfold. It is like the moving point of the cone of memory a la Bergson. Everything is focused at that point of entry into the plane of history but because everything that happens is poured into the cone of memory and alters its contents, it is clearly the case that we never step into the same river twice. There is then constant alteration but there is at the same time a style of alteration. To offer a planetary metaphor this style or interaction between the elements of the personality is like the gravity that keeps the ‘falling’ planets in the same relation to each other. So by the anatman doctrine of the Buddhists and the ‘bundle’ theory of Hume the self is a vacuous concept.

The wily advaitins expand the vocabulary of the problem and refer to that disputed entity as the jiva or individual person and reserve the appellation ‘self’ for the consciousness or awareness that takes different mental shapes but remains fundamentally the same through all its manifestations. The metaphor offered is that of ‘clay’ and various vessels that are made of clay.

This is a position that you cannot logically think your way into, the force of it must be felt through meditation or to put it into Platonic terms, it is a formal apprehension.