

Published in *Theory Culture and Society* (Volume 42, Issue 3 pp. 95-114). This is the final accepted version. Please consult the publisher's version before citing: <https://doi.org/10.1177/02632764241301334>

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Was Spinoza a Deleuzian? Rethinking the Politics of Emotions and Affects

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Abstract

A salient tradition in contemporary affect theory heavily relies on distinguishing between emotions and affects. The former refers to structured categories of socially coded affective states, while the latter denotes the pre-social libidinal flow underlying emotions. This distinction is commonly attributed to Spinoza and is thought to have been further developed by Deleuze. In this article, I argue that this overall historical picture is misleading and inaccurate. Deleuze radically transforms Spinoza's theory of affect for the ends of his own ethical-political philosophy. Moreover, I argue that Deleuzian and similar conceptualizations of affect fail to fulfill their political and ethical promises due to two critical problems. In the last section, I show that a unified notion of emotion inspired by Spinoza, which does not create a sharp rift between emotions and affect, can perform the same explanatory function intended by the emotion-affect distinction while allowing us to circumvent these problems.

Keywords: Spinoza, Deleuze, affect, emotion, affect theory, politics of affect.

1. Introduction: Thinking Affects Today

Was Spinoza a Deleuzian? This inverted question points to a crucial problem in a prevalent trend of conflating Spinoza's and Deleuze's theories of affect both in contemporary affect studies and the Deleuze scholarship. The shift towards affect in cultural studies and critical theory has been largely defined by the Deleuzian differentiation between affects as pre-social and extralinguistic bodily processes and emotions as subjectively felt psychological states, emphasizing the primordial nature of affect over emotions. Foregrounding the unconscious, extra-linguistic, involuntary, undecidable, unknowable, and automatic aspects of affects constitutes a key paradigm in a certain tradition of affect studies (Ingraham, 2023, 2020: 39-42). This turn to affect is often justified by its alleged [p. 95] political explanatory power and significance, as it allows for critical engagement with social and political mechanisms that make

it possible “to grasp and to manipulate the imperceptible dynamism of affect” (Clough, 2007: 2). Affect is argued to be the main target of the ruling powers, as it produces a more minute, imperceptible, and direct control by acting directly on the somatic level (Baranzoni, 2024; Protevi, 2009), and by creating the very conditions of the subjection and subordination of people (Berlant, 2011; Butler, 1997).

However, in this paper, I argue that despite its advantages, this characterization of affect, which confines affects to pre-cognitive corporeal sensations, offers an ontologically misleading and politically and ethically impoverished understanding of affects.¹ It not only leaves us with a very evacuated politics, but also eschews us from seeing the more complex ontology of affects, where pre-conscious affections and transindividual shared emotions are in a constant co-constitutive relationship. A more comprehensive or unified notion of affect is crucial today for understanding the complex ways in which affects are used to sustain oppressive regimes of life.

This article has three distinct but interrelated goals. First, I show that the notion of affect as pre-cognitive asignifying affections, attributed generically to Spinoza and Deleuze, derives, in fact, from Deleuze’s critical reading of Spinoza. I demonstrate that neither Spinoza was a Deleuzian nor Deleuze was a straight Spinozian by arguing against the canon of “Spinozist-Deleuzian notion of affect” that conflates these two philosophers’ divergent views. Second, I argue that the Deleuzian and like-minded conceptualizations of affect not only set up a false dichotomy between affects and emotions but also obscure the true political and ethical significance of affects. I demonstrate this by showing that this conceptualization of affect leaves us with two fatal problems – the problem of evaluation and the problem of motivation – which fatally undermine its ethical and political potential as both a theoretical and practical tool. Lastly, I argue that through a Spinoza-inspired unified conception of affect, which emphasizes the inseparability and reciprocal constitution of pre-cognitive and cognitive, pre-personal and social, and pre-individual and transindividual, we can develop more nuanced theoretical tools to comprehend how affects are employed and exploited in economic, political, and other social domains across different compositional levels. Rather than dismissing interactions preceding cognitive faculties, this approach emphasizes the coexistence and constitutive continuity between the pre-conscious, conscious, and collective dimensions of affective relations.

This paper does not reject or argue against what Deleuze seeks to achieve by moving away from Spinoza, i.e. disavowing the primacy of the subject and subjective states by showing that they are something produced. Instead, it aims to further and expand it by showing its weaknesses and problems and complementing it with a more comprehensive understanding of affects. Hence, my return to Spinoza is not motivated by a desire to revert to traditional values of emotion, subjectivity, and similar concepts in response to an alleged postmodern void. Nor is my goal to wholly deny the pre-subjective aspects of affects. Instead, I insist that affects are *constantly* and *necessarily* captured and mediated as long as there is life and argue that we should focus on understanding how affects are captured, identifying and addressing disempowering forms of investment and media, and striving to create new, empowering ways to engage with them. What matters is both the [p. 96] quality of the capture and the challenge of transforming the not-yet-captured potential of affects into empowering forms of existing. I

find Spinoza to be a valuable resource for developing immanent ethics to evaluate the processes of experimentation with and capture of affects. Hence, what is at stake in my unified notion of affect is creating the most powerful alliance between Spinoza and Deleuze with a strategic use of both, rather than rejecting one or choosing a side between them. This unified concept of affect, in so far as it focuses on how affects are mediated, is a promising framework for exploring the politics and ethics of affective mediation and media, an area that has recently garnered increasing attention from social critics (Cefai, 2018; Milani & Richardson, 2021; Pedwell & Stowe, 2023).

The itinerary of the article is as follows: after diagnosing the prevalent error of conflating Deleuze's notion of affect with that of Spinoza's in the first section, I will briefly present Spinoza's notion of affect (*affectus*) in the second section. In the third section, I will show that Deleuze uses the term affect in at least two distinct but interlinked senses, both of which are substantially different than Spinoza's notion of affect. In section four, I will argue that Deleuze's transformation of Spinoza's notion of affect was motivated by the particular goals of both his practical philosophy and his metaphysics. In his ethics, Deleuze leaves the Spinozian model of becoming active through the knowledge of causes and moves toward a view of becoming active through creation of new assemblages or becoming. However, despite his attempt to establish immanent ethics, Deleuze's conceptualization of affect leaves us unable to evaluate different forms of becoming (the problem of criteria) and account for what motivates one to engage in becoming and creation (the problem of motivation). In the last section, I defend a Spinoza-inspired unified notion of emotion by arguing that it is misleading to conceptualize emotions merely as consolidated, structured, extensive, and social states. When we thinking in terms of affect, we should be looking for the complex lines of continuities that link a specific metastable emotion to its rich and tangled field of emergence rather than limiting our frame of analysis to pre-subjective, asignifying and networked forces of a liquid nature. This would also enable us to trace better the lines of attachments that undergird and produce the forms of both oppression and freedom on the social and personal levels.

2. Was Spinoza a Deleuzian?

Deleuze is generally hailed as one of the principal initiators of the affect turn (Leys, 2017: 411 n.20) and the Deleuzian notion of affects qua impersonal flows of libidinal interactions created one of the most, if not the most, prominent traditions in the contemporary affect theory (Anderson, 2017: 1; Thrift, 2004: 62; Hemmings, 2005: 552).² Yet, contemporary affect theory, while frequently invoking a Spinozist-Deleuzian bequest, often overlooks the significant transformation the term “affect” undergoes in Deleuze's philosophy. Due to this disregard, it has become paradigmatic in cultural affect studies to conflate Spinoza's and Deleuze's theories and talk about a “Spinozist-Deleuzian notion of affect” (Thrift, 2004: 63; also see Anderson, 2017; Gregg & Seigworth, 2010; Massumi, 2002; Gould, 2009; Seigworth & Pedwell, 2023).³ Even in rare occasions where scholars highlight some differences between the Spinozian theory of affects and the Deleuzian one, they are generally under the lure of Deleuze in their reading of Spinoza, [p. 97] and seem to be completely negligent of the fundamental terminological shift happening between these philosophers. As a result, they make very disputable claims regarding

Spinoza. To the best of my knowledge, Jason Read (2016: 105; 2023: 380), who claims that Deleuze goes further than Spinoza by making a distinction between “the intensive order of affects and the extensive order of emotions,” is the first person who stresses the difference between Spinozian and Deleuzian notions of affect. In addition to the disputable idea that Deleuze “goes further” than Spinoza that I challenge in the last section of this article, Read is still negligent of the more basic terminological transformation that the term “affect” goes in Deleuze’s philosophy. More recently, Cross (2021: 149, 197), in his otherwise brilliant monograph on Deleuze’s theory of affects, also draws attention to some contentious differences between the Deleuzian and the Spinozian notions of affects. However, he is also completely negligent of the radical *terminological* difference between Deleuze’s and Spinoza’s notions of affect. Schaefer (2019: 11–14) is the first to highlight the terminological difference between Spinoza and Deleuze. He argues that Deleuze moves away from Spinoza’s notion of affects as emotions, instead embracing affects qua becomings through his reading of Bergson. However, even Schaefer’s observation, while significant, represents only a segment of a more comprehensive story that I will lay out in what follows.

A plausible explanation for this problematic conflation could be found in Deleuze’s evident admiration for Spinoza, as he hails Spinoza as “the prince” (WP 48) and “the Christ of philosophers” (WP 60).⁴ The fact that he wrote extensively and “most seriously” on Spinoza further contributes to this explanation (D 15). Based on these assertions and many similar others prevailing in Deleuze’s philosophical corpus (ATP 123, 153, 257, 260, SPP 17), scholars and interpreters seem to not even question or doubt Deleuze’s faithfulness, so to speak, to the Spinozian philosophy. As a result of this, they both fall into the error of drawing a Deleuzian picture of Spinoza, which should be prudently distinguished from Spinoza, and neglect Deleuze’s radical transformation of Spinoza. Deleuze’s deployment of Spinoza’s theory of affect in his own original philosophical work must be thought in line with his general view of “the history of philosophy as a kind of buggery.” In particular, as I will show, what he does with the Spinozian concept of affect is an unmistakable instance of his general strategy of “getting onto the back of an author, and giving him a child, which would be his and which would at the same time be a monster” (N 6).

3. Spinoza without Deleuze: The Singularity and Vitality of Emotions

In his *Ethics*, Spinoza famously makes a distinction between affects (*affectus*) and affections (*affectio*) of a being. An affection is any change that a body exerts on another in so far as these changes express a modification in the composition of the smaller bodies constituting it (II A4, ii interval L1).⁵ An affect, on the other hand, is an affection of the body that indicate an increase or decrease in one’s power to exist, which is defined by one’s capacities for affecting and being affected by other bodies (III def3). Spinoza dubs those affects that express an increase in one’s power of existence joy, while [p. 98] those indicating a decrease he identifies as sadness. Affects designate a subclass of affections marked particularly by their impact on body’s powers.⁶ Affects and affections indicate categorically distinct but inherently connected categories of events. The affections of a finite being indicate a modification in *the register of the thingly constitution*, while an affect designates a change in *the register of powers, capacities*

*or perfections.*⁷ These registers are not separate as a change in the thingly constitution can engender a change in the intensity or extension of the powers an individual has (IIIPost1). However, they are distinct because the actual existence of a being can be defined in terms of either of these two registers. On one register, a body is a dynamic arrangement of the powers or perfections for affecting other bodies (IVpref). On the other, a body is a dynamic arrangement of rest and motion (II Interval, Def).

At this point, I want to highlight that an affect itself is not *a power*, but it is the *felt change* in the intensity or extension of these powers. A decrease in the extension of one's powers amounts to losing a certain capacity, while a change in the intensity would amount to the efficaciousness or intensity of this power. What differentiates different affects are the characteristics of the affecting thing (this can also be plural) along with the causal nexus encompassing things, ideas, and other affects that this thing is embedded into, the features of the affected body, and the specific time that these two bodies encounter (IIP16, IIIP51). If I undergo an affect of sadness when my mother dies, this affect is unique to me as the relationship between my mother and me is a singular relationship due to its unique situatedness in my world. As Spinoza maintains, "Each affect of each individual differs from the affect of another as much as the essence of the one from the essence of the other" (IIIp57, cf. IIIp56). This singularity, in some way, extends to all the affects one can have (IIIp56). Thus, affects are bound to be singular because of the complex relational network and temporal context underpinning their existence.

In addition to their singularity, another crucial characteristic of affects in Spinoza is their *vitality*. There are two essential components in Spinoza's definition of affects. The first component of the definition is the change in the intensity or the extension of the powers one has. The other is the change in one's inclinations to act and think, or more generally, desire. In the general definition of affects at the very end of book three of *Ethics* (IIIGenDefAff, emphasis added), Spinoza maintains that an affect exerts a change on one's powers on the one hand, and one's desire on the other. In that respect, desire amounts to individuation, that is, we are determined to feel, act, think, and imagine in a certain way through the affection of other bodies and affects those affections create. Given that desire is the essence of an individual, then we can conclude that affects are, above all, vital and singular events. When we bring the singularity and vitality of affects together, we get a picture in which emotions and desires are understood via their embodied and situated singularity in the complex web of inter-affectivity.

4. Deleuze contra Spinoza: Between Ordinary Emotions and Singular Affects

There are at least two interlinked, but distinct uses of the term affect in Deleuze's philosophical corpus, both of which are significantly different than the Spinozian conception of affect: Affects qua capacities (ontological-ethological sense), affects qua becomings [p. 99] (ontological-ethical sense). Contrary to prevalent treatment in the literature, even though they are closely interlinked, the affect qua becoming is not identical to the affect qua capacity. The principal difference between them is that the first use indicates the *dynamic capacities* of an *already constituted individual* while the second delineates pre-individual *processes* that might *metamorphize the present arrangement of those capacities*. However, they are interlinked as capacities defining an individual are dynamic; that is, they change along with the process of

becoming. The task of this section is then to show how Deleuze's twofold notion of affect as capacities and becoming is different from Spinozist understanding of affects as embodied and singular emotions.

In *A Thousand Plateaus* and *What is Philosophy*, Deleuze and Guattari (D&G hereafter) define affects as an individual's capacities for being affected and affecting other bodies: "We know nothing about a body until we know what it can do, in other words, what its affects are" (ATP 257). This is both an ethological and ontological claim at the same time since ethology, the study of the capacities of an individual as D&G define it, also delineates what an individual is, and thus, has an ontological significance (ATP 257). One thing to be observed from the start is that this concept of affect is radically different from the Spinozist conception of affect. As I have shown above, in Spinoza, affects do not mean *capacities* or powers that define an individual but a *change in the extension of intensity in these powers*. D&G write, "Von Uexküll, in defining animal worlds, looks for the active and passive affects of which the animal is capable" (ATP 257). Here, if we were to use the Spinozist terminology to describe a tick's capacities to be affected and affecting, we would have to say the tick has three *perfections* or has the capacity for three different *affections* instead of saying that the tick has three affects. The tick has a capacity to be affected by a particular odor, but this capacity itself is not an affect but a power or perfection of the tick thanks to its capacity for such an affection. However, I should note that the Spinozian understanding of powers has both the ethological and ontological meanings that the term affect has in the Deleuzian picture.⁸ In this respect, Deleuze's notion of affects qua capacities can be seen as an expression of a Spinozian idea in a contorted Spinozist terminology.

The second use of the term affect in Deleuze delineates affects as becomings (WP 169, 173, 183; cf. ATP 256). Becomings, in Deleuzian philosophy, indicate events or undergoings that have disruptive and creative effects both on individual's internal composition and its external relationships with other things. In *Spinoza: Practical Philosophy*, Deleuze defines Spinoza's *affection* (*affectio*) as a state of an affected body expressing the presence of an affecting body while defining affects (*affectus*) as a passage from one state to another (SPP 49). Deleuze claims that what differentiates affects from affections is precisely that the former designates "passages, becomings, rises and falls, continuous variations of power [puissance] that pass from one state to another," while the latter indicates states (CC 139). Cross (2021: 194) rightly points out that Deleuze "adopts and adapts" the idea of affects as becomings from this reading of affects as interstates in Spinoza. However, the similarity between Spinoza and Deleuze does not extend too far from affects' being passages or interstates as Deleuze's characterization of affects qua becomings remains radically different than, and exclusive of the Spinozist idea of affects as singular emotions in some other fundamental respects. In this section, I limit my task to clarifying the [p. 100] difference between the two notions, and the following two sections will be more closely dealing with the claim on exclusivity.

The main upshot of viewing affects as becomings is that they are no longer seen as merely personal feelings as "they go beyond the strength of those who undergo them" (WP 164, cf. FB 39, N 137). Affects are those individuating forces that act upon the current state of being

of an entity and force it to become. They are pre-individual becomings or a field of micro-interactions happening in-between bodies, i.e., passages from one state to another in a “zone of indetermination” (WP 173). Affects exceed all lived experience (tout vécu, WP 164) and indicate impersonal states that underpin personal or lived experience. They have an “autonomous” existence (WP 168) liberated from the level of lived experience since the conjunctions and continuums of affects ontologically precede the world of the subject and its lived experience, including emotions (ATP 162). Scholars conceptualized this Deleuzian distinction between emotions and affects in different ways, among which Massumian formulation is perhaps the most influential. In *Parables for the Virtual* (p. 28), one of the centerpieces of contemporary affect theory, Massumi reiterates the ideas he expresses in his preface to *A Thousand Plateaus*, that emotions indicate social, conscious, signifying, and subjective states while affects designate pre-personal and pre-conscious pure potentialities. Though this characterization of affects is a particularly apt one as an interpretation of Deleuze, I disagree with Massumi’s and like-minded interpreters’ (e.g. Meiborg and Tuinen, 2016: 10) claim that this distinction is first invoked by Spinoza, and insist that this distinction is true only of Deleuze.

A *prima facie* difference between Spinoza’s notion of affect and the affects qua becomings is that affects are no longer singular and vitally embodied (inter)personal events but pre-conscious intensive states that have the power to metamorphize our emotions. Affects are individuating, but emotions indicate the nodes of individuated affects made ordinary, categorized, structured, “captured” (Massumi, 2002: 35) and “tamed” (Bell, 2021: 84). This new conception of affect allows Deleuze to create, in his peculiar post-Kantian and Bergsonian style, a new concept, which seems even less Spinozistic: “pure affect” (WP 181, MI 96, 103). A pure affect is an affect that is stripped from all signifying delineations and become pure potentiality or force. The questions we should be asking is, then, the following: What does Deleuze philosophically aim by this terminological and philosophical metamorphosis of the term affect? Does this transformation indicate a going beyond Spinoza in the positive sense, as many interpreters suggest (Bell, 2021: 95–96; Cross, 2021: 196; Read, 2016: 105)?

5. Deleuze Without Spinoza: Affects in Deleuze’s Ethics and Politics

Both for Deleuze and the Deleuze-inspired cultural critics, the larger stakes of the affect-emotion distinction are essentially ethical and political (Leys, 2011: 450–52; Gould, 2009: 20; Massumi, 2002: 41). When Deleuze claims that passions spring primarily from opinions and wages battle against opinions, one cannot help but think Deleuze sketches his own ethical model of becoming active which is different than Spinoza’s [p. 101] (WP 174). This model relies on the destruction of opinions that makes us tethered to particular forms of living and thinking. Emotions, as products of opinions, support the pernicious reign of dominant social orders and nail us down to dominant ways of living and feeling as emotions are usually taken up and exploited when constructing opinions (WP 175). Affects, on the other hand, are characterized by their disruptive forces which open one to new ways of feeling, seeing, thinking and acting by exposing one to the impersonal and unpredictable forces of the outside which cause one’s internal and external compositions to be metamorphized. As D&G contend, “the composite sensation, made up of percepts and affects, deterritorializes the system of opinion that brought

together dominant perceptions and affections within a natural, historical, and social milieu” (WP 197). Thus, when they characterize affects as becomings, what Deleuze has in mind is the creative and transformative power of impersonal forces, which can undo the stabilizing and capturing tendency of opinions and emotions.

Hence, in the Deleuzian ethico-political framework, one becomes active not through the adequate knowledge of causes as in Spinoza, but by connecting, conjugating, and continuing to new planes. What matters is not knowledge of oneself *per se* but creating new dynamic arrangements or assemblages (TRM 350). For knowledge is merely one among the many affects (in the Deleuzian sense) humans are capable of. The emphasis on the knowledge in psychoanalysis is part of the reason why Deleuze is dissatisfied with it. As D&G puts it, “Where psychoanalysis says, ‘stop, find your self again’, we should say instead, ‘Let’s go further still, we haven’t found our Body without organs yet, we haven’t sufficiently dismantled out self. Substitute forgetting for anamnesis, experimentation for interpretation” (ATP 151, cf. ATP 161). Thus, the Deleuzian model of becoming-active rests primarily on creative experimentation conceptualized as becoming. We can characterize this ethics as an *ethics of experimentation*. But how are we to understand experimentation as an ethical strategy? What does it consist in exactly?

According to Deleuze, there is clearly a difference between experimentation which ends up in new synthesis and conjugations, and one’s becoming chaos or death, which can result in annihilation pure and simple. In other words, he carefully distinguishes between creative experimentation and becoming death, and repeatedly warns us against the romantic aspirations for returning to an undisturbed state of being One (ATP 500; WP 165). Being well aware of this danger, Deleuze proposes *moderation* as a *general strategy for creative experimentation*. The moderation at issue concerns finding a middle ground between the pure self-destruction or becoming-death and being strictly stratified and coagulated (ATP 161-162). Instead of wildly destroying all the attachments one has, D&G propose the following as a strategy for creative becoming: “Lodge yourself on a stratum, experiment with the opportunities it offers, find an advantageous place on it, find potential movements of deterritorialization, possible lines of flight, experience them, produce flow conjunctions here and there … have a small plot of new land at all times” (ATP 161). However, the ideal of moderation needs further qualification and clarification since Deleuze does not specify what exactly makes a relation moderate or on what conditions such a moderation is attained, that is, on what condition an experimentation become creative or destructive. The question here is not to determine a prospectus for [p. 102] creative experimentation. Instead, I argue that even if we accept that immanent and particular conditions of a singular event ground a creative experimentation, there are still two questions to ask. First, what are exactly the criteria for the evaluation of the destructiveness or creativeness of an experimentation/becoming? This, I will call *the problem of criteria or selection*. Second, what motivates someone to choose to follow the line of flight that always exists, rather than not to follow it? What leads one to affirm difference and creativity over death or sedimentation? This, I will call *the problem of motivation*.

As we will see, Deleuze intentionally avoids giving a positive characterization to the conditions for creation or affirmation of difference due to his metaphysical commitments with regard to the nature of event. However, he seeks an immanent criterion to solve the problem of evaluation. But his immanent ethics leaves us with a very impoverished and misleading picture of the political and ethical significance of affects.

6. The Problem of Criterion and Motivation

Deleuze rejects any transcendent criteria to be used to evaluate different encounters. But he is also well aware of the problem of evaluation that the project of immanent ethics gives rise (CC 134). In Spinoza, the principle to evaluate new encounters is *conatus*, that is, whether those encounters increase or decrease one's power to exist. As a rigorously post-Kantian philosopher, Deleuze does not want to appeal to a dogmatic principle such as *conatus* or perseverance in existence to ground his immanent ethics.⁹ Deleuze's project of immanent ethics is generally understood with reference to Spinoza and Nietzsche. However, in the works he does his own philosophy, Deleuze does not simply use the dogmatic principle of *conatus* or the Nietzschean eternal return of the same as criteria for selection. Instead, he creates his own notion of *life as pure immanence*, which gives us an ethical picture essentially different from that of Nietzsche and Spinoza even though it contains Spinozist and Nietzschean elements. This understanding of life also forms the foundation for his placement of affects at the core of his ethics and politics, viewing them as the driving force behind difference and creativity.

Although Deleuze never explicitly formulates it in these exact terms, a particular concept of life as the production of difference serves as the criterion for assessing new encounters. According to this notion, the immanent criteria for evaluating different encounters and processes lies in their capacity to create difference, or their *difference-making character*. This concept of life has at least two essential components: the idea of constant production of the new as the essence of life, and the idea of affirmation of life, viz. affirmation of the new and chance (DR 198). Deleuze does not define life with reference to the body's perseverance in existence, as Spinoza does. Instead, he defines it as a process of differentiation or the production of the new, where what is produced cannot be predicted in advance but is a true product of chance (PI 27-29). The affirmation of life and eternal return entails the affirmation of difference and singularity, where the affirmation of difference indicates "a growth in dimensions and a gain in distinction," and thus, "an amplification, an intensification, an elevation of power" (F 73, cf. LS 151-153). When Deleuze argues that "there are never any criteria other than the tenor of existence, the intensification of life" (WP 74, cf. NP 1), he means using difference and becoming [p. 103] as criteria for ethics. When he formulates Nietzsche's eternal return as an ethical principle for selection (DI 122-125), he uses this metaphysical background of the philosophy of difference. To affirm what can be willed eternally is nothing but affirming that which contains the infinite potential for difference and novelty. So far as becoming designates incorporating a difference into a mode of existence, it indicates an expansion in one's capacities to be affected and affecting (Goodchild, 1997: 47). The iteration of the ceaseless becoming and creation on the political register gives us a principle of hope or creation under the image of a people always yet to come, and in the ethical register, a person or life always yet to come or to be created, i.e., life as a work of art. In the Deleuzian metaphysical picture of life which sees

difference as the essence of life, there remains nothing to value but creativity or the coming of difference. That's why Deleuze proposes the affirmation of difference as one and only immanent value or criteria to be used in selecting among different becomings. It is also on this ground that Deleuze despises emotions and the lived experience and foregrounds impersonal affects as powerful devices for opening one to the essence of life, i.e., novelty or difference.

How does this concept of life resolve the problem of criteria? Is not the crux of the problem of criteria rooted in the act of selection among emerging differences, rather than embracing the singularity of each event and affirming its differentiating nature (LS 149-150)? Deleuze emphasizes that on both ethical and political levels, our focus should lie in the moments of creation and becoming rather than assessing them before their conception. On the political level, we must be concerned with the moment of the appearance of an event and try to seize the chance-element or singularity that creates the event (N 176). On the ethical level we must try to affirm the chance-element or singularity of event, and “become worthy” of them (LS 149-150). We can try to seize the moment of chance by “being attentive to the unknown that is knocking at the door” (Smith, 2012: 158).

However, the idea of seizing the moment of chance and affirming the singularity of the event expressed in ethical and political formula “do not judge, create” (CC 169) gives us only a very evacuated ethics and politics. The crucial ethical and political questions often center on the nature of what we create – whether it empowers or weakens, oppresses or liberates, deadens or enlivens. What is knocking at the door might be life as well as death, empowerment as well as destructive weakening, freedom as well as oppression. Remember Tiqqun’s (2010: 200) brilliant diagnosis: “The revolutionary was molecular, and so was the counter-revolution.” We can understand both revolution and counter revolution in terms of becoming, irruption and process. What is at stake in the question of criteria is precisely the evaluation of different unknown paths that an event can lead one into, which can lead us to both “revolution” and “counter-revolution.” The same thing can be said of capitalist logic, which makes use of the molecular affective interactions. As Patricia Clough (2007: 19) aptly highlights, “the political gain expected by the affective turn – its openness, emergence and creativity – is already the object of capitalist capture, as capital shifts to accumulate in the domain of affect.” The more significant political question is not the moment of singularity and change, but what kind of new life forms this change and becoming creates. Within Deleuze’s philosophy, the tools for evaluating becomings and creations in these regards appear, at best, underdeveloped. [p. 104]

Another issue intertwined with the problem of criteria is the problem of motivation. What motivates us to affirm or resist a process of becoming? What drives one to actively deploys his or her powers rather than resist them (cf. Smith, 2012: 147–59)?¹⁰ How can we explain some people’s *desire* to despise the new, or some people’s inclination to more sedimented forms of relationship and emotions, such as the feeling of safety, trust and relationship of friendship? Can the stabilizing forms of existence serve as a source of empowerment and creation? In Spinoza’s philosophy, the impetus for rationally evaluating our relationships with things, other people, and ourselves stems from our desire to create joyful relations. For Deleuze, the new ethical ideal is “‘de-individualiz[ation]’ by means of

multiplication and displacement, diverse combinations" (AO xvi) and the new political ideal is "people's revolutionary becoming" (N 171). Yet, what propels people toward revolutionary becoming, or toward de-individualization? Deleuze maintains, "Everybody's caught, one way or another, in a minority becoming that would lead them into unknown paths if they *opted to* follow it through" (N 173, my emphasis). But why, how, and on what conditions one "opts to follow" one path rather than another? Deleuze's answer to this problem would rely on his understanding of desire, which defines it not with reference to uncapturable movement or constant excess. For Deleuze, desire is by nature creative. In a letter to Foucault he asserts, "for myself, the status of phenomena of resistance is not a problem; since lines of flight are primary determinations, since desire assembles the social field" (Davidson, 1997: 188). Yet, this view of desire merely shifts the problem elsewhere. For the question of motivation lies precisely in what impels someone to pursue a line of flight rather than abstain from it.

The implications of these two issues are paramount for Deleuze and cultural critics inspired by his ideas, particularly those who heavily depend on the notion of affect as nonsignifying, nonconscious, and pre-subjective intensity. As Leys (2011: 450–51) rightly observes, "The whole point of the turn to affect by Massumi and like-minded cultural critics is thus to shift attention away from considerations of meaning or "ideology" or indeed representation to the subject's subpersonal material-affective responses, where, it is claimed, political and other influences do their real work." However, this characterization of affect, tying the political and ethical influence of affects to subpersonal material interactions, renders us incapable of addressing the issues of motivation and evaluation. In the following section, I will argue that by adopting a Spinoza-inspired unified notion of affect, we can avoid the problems inherent in stark distinction between emotions and affects while retaining and expanding the explanatory power of the notion of impersonal affects.

7. Affective Networks of Empowerment: Between Attachment and Destruction

One drawback of the characterizing affects merely by their impersonal, pre-conscious, and transformative nature is it offers only a negative explanation of some essential affective phenomena, thereby overlooking their potential as a source of empowerment. Schafer's (2019) criticism against the Deleuzian understanding of affects as becomings or transformative events is particularly important in this respect. Schafer claims that the [p. 105] Deleuzian understanding of affects qua transformative events offers "very little, if anything, to think about" (p. 59) the significance and positivity of sedimentation, cultivation, of resilient and persistent structures in politics and ethics. Seeing life essentially as a process of the creation of the new leads Deleuze to underemphasize, if not to ignore, the empowering potentiality of attachments, bonds, and stabilizations both on ethical and political registers. On the political plane, the upshot of this is to underemphasize the empowering dimension of solidarities and to overemphasize moment of irruption and becoming in social sphere. On the ethical level, the consequence is to disregard the empowering and creative dimension of the rather sedimentary social relationships, such as friendship or long-lasting safe intimate relationships, and to overemphasize the social relationships that undo one's current state of existence, such as an agonizing love relationship (P 23, DR 139, also see Kleinherenbrink, 2016). In tandem with this, emotions such as the feeling of belonging, safety, and trust are preferred over affects that

“move” the soul or “perplex it” (DR 140), such as jealousy and suffering, just as agonizing love is preferred over friendship (PS 30).

This general inclination can be framed as a tendency to overlook *the affective power of attachments* in favor of emphasizing affects’ *power of creative disruption*. However, does this criticism not ignore the fact that the aim of the theory of synthesis Deleuze develops with Guattari in the first two chapters of *Anti-Oedipus* is precisely to scrutinize the very nature of the investment of desire in one’s attachments? Is it not the task of schizoanalysis to analyze the various types of investments of desire according to the “reactionary” (paranoiac) and “revolutionary” (schizophrenic) poles? In *Anti-Oedipus*, the stabilizing and ossifying forms of libidinal investments are viewed as results of the capture of the unruly flow of desire while desire itself is conceptualized as a destabilizing, reterritorializing, disruptive force. Thus, in the theory of three synthesis, the investments of desire in more sedimented forms of relationships are analyzed with reference to paranoic pole and labeled as “conformist, reactionary, and fascisizing” (AO 341), which is contrasted to destabilizing, reterritorializing, disruptive schizophrenic pole (Buchanan, 2008: 72–74). I argue that desire being essentially productive does not imply that it is necessarily directed toward destabilization, destruction, or deterritorialization. The attachments can have positivity and productivity of their own. The relationships of love and solidarity can be places where desire is invested in productive and creative attachments. This does not simply mean that attachments give one the minimum ground required for creative experimentation, but instead, one’s power of creative destruction and becoming comes from one’s attachments.

However, does not Deleuze already emphasize the significance of attachments when he puts forth the idea of moderation as a general strategy of creation? D&G maintains, “you have to keep small rations of subjectivity in sufficient quantity to enable you to response to the dominant reality” (ATP 160). If Deleuze values attachments, they are valued only negatively, because without a minimum amount of attachment, one cannot overcome them. They are important only in so far as they are required to go over them. My point here is that if we are to stick to the Deleuzian terminology, becoming happens, *not in spite of, but thanks to and through attachments*. If the metamorphizing power of impersonal affects is one power of political and ethical experimentation, creative alliances or solidarities is another, and maybe a [p. 106] more primordial one. It is one’s attachments that give one the power to creatively destroy the haunting passive affects and resist the oppression by the power.

“We lack creation,” D&G writes, “*We lack resistance to the present*” (WP, 108, emphasis in the original). That is their diagnosis of the present. However significant is creation, another layer of analysis should be added to this framework since Gambetti (2022: 59, original italic) aptly diagnoses, “we do not only lack resistance to the present, we lack the *power to create*.” In foregrounding the empowering and disempowering forms of affective attachment and detachment, I aim to highlight the political essentiality of an image of empowering and disempowering connections. I argue that actualizing collective power as a cure to debilitating regimes of connections requires a unified notion of affect that could enable us to diagnose disempowering and empowering forms of connection.

Moving from the Spinozian understanding of emotions as singular and vital phenomena, we can develop a notion of affect that appreciates the fundamental significance of both attachments and destruction in their constitutive positivity without leading to the problems the Deleuzian distinction between affects and emotions creates. This notion breaks with the duality of macro-level structured emotions and micro-level pre-individual interactions and foregrounds the singularity of each network interweaving micro and macro level affective interactions. It foregrounds the co-constitutive relationality between the pre-individual, individual and transindividual aspects of affects. In Spinoza's account of affects, affects have a pre-individual dimension in so far as they exceed the conscious level of knowledge. As Sharp (2005: 596) aptly puts it, in this picture "Any individual, by virtue of the various relationships constituting its being (an individual can be a person, community, nation, etc.), has a singular 'complexion' made up of many affects at once." In addition to this pre-individual level, affects also operate on a transindividual field of interaction as they are coexistent with a social structure of imagination (Williams, 2007; Read, 2016b). These two levels, pre-individual and transindividual, are continuous with and constitutive of each other. I agree with Caroline Williams (2010: 245) that Spinoza can offer "the conceptual resources to reconfigure the composition of affective subjectivity as a transindividual social bond and as an unconscious dynamic of ethico-political existence." Each affect existing in a singular and unique setting is constituted by a sprawling ensemble of dynamic interactions involving myriad actors, including conscious and unconscious, personal and interpersonal elements (Slaby et. al., 2019).

One objection against this reading of affects as emotions in Spinoza might be that while emotions entail interiority or felt awareness, affects in Spinoza are not necessarily felt states or humanistic emotions. A poisoning, in so far as it indicates a decomposition of some relations in my body, which results in a decrease in my power of existence, is an affect of sadness. In fact, whenever there is a composition or decomposition of a relation, there are affects. First of all, in the Spinozian framework, not all bodily affections or changes count as affects, as affects are those affections that increase or decrease the body's power of existence. Imagine I have a pain in my liver caused by the heavy meal I had an hour ago. Here, the pain itself is not an affect or emotion, just as the chemical changes happening in my liver are not. However, if pain generates a felt change in the extensity or intensity of my capacities, this change in one's capacities indicates an affect. But this does not mean that affects are mere psychological states. As Williams (2010) [p. 107] convincingly argues, the Spinozian conception of affect already goes beyond the merely psychological conceptualization of emotion as attributable to a conscious subject. Instead, it defines a domain that encompasses both pre-individual and transindividual relationships. The unified notion of affect I propose here highlights this continuity between unconscious bodily changes or affections and bodily feelings and emotions that are socially constituted, i.e., the inseparability of pre-individual and transindividual.

When we understand emotions as inseparable from the nexus of a dynamic set of objects, ideas, and affects that undergird it, then emotions themselves cease to be stable and become metastable phenomena. We should be looking for the complex lines of continuities that link a specific metastable emotion to its rich and tangled field of emergence. This would also enable us to trace better the lines of attachments that undergird and produce the forms of oppression

and freedom both on the social and personal level. New life forms do not come out of the blue thanks to impersonal affects. Instead, *they are the product of the inner workings of shared affects, which are underpinned by a complex nexus of personal, impersonal, conscious, and unconscious, pre-individual and trans-individual interactions all at once*. This means that there may never be a pure and impersonal affect that precedes its situatedness in a shared world. If we desire to uphold a distinction between affects and emotions, it's essential to recognize that individual affective states, considered as emotions, and visceral intensities, seen as affects, are intricately intertwined and continuously linked in a way that a clear-cut distinction between them may never be possible. My argument contends that this seamless continuity blurs the idea that affects have "autonomous" existence (WP 168) liberated from the level of lived experience. Affects and emotions constitute continuous components of one and the same order.

Consequently, tying the essential significance of affective processes solely to the non-signifying and non-cognitive corporeal domain deprives us of the tools needed to confront the problem of motivation and evaluation that are lurking behind the political and ethical aspirations of this notion of affect. A Spinoza-inspired unified concept viewing affects as complex affective networks bringing together the pre-individual and transindividual dimensions of the affect not only consolidates the explanatory role intended for pre-individual affect in the Deleuzian framework but also offers a pathway to address the problems of motivation and selection. In this perspective, the focus shifts away from an event's capacity to induce change – whether it triggers a transformation or not – towards its empowering nature, emphasizing whether the transformation is empowering or not. Here, the value lies not in the act of experimentation itself but in its potential for empowerment—a pursuit aimed at empowerment through experimentation. Moreover, the focus on the empowering forms of attachment enables us to overcome the problem of motivation. The idea that becoming happens not in spite of but thanks to one's empowering attachments suggests that empowering deployment of the creative potential of affects requires certain types of empowering attachments and emotions (love, safety, openness, etc.). Certain empowering emotions and attachments are the conditions for one's openness to the creative potential of affects. New life forms do not come out of the blue thanks to impersonal affects. Instead, they are the product of the inner workings of shared affects, which are underpinned by a complex nexus of personal, impersonal, conscious, and unconscious, pre-individual and trans-individual interactions all at once. Hence, [p. 108] focusing on the co-working of attachments and detachments and the continuity of affects and emotions through a lens of their disempowering and empowering aspects is essential both for tracing the forms of attachments that undergird the forms of oppression and creating the ones that are essential for freedom and flourishing.

8. Conclusion

The readers of Deleuze have long been focused on his affinities with Spinoza's philosophy to the extent of taking granted that Deleuze was a "faithful" descendant of Spinoza, to the detriment of a more interesting and more significant question of how he transformed the latter to meet the particular problems his philosophy plugs into. Spinoza's influence on Deleuze is without doubt. But another point which is mostly ignored but must be as clear and

straightforward as the first one is this: when Deleuze borrows a term from Spinoza and seems to use it in the Spinozian sense, he mostly transforms it and makes it his own. A central concern animating Deleuze's theory of affects is to go beyond the understanding of affects as emotional transitions of the lived. Deleuze goes even further and pitches the indeterminate and creative essence of affects against the stabilizing and enframing character of emotions (WP 188).

Having highlighted this overlooked distinction, I contend that Deleuze separates himself from the Spinozian understanding of affect as emotions primarily due to differing objectives of his practical philosophy. Nonetheless, two crucial issues persist within Deleuze's framework of immanent ethics and politics, like worms nestled within a fruit. These are the problem of criterion and the problem of motivation. Deleuze dedicates considerable effort to emphasize the importance of experimentation and irruption, yet he fails in specifying the characteristics that make an experimentation creative and empowering, as well as identifying the motivations driving one towards creative experimentation. Consequently, the ethical and political potential of the emotions-affects distinction promised by Deleuze and his contemporary followers remains both constrained and often misleading so far as the problem of evaluation and motivation is lurking behind it. Firstly, as demonstrated, the idea of impersonal affects obscures our understanding of the empowering capacity inherent in certain shared affects, such as feelings of security and trust that are essential for solidarities. I argue that these kinds of emotions and attachments are essential in creating the motivational ground for one's openness to novelty and becoming. Secondly, this concept fails to encompass the constitutive and empowering role of attachments, defining affects solely by their disruptive potentiality. This also leaves us unable to address the ethical quality of different forms of becoming. As a consequence, I argue that there are compelling grounds to favor a Spinoza-inspired theoretical framework that conceives affects as embodied, unique, and essential phenomena over the Deleuzian characterization of affects as transformative events.

The view I propose here does not deny the significance of the notion of affect as pre-conscious affections. However, I argue that we should focus more on the continuity and constitutive interaction between the pre-personal field of affections and their capture and investment in the transindividual and personal domains. My focus on networked affect, the continuity between affect and emotion, and the inseparability of experimental processes from their capture in lived experience does not signify a retreat to familiar values, [p. 109] such as a sovereign, reasoning subject or political activity based on strict organizing principles. Instead, it seeks to awaken the study of affect through a purely Deleuzian lens from its slumber filled with dreams of escapist euphoria by demonstrating how the mystification of affects undermines the critical ethico-political potential of the study of affects.

I propose to conceptualize affects as the nodes of materially, psychologically, and socially mediated and networked vital and singular changes in one's capacities – changes that are a result of one's situated existence within shared discourses, desires, intentions, images, and so forth. What Spinoza contributes to this perspective is an immanent ethical framework for evaluating whether a particular affective node and media is empowering or not. This approach paves the way for constructive ethics and politics, focusing not solely on following

revolutionary molecular transformations or creating molar conflicts but on how molecular becomings are channeled into and invested in new actions, attachments, and organizations. An ethics of empowerment, inspired by Spinoza, which challenges disempowering regimes of hope and fear at all levels of social and personal existence, can help us cultivate more empowered political subjectivities and collectivities that can resist disempowering regimes of both solidifying stratifications and anonymizing desubjectivations.

Acknowledgements: I am grateful to Daniel W. Smith for detailed and insightful comments on the first draft of this paper, which significantly helped in the improvement of the article. I also would like to extend my thanks to James Emery, Rohitashwa Sarkar, Evrim Bayındır, Corry Shores, and Bolkar Özkan, whose careful and critical readings of the manuscript greatly helped me creating more nuanced, clear and forceful arguments. Lastly, many thanks to the anonymous reviewers and the editors of *Theory, Culture, and Society* for their invaluable comments and suggestions, which were instrumental in shaping the final version of the article.

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¹ For a similar critique of the characterization of affect as impersonal, unconscious, and extralinguistic, see Wetherell (2012: chapters 3–4). Her critique highlights the inadequacies of this characterization with regard to empirical research on affect. Leys' (2011) well-known critique (for a response, see Schaefer, 2022) questions the validity of the psychological evidence Massumi uses to support the autonomy of affect. However, neither of these influential critiques addresses the political and ethical dimensions of affect as I do here. Also note that my critique does not target the affect theorists like Sara Ahmed and Laurent Berlant who reject making a clear distinction between affect and emotion.

² Some of the classic examples of feminist and queer studies of affects that benefit from these theoretical frameworks are (Ahmed, 2015; Gould, 2009; Cvetkovich, 2003; Berlant, 2000).

³ See (Boler, 2016: 23) and (Robinson & Kutner, 2019: 115) who raises some doubts in passing concerning the appropriateness of the notion of affect delineated by Massumi to its alleged original sources.

[p. 110]

⁴ For Deleuze's books, I use the following abbreviations: F: (Deleuze, 1993), WP: (Deleuze and Guattari, 1994), ATP: (Deleuze and Guattari, 2005), SPP: (Deleuze, 1988), PI (Deleuze, 2005); N (Deleuze, 1995), D (Deleuze and Parnet, 2007), CC (Deleuze, 1997), LS (Deleuze, 1990), DR (Deleuze, 1994), MI (Deleuze, 1986), AO (Deleuze and Guattari, 1983), NP (Deleuze, 2006a), PS (Deleuze, 2000), DI (Deleuze, 2004), TRM (Deleuze, 2006b), FB (Deleuze, 2003), B (Deleuze, 1991).

⁵ I use the following abbreviations for references to the *Ethics* (Spinoza, 1994): The initial roman number indicates the Part of the *Ethics*; 'P' indicates a proposition, 'A' indicates an axiom, 'Sc' indicates a scholium, 'C' indicates a corollary, "L" indicates a lemma, "A" indicates an axiom, 'd' indicates a demonstration, "def" indicates a definition, "pref" indicates a preface, "Post" indicates a postulate, GenDefAff refers to the General Definitions of the Affects at the very end of part three.

⁶ On Spinoza's definition and distinction between affects and affections see (Alanen, 2017).

⁷ For Spinoza's use of the term perfection interchangably with powers or capacities, see (Spinoza, 1994: 75) and (IV pref).

⁸ The ontological meaning of the term is clear in Spinoza's equivocation between reality and perfection. He maintains, "we understand by perfection the very essence of the thing" (III Gen Deff Aff exp). Ethological sense is obvious in Spinoza' construal of perfections as the power to produce an affect: "By perfection in general I shall ... understand ... the essence of each thing insofar as it exists and *produces an effect*, having no regard to its duration" (IV preface, my emphasis).

⁹ What makes *conatus* a dogmatic principle is that it attributes an essence to desire, which is one's struggle to persevere in existence. Observe that despite his fondness for Spinoza, Deleuze does not very often refer to the idea of *conatus* or make use of it in the books he does his own philosophy.

¹⁰ When we apply this to the solution Smith proposes, we get this crucial question which is unanswered: on what conditions one actively deploys his or her powers.

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