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A Study on Carl Schmitt's Political Philosophy: Sovereignty, State of Exception, The Political and Friend-Enemy

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Abstract

This article revisits the concepts of friend-enemy with a homogeneous society, equality, and the political in the context of Carl Schmitt's political philosophy. Schmitt's contributions to the theories of political philosophy, which are associated with an authoritarian theory, distinguish themselves as an approach that should be consulted to understand current debates The aim of this article is to examine these discussions from Schmitt's perspective and against Schmitt. The initial question of the article is about the building blocks of a society that is democratic and free from unjust inequality. This article will, therefore, examine the elements of a democratic society and analyze the democratic elements in liberal states through Schmitt. However, rather than being on either side of this line of tension, it aims to examine concepts such as inequality and otherness more explicitly, which manifest themselves more strongly today. In the first part, the article

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revisits Carl Schmitt's definition of sovereignty and state of emergency, and the second part reviews Carl Schmitt's concept of liberal democracy and equality. The third part briefly analyses the perspectives of thinkers such as Claude Lefort, Leo Strauss, and Chantal Mouffe on politics and discusses Schmitt's ideas on the distinction between friend and enemy.

Keywords: Carl Schmitt, Sovereignty, State of exception, Political, Friend-enemy.

Carl Schmitt'in Politik Felsefesi Üzerine Bir Çalışma: Egemenlik, Olağanüstü Hal, Politik Olan ve Dost-Düşman

Özet

Bu makale, Carl Schmitt'in politik felsefesi bağlamında homojen toplum, eşitlik ve politik olan ile birlikte dost-düşman kavramlarını gözden geçirir. Otoriter bir anlayışla bağdaştırılan Schmitt'in politik felsefe teorilerine olan katkıları, güncel tartışmaları anlamak için başvurulması gereken ve güncelliğini koruyan bir yaklaşım olmakla öne çıkar. Bu makalenin amacı, söz konusu tartışmaları Schmitt'in perspektifinden ve Schmitt'e karşı incelemektir. Makalenin başlangıç sorusu demokratik olan ve haksız eşitsizliğin olmadığı bir toplumun yapıtaşları üzerinedir. Dolayısıyla bu makale demokratik toplumun unsurlarını irdeleyecek ve liberal devletlerde demokratik ögeleri Schmitt üzerinden analiz eder. Bununla birlikte, bu gerilim hattının herhangi bir tarafında olmaktan ziyade günümüzde kendini daha güçlü bir şekilde gösteren eşitsizlik ve öteki olma durumu gibi kavramları daha açık bir şekilde incelemeyi hedefler. İlk bölümde, makale Carl Schmitt'in egemenlik ve olağanüstü hal tanımına değinir ve ikinci bölümde Carl Schmitt'in liberal demokrasi ve eşitlik kavramını inceler. Üçüncü bölümde Claude Lefort, Leo Strauss ve Chantal Mouffe gibi düşünürlerin politik olana dair perspektifleri kısaca ele alır ve Schmitt'in fikirleri dost-düşman ayrımını inceler.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Carl Schmitt, Egemenlik, Olağanüstü hal, Politik olan, Dost-düşman.

Introduction

Nowadays, it is impossible to conduct a complete research on political philosophy and its related subjects without thinking directly or indirectly about the concepts of sovereignty, state of exception, and especially friend or enemy. So much so that, like a pendulum, what is said and wagered on all these concepts returns as soon as it moves away from where it started, encouraging us to keep talking about them. As a matter of fact, sovereignty, the state of exception idea, and friend or enemy are old and constantly changing, even if they are spoken and asserted in different forms in contemporary political philosophy.

Carl Schmitt assessed the aforementioned themes under the concept of political theology. Henrich Meier discussed the concept of political theology in relation to Carl

Schmitt and stated that he introduced this concept to the literature: ''Political theology is as old as faith in revelation, and it will continue to exist, as far as human beings can tell, as long as faith in a God who demands obedience continues to exist'' (Meier, 2006, p. 77).

Carl Schmitt's bridge between the modern state and the political theology is a current reference to the political ethos of the modern world. In order to make an appropriate reading, it is first necessary to analyze and introduce Carl Schmitt's *Theology Political I* (1922). Thus, Schmitt has made a substantial contribution based on the analogy between the modern state structure and theology, even though he has been criticized in specific contexts. Returning to Henrich Meier, political theology and questions related to this field cannot be answered without mentioning Schmitt's political philosophy theories. As Meier puts it, ''yet whoever poses the question today asks it within the horizon of the debate that Schmitt inaugurated'' (2006, p. 77).

These concepts have been the subject of intense debates in the philosophical sphere of contemporary political philosophy. In particular, liberal theory and the analyses written in response to it are based on these concepts. Schmitt's contribution to the analyses shaped in this context is significant; therefore, Schmitt and the criticisms, supports, and alternative thoughts against him can be a suitable guide for understanding the problems of contemporary political philosophy.

In addition to Schmitt, Leo Strauss's ideas on political philosophy and his interaction with Schmitt provide important questions about the nature of politics and the political crisis of modernity. Furthermore, Chantal Mouffe's Schmitt-inspired theory of agonistic democracy invites us to rethink Schmitt's categorization of friend and enemy. Claude Lefort's analyses of modern democracy, as a critique of Schmitt's notion of the political, guide rethinking the nature of democracy with human rights. In this context, this article attempts to assess Schmitt's philosophy in the context of these perspectives as an analysis of the political structure, the debates on modern democracy, the distinction between friend and enemy, and the status of the 'other.'

Sovereignty and State of Exception in Theological Politics

In his work *Political Theology*, Carl Schmitt opens a new topic of discussion with the borderline concept [*Grenzebegriff*]. This 'borderline concept' term in point is, in fact, an emphasis: Many concepts in contemporary political philosophy, including Carl Schmitt's, begin where a line ends or stands on a line. Therefore, this definition will not appear in an ordinary situation but in a state of exception [*Grenzfall*] (2005, p. 5). The state of exception has an aspect that is compatible with the "systematic and legal logic" in terms of being suitable for definability in every way and being considered together with the concept of sovereignty. This aspect is that the state of exception comes with a decision.

Schmitt asserts that the sovereign, as the primary sovereign authority, decides on the state of exception. In addition, he also indicates that sovereignty is not a situation that can be understood in a normal, ordinary situation. The concept of sovereignty is a concept that can only be discussed when there is a situation beyond/outside the ordinary situation (Kardeş, 2012, p. 11). In other words, the sovereign is both part of the order and outside it. The decision to suspend the constitution also hides in the sovereign's power, which is why Schmitt sees modern constitutional development as an obstacle to the sovereign.

Another point that should be underlined regarding the concept of sovereignty is related to the confinement of this concept to the ''abstract'' dimension. As a matter of fact, the development of this and other related concepts has been formulated on an intangible level and confined to an echo chamber. In this context, Schmitt referred the concept of sovereignty reduced to the abstract dimension to textbook formulas, adding that they are meaningless and 'endlessly repeated' (Schmitt, 2005, p. 6–7). These discussions, however, are buried in concrete practice. In other words, there is the problem of who decides on the public and state benefits, order, and security in case of disagreement.

When it comes to sovereignty, it is possible to say that there is a discussion at the level of ontology rather than an abstract confusion of concepts. As a matter of fact, discussing sovereignty, which reveals itself under more than one condition in order to preserve itself and the state, only at the theoretical level provides an unproductive

discussion. However, naturally, it is to be hoped that this will remain at the theoretical level.

Schmitt constructs the sovereign as both inside and outside the political and legal situation and develops it so that it can be shelved to protect the legal order. As a matter of fact, this does not mean the state of exception or martial law as expressed in the constitution, but that the sovereign has unlimited powers and suspends the existing legal order. This is differs from anarchy or chaos in that it contains the necessary order of law and system (Kardeş, 2012, p. 13–14).

In order to better clarify the concept of sovereignty, Schmitt puts a question about the responsibility of the sovereign based on Bodin: "To what extent is the sovereign bound to laws, and to what extent is he responsible to the estates?" (2005, p. 8). The sovereign's commitment is based on natural law and responsibility until the exception (state of exception) comes into issue. The sovereign's commitment is limited in the course of the ordinary state of affairs; when the necessary situation arises, in other words, when an extraordinary situation arises or is created, this responsibility disappears, and judgment comes into existence. The state of urgent necessity for Bodin is the state of exception in Schmitt's thought, in which the sovereign is released from his obligations to the people.

There are cases in which sovereignty is when the people rule at times and the sovereign rules at other times -the sovereign must act without the people- and sovereignty implies a mutual situation between the two sides.. According to Schmitt, such a relationship weakens the sovereign's sovereignty but does not completely eliminate it (2005, p. 9-10). Perhaps this is the purpose of these relations. This conception of Schmitt's would later be one of the criticisms directed at him.

Schmitt opens the context of Article 48 of the 1919 Weimar Constitution and Article 14 of the French Charter in relation to this issue. According to Article 48, in the case of a state of exception, the head of state can declare it and suspend the constitution. Similarly, article 14 of the French Charter delegates all authority to the king. Schmitt dismisses the claim that governments that cannot declare a state of exception are states because the state must be able to protect itself in the event of a threat. It seems that it is necessary for the future of the state to make exceptional decisions in order to maintain the ordinary situation and order: ''It is characteristic of the sovereign to carry out certain practices that are not

applied in ordinary cases. Suspension in exceptional cases is the state's reflex of self-preservation'' (Kardeş, 2012, p. 15).

Unlike a state of anarchy or chaos, a state of exception, in which the sovereign shows itself, is a state that is different from the legal order but still exists in a legal sense. More precisely, we can say that the state of exception is a state on the internal border of the legal order. Schmitt, first and foremost as a legal theorist, did not completely exclude even the state of exception from the legal order. The decision of the sovereign who decides on the state of exception becomes absolute in the face of legal norms, and then "the state suspends the law in the exception based on its right of self-preservation, as one would say" (Schmitt, 2007, p.12). But when will the state of exception come into existence?

In order to understand when the state of exception emerged and to analyze the concept of the decision in a critical situation, it is necessary to summarise Schmitt's view of the critical situation. From what we have analyzed so far, we can see that Schmitt considers the concept of exception as a moment of crisis outside the norm. In other words, the state of exception, which manifests as an extreme situation, is not the goal of political thought. However, it continues to exist as a possibility. At this point, it was important for Schmitt to be prepared for this possibility and to have a single voice that could decide this in a state of exception. As a result of the concerns caused by the economic crisis and increasing unemployment in his era, Schmitt found a solution far away from a liberal government.

Emphasizing that the state of exception cannot be limited, Schmitt points to the moment when it manifests itself: "The exception appears in its absolute form when a situation in which legal prescriptions can be valid must first be brought about" (2007, p. 13). It is necessary to construct a sphere in which legal decisions and judgments can be applied to create the 'normal,' and as soon as this becomes a matter of 'necessity,' the ordinary situation is out of the ordinary. As a matter of fact, when the space in which legal norms can manifest themselves is threatened and obscured, the 'state' is also is in a risk because the norm needs a normative foundation, and when this relationship does not exist, a state of exception results. According to Schmitt, the opposite of this unfortunate situation can only be realized in a homogeneous social structure. What needs to be asked and analyzed here is what kind of homogeneity is.

Such an explanation would lead to an understanding of homogeneity that is not formal but content-orientated. Homogeneity, as understood here, seems to imply uniformity in every possible identity. However, Schmitt's understanding of homogeneity leads to the distinction between friend and enemy. The sovereign, who decides on the state of exception in the current political order, also decides on friend and enemy in the same order.

Schmitt's Critique of Liberalism and Equality

Schmitt criticized the liberal theories popular in his time by examining them in terms of concepts such as democracy and equality or inequality. His opposition to liberal theories was a reaction to the Weimar Republic. World War I was a significant change for Germany, as for many other countries: the Weimar Republic, with a liberal and parliamentary government, had been established, but unemployment was high, and the economic crisis was growing. For Schmitt, the cause of this crisis was parliamentary democracy, and along with his criticism of liberal democracy and parliamentarism, Schmitt also offered a 'prescription' for an 'ideal' government (see Schmitt, 1985). Unfortunately, incidents and genocide happened in the following years under Hitler and his rule. For this reason, homogeneity and other concepts emphasized by Schmitt are evaluated within the context of these unfortunate events.

While criticizing liberal democracy and parliamentarism, Schmitt also describes the 'ideal' form of democracy. According to Schmitt, homogeneity is necessary for democracy, and homogeneity is necessary for equality. Liberalism and democracy, which will always be in conflict, are products of the capitalist system, and for democracy to truly exist, liberalism must step aside.

Schmitt's pejorative approach to liberal theories arose because he saw a chaotic situation in a liberal popular order. To go further, however, the definition of a liberal civil organization is, from Schmitt's perspective, an oxymoron full of contradictions since Schmitt does not think that there can be a civil organization in a liberal and inhomogeneous society. However, this does not make Schmitt anti-democratic; Schmitt sees homogeneity as a necessary condition of democracy. Here, however, Schmitt's concepts of the people and the order that goes with it require a constitutive element such

as substance: common history, civic virtue, language, religion, and ethnicity (Rasch, 2016, p. 321).

Chantal Mouffe analyses Schmitt's proposal for the healthy functioning of a democratic polity and examines Schmitt's thesis based on the homogeneity he emphasizes. In The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy, Schmitt clearly states the principle of equality and homogeneity of democracy, as Mouffe would also emphasize:

> Every actual democracy rests on the principle that not only are equals equal, but unequals will not be treated equally. Democracy requires, therefore, first homogeneity and second -if the need arises- elimination or eradication of heterogeneity. […] democracy demonstrates its political power by knowing how to refuse or keep at bay something foreign and unequal that threatens its homogeneity. The question of equality is precisely not one of abstract, logical-arithmetical games. It is about the substance of equality (1985, p. 9).

Arguing that the idea of equality coming from liberal democracy is fundamentally false, Schmitt states that such a declaration of equality is only a kind of show. Referring to Schmitt, Mouffe argues that such equality does not provide any basis for the construction of political institutions. Accordingly, the equality of all individuals in terms of their individuality is not democracy but a particular kind of liberalism, and this is not a form of state but an individualist-humanist ethical worldview [*Weltanschauung*]. In addition, Mouffe argues that modern democracy consists of a complex combination of this individualist-humanist form of democracy (2000, p. 39).

From Mouffe's approach, Schmitt's liberal conception of equality provides for equality with others directly in terms of their individuality, without any distinction between individuals. In a democratic conception, however, there is an 'elimination' of who is in and who is out, which prevents separate inequality (Mouffe here gives examples of political equality, and economic equality), and thus, another kind of inequality is prevented (2000, p. 39). Schmitt argued that in the concept of 'equality' generalized in liberal democracy, a kind of 'inequality' emerged, and for this reason, he made a distinction between those who are part of the 'demos' and those who are not.

According to Schmitt, the definition of equality and the right to vote and to be elected are different from the universal definition. The general principle is that every adult human being, simply by virtue of being a human being, should *eo ipso* (by that itself) have equal political rights with all other human beings, which Schmitt considers to be liberal, not democratic. This is the argument that today is intertwined and which Schmitt

aims to separate. Although Schmitt similarly defended homogeneity in terms of rights, he also stated that equal rights only make sense where there is homogeneity (1985, p.11). However, Mouffe asserts that what matters for Schmitt is not the nature of the similarity on which homogeneity is based. What matters is between those who are part of the demos and those who are not. In other words, in this social system in which only citizens can participate, it is not   'humanity' but 'the people' that lies at the center of the concepts that need to be discussed. In Schmitt's thought, the people are, as we have underlined before, based on a ground where similarity is essential.

From Schmitt's point of view, the equality provided in the liberal democratic order gives rise to other inequalities, and in fact, modern -liberal- democratic states do this by classifying people they do not want in the political sphere as foreigners and immigrants. For Schmitt, however, in modern liberal democratic states, the notion of equality that covers citizens is emphasized by the definitive exclusion of all those who do not belong to the set of 'national homogeneity', in other words, who are not citizens: "But it must be noted that in this case national homogeneity is usually that much more strongly emphasized, and that general human equality is once again neutralized through the definitive exclusion of all those who do not 'belong to the state, of those who remain outside it" (1985, p. 12). Based on Schmitt's idea that the substance of equality can change, we can say that contemporary ideas based on cosmopolitanism also share a share of the "equality" underlined by Schmitt (Kardeş, 2023, p.10-11).

This is one situation in which liberal thinkers positioned against Schmitt align themselves with Schmitt, even if they do not want to and deny it. However, another issue that should perhaps be emphasized is the transparency of these titles. It is known that in liberal modern states, a migrant or a refugee can become a citizen if they are able to fulfill the necessary criteria. However, if we return to the point emphasized by Schmitt and Mouffe, these criteria may, to some extent, imply homogenization.

In the case of a political sphere in which national identity and similar types of homogeneity are not constructed, political equality will be weakened to the extent that cosmopolitan citizenship is approached. With it, the political sphere will be erased to a similar extent. In such a scenario, Schmitt argues, 'inequalities of substance' would

transfer from the political sphere to the economic sphere and create a more brutal system in this sphere:

> Wherever an indifferent concept of equality, without the necessary correlate of inequality, actually takes hold of an area of human life, then this area loses its substance and is overshadowed by another sphere in which inequality comes into play with ruthless power (1985, p. 13).

All these discussions on equality and democracy prepare us for Schmitt's distinction between friend and enemy. Schmitt, sees a foreigner, other, undesirable, or 'enemy' in liberal democracy and builds his arguments on the existence of this situation.

On The Concept of the Politics and the Political

The political, one of the most fundamental concepts of political philosophy, is considered one of the foundations of contemporary political philosophical debates. For this reason, the concept of politics, which is frequently emphasized by Carl Schmitt, will be mentioned, and then perspectives on the political will be explored. In Schmitt's political philosophy, it is possible to say that there are concepts in common with many other philosophers. In this context, Schmitt's political philosophy, Leo Strauss's What is Political Philosophy, Claude Lefort's The Political Forms of Modern Society, and Chantal Mouffe's On the Political and Hegemony and Socialist Strategy will be analyzed. It is impossible to do justice to all these works at once; therefore, in light of these works, an introduction to the political and political concepts in this context will be attempted.

To start with Claude Lefort, it is possible to say that his work is an important guide to understanding modern political philosophy and its building blocks and the impact of these structures on individuals. Lefort analyses politics as an issue together with the concept of human rights *in The Political Forms of Modern Society*. This volume is not enough to analyze Lefort's political view in detail, but it can provide a perspective on where he sees the concept of the political.

In his book's introduction to the Politics and Human Rights section, Lefort asks whether human rights belong to a political sphere. This will provide a perspective on his political thinking and enable us to understand it in conjunction with Schmitt's philosophy. According to Lefort, human rights cannot be considered as a simple political issue (1986, p. 239-240). He considers human rights as the issue that totalitarian regimes destroy, so to speak. The elimination of the rights of individuals is directly related to the efforts of

these regimes to control all areas of society. The defense of human rights is a form of struggle against these control mechanisms. Just as totalitarianism is the cancellation of human rights, democracy is the recognition of them. This comparison shows with which concepts Lefort considers politics. In Lefort's definition of totalitarianism, we can say that there is a criticism of Schmitt's political philosophy.

Lefort points to the present by saying that the body of the king, which remains from the pre-democratic age, is objectified between the divine and the earthly sphere: the space occupied by the body of the king, even though it no longer exists, remains an empty space. This empty space in democracy ensures that society is not identical to the whole, and this emptiness is a necessity. Lefort states that totalitarianism is not the ideology of a person or a race but an attempt to fill the 'empty space' of democracy as an avoidance. Lefort characterizes this state of totalitarianism as the 'embodiment of the people', which creates this state of ''*people-asOne*''. Unlike Schmitt, Lefort does not accept such identification, and this discourse of 'the people as one' is nothing other than totalitarianism (Aydin, 2009, p. 811-812).

Leo Strauss is one of the thinkers whose intersection with Schmitt is mentioned at least as much as Mouffe. Strauss and Schmitt, two important philosophers active during the collapse of the Weimar Republic, are representatives of an intellectual pursuit. Both philosophers reflected deeply on the concepts of the political, the political, law, and sovereignty and developed different but intersecting approaches to the political crises caused by modernity. Strauss constructs the concept of the political by basing it on human nature and historical conditions (Günsoy, 2009, p. 156).

Strauss, who is far from an attitude that advocates equality in terms of human nature, states that even if there is no cognitive difference between people, there are differences in terms of specific characteristics. According to Strauss, the flattening of such an important difference in equality is a negative situation. Questioning the philosophical basis of modernity, Strauss keeps the concept of crisis at the center of his philosophical argument. This crisis, which emerged on a theoretical ground in Western philosophy, expresses the imbalance of modern progress. In the modern world in crisis, the position of political philosophy is similar. In a state of collapse, not only paralyzed but also dying,

"we find it cut into pieces which behave as if they were parts of a worm" (Strauss, 1959, p. 17).

For Strauss, the key to this situation is hidden in classical philosophy: "Classical political philosophy is non-traditional, because it belongs to the fertile moment when all political traditions were shaken, and there was not yet in existence a tradition of political philosophy"(Strauss, 1959, p. 27). Therefore, Strauss constructed the concept of the political and the political in a classical tradition. Suggesting that classical political philosophy can be a guide against the crisis in modern philosophy, Strauss found the political in the footsteps of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, who are important philosophers in classical philosophy (Günsoy, 2009, p. 178-193).

When we come back to Chantal Mouffe, we see that her intersections with Schmitt, as mentioned in other parts of the article, are valuable in understanding the subject's problem. Aware of the distance from Schmitt, Mouffe invites liberal theorists to think about Schmitt. Mouffe begins On Politics by distinguishing between politics and the political. While the politic is on the ontic level, the political is on the ontological level: the ontic is political in relation to the various practices of the traditional political view, while the ontological is political in relation to 'the ways in which society is organized.' According to Mouffe, there are two disagreed views on the definition of the political: In the view of Hannah Arendt and similar philosophers, the political is a matter of freedom. The political, in the short definition of the public sphere of deliberation, is a view defended mainly through liberal theorists. However, there are theorists in the other corner of the room who do not see the political as a matter of freedom at all. According to this view, the political is the realm of power, conflict and antagonism (Mouffe, 2005, p. 16).

In the next part of her work, Mouffe will define the political as an antagonism. According to him, the political is antagonistic in nature, and liberal theorists should recognise this at the outset. This is another point of intersection between Mouffe and Schmitt both of them shift their concept of the political to antagonism, but Mouffe prefers the term agonism:

> While antagonism is a we/they relation in which the two sides are enemies who do not share any common ground, agonism is a we/they relation where the conflicting parties, although acknowledging that there is no rational solution to their conflict, nevertheless recognize the legitimacy of their opponents (Mouffe, 2005, p. 20).

From Mouffe's perspective, the political is quite close to Schmitt's definition, although it has a conflictual nature. Both criticise the liberalism theorists in the context of the concept of the political because they deny this nature.

In the agonism proposed by Mouffe, one of the parties in the inevitable conflict is not the enemy but the adversaries. In addition, this unites both parties 'in the same political unit' and makes the conflict democratic. For Mouffe, the 'adversary' is necessary for a democratic political order. In addition, this order is a constitutive factor that transforms antagonism into agonism. Furthermore, there is a distinction to be emphasized: the concept of adversaries is not a competitor in the sense that liberal theorists understand it. For Mouffe, this distinction is significant because, according to her, liberals only want to 'dislodge others in order to occupy their place" and "they do not put into question the dominant hegemony, and there is no attempt at profoundly transforming the relations of power" (Mouffe, 2005, p. 20-21).

Mouffe is a theorist who has considered the distinction between 'us' and 'them' together with Schmitt's distinction between friend and enemy, who has boldly stated that he was influenced by Schmitt's political philosophy and criticized liberal theorists. In addition to all these, these introductory summarised distinctions of the political, the political, and us/them will lead us to Schmitt's ideas and the friend-enemy distinction, which is the key point of these problems.

Schmitt's Friend-Enemy Categorization

Schmitt's categorization of friend and enemy [Freund und Feind] is based on his definition of the political and his classification of these concepts. Therefore, Schmitt's distinction between friend and enemy is not only a distinction in terms of these concepts, but a distinction that is methodologically inherent in Schmitt. I would like to suggest referring to Schmitt's classification of friend-enemy as a categorization because these two positions share a common feature of the political and the concept of categorization points to this.

Schmitt is a philosopher who attaches great importance to concepts and categorization in his political philosophy. In addition to this, Schmitt emphasizes the distinction between friend and enemy in the foggy environment of war and peace by

reminding the concepts of enemı and enemy while introducing the analysis of the concepts of friend and enemy. The concepts of enemy and enemy differ in a way that does not change their sameness, especially in their origins. While enemy belongs to the old Germanic language, the concept of enemy originates from Latin and Greek. Schmitt attaches great importance to this conceptual distinction belonging to the public sphere. Enemy [enemi] means "enemy [hostis]" and should not be confused with inimicus (Kardeş, 2015, p. 46-47).

In this way, Schmitt reduces the concepts of friend and enemy from theoretical discussion to the ontic and political sphere and makes distinctions about them. Seyla Benhabib finds Schmitt inconsistent precisely on this distinction between the public and private spheres of the enemy. According to her, Schmitt sees the "enemy is the one with whom one has the most 'intense' kind of conflict" and reverts to a race-based theory of the people (Benhabib, 2012, p. 695).

For Schmitt, "the distinction of friend and enemy denotes the utmost degree of intensity of a union or separation, of an association or dissociation" (2007, p. 26). Therefore, the criterion of the categories of friend or enemy gives us clues about the state of exception and war. Depending on the degree of enemy intensity, a possible crisis, state exception, or war emerges. Therefore, in his view, unless there is a homogeneous society and democracy, there will always be indifferent equality and confusion of the 'other.'

There is a significant question in the criticism of Schmitt's friend-enemy distinction: who decides who is a friend and who is an enemy? Because it seems that nowadays these categorizations are made in a "mystical" way (Koralewki et al., 2023, p. 419). Today, we need a more precise definition of the enemy than 'the other who denies our existence'. The logic underlying the discourse of dominant politicians, especially in recent years, is reminiscent of Schmitt's ideas. This is what makes Schmitt an essential figure in today's debates.

In addition, one more criticism is to be made about the structure of the friend-enemy categorization. Benjamin Arditi addresses the structure of Schmitt's friend-enemy categorization with the concept of "invariable change." According to Arditi, the content of the friend-enemy formula, whose essence does not change, can change (2008, p.21). In other words, the underlined friend-enemy remains constant, but who is a friend and the

enemy changes. This necessitates analyzing political relations not on ethical and ideological grounds but based on power relations, strategic interests, and other contexts. So, in politics and anywhere else where the friend-enemy relationship dominates, it is not at all so clear with whom we sit at the same table. Lastly, based on Arditi's reading of Deleuze and Derrida, we can mention the reproducibility of the friend-enemy categorization: this friend-enemy situation might have a "paradoxical" structure that involves a different context each time it comes up.

Conclusion

Schmitt worked with the fundamental questions that anyone working directly or indirectly with political philosophy today must ask: What is a democratic society, and how does it work? Who is the sovereign, and who is the enemy? It can be said without any doubt that the idea of the enemy is more dominant in Schmitt's thought because it presents a situation of 'exception .'The existence of this group, which remains the 'other,' is not unique to Schmitt, who is considered to be exclusionary: in liberal societies, too, this boundary is very clearly drawn. In other words, the 'other' will be inevitable as long as there are borders. However, the concept of the 'other' should be discussed here because this is where Schmitt and liberal democracy go in opposite directions.

Schmitt is one of the philosophers who should be read to see the dead ends of modern liberal political thought. In this respect, Schmitt, who manages to remain relevant, wants to break the link between liberal thought and democracy. However, according to Habermas, Schmitt's move also weakens and deforms the link between democracy and humanism. Habermas argues that the era of the one-nation state is over, and therefore, a Schmittian understanding of democracy and the state no longer exists (Kardeş, 2015, p. 305). From a contemporary perspective, for better or worse, Habermas was right about the existence of a Schmittian state. However, the gaps and implications of this for liberal democracy remain open to discussion.

Schmitt's view of democracy is shaped by the principle of homogeneity as opposed to a conception of the people as in liberal democracy. Equality, by its very nature, only comes to life in the case of a "homogeneous" society. Homogeneity is religious, racial, and 'common fate'. Therefore, Schmitt advocates a social order based entirely on a single foundation, leaving no room for separation or pluralism. According to Schmitt, the

equality of democracy is inherent in the demos and the people and requires a bond of identity.

Demos [δῆμος] is used in Ancient Greek not only in the dictionary meaning of "people" but also in the refers "common people" (Lidell and Scott, 1996, p. 386).   This means that those who belong to the demos are not merely a group of individuals; they constitute a collective identity and a shared commonality. In Ancient Greek times, this commonality naturally consisted only of Greeks and free people. However, how much can this change today? In Schmitt's 'prescription,' there is no change in this uniformity; he preserves it. Criticism from the liberal side, on the other hand, argues for the diversity of those included in demos. In both cases, no matter who remains in the demos, there is the concept of 'outsiders,' which in liberal democracy is characterized by the status of 'immigrant, foreigner.' There seems to be a difference only in the diversity of those included in the demos and the conditions of inclusion. Schmitt focuses on the situation of the 'outsiders' or others. In this context, he examines the concept of the 'enemy' and attributes to it an existential rather than a purely conceptual or abstract character. To emphasize again, for Schmitt, the enemy is not an adversary or opponent, '' The enemy is not merely any competitor or just any partner of a conflict in general. He is also not the private adversary whom one hates. An enemy exists only when, at least potentially, one fighting collectivity of people confronts a similar collectivity'' (2007, p. 28).

If we return to the enemy in the friend-enemy categorization, the enemy is no different from a state of crisis or even war. In the case of a state of exception, it is necessary to talk about the sovereign, which brings us back to the beginning of this article. There is a 'vision' in Schmitt's thought: democracy requires a homogeneous society, and if this is not achieved, inequalities in other spheres will manifest themselves ruthlessly. Not only that, another unity emerges from within the unity and begins to struggle. The political and legal spheres weaken, normativity cannot function, and a state of exception emerges. So Schmitt's friend-enemy paradigm can help us understand contemporary local and international political discourses and provide a real prescription for new regime creation. But in today's multicultural and post-national world, how far can it help us to become a society free of resentment? Especially today, the figures of 'threats' and enemies on a global scale - as they are called - are like a contemporary echo of Schmitt. In addition, a voice of this contemporary echo tries to legitimize the figure of the "enemy

and the other" with a political justification that is pushed outside the law. At this point, we should not only ask the question of who the enemy and those worthy of protection - we cannot call them friends - are, but also why we should so confidently entrust the authority to decide this. Lastly, I suggest that in today's age of artificial intelligence and post-truth, we need to rediscuss the categorization of friend and enemy and examine its paradoxical and transforming structure. In particular, it is essential to underline that the definition of friend or enemy might be state-centered and can change depending on the context.

Today, Schmitt's ideas are being discussed repeatedly, especially in relation to phenomena such as identity politics, populism, authoritarianism and democracy. At a time when liberal democracies are facing increasing polarization and crises, Schmitt's distinction between friend and enemy and his criticisms of liberal democracy remain relevant. In addition, these debates are not limited to the defense or criticism of Schmitt's ideas. Approaches by thinkers such as Strauss, Mouffe, and Lefort reveal different aspects of Schmitt's conception of politics, making it possible to understand the dynamics of modern politics from a broader perspective.

Schmitt's political philosophy provides an essential starting point for discussing the concept of the political, one of the central issues of contemporary political theories. However, it is clear that it needs to develop new approaches to preserving democratic spheres and institutions. In this context, understanding the structure of the political requires not only crisis and conflict, but also a new and more constructive management of this crisis and conflict.

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