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An Apology for Feeling

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Abstract. In what follows I will try to establish the role feeling plays, primarily, in Kant’s worldly conception of philosophy – some remarks will refer to its role in theoretical philosophy as well. I will claim that it is through feeling that we are able to situate ourselves within the world both physical and human. Situating ourselves within the world entails a broadening of our horizon, first and far most geographically and then in thought, both contributing to our moving beyond or overcoming what is private, be that feeling or judgment, that is, moving beyond self-interest. From the bare feeling of existence to the feeling of differentiating the directions in space in the physical world, and, finally, to the feeling of reflection Kant shows how this broadening can and should take place, namely, by broadening our way of thinking.

Keywords. Feeling, broadening, reflection, way of thinking, physical and human world, situating.

Introduction

In *What Does it Mean to Orientate Oneself in Thinking* (Kant [1786]) Kant offers, what seems like, a rough sketch of an ascent from the empirical world to the world of ideas or Reason: first of all, we orientate ourselves in geographical

space, before moving on to geometry or mathematics and finally, we orientate or should orientate ourselves in thought in general. Kant responds here, after Mendelssohn's death, to the well-known *Pantheism controversy* and in particular the strife between Mendelssohn and Jacobi regarding Lessing's alleged Spinozism¹. We need not bother with the historical or philosophical details of the controversy; however Kant's answer presupposes nothing less than the conclusions of the critical philosophy itself, the conclusions of the *Critique of pure Reason*, that is, before all, what is demanded of us is to situate our representations to their appropriate faculty or *topos* (Kant [1781/1787]: 371)². We can thus relate the demand to orientate ourselves with the act of transcendental reflection. Makkreel (2008) has offered an impressive account of Kant's use of geographical metaphors and how these metaphors form a complex mental topology of the faculties and their appropriate *topoi*, establishing thus the possibility of orientation – and the act of transcendental reflection is indispensable as the means by which we orientate ourselves³. What is more, orientation appears to be almost tantamount to the critique itself, showing how the critique, as Kaulbach (1966) already suggests, is a never-ending task that demands not only orientation but constant re-orientation of the subject. Kaulbach (1966) goes so far as to suggest that the demand of orientation is not only a matter of thought but it is a more radical demand that refers to the pragmatic and the human world – a similar point with reference to hermeneutics is made by Makkreel (2008). And what this means is to constantly orientate and reorientate theoretical Reason in view of its interests, and primarily, in view of the pragmatic, that is, the human world (Kaulbach [1966]: 75). Pragmatic Reason, if I may, becomes thus an important supplement and a correction to theory.

What I want however to argue for is that this act of orientation presupposes in many ways feeling⁴. Feeling situates the human being within the world paving thus the way to orientate itself in the physical and the human world – not just thought. Unlike intuition, feeling is not blind (Kant [1781/1787]: 193-194); it already carries significance. It is the subjective ground of differentiation in space, that is geographically, as is the case in the *Orientation* essay of 1786, and, as I will claim, pragmatically or mundanely, that is, in the human world, as is the case in the 1st part of the *Critique of the Power of Judgment* or so I will claim. The question I want to ask is what does feeling have to offer to Kant and how can it relate to reflection and judgment?

A preliminary answer is: unable to grasp feeling conceptually, that is unable to determine it beforehand, we need to reflect on it; only then are we in position to articulate judgments based on feeling. These judgments are subjective or at least they do not determine feeling with reference either to knowledge or to morality. But now, feeling, reflection and judgment are equally indeterminate or without concept. Through the reflective use of the power of judgment the mind

is in constant search for a general concept to help comprehend a multiplicity of empirical representations that cannot be determined according to the rules of the understanding – this multiplicity refers to nature as an organic system, beauty and the sublime (Kant, 1790). But this remains to be seen in what follows. For now, it suffices to say that feeling (and sensibility), reflection and judgment appear to be characteristically human.

1. *Feeling: a small genealogy of difference*

Sensation (*Empfindung/sensatio*) occupies a seminal place within Kant's thought. It refers to the «(subjective) modification of the state of the subject» (Kant [1781/1787]: 398-399). Before anything else, feeling is the radical other of the concept, embodying difference, a difference that is and cannot be conceptually grasped nor brought under concepts, not directly at least – even intuition, as an objective perception, is non-conceptual signifying an immediate relation to an object (*ibidem*), a relation that again has to be brought, indirectly, under concepts. Be that as it may, the modification of the subject can refer either to the physical world (sensation) or to the effect brought about by the activity of its faculties (feeling)⁵.

As an objective perception (intuition), sensation (*Empfindung*) anchors our representations to the world of objects or experience (in theory); and as a subjective perception, feeling (*Gefühl*) situates us within the physical and the human world. Feeling may not be blind (as is the case with intuition) but it does need to be cultivated (through the maxims of the healthy human understanding and through ideas), requiring thus guidance. Yet, even the uncultivated or unguided feeling, still retains significance. Unadulterated by interests, be those of self-love or even of Reason itself and its interests, feeling signals not only our individual existence but, what is more, allows us to relate to a common *sense* (emphasis added) that will become, in reflection, a *communal* sense (emphasis added) referring to the human world as such (Kant, [1790]: 173).

In what follows I will first present how feeling or rather our receptivity already situates us in a world beyond, as paradoxical as it may sound, the Ego or the «I». To situate ourselves in a world, be that the physical or the human one, entails already moving beyond ourselves. What we need however is to allow for receptivity and subsequently feeling to come to the fore (unhindered by thought or even reflection, at least at first). What we will find thus is that even in the bare feeling of our existence we can discern ways to move beyond ourselves or at least I will claim so. If we are not to fall prey of our self, a distorted self-interest in our particular existence and nothing else, then we need to move beyond it and to accomplish this we need to see how we are able to situate ourselves within the world, both physical and human.

2. *Don't think; feel*

«The capacity (receptivity) to acquire representations» we read in the *Critique of pure Reason* «through the way in which we are affected by objects is called sensibility» (Kant [1781/1787]: 172). Sensibility is passive, juxtaposed to the spontaneity of the (active) understanding, and it consists in the subject's capacity to being affected not only by objects but, we should add, by itself as well (Kant [1798]: 250). When the subject is affected, it modifies its state (Kant [1781/1787]: 398-399). But modification can refer equally both to the physical (or outer) world and the inner activity of the mind; they both bring a modification to our state. I have on one hand sensations (referring to the empirical world) and the other hand feelings (referring to the activity of the mind). We need thus to supplement Kant's analysis of representation adding, next to the objective, the subjective perception, that is, feeling⁶.

Sensations situate us within the empirical or physical world in a rather straightforward way providing *objective representations of the senses* (Kant [1790]: 91); feelings «*relate solely to the subject*» (*ibidem*), situating us, or so I will claim, within the human world – the way we situate ourselves within the human world however is not as straightforward as is the case with sensations but requires, nay, even demands reflection on our part (a point that I will have to return to later). But before being able to do so, that is, before situating ourselves within the world (physical and human) we feel ourselves or our particular existence, an existence that is «neither an appearance nor a thing in itself (a noumenon) but rather a something that in fact exists and is indicated as an existing thing in the proposition “I think”» (Kant [1781/1787]: 452-453).

In the *Critique of pure Reason* Kant describes the empirical proposition «I think» as follows:

an indeterminate empirical intuition, i.e., a perception (hence it proves that sensation, which consequently belongs to sensibility, grounds this existential proposition), but it precedes the experience that is to determine the object of perception through the category in regard to time. (*Ibidem*).

This indeterminate empirical intuition is a *sensation*; it thus refers, as a sensation, to the physical world. Yet, in the *Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics That Will Be Able to Come Forward as Science (Prolegomena)*, it is qualified as a feeling; it is the «feeling of a particular existent (*Dasein*)» (Kant [1783]: 125). I am not sure if we can assign Kant's incompatible, at first sight, descriptions to a *slip* of the tongue as Yibin Liang suggests claiming that all of Kant's descriptions *rely* ultimately *on sensation* (Forthcoming: 8). In the *Prolegomena* Kant appears to have a clear view of the distinction between a sensation and a feeling where he says that «feeling is merely subjective and must therefore never be attributed

to the object or it is only subjectively valid» (Kant [1783]: 93) and this is again consistent with the relevant passage in the B-Deduction of the *Critique of pure Reason*, where Kant refers to the subjective *feeling* of pressure or weight (Kant [1781/1787]: 252); if a subject feels pressure its feeling is, of course, subjective. What is of course still missing from this account of feeling is reflection⁷.

For the time being however one might wonder: What – if anything – does it mean to feel a particular existence? As a matter of fact, it appears that we feel a lot of things that pertain to the empirical representation of a body – not to phenomena, nor noumena. From the bare feeling of existence to the health of our body (Kant [1798]: 334) and from there to the difference between our left and our right hand, unreflected or bare feeling discloses the representation of a body that is situated in a number of ways within the world. This last point deserves some attention. The connection between body and feeling can be traced back as early as 1768 and Kant's short essay *Concerning the ultimate ground of the differentiation of directions is space*. Kant says there: «Since the distinct feeling of the right and the left side is of such great necessity for judging directions, nature has established an immediate connection between this feeling and the mechanical organization of the human body» (Kant [1768]: 368). The body and feeling become thus the radical difference over and against the concept⁸.

In his criticism against Leibniz and Leibniz's effort to «intellectualize phenomena» (Kant [1781/1787]: 372) or render everything a matter of concepts and conceptual relations, that is, a matter of logic, Kant points to a case, the case of indiscernibles, as an example where conceptual or logical relations will not help us comprehend why two objects, identical in every (conceptual) aspect, are still different⁹. Indiscernibles substantiate Kant's criticism against Leibniz showing that we cannot yield knowledge of the empirical through concepts or logic alone; a further element is required – and this element is feeling in its immediate relation to the body. Although Kant is not yet explicit as to the true ground of feeling evoking two different arguments, one referring to the powers at work in nature, and one referring to the a priori, absolute representation of space, the one the geometer uses, yet, in this last argument, one we can easily discern an idea that will ultimately lead to the introduction of the a priori form of the sensible world in the *Inaugural Dissertation* (Kant [1770]: 373-416) and, subsequently, transcendental idealism in the *Critique of pure Reason*¹⁰. Be that as it may, Kant reintroduces feeling as the subjective ground of differentiation in 1786 and his short essay *What does it mean to orientate oneself in thought?*. This time however there is no mention of a body; only of a faculty of feeling (Kant [1786]: 9).

To be able to discern or rather differentiate the direction of the movement of the stars in the sky, says Kant there, we «also need the feeling of a difference in our own subject, namely, the difference between my right and left hands». Kant calls this a feeling «because these two sides outwardly display no designable

difference in intuition». We can therefore determine already a difference in the position of the objects with reference to our bodies. Kant concludes: «Thus, even with all the objective data of the sky, I orient myself geographically only through a subjective ground of differentiation» (Kant, [1786]: 8). It is worth mentioning that feeling as a subjective ground of differentiation extends beyond geographical spaces to mathematical space as well or space in general (*ibidem*)¹¹.

Already on the subjective level of feeling we find ourselves not only embodied, if I may, but what is more important, as situated among things in the world – all we have to do is *broaden* our geographical notion of orientation, that is the subjective feeling of the difference of my left and my right side, that is my feeling that pertains to my body, to a feeling that allows us to mathematically orientate ourselves in space in general or the physical world. To broaden however one's horizon is to find himself not only situated within the physical world but to a world as «the stage of our experiences» (Kant [1802]: 446), a world that not only includes things but other human beings as well. Broadening thus one's horizon or range means to orientate or rather re-orientate oneself from the particular existence I feel, the «I think», to the world, the physical and human, becoming thus familiar or acquainted (*kennen*) with it (Kant [1802]: 445). It is here or rather in the *Physical Geography* that we start to situate ourselves in the world, before that is we proceed to become part of the human world. *Physical Geography* is thus the *propaedeutic* for becoming acquainted with the world (*ibidem*). In the context of physical geography «we broaden our familiarity with the external world [...]; and, after this, we say of someone that he knows the world, we mean that he knows mankind and nature» (Kant [1802]: 446)¹².

If physical geography allows us to broaden our horizon with reference to the external or the physical world, it is anthropology that allows us to become familiar with human beings:

Contact with people broadens what we become familiar with. Nonetheless, it is necessary to provide a propaedeutic exercise for all experiences of this kind, and this is what *anthropology* does. From it, one gets to become familiar with those things about human beings that are *pragmatic*, rather than speculative. It treats human beings not from a *physiological* point of view, in which the origins of phenomena are identified, but from a *cosmological* point of view. (Kant [1802]: 445)

But if situating ourselves within the physical world is rather straight-forward the same cannot be said about situating ourselves within the human world. Before thus we move on from the physical to the human world, we need to address the dangers of distorting feeling and endangering our place within the world. I am referring to egoism.

3. Reprise: Told you not to think!

In the *Anthropology from a Pragmatic View* Kant describes how «a light dawns upon the child when it starts addressing itself as an “I”; at precisely that moment, the child doesn’t feel or rather it doesn’t just feel itself anymore; it thinks» (Kant [1798]: 240). Addressing however oneself as an «I» distorts the light or the «I», if left *unchecked*, leading thus to egoism. Kant writes: «From the day that the human being begins to speak by means of *I*, he brings his beloved self to light wherever he is permitted to, and egoism progresses unchecked» (*ibidem*).

The egoist, we read in the *Anthropology*, be that logical, moral or aesthetical, proclaims himself as his sole interest, maximizing his self-love beyond any proportion. The egoist is someone who finds it unnecessary either to «test his own judgment against the understanding of others» (this is the logical egoist); or one that «limits all ends to oneself» (this is the moral egoist) or, finally, one «who is satisfied by its own taste and only» (this is the aesthetic egoist) (Kant [1798]: 240-241). In all cases, an egoist will not take into account the judgment of others. What is common in all cases is the prevalence or the priority the egoist places on the *feeling* of self-love – over and against e.g. duty or the moral law (Kant, [1798]: 199).

The remedy is to «regard and conduct oneself as a citizen of the world, without that is considering oneself as the whole world» (Kant [1798]: 240-241). In the same passage Kant speaks of a community of thinking beings describing it as a problem that belongs to metaphysics – not anthropology (*ibidem*). Kant is presumably referring to the «community of rational beings» (Kant [1788]: 82); but what is the case when the issue in question does not refer to a thinking or a rational being but to a way of thinking of a human being.

4. Feeling, the power of judgment and reflection

Feeling acquires its rightful place within the transcendental edifice only in the *Critique of the power of Judgment* – of course Kant has already referred to the moral feeling but it is in the *Critique of the power of Judgment* where for the first time feeling becomes a part of transcendental philosophy in its relation to reflection and judgment. But how can Kant retain its primarily receptive and non-conceptual character while relating it on one hand to reflection – that is an active mental faculty – and on the other to purpose, a concept (Kant [1790]: 67)? The answer lays in reflection: reflecting on feeling leads us to articulate (aesthetic) judgments; but before we articulate a judgment, we already feel «the effect of the free play of our cognitive powers» (Kant [1790]: 122) assigning to this feeling universal validity – Kant calls this effect, *common sense* (*ibidem*). Feeling is now thus reflected, on its way to situating us within the human world.

Common sense signifies the pleasure we feel when the mind is active and this pleasure permeates every aspect of that activity even if it goes undetected (Kant [1790]: 73-74). But pleasure is related to purposiveness; we feel pleasure when we reflect on nature's appropriateness for our faculties, namely, that everything is given «for the sake of reflection» (Kant [1789]: 36) or «of my faculty of cognition» (Kant [1790]: 67). That is, we feel pleasure when we satisfy our need, a need to comprehend nature as purposive:

hence, we are also delighted (strictly speaking, relieved of a need) when we encounter such a systematic unity among merely empirical laws, just as if it were a happy accident which happened to favor our aim, even though we necessarily had to assume that there is such a unity, yet without having been able to gain insight into it and to prove it. (Kant [1790]: 70)

But if we are to account for the pleasure we feel, we need, before all, to reflect on the workings of the mind without an explicit purpose, e.g., nature as a systematic unity or organism as a natural product. In other words, we need to reflect on the workings of the mind without any interest. And it is precisely in this reflection that we secure the a priori principle of the power of judgment in its reflective use, namely, purposiveness (Kant [1790]: 68)¹³.

Disinterestedness disentangles the feeling of pleasure from any interest we may take on the representation of an object, be that a practical or a theoretical or even the subjective interest of agreeableness (Kant [1790]: 94-94) and, we should add, a private or egoistic interest. As an affect the feeling of pleasure discloses the workings of the mind, the interrelatedness of the faculties (Kant [1790]: 122), that is, the play of the understanding and of the imagination, signaling beauty, and the more serious play of Reason and imagination, signaling the sublime. And this play brings about a satisfaction without interest. Pleasure thus:

is not grounded in any inclination of the subject (nor in any other underlying interest), but rather the person making the judgment feels himself completely *free* with regard to the satisfaction that he devotes to the object, he cannot discover as grounds of the satisfaction any private conditions, pertaining to his subject alone, and must therefore regard it as grounded in those that he can also presuppose in everyone else; consequently he must believe himself to have grounds for expecting a similar pleasure of everyone. (Kant [1790]: 96-97)

As the effect of the mind's activity, common sense allows us, besides feeling pleasure in the workings of our mind, to assume a universal voice, namely, in absence of any interest or private conditions, «demand everyone's consent regarding what I find to be beautiful» (Kant [1790]: 99-101). Are we now situated within the human world? The answer is no, not yet at least. Appealing to common sense or the common constitution of our faculties does not situate us

yet within the human world. Although we demand universality and necessity for our claim, still, our self-proclaimed universal voice is rather strange, reminiscent of the voice of the egoist.

We assume a universal voice and demand that all agree with us (Kant [1790]: 98, 101). *Demand* (*Verlassung*) is a rather strong word; what is more, we find ourselves perplexed; almost impatient.

[We] rebuke anyone if they judge otherwise and deny that they have taste requiring, nevertheless that they ought to have it because we could never say that «everyone has his own taste; this would be as much as to say that there is no taste at all», i.e., no aesthetic judgment that could make a rightful claim to the assent of everyone. (Kant [1790]: 98. Modified)

A further element, besides disinterestedness, is needed if we are to claim a universal voice, or rather articulate a judgment of taste and demand consent and it is at this point where the reflective judgment proper takes over.

Kant distinguishes determinate from reflective judgment. The power of judgment is «the faculty for thinking the particular as contained under the universal; if the universal (be that rule, principle or law) is given then judgment determines; if not, it reflects» (Kant [1790]: 57). In other words, a reflective judgment is indeterminate or at least, it is so in its pure workings that an aesthetic judgment discloses. Why is this important? Because even if I demand everyone to agree with me, still I cannot be sure about my claim – there is no determinate rule or concept to determine what beauty is, therefore, I cannot know whether everyone will agree with me¹⁴.

One solicits assent from everyone else because one has a ground for it that is common to all; one could even count on this assent if only one were always sure that the case was correctly subsumed under that ground as the rule of approval. (Kant [1790]: 121-122)

At this point we can move beyond common sense as the effect of the play of our faculties, an effect that we presume common to all, given that we all share a common structure of faculties, and appreciate the uncertainty that the absence of a determinate rule or concept instills within us. If «demanding» requires absolute certainty, Kant's cautious evoking of the *Ought / Should* (*Sollen*) betrays our uncertainty. To be sure; our pleasure is still there, that is, we still feel. What has shifted however is the tone of our voice. We come to realize that we can only request assent because, in the absence of a determinate concept or rule, we cannot *prove* our claim. In other words, there is no apodictic certainty that can accompany a judgment of taste. What is left is to limit the universality of its validity to an exemplary case, put simply, to judge singularly (and thus only *hope* for consent). And this is precisely what allows us to further reflect, moderate our voice and begin to situate ourselves within the human world.

We might still stand fast to our judgment; yet Kant will not tell us anything more. We are like the young poet who if he is to give up his conviction about his poem, that it is beautiful, then he will have to do so with the aid of his own reason. In a rather compassionate passage in the *Critique of the Power of Judgment* Kant illustrates this point by attending to what a young poet thinks about his art. It is worth citing it in full:

Hence a young poet does not let himself be dissuaded from his conviction that his poem is beautiful by the judgment of the public nor that of his friends, and, if he does give them a hearing, this is not because he now judges it differently, but rather because, even if (at least in his view) the entire public has a false taste, he nevertheless (even against his judgment) finds cause to accommodate himself to the common delusion in his desire for approval. Only later, when his power of judgment has been made more acute by practice, does he depart from his previous judgment of his own free will, just as he does with those of his judgments that rest entirely on reason. Taste makes claim merely to autonomy. To make the judgments of others into the determining ground of one's own would-be heteronomy. (Kant [1790]: 163)

The young poet, in other words, must come to realize the value (or no-value for that matter) of his art by himself, after years of practicing his judgment without allowing neither the need for approval nor scorn to guide his judgment.

Be that as it may, we are finally on our way of becoming part of the human world or the idea of humanity. We can communicate our feeling, «our inmost self», universally, and become a part of society (Kant [1790]: 228-229). We are learning not only that we are capable to demand a universal voice; nor that we can hope for consent. What we are primarily learning is that we can disagree about taste, that is, that «we all have some sense that it is possible to argue about taste» (Kant [1790]: 214). And with this last sentence we are ready to situate ourselves within culture, the human world proper¹⁵.

5. *Communal sense*

If I can communicate my innermost feeling on the presupposition of a *sensus communis*, that is, an effect of the play of the faculties of the mind, I have to use judgments to express or articulate feeling and this is how I participate in the human world, I articulate judgments (communication and participation constitute the idea of humanity or the sociability of the human being (Kant [1790]: 229). But to participate or articulate judgment I need to moderate my demand and transform it to a simple request, I need, that is, to supplement the *sensus communis* as a feeling of the play of the faculties of the mind with another sense, one that results from reflection proper – I am referring to the *sensus communis* that Kant evokes in §40 of the *Critique of the power of Judgment* (Kant [1790]: 173). The *sensus communis* there does not establish a feeling but rather a sense that

pertains to reflection, allowing us to form a vague idea of abstract notions that pertain to the human world, such as *beauty*, *justice*, *politeness* or even *truth*¹⁶.

The essence of reflection is still at large the same even on this elevated level of the higher cognitive faculties: We are still at a loss, meaning that, there is no determinate concept or rule to determine the content of these notions; we only have a vague sense of their meaning. On this level of reflection however we can find guidance and orientate ourselves beyond our private conditions for judging with the aid of the concrete maxims of the common human understanding. There are three maxims and these are:

1. To think for oneself; 2. To think in the position of everyone else; 3. Always to think in accord with oneself. The first is the maxim of the *unprejudiced* way of thinking, the second of the *broad-minded* way, the third that of the *consistent* way. (Kant [1790]: 173-176)

These are the three maxims that pertain to the communal sense – and not to a sense common to all anymore. Of the three maxims pertaining to the healthy human understanding, it is the 2nd maxim that contributes to the meaning of the communal sense – Kant already describes the communal sense as «a faculty for judging that in its reflection takes account (a priori) of everyone else’s way of representing in thought» (*ibidem*); and this is precisely what the 2nd maxim prescribes for judgment. Kant says:

As far as the second maxim of the way of thinking is concerned, we are accustomed to calling someone limited (*narrow-minded*, in contrast to *broad-minded*) whose talents do not suffice for any great employment (especially if it is intensive). But the issue here is not the faculty of cognition, but the *way of thinking* needed to make a purposive use of it, which, however small the scope and degree of a person’s natural endowment may be, nevertheless reveals a man of a *broad-minded way of thinking* if he sets himself apart from the subjective private conditions of the judgment, within which so many others are as if bracketed, and reflects on his own judgment from a *universal standpoint* (which he can only determine by putting himself into the standpoint of others). (Kant [1790]: 175)

First of all, the universal standpoint that I acquire in reflection is indeterminate – there is no determinate rule or concept to guide my judgment. What the above-mentioned maxim offers me is only a guidance or a safeguard against the self-deceit of proclaiming my judgment as objective. In other words, it allows me to reorientate my judgment, from a demand to a request. But, second and perhaps more importantly, reorientation or reflecting on my judgment becomes possible under the presupposition of disagreement. To cite the passage a part of which I referred to earlier in full: «It is easy to see that between these two commonplaces one proposition is missing, which is not, to be sure, a proverb in general circulation, but which nevertheless everyone has some sense of: *It is possible to argue about taste* (but not to dispute)» (Kant [1790]: 214).

We may hope of coming to a mutual agreement regarding a judgment of taste, nevertheless and regardless of realizing this hope or not, regardless even of the suspicion that we are not to realize this hope (but rather that we are to presuppose it as an ideal)¹⁷, regardless of all of the above, it is disagreement that promotes the broadening of our way of thinking or at least, this is how I interpret the 2nd maxim of the healthy human understanding¹⁸. To think from the standpoint of another means thus to appreciate a difference in judgment (why put oneself to a position of another who already agrees with you?). I believe that this is how we situate ourselves within the human world; through disagreement, that is, dissensus and, obviously, a hope of consensus.

Conclusion

What I tried to show with reference to receptivity, both sensation and feeling, reflection and ultimately judgment, is that to situate oneself within the world entails a multi-faceted task of broadening one's horizon.

We can thus imagine a broadening from the «I» to the world with the aid of feeling. The feeling of the «I» allows us to differentiate ourselves as a particular being (*Dasein*) that, however, already finds itself within a world; we already feel the difference in the directions of space with reference to our body, that is, we feel situated in the physical world among things whose place we can already locate with reference to our bodies. What is more, we are receptive of this world of things; not only are we able to locate their place but we also have sensations. In one word, we feel or sense the modification of our state (thus, we already feel the physical world). Becoming thus attentive to receptivity we feel a particular being (our body) and a world (the physical).

At this point lays the danger of isolating this particular being from the world distorting that is feeling. Instead, thus of being situated within the world the «I» runs the risk of proclaiming itself as the world; it runs the risk of becoming self-interested. It is not enough to be attentive to feeling and our receptivity, if we are to remedy for this deformation of the «I»; we need, this time, to reflect on feeling because it is thinking that is responsible for this deformation – not feeling per se. It is through reflection and the aid of the healthy human understanding that we can re-orientate ourselves and find our way back into the world, this time, the human world. And we reflect precisely because everything within the human world is indeterminate.

Thus, even if we possess the map (the system of Reason) and its cardinal signs (Reason's interests), still what we possess is nothing more than an idea or an ideal. These are equally indeterminate, that is, unrealizable as feeling – at least in our world, both physical and human. Nevertheless, even if we might never

secure a determinate rule to determine feeling or the human being for all we know, yet we are expected to pursue the effort. In the meanwhile, we will have learned that we can only disagree with the hope of coming to a consensus, more importantly, we will have found our way within the human world.

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Notes

- 1 For a historical account of the controversy see: Chance, Pasternack [2018]: 195-214.
- 2 This might sound like a bold claim, namely that the critique demands before all transcendental reflection but the demand to delimit the use of our concepts or ideas already presupposes a map, that is, the system of Reason, and a compass, that is, Reason's interests and, obviously, the use of both. Transcendental reflection refers to the use. For this conception of the critique, I rely on the work done by Kaulbach (1966) and Makkreel (2008).
- 3 Kant continually makes use of geographical metaphors; yet geography is not just a simile that Kant uses to map his conception of Reason. Geography is an integral part of his critical project, as Paul Richards says already in 1974. And this has to do with its place as a propaedeutic to becoming acquainted with the world as the *stage of our experiences* (Kant [1802]: 447).
- 4 I am not interested here in feeling or emotion and its significance in Kant's philosophy in general – a significance that I do not doubt. What I am primarily interested is rather feeling as the effect of our interaction with the world and as the self-effect of our own activity, that is feeling as part of receptivity. For an excellent presentation of the multifaceted significance of feeling within Kant's theoretical, practical and aesthetical philosophy see: Sorensen, Williamson (eds.), 2018.
- 5 For an attempt to offer a taxonomy of Kant's use of the relevant terms see Sorensen (2002).
- 6 This is consistent with Kant's efforts to disambiguate the difference between a sensation and a feeling in the *Critique of the power of Judgment* (Kant [1790]: 91).
- 7 Interpreting thus the «I think» primarily as feeling or at the level of an indeterminate empirical intuition that senses and feels, with one word, is receptive, somewhat perplexes Manfred Frank's view that for Kant the «I think» cannot have sensory or emotional states per se. In other words, the equation of the «I think» to the transcendental unity of apperception or self-consciousness is not exclusive (Frank, [2019]: 12-13). As a pre-reflexive feeling the particular existence is a self (*contra* Onof, [2010]: 162), although it is not an appearance nor a noumenon. What is more, far from isolating the self, feeling, or at least so I claim, situates this self within the world without renouncing the particular existence of the «I think». In

- other words, the pre-reflexive refers to the “I” that feels its particular existence or its body, if you like, and the world.
- 8 Angelica Nuzzo characterizes the body as «transcendental embodiment» meaning that the body is the *possibility* of sensibility (Nuzzo [2008]: vii). Her understanding however of the *transcendental* is in tension with Kant’s use that refers to the *transcendental* as «our mode of cognition of objects insofar as this is to be possible a priori» (Kant [1781/1787]: 6). Although all knowledge does start with experience (as an empirical representation) – and our body is obviously part of *that* experience – experience, however is not for this reason a priori.
 - 9 Kant reintroduces the case of the indiscernibles in his *Inaugural Dissertation* (Kant [1770]: 375) and in the *Prolegomena* (Kant [1783]: 81-82) as well, serving the same purpose, that is justifying the non-conceptual character of intuition.
 - 10 Although it is well beyond the scope of my investigation here, the relation of body and feeling to intuition is not as straight-forward as e.g. Angelica Nuzzo (2008) claims, at least, not as far as the critical and transcendental philosophy is concerned. In 1786 (Kant 1786) Kant is explicit denying that feeling is intuition because he has already introduced intuition as an objective perception, that is cognition (Kant [1781/1787]: 398-399). Feeling refers to orientation while intuition to coordination – direction never enters the discussion about the a priori conditions of the possibility of experience and its objects.
 - 11 It is interesting to try to supplement geographical and mathematical space, that Kant mentions in the 1786 essay of *Orientation* with intuition, as parts contributing to the possibility of an a priori description of the earth as a sphere in space (Kant [1781/1787]: 614).
 - 12 Robert Loudon (2011) describes the relation between geography or the physical world and anthropology or the human world as a *cosmological aim* that we share. He writes: «The cosmological goal is to acquire an overall sense of nature as a systematic and integrated whole, so that we may better find our way in the world and in our interactions with other people» (Loudon [2011]: 142). What I want to stress, in addition, is that receptivity in general, and feeling in particular, already situate us in the world or rather, it is the way we already find ourselves within a world.
 - 13 In this context I would rather translate the term «Zweckmäßigkeit» as «appropriateness». Why? As Kant says, I judge everything as being appropriate for my faculties or for the sake of my faculty of cognition (Kant [1790]: 67). “Purposiveness” already points to a concept beyond appropriateness – something that will of course become explicit in the 2nd part of the *Critique of the power of Judgment*, namely, teleology.
 - 14 Gershon Weiler (1962: 438) offers an impressive genealogy of the meaning of an indeterminate concept referring it ultimately to the «supersensible substratum» that Kant evokes as the resolution to the Antinomy of Taste (Kant [1790]: 215-217). He identifies this as «perhaps the last flight of Kant’s metaphysical impulse». Yet, if we interpret indeterminateness as embedded in reflection, saying simply thus that we lack any determinate rule to exercise our judgment when not determined either in theory or in praxis, then indeterminateness becomes essential in the way we cultivate our way of thinking within the human world, and not a metaphysical impulse.
 - 15 As embedded within the idea of humanity in the *Critique of the power of Judgment* and, primarily, in its relation to feeling, communication becomes integral to reflection and not just an «external criterium for truth» as Katerina Deligiorgi maintains (Deligiorgi [2012]: 83) citing the relevant passage in *The Jäsche Logik* where Kant actually describes “communication” as an *external extension* of cognition and not as an external mark for truth (Kant [1800]: 556).
 - 16 Gershon Weiler, as far as I am aware of, first draws the distinction (Weiler [1962]: 436).
 - 17 Munzel (1998: 209) relates the 3 maxims of the healthy human understanding with an orientation towards the community. But I suspect that what she has in mind is an ideal community or the ethical community and not the human world. Disagreement allows us to situate ourselves within the human world and the public use of reason.
 - 18 Katerina Deligiorgi (2012: 83) argues that disagreement in, what she calls, «its formal aspect alerts us to a possible deficiency in our reasoning» referring to *The Jäsche Logik* (Kant

[1800]: 563). Although I agree with her, I would like to expand Kant's view on disagreement on the transcendental level of the *Critique of the power of Judgment*. To think from the standpoint of others or even under the demand of a universal voice where a determinate rule or concept is missing is to embrace indeterminateness and the possibility of disagreement, as I tried to show.