



Platonism *and the* Haunted Universe*

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ROBERT K. GARCIA
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*We do not have to understand new things, but by dint of patience, effort and method
to come to understand with our whole self the truths which are evident.*

SIMONE WEIL¹

*If you want to go down deep you do not need to travel far; indeed you don't have to
leave your most immediate and familiar surroundings.*

LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN²

Any culture which loses a commitment to the unseen world will ultimately degenerate.

J. P. MORELAND³

THROUGHOUT HIS CAREER, J. P. Moreland has invested a great deal of time and effort developing and defending a metaphysical thesis called Platonism. To those familiar only with his popular work, this might be surprising. After all, the scuttlebutt has it that Platonism is a posh piece of metaphysical speculation, a rather rococo knickknack on the top shelf of a worldview, maximally aloof from the concerns of everyday life. So why would Platonism, of all things, receive so much time and attention from a man so passionately devoted to the kingdom of God?

This is a far-reaching question, to be sure, and in this chapter I'd like to suggest at least the start of an answer. It is not the only answer, but I believe it is among the answers J. P. would give, and, indeed, it is the answer I find most satisfying. More-

over, it is an answer that speaks to the relevance of Platonism for the pursuit of a fully integrated life.

The relevance of Platonism is best understood within the context of J. P.'s broader aims as a Christian philosopher and, in particular, as a fundamental part of his critical engagement with philosophical naturalism (hereafter, simply "naturalism"). To disentangle these ideas, I will proceed as follows. In the next section, I will sketch naturalism, underscore its discord with Christian theism, and describe three lines of attack J. P. has mounted against naturalism. The third line of attack involves J. P.'s defense of Platonism; I will focus on this in the subsequent section. In the final section, I will tie things together by discussing how thinking about Platonism can catalyze integration.

NATURALISM

One of J. P.'s important philosophical contributions is his sustained critique of naturalism. According to J. P., naturalism has three distinct ingredients:⁴

- (1) *the naturalist epistemic attitude*: claims not justified by scientific methodology are to be met with denial or extreme skepticism.⁵
- (2) *the naturalist grand story*: all entities whatsoever—everything on a comprehensive Inventory of What There Is (hereafter, simply the "Inventory")—have come into existence by causal processes completely explainable in scientific terms.
- (3) *the naturalist ontology*: the only kinds of things on the Inventory are the kinds of entities postulated by the best (current or future) scientific theories. Arguably, this means that there is nothing on the Inventory except spatio-temporal entities capable of entering into physical, causal processes.⁶

It should be clear that Christian theism and naturalism are at loggerheads. Or, they are in so far as Christian theism involves a commitment to (i) non-scientific sources of knowledge (e.g., special or natural revelation, natural theology, religious experience), (ii) the existence of a divine being whose existence cannot be explained, much less explained in terms of a causal process, and (iii), less uncontroversially, the existence of entities that are not essentially spatial and temporal (i.e., God, souls, angels). Thus, challenging naturalism is a crucial part of making a case for the reasonableness of Christian belief.

J. P. has advanced numerous challenges for naturalism. First, J. P. has made extensive contributions to natural theology, such as his development and defense of some of the traditional philosophical arguments for theism.⁷ By providing arguments for the reasonableness of Christian belief, these contributions amount to an indirect indictment of naturalism. Second, and relatedly, J. P.'s groundbreaking work on the Argument from Consciousness⁸ offers not only a defense of the genuine immateriality of the mind—a direct attack on naturalism—but also offers a powerful argument for theism. Third, J. P.'s robust defense of Platonism is an important contribution to our understanding of the metaphysics of properties; it is, moreover, an explicit attack on the naturalist ontology. In the next section, I will focus on Platonism and its bearing on naturalism.

THE PATH TO PLATONISM

The dispute between Platonism and naturalism is perennial. In fact, Plato himself describes it as an “interminable battle” (*Sophist*, 246_{AC}). Plato's choice of “interminable” was prescient, as it was succeeded by two thousand years of philosophical fracas. Indeed, it seems that a resolution to this dispute retreats from the advancing philosopher like a rainbow's end.⁹ But what's the battle about, exactly? The Stranger in Plato's *Sophist* says it's a quarrel about reality: the “giants” have it that all reality is bodily and visible, whereas the “gods” have it that true reality consists in bodiless and invisible forms. This battle has many fronts, but I will focus on one: the perpetual dust-up between naturalists and Platonists concerning the existence and nature of *properties*.

Traditional disputes concerning the existence and nature of properties center around a constellation of questions about the character of ordinary objects. They include: We may suppose that the Inventory includes *charactered objects*, but, without double-counting, does it also include the *characteristics* of those objects? (I use *characteristics* and *properties* interchangeably.) If the Inventory includes a red apple and a hard sphere, must it also include *redness* and *sphericity*? And, if the Inventory includes both charactered objects and characteristics, how do they relate to one another? Is the sphericity of the ball in some sense a part or constituent in the ball? And, if sphericity is a constituent in the ball, is that property spatially and temporally located like the ball is? If two distinct objects are spherical, how many sphericities must there be to explain that—one or two?

The last question concerns the phenomenon of *attribute agreement*. In such

a case, we say that two objects have the same property, or are characterized in the same way. To say *that*, however, is not to say anything very controversial. To spawn philosophical fisticuffs we must ask what, if anything, *explains* attribute agreement; or, put differently, we must ask *what makes it the case* that, say, two objects have the same spherical shape. Platonism offers a plausible way of answering these questions. In the rest of this section I will outline a case for Platonism that has its source in J. P.'s work. The case advances in three steps. Each step is prompted by a unique question and involves offering various considerations supporting an affirmative answer to that question.

First Question: Must Properties Exist Per Se?

The first step is prompted by the First Question: *In order to explain attribute agreement and other character-related phenomena, must there exist properties per se, in addition to characterized objects and classes of characterized objects?* One tribe of metaphysicians—the *extreme nominalists*—answers with an out-and-out “No.” On their view, the strict metaphysical truth is that there are no properties and, moreover, we don’t need to postulate properties in order to provide an adequate account of character-related phenomena (or anything else). Apart from their shared allergy for properties, extreme nominalists make up a rather motley tribe. Some take character-related phenomena not to require an explanation at all; some think an explanation is in order, but disagree about what it looks like.

According to the *austere nominalist*, character-related phenomena either cannot or need not be explained. On her view, we needn’t posit any entities besides concrete particulars in order to discharge whatever explanatory duties we might have concerning character-related phenomena. If we want a truth-maker for the sentence “This apple is red,” we need only point to the apple itself, qua metaphysical simple. That is, to account for the character of the apple, we need only one explanatory resource: the apple itself, taken as a whole—that is, taken as a metaphysically unstructured, simple, entity. Pointing out that explanation must stop somewhere, the austere nominalist takes it to stop at the place where other theories begin: with ordinary facts about characterized objects. On her view, nothing is gained by trying to explain ordinary facts about character in terms of anything else—especially not in terms something so esoteric as universals or tropes (about which, see below). Instead, she takes facts about character to be primitive, or brute.

There are several standard objections to austere nominalism.¹⁰ I’ll mention

two. One objection says the view is unable to account for the truth of (true) sentences that deploy abstract singular terms. In brief, it goes as follows. Consider a sentence like “Courage is a moral virtue.” The subject of the sentence appears to name a property—courageousness. And, arguably, no adequate paraphrase of the sentence can avoid naming this property.¹¹ Thus, if we accept the truth of the sentence—and we should—then we are committed to the entity named by its subject. A second and similar objection says that austere nominalism is unable to account for true sentences that appear to quantify over properties. For example: “Spiders share some of the anatomical features of insects.”¹² This sentence (and any adequate translation of it) appears to quantify over *features*, and so by accepting its truth we are committing ourselves to properties. Thus, the standard objections to austere nominalism challenge its resources for providing an adequate account of sentences deploying abstract singular terms and sentences that appear to quantify over properties.

Slightly-less-exacting extreme nominalists are less sanguine about the prospects for forswearing an explanation of character. Here, I’ll rough out two general strategies. Each aims to explain character without postulating properties *per se*. The first strategy explains the character of an object in terms of how that object stands to another *individual* object, whereas the second explains the character of an object in terms of how that object stands to *classes* of objects.

The first strategy is shared by *predicate extreme nominalism* and *concept extreme nominalism*. The former takes an object to be characterized in virtue of a certain linguistic object (a predicate) being true of the object: a toy is spherical in virtue of the fact that the word *spherical* is true of the toy. The latter takes an object to be characterized in virtue of a certain mental object (concept) being satisfied by the object: a toy is spherical in virtue of the fact that the toy falls under the concept *spherical*.

This strategy is scuppered by several objections. Here’s one: On pain of tacitly appealing to *types* of predicates or concepts, the strategy must involve an appeal to *token* predicates or concepts. But then the strategy appeals to a “grotesquely anthropocentric” ground for the character of objects.¹³ For example, if the character of an electron is grounded in a *token* predicate/concept, then we get an incredible result: had our language/thought been just slightly different with respect to its predicates/concepts, the electron wouldn’t have been negatively charged.

This brings us to the second strategy of the slightly-less-exacting extreme

nominalist, what we may call *set-theoretic extreme nominalism*. Here, character-related phenomena are explained in terms of classes (or sets) of objects. There are different versions of this strategy, but they share the following core interrelated ideas:

- (1) It is in virtue of being a member of a class, or kind of class, that an object is characterized in the way(s) that it is.
- (2) Attribute agreement amounts to comembership; that is, two objects are characterized in the same way in virtue of those objects being comembers of a class.
- (3) Talking about the characteristics of objects or quantifying over a property amounts to talking about or quantifying over a certain set (a “property class”) of ordinary objects.¹⁴

Two versions of set-theoretic extreme nominalism are *class extreme nominalism* (CEN) and *resemblance extreme nominalism* (REN). An important difference between these views concerns whether or not *resemblance* is supposed to play an explanatory role. On CEN it does not play a role; on REN it does.

According to CEN, resemblance does *not* explain character. Rather, the fact that two spherical objects resemble each other is explained by the fact that those objects belong to the same set—the set of all and only spherical objects. However, on this view, for *any* extensionally defined class of ordinary objects, we can aptly say that a unique property is shared by all and only its members. Of course, *every* class is extensionally defined. Thus, for any class of ordinary objects, we could aptly predicate a unique property of each of its members. This spells trouble. Consider these sets:

- *Electrons* = {all the electrons}
- *Hodgepodge* = {J. P.’s current Disney pass, my old bandana, Mike Erre’s Duran Duran poster, and Tim Pickavance’s brodingnagian brain}

As J. P. notes, the problem for CEN is that it has two implausible implications: (i) there is a property uniquely shared by all and only the members of *Hodgepodge*, and (ii) *Electrons* and *Hodgepodge* are on par in that there is no account for what we would pre-theoretically describe as the difference between natural groupings (e.g., *Electrons*) and gerrymandered ones (e.g., *Hodgepodge*).

The problem of accounting for the difference between sets that “carve reality at its joints” and those sets that do not has been called the *Problem of Naturalness*.¹⁵

REN attempts to solve this problem by privileging a certain type of object-class, the so-called *resemblance class*. It begins by taking it to be a primitive fact that objects resemble each other to various degrees. On this view, resemblance is not explained; rather, it does the explaining. In particular, primitive resemblance allows a principled way of privileging some but not all object-classes. The privileged classes are the resemblance classes, where ϕ is a resemblance class if and only if:

- (i) Each member of ϕ is an ordinary object;
- (ii) each member of ϕ resembles every other member to some degree; and
- (iii) no nonmember of ϕ resembles every member of ϕ to that degree.¹⁶

Thus, for example, *Electrons* is a resemblance class, as is the class of all red things. According to REN, two objects can be said to share a property if and only if they are comembers of a resemblance class. Thus, all exactly resembling spherical objects can be said to share a property, “sphericity.”

REN faces serious and well-known difficulties.¹⁷ Some stem from the identity condition for classes.¹⁸ Where Γ and Σ name classes, $\Gamma = \Sigma$ if and only if anything that is a member of Γ is a member of Σ and vice versa. Thus, a class has its members essentially or necessarily. Let “*R*” stand for the class of all red objects. Given the identity condition for classes, it follows that the *number* of objects in *R* could not be other than it is — if *R* has exactly ten members then it is impossible that *R* have only nine members. But because REN is committed to the conditional that there are red objects only if *R* exists, it follows that there could not be one more or one less red object in the world. This and other implausible consequences serve to scuttle REN.

Let’s take stock. We’ve been interrogating the tribe of extreme nominalists with the First Question and we’ve seen that each version of extreme nominalism faces significant objections.

These problems motivate the first step toward Platonism, an affirmative answer to the First Question. Those who so answer we may call *property-realists*. The label is apt because they agree about the *existence* and explanatory importance of properties. On their reckoning, properties exist and are among the fundamental entities that there are, and, moreover, properties play a crucial role in

any adequate account of reality. Property-realists disagree, however, concerning the *nature* of properties.

Second Question: Are Properties Shareable?

Perhaps the most important disagreement concerns how to answer the Second Question:

Given that properties exist, are they shareable? This query divides the tribe of property-realists into two camps. *Moderate nominalists* say “No.” *Metaphysical realists* say “Yes.”¹⁹ The disagreement over shareability concerns whether or not multiple objects can simultaneously have one and the same property.

According to moderate nominalism—often called *trope theory*—properties are unshareable in that it is impossible for one and the same property to be simultaneously had by multiple objects. Unshareable properties are called *tropes*. If property F is a trope and object O has F at time *t*, then no other object has F at *t*. If the toy on the table is spherical, the sphericity of the toy is not the sphericity of any other spherical object. If there are two spherical toys on the table, there are two sphericity tropes—one for each toy. The fact that the toys are both spherical is grounded in the fact that they have exactly similar but numerically distinct tropes. On this view, attribute agreement involves the multiplication of properties, not the multiple instantiation of a single property.

The metaphysical realist disagrees. On her view, one and the same property *can* be simultaneously had by multiple objects, and, indeed, such literal property sharing is required for an adequate account of attribute agreement. Shareable properties are called *universals*. If properties are universals and the toy is spherical, the sphericity of the toy is the very same sphericity as the sphericity of every other spherical object. No matter how many spherical toys are on the table, there is exactly one sphericity—a universal shared by all those toys. The fact that the toys are all spherical is grounded in the fact that they share one and the same universal. On this view, attribute agreement does not involve the multiplication of properties, but the multiple instantiation, or sharing, of a single property.

Affirming metaphysical realism is the second step toward Platonism. This step is motivated by numerous considerations, including the conviction that an adequate account of character-related phenomena requires shareable properties. J. P., in fact, has mounted a career-long campaign against moderate nominalism and for metaphysical realism.²⁰ It is impossible to do justice to the details of his tren-

chant campaign here. But to give a sense for how universals fare better than tropes, I will sketch (and extend) a traditional line of criticism against moderate nominalism. The objection concerns the ontological status of exact resemblance.

A central doctrine of moderate nominalism is that some tropes exactly resemble each other. This is important because it underwrites an account of resemblances between ordinary objects. For example, two apples are red because they each have a constituent trope—redness₁ and redness₂—such that those tropes are numerically distinct but exactly resemble each other. Worries about exact resemblance have been at the center of the dispute concerning moderate nominalism. The most forceful concerns the ontological status of exact resemblance itself. Does each case of exact resemblance involve an exact resemblance trope? For example, should the moderate nominalist take the fact that redness₁ and redness₂ exactly resemble to involve a further relation trope—exact resemblance₁—that holds between redness₁ and redness₂? The problem is that there doesn't seem to be a good way to answer this question. Let's consider each option.

Option One: suppose there *are* exact resemblance tropes. On this option, there is an exact resemblance trope, R_1 , which holds between redness₁ and redness₂. This raises a Euthyphro-like dilemma: Which of the following is the case?

- (A) Redness₁ and redness₂ exactly resemble because there is an exact resemblance trope, R_1 , which holds between them.
- (B) There is an exact resemblance trope, R_1 , which holds between redness₁ and redness₂ because they exactly resemble each other.

If the moderate nominalist opts for (A), then a vicious regress would seem to ensue. This sort of argument has its source in Bertrand Russell, and goes as follows.²¹ The strategy represented by (A) seems to be a fully general one: if any two tropes exactly resemble, then their resemblance is grounded in a resemblance trope. Presumably, there will be numerous cases of exact resemblance, and so numerous exact resemblance tropes. Let's name two of them " R_1 " and " R_2 ." But notice that a further case of exact resemblance holds between any two resemblance tropes. R_1 and R_2 , for example, exactly resemble each other with respect to being resemblance tropes. And so the general strategy represented by (A) would require that the latter case of resemblance be grounded in a further resemblance trope, RR_1 , which holds between R_1 and R_2 . But then there will be numerous such higher order resemblance tropes, RR_1 , RR_2 , etc., for which the

general strategy will require further resemblance tropes, RRR_1 , RRR_2 , etc. This regress is apparently vicious. Thus, if the trope theorist holds that there *are* exact resemblance tropes, she should reject alternative (A) and deny that redness₁ and redness₂ exactly resemble *because* there is an exact resemblance trope, R_1 , which holds between them.

This is alternative (B), on which an exact resemblance trope supervenes on its terms and the grounding relation does not generate a vicious regress. But (B), too, hits a snag. Notice that to reject (A) is to deny that the resemblance between redness₁ and redness₂ is grounded in anything distinct from either redness₁ or redness₂. This leaves the moderate nominalist with two options. Either their resemblance is grounded or it is not. If their resemblance *is* grounded, then it must be grounded in redness₁ and redness₂ themselves. The problem, however, is that for this to be the case, there must be something in the nature of redness₁ that is directed toward redness₂, and vice versa. Put differently, it would seem that the content of redness₁ must essentially involve something besides redness₁. But this would seem to be impossible since there is no universal—i.e., general—content in a trope. Hence, it would seem impossible for a trope to have content that is “directed” at all, much less directed toward anything outside of itself. Thus, it seems that if the trope theorist opts for (B), she must take it to be an ungrounded, primitive fact that some tropes exactly resemble and some do not. Moreover, she must take *every case* of exact resemblance between two tropes to be a distinct primitive fact. Because there is nothing “in” the nature of any trope that connects it with another trope, if there is such a connection in any given case, it will be a primitive fact. Thus, the trope theorist will have to take *every* such connection to be primitive. This means that the theory must postulate a distinct primitive fact for every pair of tropes that exactly resemble. This quickly leads to an untoward number of primitive facts: for each case of attribute agreement between ordinary objects, the moderate nominalist postulates a pair of exactly resembling tropes (one in each object). Thus, there will need to be a distinct primitive fact for every such case. In addition, it seems that such a view would fail to explain *any* significant phenomena of resemblance. This sticks alternative (B) with an exorbitant price.

In sum, there are two alternatives on Option One. The first, (A), is to take redness₁ and redness₂ to exactly resemble because there is an exact resemblance trope, R_1 , which holds between them. We saw that this seems to generate a vicious regress. The second alternative, (B), is to hold that there is an exact resemblance

trope, R_1 , which holds between redness₁ and redness₂ because they exactly resemble each other. We saw that this view seems to saddle moderate nominalism with an untoward number of primitive facts.

So much for Option One. Option Two: suppose there *are not* exact resemblance tropes. Unfortunately, Option Two fares no better than alternative (B) above. While it would avoid the postulation of explanatorily superfluous resemblance tropes, it would still seem to saddle the view with an untoward number of primitive facts. The argument here is the same as the one given concerning (B); namely, there is nothing “in” the nature of any trope that connects it with another trope, so if there is such a connection, it will be a primitive fact. And, there will be a distinct primitive fact for every pair of tropes that exactly resemble. So it seems that the final option is also unsatisfactory.

The metaphysical realist takes the general lesson here to be the following. The attempt to avoid shareable properties (universals) by multiplying exactly similar nonshareable properties (tropes) leads to either resemblance regresses or an untoward number of primitive facts concerning resemblances between properties. In neither case do we have an adequate explanation for attribute agreement and other character-related phenomena. By taking properties to be universals we can forestall resemblance regresses and avoid untoward primitives. Moreover, taking properties to be universals provides a satisfying and straightforward account of attribute agreement and other relevant phenomena.²²

These considerations motivate an affirmative answer to the Second Question, that is, the postulation of shareable properties, or universals. This postulation is the second step toward Platonism.

Third Question: Are Universals Spatio-temporally Located?

The third and final step involves resolving a dispute among metaphysical realists concerning how to answer the Third Question: *Are universals spatio-temporally located?* The issue here concerns whether a universal is located where and when its bearer is located. For example, if a spherical toy is on the table right now, is the universal sphericity also on the table right now? One prominent metaphysical realist, David Armstrong, takes universals to be located. On his view—immanent realism—sphericity *is* on the table, and this is because sphericity is a spatio-temporal *constituent* in the ball. Against Armstrong, however, Moreland has argued that while sphericity is a constituent in the ball, it is *not* a spatio-temporal constituent.

On J. P.'s view, a universal is metaphysically "in" an object, but this does not mean that the property is located where and when the object is.²³ Among the arguments J. P. has deployed for his view, I will mention one that expresses a traditional worry about universals. As we will see, the worry incriminates Armstrong's view but not Moreland's.

To see the worry, suppose there are two spherical toys on the table, toy-1 and toy-2. Suppose also that toy-1 is stationary and toy-2 is rolling away from toy-1. According to metaphysical realism, there is exactly one sphericity, and both toys have it. On Armstrong's view, sphericity is located where each sphere is located. So, sphericity is wholly located both where toy-1 is and where toy-2 is. But, given that toy-2 is rolling away from toy-1, on Armstrong's view it follows that sphericity is moving away from itself. And, it follows that sphericity is simultaneously both stationary and moving. These kinds of results are frequently taken to be an unacceptable, perhaps even absurd, consequence of metaphysical realism. And, they are consequences of Armstrong's view. They are not, however, consequences of J. P.'s view. On his view, sphericity is not, strictly speaking, located anywhere. To be sure, each toy has it, and the fact that each toy has it explains why each toy is spherical. But properties are not had in a way that requires their being spatio-temporal located. This traditional worry is one of several motivations for taking the final step towards Platonism. Doing so involves affirming that while properties exist and are shareable, they are not located in time and space. It is because of this final step that Platonism and naturalism are at loggerheads.

PLATONISM AND THE FULLY INTEGRATED LIFE

I'll conclude with a few thoughts on how Platonism might contribute to the fully-integrated life.²⁴ Pursuing a fully integrated life requires a *habit of mindfulness*. I say *habit* of mindfulness because integration, much like physical health, is not something you achieve once and for all. Rather, it is something you regularly pursue or maintain. And, like physical health, the pursuit of integration is best facilitated by habits—regular activities done with increasing facility and skill. I say *habit of mindfulness* because the sort of habit required is one that involves a concerted effort at paying attention. We pay attention to many different things in our lives—often all at once: the time, the weather, our text messages, our email, our kids. According to Beckwith and Moreland, the pursuit of a fully integrated life requires habitually paying attention to two interrelated dimensions of integration:

- *Conceptual integration* requires paying attention to your beliefs and how they accord with each other. This involves blending and unifying our theological beliefs with other important and reasonable ideas “into a coherent, intellectually satisfying Christian worldview.”²⁵
- *Personal integration* requires paying attention to your actions and how they accord with your beliefs. Here “we seek to live a unified life, a life in which we are the same in public as we are in private, a life in which the various aspects of our personality are consistent with each other and conducive to a life of human flourishing as a disciple of Jesus.”²⁶

Platonism is relevant for both dimensions of integration. Because there is value in understanding God’s creation, Platonism promises to enrich our conceptual integration by offering a powerful account of what structures and unifies creation. This is not to deny that there are important questions concerning whether Platonism *can* be unified with core theistic doctrines (see, for example, the chapter by Gould & Wallace in this volume). Instead, it is the importance of conceptual integration that requires us to take those questions seriously.

Platonism is relevant for personal integration because it can bolster a theism-friendly plausibility structure. According to Beckwith and Moreland, a plausibility structure is the set of ideas a person is willing to entertain as possibly true.²⁷ Plausibility structures are crucial for personal integration because “individuals will never be able to change their lives if they cannot even entertain the beliefs needed to bring about that change.”²⁸ By considering the case for Platonism, we can facilitate personal integration by improving our plausibility structures. In so far as the case leads you to entertain the possibility that Platonism is true, it leads you to entertain the possibility that there is more than the space-time realm. Moreover, it can lead you to entertain the possibility that there are unseen realities with which we enjoy a more intimate form of closeness than spatio-temporal proximity. As J. P. once enjoined us:

You must become aware that the unseen world shows up and leaves all the time, and if redness can do it, so can God. God is not a property or a universal, for properties and universals cannot just show up anywhere, (redness cannot show up in the dark), but God can.²⁹

In this way, the case for Platonism can bolster a theism-friendly plausibility

structure. Notice that the case can do this even if you ultimately reject Platonism!

Platonism is relevant for personal integration in another way. Atheism, in its colloquial sense, seems to be not merely the denial of this or that divine being, but, rather, the affirmation that the beings of the spatio-temporal realm either exhaust reality (there is nothing else) or completely explain reality (there is nothing more fundamental). As Dallas Willard notes, “Atheism in the contemporary world draws most of its motivation from a desire to *tame* or to *naturalize* reality.”³⁰ Willard goes on to make the following point: Although a standard fine-tuning argument for theism may not suffice to establish the truth of theism, it can still show that “there is something more than the physical or ‘natural’ universe, something of very impressive proportions. It is something quite different from the physical world in character and something from which the physical derives its existence and nature.”³¹ It can show that we have a “haunted universe on [our] hands.”

Willard introduces the notion of a haunted universe to capture the broadly religious significance of the fact that the universe is fine-tuned. It would seem, however, that there could be other haunting considerations that, while falling short of establishing theism, should make an atheist ill at ease in our universe. Thus, I propose the following more general condition on haunting:

Haunted: A universe is haunted if some *H* (or *Hs*) exist such that *H* is (or the *Hs* are) non-spatio-temporal and, in some way, explains or grounds something which is spatio-temporal.

If Platonism is true, then the universe—the space-time realm—is ontologically haunted. An atheist should feel less at home in a Platonist universe than in a non-Platonist one. Put differently, on the above understanding of atheism, the case for Platonism makes atheism less plausible than it otherwise would be. That is, a plausibility structure that can entertain the possibility that Platonism is true is, all things being equal, a structure on which theism is more plausible than atheism.

Notes

* My years at Talbot as J. P.’s student were some of the most deeply formative of my life. Without his teaching, wisdom, encouragement, and friendship, I would never have succeeded as a philosopher and I do not know how I could have weathered the many storms that have come my way. With such an immeasurable debt of gratitude, I can only hope to discharge it by striving to be as good a philosopher, teacher, and friend to my students as J. P. has been to me.

1. Simone Weil, *Gravity and Grace* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd., 1987), 150.

2. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Culture and Value* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980), 50.
3. J. P. said this in a 1994 lecture for his Metaphysics seminar at Talbot School of Theology.
4. J. P. Moreland, "Naturalism and the Ontological Status of Properties," *Naturalism: A Critical Analysis*, eds. William Lane Craig and J. P. Moreland (London & New York: Routledge, 2000), 67–109.
5. *Ibid.*, 73.
6. For J. P.'s arguments, see J. P. Moreland, "Searle's Biological Naturalism and the Argument from Consciousness," *Faith and Philosophy* 15 (1998): 68–91; and J. P. Moreland, "Should a Naturalist Be a Supervenient Physicalist?," *Metaphilosophy* 29 (1998): 35–57.
7. See, for example his *Scaling the Secular City* (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 1997) and *The God Question* (Eugene, OR: Harvest House, 2009).
8. J. P. Moreland & Scott Rae, *Body & Soul* (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2000), and especially his *Consciousness and the Existence of God: A Theistic Argument* (London: Routledge, 2008).
9. I adopt this analogy and phrasing from N. T. Wright, *The New Testament and the People of God* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1992), 390.
10. For further discussion, see Michael Loux, *Substance and Attribute* (Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1978), chap. 4, and John Carroll and Ned Markosian, *An Introduction to Metaphysics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), chap. 9.
11. For arguments, see Michael Loux, *Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction*, 3rd ed. (New York and London: Routledge, 2006), 57f.
12. This example is part of Peter van Inwagen's argument for properties: "A Theory of Properties," *Oxford Studies in Metaphysics*, Volume 1, ed. Dean Zimmerman (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 114. True sentences like this one also pose problems for William Lane Craig's nominalism.
13. Keith Campbell, *Abstract Particulars* (Oxford and Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell, 1990), 18.
14. David Manley, "Properties and Resemblance Classes," *Noûs* 36.1 (2002): 75.
15. *Ibid.*, 76.
16. This definition of a resemblance class is a modified version of one offered by David Manley in *Ibid.*, 77.
17. For discussion see J. P. Moreland, *Universals* (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2001), chap. 2 and Michael Loux, *Substance and Attribute*, chap. 3.
18. The objection has its source in Nicholas Wolterstorff, *On Universals: An Essay in Ontology* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1970), 175–76.
19. I suspect J. P. would balk at my characterization of moderate nominalists as property-realists. And, nothing hangs on how we label these views. The label, however, seems apt, since moderate nominalists *are* realists about properties, though they are *not* realists about universals. For more see J. P. Moreland, "How to Be a Realist in Nominalist Clothing," *Grazer Philosophische Studien* 39 (1991): 75–101; and J. P. Moreland, *Universals*, chap. 3.
20. For a representative example of J. P.'s case against moderate nominalism and for metaphysical realism, see *Universals*, chaps. 3–5.

21. In this paragraph, I am summarizing Chris Daly's construal of Russell. See Daly, "Tropes" in *Properties*, ed. by D. H. Mellor and Alex Oliver (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 140–59.
22. For more, see J. P. Moreland, "Resemblance Extreme Nominalism and Infinite Regress Arguments," *The Modern Schoolman* 80 (2003): 85–98.
23. See *Universals*, 83–96. For a recent (and excellent) discussion of how property can be "in" something non-spatially, see J. P. Moreland, "Exemplification and Constituent Realism: A Clarification and Modest Defense," *Axiomathes* 23.2 (June 2013): 247–59.
24. For an excellent discussion of how *metaphysics in general* can contribute to integration, see Garrett Deweese, *Doing Philosophy as a Christian* (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 2011), especially chapter 5.
25. Frank Beckwith and J. P. Moreland, "Series Preface: A Call to Integration and the Christian Worldview Integration Series," in Garrett Deweese, *Doing Philosophy as a Christian* (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 2011), 9.
26. *Ibid.*, 10.
27. *Ibid.*, 18. For more on the nature and importance of plausibility structures, see Moreland's *Love Your God with All Your Mind: The Role of Reason in the Life of the Soul* (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 1997), 75f.
28. *Ibid.*
29. J. P. said this in a 1994 lecture for his Metaphysics seminar at Talbot School of Theology.
30. Dallas Willard, *Knowing Christ Today* (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 2009), 109.
31. *Ibid.*