

## No Special Morality for Carbon Emitting

Scott Hill

Wichita State University

(This is a draft. Please cite the official version that is forthcoming in *Ethics, Policy, and Environment*)

### Introduction

By one estimate, the carbons I cause to be emitted into the Earth's atmosphere have the expected harm of reducing human life by six months. A natural thought is that it is permissible for me to do this if I also do something to offset that harm. So if I plant enough trees, for example, to have the expected effect of increasing the life of one person by six months, then my lifetime emissions are permissible. This reasoning also delivers the judgment that my acts in the case below are permissible:

*Boating and Extracting:* People in my village frequently go boating. The boats produce a toxic discharge that exposes those downstream to harm. The expected harm of one boat trip's worth of toxin is one cancer death. I go boating. I install a toxin extractor in the river. I switch on the toxin extractor when I boat. This leaves the expected toxicity of the water the same as it would have been if I had not gone boating at all.

Barry and Cullity argue that my acts in this case are permissible. But they point out that the natural way to arrive at this result (that it is permissible to cause expected harm if you offset it by the same amount) goes awry in the following case:

*Business Opportunity:* Just like *Boating and Extracting* with the exception that I am paid by the population downstream to reduce the toxin in the river by one expected cancer death. After reducing the toxin in this way, I then relax by going boating. After boating, the expected harm is back to where it was before I reduced the toxin in the river.

In both *Boating and Extracting* and *Business Opportunity*, I reduce the risk of harm by the amount that I raise the risk. So the total risk of harm is exactly what it would be if I had not acted at all. But, Barry and Cullity argue, what I do in *Boating and Extracting* is permissible while what I do in *Business Opportunity* is impermissible. What is the difference? Why does offsetting seem to get me off the hook in one case but not the other?

### Background

One way of assessing risk is in terms of the *standard baseline*. The standard baseline for the impact of a set of acts on a group is the probability that the group will be harmed given that the set of acts is not performed. So in *Boating and Extracting*, it is the probability that the population downstream will be harmed given that I do not go boating and turn on the extractor. Going boating by itself would raise the probability beyond the standard baseline. Extracting alone would lower the probability. But the two together leave the baseline unchanged. And therefore I meet the standard baseline in *Boating and Extracting*.

Another way of assessing risk is in terms of the *moralized baseline*. Let's say that A is a set of acts that one is independently obligated to perform. Let's say that S is a set of acts that imposes the risk of harm on a group. Then the moralized baseline for the impact of S on a group is the probability that the group will be harmed given that A but not S is performed. In *Boating and Extracting*, we are presuming, I have no independent obligation to run the extractor. So what I do meets the moralized baseline. Contrast this with *Business Opportunity*. In that case, I am paid by the population downstream to extract. And I therefore have an

independent obligation to do so. And in that case the moralized baseline for my set of acts would be the probability of harm given that I extract but not that I boat. And so by boating as well as extracting the moralized baseline would not be met. Thus, I meet the moralized baseline in *Boating and Extracting* but not in *Business Opportunity*.

A third way of assessing risk is in terms of the *attributional baseline*. Let's say that A is a set of acts that someone else will perform that will impose a risk on a group. Let's say that S is a set of acts that imposes a risk of harm on that same group but that also preempts A. Then: The attributional baseline for S's impact on a group is the probability that the group will be harmed given that neither A nor S is performed. So imagine a case in which you are about to boat but I preempt your own boating by paying you not to boat and to let me boat instead, then the attribution baseline would be the probability of harm given that neither of us go boating. And since I in fact do go boating, the attributional baseline is not met. However, we are supposing that in *Boating and Extracting* I do not preempt any other risk imposing acts. And so my set of acts meets the attributional baseline.

Now we can state Barry and Cullity's theory:

BC: A set of act's impact on a group is risk imposition permissible if that set of actions does not increase the expected harm of that group on any of the baselines.

The idea is that my set of acts in *Boating and Extracting* meets all the baselines individually and together. And so that is sufficient to render my set of acts risk imposition permissible. However, my set of acts in *Business Opportunity* fails to meet the moralized baseline. And so the BC does not exculpate me in *Business Opportunity*.

### **A Problem for BC**

I think the reasoning Barry and Cullity employ in defense of the acts in *Boating and Extracting* has a counterintuitive implication. Consider:

*Shooting and Extracting*: Imagine you have a gun that works in the following way. It fires bullets like a normal gun. But it also has a switch that when flipped dissolves bullets that other people have fired. For each such bullet, if it had not been dissolved, it would have killed someone. You happen to be next to a crowd of people. You begin recklessly firing bullets. You know that some people will die. But that is not why you do it. You are just interested in seeing how the gun works. You flip the switch on at the beginning of your shooting spree and flip it off when you are done. It is on long enough so that for each person you kill another person will be saved. You know ahead of time that this is how things will work out.

*Shooting and Extracting* satisfies the standard and attributional baselines for the same reason that *Boating and Extracting* satisfies those baselines. The standard baseline is met. The expected number of deaths is exactly what it would be if you hadn't performed the set of acts in *Shooting and Extracting*. Going into it, you can predict that for each person you murder, another will be saved by the extractor on your gun. This is parallel to the explanation of why *Boating and Extracting* meets the standard baseline. Going into it, I can predict that one person will be killed by my boating and one person will be saved by my running the extractor on my boat. So the standard baseline is met in each case.

The attributional baseline is met as well. In each case, the risk imposing actions of others are not preempted. Instead, the relevant actions are performed, and then it is ensured that the consequences of those risk imposing actions are not harmful. In *Shooting and Extracting*, the bullets have been fired and they are

already in the air. Flipping the switch on your gun prevents the harmful consequences of such actions. But you do not preempt the acts themselves. This is parallel to the explanation of why *Boating and Extracting* meets the attributional baseline. In *Boating and Extracting*, the risk imposing actions of others are still performed. Others are still boating and leaving toxin in the water. Flipping the switch on my boat prevents the relevant acts of boating from having bad consequences. But I do not preempt the acts themselves. So the attributional baseline is met in each case.

I think that what is questionable is whether the moralized baseline is met. I will challenge this assumption later. But Barry and Cullity maintain that it is met. And if they are right that the moralized baseline is met in *Boating and Extracting*, then I think it is met in *Shooting and Extracting* as well. Recall that the reason Barry and Cullity maintain that the moralized baseline is met in *Boating and Extracting* but not *Business Opportunity* is this: In *Business Opportunity*, I am paid by the downstream population to clean toxins from the water by one expected cancer death. That creates an independent obligation for me that I do not have in *Boating and Extracting*. But notice that that independent obligation is not present in *Shooting and Extracting* either. The crowd has not paid me to clear the air of bullets by  $n$  deaths. And so, such payments do not generate an independent obligation to do so. It seems to me that there is no relevant difference between *Boating and Extracting* and *Shooting and Extracting* that would make me have an independent obligation to save in one but not the other. In each case, people may be expected to die if I do not flip a switch. If I do not have an independent obligation to flip the switch in one case, then I do not see why I have an independent obligation to flip the switch in the other case. So it seems to me that Barry and Cullity's case that the moralized baseline is met in *Boating and Extracting* applies equally to *Shooting and Extracting*.

So my concern is this: BC is intended to deliver the following results. First, my acts in *Boating and Extracting* are risk imposition permissible. Second, my acts in *Business Opportunity* are not. But it seems to me that the case Barry and Cullity provide for thinking my acts in *Boating and Extracting* are risk imposition permissible applies equally to my acts in *Shooting and Extracting*. But my acts in *Shooting and Extracting* are clearly risk imposition impermissible. So something has gone wrong.

### **Why the Acts in *Boating and Extracting* and *Shooting and Extracting* are Impermissible**

I think that what has gone wrong is that the acts in *Boating and Extracting* are impermissible in virtue of the risks they impose. In *Shooting and Extracting* your reckless shooting increases the risk of a community by one shooting death. You do so for the trivial pleasure of finding out how the gun works. The fact that you flip a switch that also reduces the risk of death by gunshot in the community by one does not get you off the hook. You should have just flipped the switch without going around shooting recklessly. In *Boating and Extracting* you put enough toxin in the river to increase the risk of a community by one cancer death. You do so for the trivial pleasure of a boat ride. The fact that you flip a switch and also reduce the expected cancer deaths of the community by one does not get you off the hook. You should have just flipped the switch without going around dumping toxin in the river.

I also think that the fact that the goods the subjects in these cases get could have been easily satisfied without imposing risk matters. In *Shooting and Extracting*, you could easily satisfy your curiosity about how the gun works by going to a secluded area and firing it there. You could refrain from firing the gun altogether and find something else interesting to do. There is something especially disturbing to me about engaging in murder for the sole reason of satisfying a desire that could easily have been satisfied in some other way.

In *Boating and Extracting*, you could easily satisfy your boating desires by going to a different lake. You could refrain from boating altogether and find something else interesting to do. Again, it is especially disturbing to me that in the boat case I increase the risk of cancer death by one person for the sole reason of satisfying a desire that could easily have been satisfied in other ways.

I think an insight from Barry and Cullity concerning the moralized baseline also helps to explain why my actions are impermissible in these cases. I think that we have duties of beneficence. I think that if I have a special switch that can remove bullets from the air, and if there is no cost to me for pressing the switch, and if there is no good that comes from not pressing it, then I have an obligation to press the switch. I think that if I am sitting nearby and there are bullets flying around that are sure to kill someone and I do nothing, then I have acted impermissibly. In the same way, I think that if I have a special switch that can remove toxins from the river, and if there is no cost to me for pressing the switch, and if there is no good that comes from not pressing it, then I have an obligation to press the switch. I think that if I am sitting near the river and people keep going boating and people downstream can be expected to die of cancer at the rate of one cancer death per boat trip, then I have an independent obligation to press the switch. I think it would be wrong for me to leave the switch unpressed.

It will be useful to compare *Boating and Extracting* with a case that explicitly brings out the features that I take to be morally relevant. Consider:

*Buttons:* In front of you are three buttons. Below is a list of the buttons together with information about what they do if you press them:

A: You receive an amount of pleasure equal to consuming one martini.

B: You impose an expected harm of one additional cancer death in your neighboring community and receive an amount of pleasure equal to consuming one martini.

C: You reduce the expected harm in your neighboring community by one cancer death.

You can press C in combination with either A or B. But you cannot press both A and B.

It is wrong to press B and C. A large part of the wrongness is due to the fact that you impose a significant risk on your neighboring community, you only do so for a trivial good, and you could have gotten that trivial good without imposing that risk. These same features are present in *Boating and Extracting* and *Shooting and Extracting*. You impose a risk for a trivial good, you could have easily gotten that good without posing that risk, and you had an obligation to reduce the risk. This is sufficient to render your actions impermissible in virtue of the risk you impose on the communities in question.

This diagnosis complements Stefanson's (2022) and Stefanson and Willners' (2023) criticism of Barry and Cullity. They argue that in offsetting you do not fix the harm you cause. And so you might as well do something even better. I agree. But I add that even if you did fix the harm or expected harm you cause, that does not entitle you to engage in generating expected harms yourself.

### **Why My Lifetime Emissions Are Permissible But My Boat Trips Are Impermissible**

Now for my diagnosis of why my lifetime emissions are permissible but the actions in *Boating and extraction* are not.

One relevant difference is the difference in sacrifice required to avoid raising the risk of harm. In *Boating and Extracting*, to avoid imposing risk of harm, all I have to do is go to a different river, find something else fun to do, etc. There is no great cost incurred by me if I refrain from imposing the risk. On the other hand, in real life, I must radically change my entire life in order to avoid imposing risk of harm on others. I must forgo job opportunities that would require me to fly either for an interview or to move. I must radically change my diet. I must not drive. I must not have children (though see Hill (2024) for a criticism). I must limit

my life in ways that will prevent me from many of the projects I have devoted myself to that I regard as especially meaning making and central to my life. The sacrifices I make in these cases are radically different. One requires little or no sacrifice. The other requires great sacrifice.

Another relevant difference is the expected harm I impose. In *Boating and Extracting*, I impose one expected cancer death per boat trip. Presumably over the course of my life I will go boating many times. And in doing so I will impose many expected cancer deaths. If I go boating 300 times, I will have imposed a risk of 300 extra cancer deaths onto the community below. On the other hand, in real life, I impose one six month reduction in human life over the course of my entire life. So in the one case, I increase the expected cancer deaths of a comparatively small community by hundreds over the course of my life. In the other case I impose the risk of a loss of human life by just six months spread out over the entire global community. The expected harms of my acts in these cases are radically different.

Finally, I deny that my acts in real life are made permissible by offsetting. I think they are permissible merely in virtue of the great sacrifice it would take to avoid them and the comparatively small risk of harm I impose. As you make it easier for me to avoid emitting and as you make the risk of harm that I impose worse, you make my act closer and closer to being impermissible. But given that the sacrifice is great and the harm is comparatively small, the act is permissible.

### Objections and Replies

*First Objection:* A referee says:

*Shooting and Extracting...* is presented as a "counterintuitive implication" of Barry and Cullity's view. But then the paper goes on to notice that, since the cost of eliminating the already-fired bullets is trivial, it is plausible that there is an obligation to eliminate them. If so, this case does count as risk-imposing as measured against Barry and Cullity's moralized baseline. But then their view does not counterintuitively imply that the action in *Shooting and Extracting* is risk imposition permissible.

*Reply:* My view is that *Shooting and Extracting* meets the moralized baseline if and only if *Boating and Extracting* meets the moralized baseline. The cost of eliminating already-fired bullets is trivial because you only have to flip a switch on your gun. Similarly, the cost of eliminating already-dumped toxins is trivial because you only have to flip a switch on your boat. If the trivial risk removal implies the moralized baseline is not met in the former case, then it implies that the moralized baseline is not met in the latter. And so if the objector is right, then B&C are mistaken in thinking that their theory delivers the judgment that the acts in *Boating and Extracting* are risk imposition permissible. And that is sufficient for my purposes. On the other hand, if the set acts in *Boating and Extracting* does not fail to meet the moralized baseline even though the cost of eliminating already-dumped toxins is trivial, then the set of acts in *Shooting and Extracting* does not fail to meet the moralized baseline for that reason either. And so the counterexample stands. So B&C face a dilemma: *Either* their theory doesn't get you off the hook for imposing risk in *Boating and Extracting* or their theory gets you off the hook for imposing risk in *Shooting and Extracting*.

*Second Objection:* A referee says:

[I]n *Boating and Extracting* any one boater's toxic discharge mingles with everyone else's as it travels down the river. When people are affected downstream there isn't a one-to-one correspondence between the impact on an affected person and the action of an individual boater. In... *Shooting and Extracting...* an individual victim is killed by a bullet fired by an individual shooter. Accordingly, it's not obvious that the risk imposed when someone boats without extracting is what Barry and Cullity

call a "risk of attributable harm"; but clearly the shooting case does involve a risk of attributable harm. Perhaps that doesn't matter: perhaps there is some relevant wrong-making feature of *Shooting and Extracting* that is shared by *Boating and Extracting*. But that needs to be argued.

A different referee says:

In [Boating and Extracting] a boater may together with many other actors cause the death of someone, but even ex post it is impossible to know whether the particular boater contributed to a particular person's death.... By contrast, as I understand Shooting and Extracting, the shooter single-handedly kills someone... and ex post we know whom they killed.

So the referees converge on the following concern:

*Reply:* First, it is important to note that the set of acts in the original *Shooting and Extracting* do in fact meet the attributional baseline. Recall, that the attributional baseline requires that your acts do not preempt other harm causing acts. Consider an example B&C use to illustrate the importance of the attributional baseline:

*Boating and Buying Off:* My neighbour Ned plans to go boating tomorrow. I pay him to cancel his outing, and I go boating myself.

B&C regard the set of acts in *Boating and Buying Off* as risk imposition impermissible in virtue of failing to meet the attributional baseline. In this case, I preempt Ned's risk imposing act. And so the attributional baseline does not include the toxin that Ned would have dumped if I had not preempted. This case is contrasted by B&C with Boating and Extracting. In that case, I do not preempt the risk imposing acts of other boaters. They have already dumped toxins in the lake. I am just cleaning up toxins that are already there. For this reason, B&C argue that I meet the attribution baseline in *Boating and Extracting*. *Shooting and Extracting* meets the attributional baseline for the same reason as *Boating and Extracting*. The bullets are already fired. They are already in the air on their way to their destinations. The risk imposing actions have already been performed by other shooters. So I am not preempting them by flipping the switch on my gun any more than I am preempting the toxin dumping actions by flipping the switch on my boat. I am only cleaning up after their actions. And so my actions in *Shooting and Extracting* meet the attributional baseline. Avoiding a one-to-one correspondence between death and action is not required to meet the attributional baseline. Only avoiding preemption of risk imposing acts is required to meet the attributional baseline.

Second, go back to *Buttons*. In that case, there is no one-to-one correspondence between who dies and your contribution to the toxic sludge y. You don't know ex post who you might have killed. And yet, it is wrong to press buttons B and C in virtue of the risk they impose. It is trivially easy to get the good of one martini's worth of pleasure without imposing the risk. Or just wait and go to the liquor store! And you have a duty to lessen their risk anyway.

Or consider:

*Shooting and Extracting II:* As similar to *Shooting and Extracting* as is consistent with the following difference. One shooter's recklessly fired bullets mingle with everyone else's as they fly through the air then forming into distinct bullets again before reaching their destinations whether it be a person's head or a completely harmless destination.

This case has the feature in common with *Boating and Extracting* that the objector worries *Shooting and Extracting* lacks. There is no one-to-one correspondence between who dies and the acts of firing. You don't know who you killed and who you didn't. But it seems that the set of acts in *Shooting and Extracting II* is no less wrong in virtue of imposing risk than the acts in *Shooting and Extracting*. You could just go to a different area to harmlessly see how the gun works. You have an obligation to flip the switch anyway. So that can't be a morally relevant difference between the cases.

Third, the most pressing question isn't whether there is a morally relevant difference between *Boating and Extracting* and *Shooting and Extracting*. The relevant question instead is whether B&C's theory is capable of distinguishing between the two. As I see it, B&C delivers the result that *Shooting and Extracting* is risk imposition permissible if and only if it delivers the result that *Boating and Extracting* is risk imposition permissible. And so what is pressing is whether the features of the cases that B&C's theory take to be morally exculpatory are shared by both cases. My view is that each case satisfies the standard and attributional baselines. And their fates are joined when it comes to whether they satisfy the moralized baseline. If I am right about that, then I have done my job whatever other differences there might be. For in that case, even if there were some other morally relevant difference between the cases, it is not a morally relevant difference that B&C's theory tracks.

Put another way: B&C claim the acts in *Boating and Extracting* are risk imposition impermissible in virtue of meeting each of their baselines. They point to certain features of *Boating and Extracting* in virtue of which the acts in that case meet the relevant baselines. The acts in *Shooting and Extracting* have the very same features. So B&C's case for the claim that the acts in *Boating and Extracting* are risk imposition impermissible also implies that the acts in *Shooting and Extracting* are risk imposition permissible. Even if there are other morally relevant differences between the cases, the fact remains that B&C's theory implies that the acts in *Shooting and Extracting* are risk imposition permissible. But those acts are not risk imposition permissible. So B&C's theory is false.

*Third Objection:* A referee says:

Barry and Cullity don't claim that *Boating and Extracting* is permissible, or that emitting and offsetting is permissible. They claim that there are ways of doing these things that impose no risk, and are therefore "risk imposition permissible" - that is, are not made impermissible by imposing too much risk (p. 356). So, to have a good objection to their claim about *Boating and Extracting*, it is not enough to argue that *Boating and Extracting* is impermissible. It needs to be shown that it is impermissible because of the risk it imposes. They maintain that it worsens no one's prospect, and therefore does not impose risk on anyone. So, to produce a good objection to their argument, it needs to be shown either that *Boating and Extracting* does worsen some people's prospect, or that it imposes risk without worsening anyone's prospect. But the paper doesn't attempt to argue for either of those claims.

Reply: First, it is worth noting that B&C do claim that the set of acts in *Boating and Extracting* is permissible. They say (2022, p. ) this:

We began by asserting that in *Boating and Extracting* my conduct is permissible. We don't take that judgment to be beyond question, and we aim to support it in what follows.

Still, the referee has a point. They could take the referee's line and deny that the set of acts in question is all things considered permissible. So I need to address that move. I need to argue that it is not just impermissible but also risk imposition impermissible.

Here is my argument: Go back to this referee's remarks on *Shooting and Extracting*. The referee said:

since the cost of eliminating the already-fired bullets is trivial, it is plausible that there is an obligation to eliminate them. If so, this case does count as risk-imposing as measured against Barry and Cullity's moralized baseline.

In *Boating and Extracting*, it would be trivially easy for me to reduce the risk the community in question faces by flipping the switch on my extraction machine and just leaving it on. Because trivial rescues generate independent obligations, per the referee's point, leaving the switch on is already part of what Barry and Cullity regard as the set of acts one is independently obligated to perform. And so in *Boating and Extracting* I fail to meet the moralized baseline which measures risk imposition permissibility against the scenario in which the extractor is left on. Relative to that baseline, going boating *does* worsen the community's prospects: the risk would have been lower had I taken another readily available option. So even though the *net* risk is zero, the risk I impose is impermissible.

Put another way: B&C face a dilemma: Either deny that trivial rescue creates an obligation, in which case their theory has the result that the set of acts in *Shooting and Extracting* is permissible *or* accept that *Boating and Extracting* fails the moralized baseline in which case their theory does not have the result that *Boating and Extracting* is risk imposition permissible.

Some of the things the referee says suggest that they think B&C might be arguing that since the net risk of one's set of acts is zero, one's act in *Boating and Extracting* can't be wrong in virtue of imposing risk. But taking this line would undermine the main point of B&C's paper. Their aim is to distinguish between cases in which a set of acts is risk imposition permissible when net risk is zero from cases in which a set of acts is risk imposition impermissible even though the net risk is zero. Take *Business Opportunity* and *Boating and Buying Off*. They are cases in which the net risk imposed by the set of actions in those cases is zero. But B&C argue that the set of acts in those cases are nevertheless impermissible in virtue of the risks imposed. So if B&C were to argue that the set of acts in *Boating and Extracting* is risk imposition permissible merely in virtue of the fact that the net risk is zero, it would undermine the whole point of B&C's paper. This shows that by B&C and the referee's own standards, the set of acts in *Boating and Extracting* impose risk impermissibly even if overall risk remains unchanged.

*Fourth Objection:* A different referee raises the issue of distinguishing between risk imposition permissibility and overall permissibility in the context of *Shooting and Extracting*. They say:

Another thing that I would welcome some remarks on, is "risk imposition permissibility" vs. \*all-things-considered\* impermissibility. As I understand B&C, they are not talking about the latter, only the former. (See, e.g., B&C 2022, page 356.) In fact, they admit (on page 356) that one could be acting all-things-considered impermissibly by failing to \*reduce\* risk, even though one is acting risk imposition permissibly. So, I think B&C can agree with the author that the shooter, in the author's example, is acting impermissibly, but might (although I am not sure if they would) say that the shooter is acting \*risk imposition\* permissibly.

The referee's point here is that B&C can bite the bullet and say that the set of acts in *Shooting and Extracting* are risk imposition permissible. But that isn't such a bad result since they may still maintain that the set of acts is

all things considered impermissible. And in particular, the referee suggests, B&C may say that the wrong making feature of the set of acts in *Shooting and Extracting* is that you have impermissibly failed to reduce the risk of the people in the crowd rather than impermissibly increasing the risk.

*Reply:* I worry that this would undermine the motivation for B&C's theory. They rely on the intuition that various cases are not just impermissible but risk imposition impermissible in particular. What is to prevent their opponent from engaging in this same strategy and insisting that the the cases that motivate their theory are all merely impermissible and not risk imposition impermissible? What is to prevent their opponents from insisting that these are all cases in which subjects act wrongly not by imposing risk of harm but instead by failing to decrease risk of harm?

Any plausible story B&C can tell to motivate their judgments that cases like *Business Opportunity* and *Boating and Buying Off* are not just impermissible but impermissible of the risk one imposes can be appropriated by me to show that the set of acts in *Shooting and Extracting* are not just impermissible but impermissible in virtue of the risk they impose. For example, they might look at the acts that increase risk. They might note that the risk increasing acts, namely going boating and releasing toxins, seem like wrong making features of the case. And conclude that therefore the acts in the cases are wrong in virtue of the risk they impose. But if that is the line they take, then I can appropriate it to explain why the acts in Shooting and Extracting are impermissible in virtue of the risk they impose. Look at the risk imposing acts in the case, firing a gun recklessly in a crowd. It seems like the acts in *Shooting and Extracting* are wrong at least partly in virtue of that. And so the very same case can be made to support the claim that the acts in *Shooting and Extracting* are wrong in virtue of the risk they impose. So it seems to me that B&C owe an explanation of why the acts in Shooting and Extracting might be permissible but not risk imposition permissible that does not at the same time undermine the paradigm examples they use to motivate their theory. Without that, then they bit the bullet at the cost of undermining the force of their motivating examples.

## References

- Barry, C., & Cullity, G. (2022a). Offsetting and risk imposition. *Ethics*, 132(2), 352–281. <https://doi.org/10.1086/716871>
- Barry, C., & Cullity, G. (2022b). Do we impose undue risk when we emit and offset? A reply to Stefánsson. *Ethics, Policy & Environment*, 25(3), 242–248. <https://doi.org/10.1080/21550085.2022.2104090>
- Hill, S. (2024). Against adoption based objections to procreation. *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly*, 105(4), 541-554 <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/papq.12472>
- Stefánsson, H. O. (2022). Should I offset or should I do more good? *Ethics, Policy & Environment*, 25(3), 225–241. <https://doi.org/10.1080/21550085.2022.2104093>
- H. Orri Stefánsson & Mac Willners (2023) Why Offsetting is Not Like Shaking a Bag: A Reply to Barry & Cullity, *Ethics, Policy & Environment*, 26:1, 144-148, DOI: 10.1080/21550085.2023.2171680