Getting Attitudes Right

Critical Notice of *Getting Things Right*

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In 1903, G. E. Moore provoked generations of philosophers by placing goodness at the centre of ethics. Derek Parfit, Jonathan Dancy, and T. M. Scanlon did the same nearly a century later using reasons. Now, Conor McHugh and Jonathan Way have followed suit by resurrecting broader interest in *fittingness*. Their lucid and comprehensive *Getting Things Right* argues that the normative realm is built atop fitting attitudes, i.e., that fittingness—not goodness, not 'oughts', not reasons—explains all normative claims.

The title states the book's guiding idea that an attitude is fitting just when 'it gets things right'. An attitude gets things right, according to the authors, when it matches its object, where different objects match with different attitudes in different ways. For example, a belief matches its object when the object is a fact; a desire matches its object when the object is desirable; a fear matches its object when that object is fearsome, and so on. An attitude is fitting, we are led to think, when ordained by the world through this match. McHugh and Way approvingly cite Selim Berker's metaphors of a puzzle piece fitting into place or a key fitting a lock to further illustrate this guiding idea (77).

Despite its titular focus on fitting attitudes, reasons enjoy nearly equal attention in *Getting Things Right*. Indeed, four of the book's seven chapters mainly concern the relationship between reasons and fittingness; there isn't a chapter where reasons are peripheral. This is because one of the book's chief aims is to reduce claims about reasons to claims about fittingness. A central advantage of doing so—also explored by Chris Howard (2019)—is that reasons-privileging or 'buck-passing' accounts of normative claims face a

thorny challenge in the wrong kind of reason problem (WKR problem), explained below, whereas fittingness-privileging accounts do not.

But fitting-attitudes accounts are troubled by an equally thorny problem that reasons-privileging accounts easily solve: the so-called partiality problem. An important development of the book is advancing a fittingness-friendly solution to this problem. This solution is important because if it works better than any 'buck-passing' solution to the WKR problem, then we should privilege fittingness over reasons in metaethics, at least other things equal. I question this solution below by showing that an important challenge that McHugh and Way raise for buck-passing also arises for their own view. Overcoming this challenge requires abandoning the guiding idea of *Getting Things Right*.

1. The Big Picture

The two familiar ideas central to *Getting Things Right* make its position appealingly simple: first, that normative reasons are the premises of good reasoning; and second, that reasoning is good when it preserves the fittingness of its starting attitudes in its conclusion. The first idea reflects a 'Reasoning View' of reasons, associated with Joseph Raz and Bernard Williams, which holds that reasons explain normative phenomena because they are what we reason with when we reason well. Their second idea that 'reasoning well' or 'good reasoning' preserves fittingness makes their version of this Reasoning View distinctive.

We teach a version of this second idea to our students: good deductive arguments are truth-preserving—that is, valid—ones. Likewise, good theoretical reasoning is truth-preserving. But truth-preservation characterizes only some patterns of good reasoning. The attitude of fearing a tiger isn't truth-apt but we can reason well from the belief that the tiger is fearsome to fear of the tiger. Likewise, even if the desires and intentions that constitute good instrumental reasoning are truth-apt, their truth is peripheral to their role in good reasoning.

Unifying these divergent forms of good reasoning requires identifying why truth-preservation makes theoretical reasoning good. McHugh and Way hold that 'in theoretical reasoning we aim, at least, to form true beliefs' (89) and that beliefs are fitting when true. Thus, good theoretical reasoning is truth-preserving because truth-preserving theoretical

reasoning is fittingness-preserving. Generalizing this idea unifies disparate forms of good reasoning, whether theoretical, practical, or otherwise. Good reasoning in general is simply reasoning that preserves fittingness.

Modeling good reasoning on valid theoretical reasoning creates a tidy account, but it imposes the perhaps idiosyncratic features of valid reasoning on good reasoning writ large. Specifically, it applies an 'objectivist' standard, where 'the correct application of FITTING is widely assumed to be objective, i.e., not to depend, in general, on the subject's epistemic position' (78). If a belief is fitting only when it's true, and truth is independent of the believer's epistemic position, then valid theoretical reasoning is clearly 'objective' in this way. And if all good reasoning mirrors valid theoretical reasoning, the quality of an agent's episode of reasoning *in general* does not depend on their epistemic position. This idea is much less clearly true.

One way objectivism is counterintuitive is that it implies that reasoning to a necessary truth from an arbitrary starting point is good when it intuitively isn't. Another way is that someone ignorant of water's chemical identity employs good reasoning, according to their account, if they conclude that a substance is water from the belief that it's H_2O. McHugh and Way defend these implications (51–6) by saying that they involve good reasoning *incompetently executed*, perhaps similar to making an accurate but merely lucky guess. The more natural response, I think, is that the water-H_2O bit of reasoning is good only if the reasoner knows water's identity. But this characterization depends on claims about the reasoner's 'epistemic position' that objectivists renounce.

There are also important difficulties arising from only *defeasibly* good reasoning, such as non-monotonic reasoning. For example, it seems to be good reasoning to infer that you'll be full from the fact that you ate a burrito—but it's not good reasoning if the burrito will make you sick. McHugh and Way address this challenge with the qualification that a pattern of reasoning is good if the concluding attitude is *normally* fitting when the starting attitudes are (45–8). But we might instead claim that the reasoning is bad when you should suspect that the burrito will make you ill and good otherwise. Consequently, while the objectivist interpretation of the guiding idea makes the book's position easy to grasp and it

is supported by the analogy between valid arguments and good reasoning, philosophical ingenuity is required to smooth the wrinkles it creates.

McHugh and Way wield this account to advance a distinctive form of the Reasoning View of normative reasons: broadly, a consideration is a reason to φ just when and because it is a premise of good reasoning from fitting responses, which concludes in φ. This account has many advantages. It cleanly solves the WKR problem, discussed below, which is the foremost obstacle to buck-passing. It also promises to answer challenging questions about the relationship between reasons and various deontic statuses, such as being obligatory or permissible, by offering an account of how to modify and aggregate reasons' weights.

In sum, *Getting Things Right* offers a comprehensive account of how the various elements of the normative landscape depend on questions of fit. There is plenty to quibble with but even more to enjoy. I want to focus on how objectivism fits into their broader goal of explaining value, reasons, and deontic concepts in terms of fitting attitudes. In particular, I'll argue that McHugh and Way's commitment to objectivism prevents us from accounting for value in terms of fittingness, the central topic of Chapter 4.

2. The WKR Problem

Chapter 4 contrasts buck-passing with the fitting-attitudes account by focusing on two problems: the WKR problem (102–7) and the partiality problem (108–17). Both problems challenge an appealing network of three biconditionals:

1. X is better than Y (in respect R) iff it is fitting to prefer X to Y (in respect R). (*c.f.*, 109)
2. It is fitting to prefer X to Y (in respect R) iff there is conclusive reason to prefer X to Y (in respect R).
3. There is conclusive reason to prefer X to Y (in respect R) iff X is better than Y (in respect R). (*c.f.*, 109)

While (1–3) don't explicitly quantify over agents, it's common to assume that they do, because non-finite clauses such as 'to φ' typically quantify over a (possibly restricted) domain of agents when fronted by a null grammatical subject such as 'it is' or 'there is'. For

example, 'it is great to dance' is typically thought to entail that it is great that anyone (in the relevant domain) dances. This makes it natural to understand (1–3) as follows:

4. X is better than Y (in respect R) iff it is fitting *for anyone* to prefer X to Y (in respect R).
5. It is fitting *for anyone* to prefer X to Y (in respect R) iff there is conclusive reason *for anyone* to prefer X to Y (in respect R).
6. There is conclusive reason *for anyone* to prefer X to Y (in respect R) iff X is better than Y (in respect R).

The buck-passing approach is so-called because it passes the 'buck' of analyzing value in terms of fitting attitudes expressed in (4) to the analysis of fitting attitudes in terms of reasons in (5), thereby analyzing value in terms of reasons as in (6).

The first problem McHugh and Way consider comes from cases where there is conclusive reason to prefer X to Y when that preference isn't fitting nor is X better than Y. A prominent example, tracing back to G. E. M. Anscombe, involves a demon who threatens to inflict destruction on you and yours unless you prefer one saucer of mud to a qualitatively identical one. The demon's threat or *incentive* appears to provide a conclusive reason to prefer one saucer to the other. But that preference isn't fitting nor does it track a difference in value. Preserving the relationships between reasons, value, and fittingness in (5) and (6) requires excluding reasons like these.

This problem is a special case of the more general 'WKR problem' of identifying the reasons that figure in a reasons-based analysis of some normative property—'betterness' in this case—without circularly appealing to that normative property in the identification (102–7).[1] In this particular case, we need some way to identify the 'right-kind' reasons for the analysis, thereby excluding reasons like those given by the demon's threat from (5) and (6) without invoking betterness.

[1] Some understand the WKR problem differently, less as a problem for buck-passing analyses of value and more as a problem of how agents could be motivated by wrong-kind reasons—see Heuer (2010). It seems to me that's a different problem. Moreover, as McHugh and Way note, some, such as John Skorupski, doubt there is a problem. I'll set that view aside.

Mark Schroeder (2010) defends an influential solution to this problem. According to him, right-kind reasons are reasons which are shared by everyone engaged in a certain activity, because they are engaged in that activity. Schroeder's account explains why, for instance, proof offers the right kind of reason to explain justified belief, while incentives, such as threats and bribes to believe something, do not. Proof that something is true is a reason for anyone to believe it in virtue of engaging in the activity of belief. Conversely, threats offer a reason for belief only to the person who is threatened. This solution appears to extend to the demonic threat: it is a reason to prefer one saucer to the other only for the person who is threatened, so it is not a right-kind reason for preference.

McHugh and Way challenge Schroeder's solution by observing that it's contingent whether incentives concern only some and not all.[2] What if an incentive *necessarily* included all who engage in an activity and included them in virtue of engaging in it? They ask us to imagine a scenario, which I'll call *Insecure God*, in which 'a necessarily existing god will reward all believers who believe in it' (106). The reward is an incentive, so it's not evidence or proof that the god exists, so it's not a right-kind reason for belief.[3] Yet the incentive enjoins all who engage in belief to hold the belief in virtue of the fact that they're believers.

McHugh and Way's challenge extends to the buck-passing analysis. It might seem that we can insulate the analysis from the demon's threat using Schroeder's idea because the threat offers a reason only to the person threatened, not to all preferrers in virtue of engaging in the activity of preference. But we can imagine a necessarily existing god who will reward all preferrers who prefer the first saucer to the second. Incentives like these challenge the sufficiency of Schroeder's analysis by offering wrong-kind reasons nevertheless shared by all engaged in an activity because they are engaged in it.

Conversely, fitting-attitude theory easily explains the difference between wrong-kind and right-kind reasons: right-kind reasons for an attitude are those that can make it fitting. The demon's threat doesn't make favouring the saucer fitting—prudent, certainly, even

[2] Indeed, McHugh and Way present *three* challenges to Schroeder's account (106–7) but I have space to discuss only this one.

[3] I question this kind of inference in Howard (2021). I bracket that argument here.

rational, but not fitting. So fitting-attitude theory's solution to the WKR problem is much simpler than any buck-passing solution because it can identify right-kind reasons using facts about what's fitting.

3. Idiosyncratic Fittingness

McHugh and Way contrast the WKR problem with the *partiality problem*. For instance, suppose that Sam prefers that their friend, Sarah, escape from trouble rather than a stranger, Steven, when it's no better that Sarah escapes. Sam's preference is understandable, perhaps even required by friendship, so many will find Sam's preference fitting.[4] But the qualities that underlie friendship differ from those that underlie goodness. For example, the moral value of Steven's escape is not diminished by his lack of charisma; Sarah's sharp sense of humour does not improve the value of her escape. So we can suppose that the features that lead Sam to favour Sarah's escape don't make it better than Steven's. Because Sam, fittingly and with good reason, prefers Sarah's escape to Steven's though the first escape is no better than the second, the case is a counterexample to (4–6). So the question is how best to repair (4–6) to recover what's intuitive (1–3) without heartlessly condemning Sam's preferences.

Sam's preference for Sarah's escape is rooted in their friendship—a form of bias or partiality *par excellence*. It stands to reason, then, that correcting for that bias restores (1)'s harmony between value and fitting preference. McHugh and Way pursue this idea by introducing the notion of a 'neutral agent'—roughly, an impartial one—replacing (4) with:

7. X is better than Y (in respect R) iff it is fitting *for the neutral agent* to prefer X to Y (in respect R).

But what is a neutral agent? McHugh and Way define them with a second new notion, 'idiosyncratic fittingness'.

[4] As McHugh and Way note, some, such as Jonas Olson and (in some moods) Chris Howard, reject the fittingness of Sam's preference, but that says more about them than it does about (4–6).

Idiosyncrasy: 'Preferring X to Y in respect R is *idiosyncratically fitting* for an agent A iff it is fitting for A, but not for all agents, to prefer X to Y in respect R.' (113, emphasis added)

An absence of idiosyncratically fitting attitudes characterizes neutral agents:

Neutrality: 'A neutral agent in respect of X and Y is an agent for whom no (*pro tanto*) preferences between X and Y are *idiosyncratically fitting*.' (114, emphasis added)

Because Sam's preference for Sarah's escape is not fitting for all, it is idiosyncratic. Because of this idiosyncratically fitting preference, Sam is not a neutral agent. Since Sam is not a neutral agent, they don't threaten (7).

Introducing new ideology is often costly to a theory. In particular, positing *two* brute normative notions—idiosyncratic fittingness and non-idiosyncratic fittingness—would disadvantage fitting-attitude theories relative to value-based and buck-passing theories, which balance all normative claims on a single normative notion. So McHugh and Way are keen to avoid this pitfall. They avoid bloating their ideology by deriving idiosyncratic fittingness from the distribution of fitting attitudes across agents, making *idiosyncratically fitting*—that is, fitting only for some—the contrary of *universally fitting*—that is, fitting for all.

This approach to the partiality problem resembles the buck-passer's solution, which begins by observing that there can be a reason for someone to do something that isn't a reason for another to do that thing. For example, that there's dancing at the party is a reason for Ronnie, who loves dancing, to go to the party, but not for Bradley, who loathes dancing, to go. These are *agent-relative* reasons.

Intuitively, that Sarah is Sam's friend is a reason for Sam but not for all to prefer Sarah's escape to Steven's. So it is an agent-relative reason. As we've seen from Schroeder's solution to the WKR problem, right-kind reasons are generally not agent-relative reasons. So we can exclude Sam's reason by changing (5) and (6) to include right-kind reasons:

8. It is fitting for anyone to prefer X to Y (in respect R) iff there is conclusive *right-kind* reason to prefer X to Y (in respect R).

9. There is conclusive *right-kind* reason to prefer X to Y (in respect R) iff X is better than Y (in respect R).

McHugh and Way's solution resembles this one because both begin by observing that Sam's preference is *partial* and that goodness is what's *impartially* desired. Consequently, both locate goodness by excluding partiality. Doing so requires slightly different things from each theory. Fitting-attitudes accounts of value must exclude *idiosyncratically fitting preferences* and buck-passing accounts of value must exclude *agent-relative reasons for preference* since each of these reflects partial preferences. But the same thought underpins each strategy: what's good is what's impartially preferred and what's impartially preferred is what's preferred without bias. McHugh and Way touch on this parallel when they 'see no reason to think that it will be any more straightforward for buck-passers to specify the [circumstances where something may be valued by someone] than for proponents of fitting-attitude accounts' (117).

But McHugh and Way are misled by this superficial parallel. There's a deeper yet overlooked asymmetry between agent-relative reasons for preference and idiosyncratically fitting preferences that prevents McHugh and Way from appropriating the buck-passer's solution. Buck-passers typically assume that agent-relative reasons are normatively basic—for example, by defining agent-neutral reasons in terms of them.[5] But idiosyncratic fitting attitudes are not normatively basic. Whether a fitting attitude is idiosyncratic depends on further normative facts about the distribution of fitting preferences across persons.

This creates problems for the fitting-attitude theorist. In particular, *Neutrality* entails that a fitting preference is impartial if it's universally fitting. As a result, whether a fitting preference is impartial *also* depends on the distribution of fitting preferences across persons. This idea misrepresents impartiality. Impartiality isn't universal partiality; a bias doesn't evaporate when everyone has it. Rather, one is impartial when one attends to certain

[5] This is especially natural if we understand agent-neutral reasons in terms of universal quantification over agents and agent-relative reasons in terms of existential quantification, for universally quantified truths are often derived from existentially quantified ones. For example, if everyone is wearing jeans, it's because someone is wearing jeans, and someone else is wearing jeans, and so on for all the members of the relevant domain. See also Schroeder (2007).

features in the manner and to the degree that they merit attention. Whether you're impartial about some matter is independent from what other people favour or disfavour, whether fittingly or not. Bernard Williams, for example, characterizes impartiality as the exclusion of *indexicality*:

> [A principle of impartiality] will claim that there can be no relevant difference from a moral point of view which consists just in the fact, not further explicable in general terms, that benefits or harms accrue to one person rather than to another—'it's me' can never in itself be a morally comprehensible reason. (1973: 96)

Likewise, Thomas Nagel (1979) defines *agent-neutral* reasons as characteristically lacking an essential reference to the agent for whom the consideration is a reason. Kieran Setiya echoes this idea in his characterization of agent-neutral value: '*Agent-Neutrality*: which consequences you should prefer is fixed by descriptions of consequences that make no indexical reference to you' (2018: 94). All of these conceptions characterize an agent's impartiality preference by excluding grounds for preference that give extra weight to benefits, broadly understood, to the agent herself.

We must be careful to distinguish *Neutrality* from the idea that a preference is impartial and fitting *only if* it's fitting for everyone to have it. Surely that's plausible enough. But *Neutrality* also implies the converse claim that a fitting preference is impartial *if* it's fitting for everyone to have it. This implication is dubious for it allows seemingly irrelevant changes to others' fitting preferences to make *your* fitting preferences impartial. For example, consider the following:

> *Popular Sarah:* Sarah and Steven are just the same as in McHugh and Way's original scenario, but the universe of persons contains only Sam, Sarah, and Steven, all of whom are friends with Sarah (including Sarah). All involved fittingly prefer that Sarah escape rather than Steven.

Although Sam's fitting preference for Sarah's escape in *Popular Sarah* is identical to his preference in the original scenario, it not idiosyncratic in this second case—everyone shares it. Rather, Sam counterintuitively counts as a *neutral* agent with respect to Sarah's escape, according to *Neutrality*. So his preference falsifies (7).

This challenge may seem shallow. After all, it's contingent whether everyone is friends with Sarah. So it's natural to reply to this problem by modifying *Idiosyncrasy* to account for contingencies such as these:

> *Necessary Idiosyncrasy*: Preferring X to Y in respect R is *idiosyncratically fitting* for an agent A iff it is fitting for A, but not *necessarily* for all agents, to prefer X to Y in respect R.

Necessary Idiosyncrasy correctly classes Sam's preference as partial, since it's possible not to be friends with Sarah, so for it not to be fitting to prefer her escape. But someone (perhaps McHugh and Way's insecure god) *could* be so charismatic that they're an irresistible friend and for them to have this feature essentially. Call this individual *Necessarily Popular Sarah*. It's fitting for any agent to prefer her escape to Steven's, whom we may imagine as essentially uncharismatic but whose escape is no less valuable for his lack of charisma.

In discussion, some report a change in their intuitions about the value of Sarah's escape when she is necessarily very charismatic rather than ordinarily charismatic. They see her escape as *more* valuable when she is very charismatic rather than otherwise. But this impression is hard to defend. After all, the partiality problem is a problem precisely because the qualities that underlie partiality, such as charisma, don't typically contribute to impartial value. Sarah's charisma explains why it's fitting to prefer her escape even when it's not better than Steven's. Given that ordinary charisma does not contribute value, it would be odd if extraordinary charisma did in *Necessarily Popular Sarah*. For example, Hollywood actors don't enjoy moral priority simply because they're very charismatic.

The root of the trouble is the *two* fundamentally distinct ways for an agent's preference to 'get things right': an ostensibly agent-neutral kind of fittingness that tracks what's impartially good and an ostensibly agent-relative kind of fittingness that tracks the

agent's nearest and dearest. Cases like *Necessarily Popular Sarah* teach us that we cannot understand the former in terms of the latter. Unless fitting-attitude theorists can succeed at the unpromising task of understanding agent-relative fittingness in terms of agent-neutral fittingness, they must accept two irreducibly dissimilar forms of fittingness, disadvantaging their view relative to buck-passing and value-based theories.

4. The Lesson

Counterexamples that teach us nothing more than that some view is false are often dissatisfying. Fortunately, there's a lesson here: objectivism makes the partiality problem insoluble for fitting-attitude theory. Why? Recall that objectivism is the view that 'the correct application of FITTING [does] not depend, in general, on the subject's epistemic position' (8). While McHugh and Way's objectivism might be right for fitting admiration, amusement and awe, it distorts friendship. Friendship, plausibly, involves your 'epistemic position' in the sense of involving thoughts and feelings about your friend—you aren't friends with someone unless you're partial to them and partiality requires certain thoughts and feelings. Because friendship involves your epistemic position and friendship is the basis of Sam's fitting partiality, it's no surprise that objectivists can't account for it.

Elsewhere, McHugh and Way (2022) build on their approach to the partiality problem. According to these extended remarks, the quality that makes Sam's preference fitting is the indexical respect in which Sarah is *my* friend (as thought by Sam). While plausible, there are at least two distinct concerns with this proposal.

First, it conflicts with objectivism, the idea that attitudes are fitting when they get their objects 'right'. Introducing an 'indexical property' of being *my* friend (as thought by Sam) as distinct from being Sam's friend is questionable. Concepts like *I* and words like 'now' have indexical properties insofar as they issue from a specific perspective. But this makes indexicality a feature of thought and language, not of objects themselves like Sam's friend Sarah. So, Sarah's 'property' as my friend is really just a projection of Sam's epistemic perspective, not an independent feature of Sarah herself. Relying on this property covertly invokes Sam's perspective, violating the spirit if not the letter of objectivism. It's similar to

explaining why Jim's high confidence in an event is fitting with the only superficially objectivist claim that the event has the property of being 'well-supported by Jim's evidence'.

A second problem is more revealing; it's the problem of explaining why the indexical 'property' of being my friend (as thought by Sam) makes only Sam's preference for Sarah fitting. McHugh and Way allow that the non-indexical property of being Sam's friend can make *anyone's* preference for Sarah's escape fitting.[6] But this raises the question of why the corresponding indexical property behaves differently from the co-intensive non-indexical one? McHugh and Way cannot appeal to *Idiosyncrasy* (which we've already seen is deeply flawed) without begging the question. So it seems that McHugh and Way are pushed to adopt a second form of fittingness to account for the idiosyncratic way in which indexical considerations make attitudes fitting.

By contrast, buck-passing offers an easy explanation of why 'being *my* friend' (as thought by Sam) makes only Sam's preference for Sarah fitting when, in contrast, 'being Sam's friend' might make *anyone's* preference for Sarah fitting. It's a platitude that reasoning involves reasons. Some believe that this constrains an agent's reasons to those from which they can reason. Indexical thoughts like 'Sarah is my friend' are private. Only the subject of an 'I'-thought can think them, and likewise for 'my'-thoughts. Thus, only Sam can prefer Sarah on the basis of that indexical thought. The reasoning constraint therefore explains why 'being *my* friend' provides a reason only for Sam.

This account uses a consideration's epistemic profile, particularly its profile in reasoning, to explain why it contributes to the fittingness of only some agents' attitudes and not all. Objectivists plainly cannot avail themselves of this explanation, which appeals to agents' epistemic position in the form of limitations on which thoughts they can think. Objectivism therefore prevents us from properly distinguishing partial and impartial fitting preferences.

[6] 'We suggest that it is fitting for you to prefer that Sarah escape in the first, indexical respect – that Sarah is, as you would say, my friend. But it is not fitting for all agents to have this preference (indeed this preference is arguably not even available to agents other than you). By contrast, it may be fitting for you, and for all agents, to have the same attitude – be that preference or indifference – in the second, non-indexical respect – that Sarah is Suzy's friend' (McHugh and Way 2022: 258).

But how damaging is this conclusion for objectivism as a general thesis about fittingness? After all, it is the view that fittingness does not 'depend, *in general*, on the subject's epistemic position' (78, emphasis added). This idea tolerates exceptions: dogs, in general, have four legs even if some don't. Indeed, McHugh and Way go on to name hope, anxiety and curiosity as attitudes whose fittingness plausibly depend on more than their objects (89). Why not simply add preference to this list?

Pro-attitudes like preference—particularly since A. C. Ewing's response to Moore—are rightly regarded as the key attitudes through which to understand fittingness. It draws on the idea that the 'constitutive predicate' or 'aim of' desire is *goodness*, much as truth is the aim of belief. The centrality of pro-attitudes to fitting-attitude theory suggests that allowing such an exception to objectivism carries more weight in the case of desire than in other cases such as hope or anxiety. If objectivism requires carving out significant exceptions for pro-attitudes, it could be seen as weakening its general claim about fittingness. Thus, while objectivists might accept the exception for preference, doing so undermines the view that an attitude is made fitting by 'getting things right' in a way that exceptions for other attitudes don't.

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