

Boundaries and violence: Repertoires of state action along the Bosnia/Yugoslavia divide

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Territorial boundaries continue to produce substantial inequalities, even in an era of globalization.¹ Although territorial boundaries are socially-constructed lines in the sand, they have dramatic, real-world consequences. Acting on a host of explicit and tacit rules and norms, state actors treat the area on the “their” side of a boundary very differently than on the “other” side, generating radically dissimilar bits of social space out of the same geographic terrain.²

Boundary-related inequalities are perhaps starker during war, where one’s location vis-à-vis a boundary can mean the difference between life and death. Drawing on 1997 field interviews in the former Yugoslavia, I explore the impact of the newly-created Bosnia/Yugoslavia border on the lives of Muslim Slavs during the first year of the Bosnian war.³ On what became the “Bosnian” side of the border, Yugoslav authorities helped ethnic Serb paramilitaries launch a wave of ethnic cleansing, forcing tens of thousands of Muslims from their homes.⁴ Miles away in the Sandzak, however, a partially Muslim area on the Yugoslav side of the boundary, the same authorities blocked forced displacement, prompting Serbian paramilitaries to engage instead in ethnic harassment, a perverse but less lethal phenomenon involving nationalist threats, attacks on Muslim property, and occasional murders or kidnappings. Although Sandzak’s 200,000 Muslims feared the Serbian paramilitaries living in their midst, the irregular fighters, many of whom were active in the Bosnian fighting, did not launch systematic attacks inside Yugoslavia. Sandzak’s Muslims, in other words, were spared the destruction visited upon their Bosnian co-nationals, many of whom often lived only miles away.⁵ For Sandzak’s Muslims, the new Bosnia/Yugoslavia territorial marker was enormously significant. Ironically, Muslims along the Bosnia/Yugoslav divide were safer if they were *inside* rather than immediately *outside* Serbian-dominated

Yugoslav territory, despite the role Serbia and ethnic Serbs played in Bosnian ethnic cleansing. In 1992–1993, it was safer for Muslim Slavs to be firmly held within Serbia’s grip.

My account differs from three leading interpretations of contemporary Serbian violence. First, I dispute Michael Sells’s proposition that Serbian violence stemmed chiefly from deep-seated anti-Muslim sentiment.⁶ If this is true, why were these passions transformed so dramatically by the Bosnia/Yugoslavia territorial boundary? Serbian anti-Muslim feelings must have played a role, but they were insufficient on their own. Second, I extend Susan Woodward’s analysis of the “chaos and dissolution” produced by the collapse of socialist Yugoslavia’s federal system, suggesting that borders served as crucial shaping mechanisms during the confusion of war.⁷ Although all of the former Yugoslavia was thrown into disarray by the disappearance of central authority, the resulting violence was highly scripted so as to conform to new and existing boundaries. Woodward, along with many other analysts of the Yugoslav violence, has neglected boundary-driven patterning. Third, my interpretation supplements the work of rational choice theorists such as V.P. Gagnon, who suggests that Serbian leaders chose to attack Muslims in Bosnia because it was “foreign” land and thus less costly than attacking “internal” areas such as the Sandzak.⁸ Why wouldn’t elites with exclusive control over a piece of territory treat it *more* brutally than outlying areas belonging to others?⁹ Where do the relative “costs” of domestic wars come from?

Borders are institutional mechanisms patterning state activities and generating notions of appropriate behavior through tacit norms and explicit rules.¹⁰ Borders also serve as tools of statecraft, helping elites implant notions of state legitimacy in the minds of relevant audiences, including officials of other states, international organizations, and important domestic audiences. Especially crucial in this respect are groups who still have not accepted the state’s borders as “natural” and might therefore be inclined to challenge the state’s boundaries.¹¹ Borders can help states define some areas as “internal” and “pacified” regions that unequivocally belong to “us,” while defining other areas as “external” and “dangerous” lands belonging to outsiders. The existence and effects of such distinctions are even more remarkable when boundaries are disputed and in flux, as was the case in the former Yugoslavia during 1992–1993 (see Map 1).



Map 1. Former Yugoslavia.

Background

Bosnia was one of six republics joined together under socialist Yugoslavia's increasingly loose federal system.¹² Beginning in 1991, the federal system began to collapse as first Slovenia and then Croatia sought independence, and in 1992, Bosnia seceded from the old Yugoslavia to form its own state.¹³ The move was facilitated by international recognition of Bosnia's independence over the objections of Bosnia's ethnic Serbs, who feared minority status within the new state.¹⁴ The Muslim-led Bosnian leadership, however, viewed independence as the best way to escape domination by Serbia, which had been convulsed by

nationalist mobilization since the late 1980s.¹⁵ Serbia's preoccupation with the welfare of diaspora Serbs, coupled with Serbia's substantial influence over the Yugoslav federal army, was a source of considerable anxiety for Bosnian Muslims and Croats.

On April 6, 1992, the United States recognized Bosnian sovereignty, hoping the creation of a sovereign border between Bosnia and a new rump Yugoslavia – in which Serbia was the dominant member – would head off Serbian cross-border intervention. The European Union followed suit a day later.¹⁶ In an effort to ensure Yugoslav/Bosnian separation, the United Nations Security Council threatened Belgrade with sanctions if it did not respect the border's integrity. Hoping to retain international goodwill, the newly-created "Federal Republic of Yugoslavia" publicly resolved to cut its ties to Bosnian Serbs. In private, however, the new Yugoslav federal government and its dominant constituent member, the Serbian Republic, resolved to continue aiding Bosnian Serb fighters by clandestinely sending arms, material, and men across the newly-created Bosnian border. Thus, while Serbia and the new Yugoslavia theoretically respected Bosnia's boundaries, they violated them in practice through clandestine flows of arms, material, and men.

Several vital border crossing points used by Serbian paramilitaries were located in the Sandzak, a mountainous region divided administratively between Serbia and Montenegro, the two republics that composed the new Yugoslavia.¹⁷ Irregular Serbian fighters set up shop in the Sandzak, crossing over on a regular basis to attack Muslim strongholds in Bosnia. Despite the intensity of their Bosnian activities, however, the paramilitaries did not systematically attack Muslims in the Sandzak itself. This two-track paramilitary strategy is something I call the "Sandzak paradox."

The Sandzak paradox

Serbia's distinction between Muslims living in Bosnia and in Yugoslavia was surprising, given the strong incentives favoring an ethnic cleansing effort in Sandzak. Both Serbian state officials and the Serbian nationalist movement were fearful of Muslim designs on the Sandzak, and had Serbian officials launched a forced depopulation campaign in the area during the summer of 1992, when the Bosnian war was at its height, few observers would have been surprised. The reasons for a Serbian

ethnic cleansing campaign in the Sandzak were many. Serbian officials worried that a thriving secessionist Muslim movement in the Sandzak, allied to the Bosnian Muslim Party of Democratic Action (SDA), might form the centerpiece of a hostile, Muslim-controlled territorial arc encircling Serbia on three sides, the so-called anti-Serb “Green Belt.” As one Belgrade military journal warned, the Muslims covet Sandzak as “the important link of the Muslim chain that should connect the Islamic centers Sarajevo and Istanbul.”¹⁸ Sandzak, moreover, was Serbia’s only land link to the Adriatic sea. If Sandzak’s Muslim secessionists were to succeed, Serbia’s strategic position would be gravely endangered. Belgrade officials were particularly worried about international interest in Sandzak affairs, including Western concern for the human rights of Sandzak’s Muslim residents. Serbia strongly believed that Western meddling had precipitated the breakup of the old Yugoslavia and that any additional Western intervention in the Sandzak would only encourage Muslim secessionism.

Serbia’s fears were not unfounded, since Sandzak’s Muslims, like those of Bosnia, identified themselves politically as members of (old) socialist Yugoslavia’s “Muslim nationality.”¹⁹ During socialist Yugoslavia’s first democratic elections in 1990, Muslims on both sides of the border voted overwhelmingly for the Party of Democratic Action (SDA), a Muslim nationalist movement whose leader, Alija Izetbegovic, stated in 1990 that Bosnia had legitimate territorial interests in Sandzak, and encouraged Sandzak Muslims to demand autonomy from Serbia and Montenegro.²⁰ Between 1990 and 1992, when the Bosnian war erupted, the Party of Democratic Action’s definition of “Bosnian territory” occasionally included the Sandzak,²¹ while some of the party’s most ardent Muslim nationalists originally hailed from the mountainous region.²² In October 1991, the Party of Democratic Action organized a Sandzak referendum that supported autonomy and Sandzak’s right to secede,²³ and in March 1992, immediately prior to international recognition of Bosnian independence, a senior Sandzak Muslim leader warned that the region might attach itself to Bosnia if Serbia did not grant it autonomy.²⁴ Throughout 1992 and 1993, while the Bosnian war raged nearby, the Sandzak Party of Democratic Action pressed for autonomy and even secession. It was only some years later, after repeated Western rejection of Muslim-Sandzak territorial claims, that the Sandzak branch of the Party of Democratic Action dropped secession from its agenda. The 1992–1993 specter of Sandzak separatism, therefore, was a real one.

Leaders of the Serbian national-patriotic movement, which was not officially in government, had their own reasons for wanting Muslims out of Sandzak. Like the better known region of Kosovo, Sandzak was cherished by Serbian nationalists for its role as a medieval center of Serbian culture, politics, and religion. For many, a self-confident Muslim political presence in the Sandzak represented a threat to the region's Serbian identity and heritage. During the 1980s, fiercely nationalist figures such as Vuk Draskovic had placed Sandzak's Muslims high on their list of potential enemies. In February 1988, for example, Draskovic warned of the "rage of offensive and intolerant Islam in Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Sandzak," as well as of the "vampire rebirth of" Islamic law and the "*Jihad* strategy of creating an Islamic state in the Balkans."²⁵ In September 1990, Draskovic organized a demonstration in Novi Pazar, Sandzak's largest town, where he dramatically warned Muslims that they risked losing their arms if they dared raise any flag other than that of Serbia.²⁶ Serbia's socialist leadership, for its part, incorporated elements of the nationalists' ideology into their own political agenda during the late 1980s and early 1990s, increasingly speaking of Sandzak, Kosovo, parts of Croatia and Bosnia as part of Greater Serbia, and sharing some of the militants' anti-Muslim sentiments. Both Serbian state officials and private Serbian nationalists thus had reason to fear a Muslim demographic presence in the Sandzak, a fact recognized by concerned international analysts. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), for example, urgently deployed monitors to the region in 1993, and Sandzak's Muslim leaders repeatedly warned of an impending genocide.²⁷

The Sandzak paradox, then, is as follows: Why, given the incentives pushing for Sandzak's ethnic cleansing, did forced depopulation *not* occur? Sandzak's Muslims thought of themselves as a distinct nationality. They were organizing to demand their national rights within the same political party as their Bosnian co-nationals, were seeking autonomy or secession, and were appealing to Western powers for succor. Ethnic cleansing would have been a quick solution for Serbia and the newly-reduced Yugoslav federation. If paramilitaries could push Sandzak's Muslims out through Bosnia-style violence, state officials would have resolved a thorny strategic problem while simultaneously placating the nationalist camp in Belgrade. The Sandzak attacks might have easily been concealed amidst the fog of war, as the Bosnian conflict was then raging only miles away. Belgrade's decision *not* to engage in ethnic cleansing in the Sandzak is thus one that requires explanation. Who would have anticipated such restraint, especially in

an area immediately adjacent to the Bosnian carnage? Why did Serbia choose not to depopulate Sandzak forcibly of its Muslims?

Weberian perspectives

In his discussion of the modern state Max Weber rightly emphasized the importance of territoriality and the monopolization of legitimate violence by state authorities.²⁸ Drawing on the Weberian tradition, Anthony Giddens observes that states learned, over time, to differentiate between “internal” and “external” spheres of action.²⁹ The more states penetrated and controlled daily life in their territory, the more they were forced to reduce the intensity of state coercion, largely because of tacit negotiations with civil society. In Giddens’s words, as the “scope” of state power expanded domestically, the “intensity” of that power declined. For our purposes, Giddens’s distinction between internal policing and external warfare is particularly helpful. The more states eliminate armed rivals in their domestic territory, Giddens argues, the more internal areas are defined as “pacified” and therefore appropriate for police-like control.³⁰ War, on the other hand, is still the norm for external geographic areas.³¹ Modern state coercion, in other words, is organized into internal and external spheres, a claim that seems to fit with the Sandzak/Bosnia differences.

In this respect, Michael Mann’s distinction between “despotic” and “infrastructural” state power is similarly helpful.³² Despotic power is dramatic and intense, Mann says, but is limited in scope; while infrastructural power is more broadly dispersed, but is limited in its intensity. Premodern states used despotic power to control their own populations, and traditional sovereigns could do as they wished with whomever they could seize.³³ Such sovereigns also had access to fewer technologies of control, however, limiting their ability to penetrate civil society. Although despotic power was high, infrastructural power was low. Modern industrialized states, on the other hand, have a high “capacity … to actually penetrate civil society, and to implement logically potential decisions throughout the realm.”³⁴ The penetrative capacities of infrastructural power were accompanied by reductions in despotic intensity. As Mann explains, modern states with high levels of infrastructural power cannot “brazenly kill or expropriate their [internal] enemies” without exciting opposition, and cannot change the fundamental “rules of the game” at will.³⁵ Thus, as infrastructural power increases, despotic power declines. The more states control the

daily lives of their own populations, the less able they are to exercise their despotic options.

Working on related issues, Michel Foucault observed that beginning in the nineteenth century, modern states began to eschew spectacular acts of “punishment” – a term roughly analogous to Mann’s despotism – substituting more subtle and efficient methods of micro-discipline and surveillance. The result, Foucault suggested, is the modern “carceral state” that controls populations through unobtrusive but insidious methods.³⁶ Allan Silver, similarly, notes that modern policing relies on power that is “widely diffused throughout civil society in small and discretionary operations.”³⁷ Of equal importance, Steve Herbert suggests, is the fact that modern police themselves are heavily regulated by laws and internal administrative guidelines, which “seek to determine police procedures more finely through a set of rules that establish a chain of command.”³⁸ Modern social control involves the disciplining of populations within domestic arenas, a process applied to the agents of control themselves.

The notion that modern infrastructural power somehow limits the intensity of domestic state violence, however, is clearly not universally valid. Some states with high infrastructural power have used despotic violence against their own populations, as did Stalin during the deportation of restive nationalities. As Zygmunt Bauman eloquently argues, powerful state apparatuses with high infrastructural power can, given the right conditions, be a terrifying weapon aimed at domestic populations.³⁹ Yet, while there are cases of wholesale domestic destruction by states with high infrastructural capacities, the general thesis holds true for many – if not most – states, especially when they are sensitive to international and domestic legitimacy, as Serbia most certainly was. This argument certainly rings true for the post-Stalinist era in the Soviet Union, where the despotism of the early years was replaced with a smoother, more unobtrusive system of social control. Post-Stalinist “socialist legality,” Anatol Lieven writes, “was not wholly without content when it came to restraining regime behavior,” since Soviet internal security forces often went to “extraordinary lengths … to pretend – sometimes it seems almost to themselves – that the rules [were] being followed.”⁴⁰ As Giddens, Mann, and Foucault might have anticipated, greater levels of Soviet control over the domestic sphere led to a decrease in the most spectacular displays of state coercion, such as the gulags, forced collectivization, and mass purges. Giddens would have described the shift in Soviet styles of control as the product of “internal

pacification”; Mann would have observed a change from “despotism” to greater levels of “infrastructural” power; and Foucault might have noted a transition from “punishment” to “discipline.” None of the three, however, would have been surprised by the Soviet trajectory.

These approaches shed some light on the Sandzak paradox. Through an accident of history, the remote, mountainous region was defined as an “internal” area within Serbian control, and thus was destined for policing rather than war. Serbian infrastructural power was higher in the Sandzak than in Bosnia, an outlying land over which it had no formal control. Its grip over the Sandzak was stronger and more evenly dispersed, but its ability to deploy despotic coercive powers – such as forced depopulation – was subsequently limited. The result was Serbian ethnic harassment of local Muslims, rather than Bosnia-style ethnic cleansing. The problem with this account, however, is that it relies too heavily on the objective balance of forces between Serbian state and Muslim society in the Sandzak during 1992–1993. If Muslims were “weak” vis-à-vis the Serbian state, would they have been exposed to despotism? If not, then why?

Statecrafting

One way of bolstering the Weberian perspective is to add the notion of “statecrafting” to the theoretical mix, acknowledging that borders play a key discursive and expressive role in the process of state identity construction. Broadly put, statecrafting is the multi-layered effort through which social actors construct, disseminate, naturalize, and reproduce notions of “the state” – any state – in the discourse and consciousness of relevant audiences.⁴¹ A key statecrafting mechanism is territorial marking, since spatial boundedness is an essential component of state-centric discourse. A state boundary, Steve Herbert notes, “differentiates inside and outside,” and that, in turn, “assists the state’s attempt to create a sense of nationhood and defines its range of administrative concern.”⁴² Without a clear sense of territorially bounded space, other vital concepts in state theory and discourse, including the “state” itself as well as the notions of “citizens” and the “public,” are difficult to imagine. Timothy Mitchell describes the basic practices of frontier-creation as involving “continuous barbed-wire fencing, passports, immigration laws, inspectors, currency controls, and so on.” These “mundane arrangements,” he notes, were virtually unknown until the last century, but are now vital parts of manufacturing

stateness.⁴³ The promotion of territorial boundedness, in other words, is a key part of the performance states put on every day to promote and reinforce their identity.⁴⁴

The differential use of violence on either side of an international border is a particularly compelling way of emphasizing territorial boundedness, especially in times of war. State security forces can deploy despotic violence on the “foreign” side of the border while simultaneously policing the “domestic” arena, thereby naturalizing the boundary line and reproducing “stately” identities. If security forces were to treat internal enemies the same as those on the outside, what meaning would territoriality then have? The irony is that while domestic populations may gain a measure of protection from the inside/outside distinction, “insider” protections help reproduce the broader statist project, which itself is a significant source of global violence.

The Weberian and statecrafting perspectives jointly provide a compelling explanation for the Sandzak paradox. Giddens differentiates between “internal” policing and “external” war making, Mann distinguishes between “infrastructural” and “despotic” power, and Foucault traces changes from “punishment” to “discipline.” The logic of statecrafting suggests that these distinctions can be manipulated by state representatives seeking to bolster their own institutional legitimacy and to naturalize their state in the minds of citizens and foreigners alike. Serbian officials promoted policing in the Sandzak and despotism in Bosnia because they were aware of the historically-generated differences between “internal” and “external” violence, and because a bifurcated strategy of violence advanced the broader Serbian statecrafting project during a time of great institutional confusion, state collapse, and international oversight. By emphasizing the border’s ability to alter repertoires of violence, Serbian officials were signaling to both domestic and international audiences that their state was a legitimate and responsible member of the international state system, that it should not be punished by sanctions, and that its leaders were capable of ensuring the rule of law in their own, domestic turf.⁴⁵

The following section traces the evolution of the Yugoslav/Bosnia divide during the spring of 1992. In an effort to promote a legitimate profile in the international arena, rump Yugoslavia argued that it was a distinct entity from Bosnia and that it was playing no role in the Bosnian violence. Serbian officials were clandestinely helping Serb paramilitaries cross into Bosnia, however, a process explored in some

depth below. Next, I provide empirical evidence of the border's effect on state violence, contrasting Serbian attacks on Bosnian Muslims living along the border with ethnic harassment against Muslims living only miles away in Serbia. In a final section, I extend the analysis to other cases, probing its relevance to current events in areas such as Turkey, Israel, and Kosovo.

The formation of the new Bosnia/Yugoslavia divide: Spring 1992

The “external” Bosnian sphere and the “internal” Yugoslavia were generated simultaneously in spring 1992 through a series of international and local statecrafting practices. Bosnia was internationally recognized as a sovereign state on April 6 and 7, 1992, followed almost immediately by Serb paramilitary operations in eastern Bosnia. Western states and international organizations swiftly condemned Serbian cross-border intervention, and in May 1992, imposed painful sanctions on Belgrade. At the same time, Serbia and its tiny neighbor, Montenegro, declared a new, slimmed-down “Federal Republic of Yugoslavia” and swore that they had no intention of intervening in Bosnia’s internal affairs. Anxious first to avoid, and then to end, international sanctions, Belgrade officials took a series of actions aimed at persuading foreign observers that they respected Bosnian sovereignty. As Belgrade officials highlighted their disengagement from the war in a newly-externalized Bosnia, they sought to emphasize the law-and-order regime obtaining on the territory of rump Yugoslavia. Under the surface, Yugoslav links to the Bosnian Serb war still thrived but, publicly, two separate entities were going their separate ways. In so doing Serbian elites were seeking to bolster their legitimacy at home and abroad, promoting an image of their new state through mechanisms of border-definition and control.

The first official step came on April 27, 1992, when government officials proclaimed the new Yugoslavia’s existence, declaring that they had “no territorial aspirations to any neighboring state,” and were prepared to “fully respect the rights and interests of the [former] Yugoslav republics which have proclaimed their independence.”⁴⁶ In an effort to lend weight to their separation from Bosnia, Yugoslav agencies began to trace lines around their new entity, physically and bureaucratically inscribing their distinctness. In March 1992 the Yugoslav federal Customs Administrations said it would create 28 new checkpoints between Serbia and Montenegro and the seceding republics aimed at preventing “arms and drugs smuggling, and damages which might be incurred in

inter-republic traffic....”⁴⁷ On April 30, Yugoslavia specified fifteen authorized road-crossings with Bosnia and two authorized rail crossings, noting that its borders “can be crossed only at these points,” and that “a valid Yugoslav or foreign passport and identity card” were required.⁴⁸ On May 23, the semi-official Belgrade daily *Politika* wrote that rump Yugoslavia, eager to protect its “integrity and economy,” had established border crossings where “the militia and customs officers are already doing their jobs....” Special “border military units,” the paper explained, “are expected to take over the security and control of the state borders soon.”⁴⁹ By deploying border units, customs officials and official border-crossing, Yugoslav authorities were inscribing their bureaucratic and legal separation from Bosnia.

The most important statecrafting mechanism was rump Yugoslavia’s withdrawal of troops stationed in Bosnia under the rubric of the old federal army, and Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA), back into Serbia and Montenegro. On May 4, Serbian leaders announced that “all remaining citizens of the [new Yugoslavia] who are [Federal Army] members in Bosnia-Herzegovina should be returned speedily to the territory of Yugoslavia within 15 days at the latest.”⁵⁰ On May 5, Yugoslavia called on Bosnia’s three ethnic groups to take over the fragments of the old federal army, explaining that according to the new Yugoslav constitution, “there are no longer grounds for the [rump] Yugoslav Presidency ... to decide on military questions in ... Bosnia-Herzegovina.”⁵¹ On May 20, top officials announced that 14,700 Yugoslav men had already been withdrawn and by June 7, disengagement was formally complete.⁵² In reality, the bulk of the old federal army remained in Bosnia, but these men were largely Bosnian Serbs citizens transferred to the newly-formed Bosnian Serb army.

Belgrade officials also pledged to enforce the Bosnia/Yugoslav divide by blocking cross-border paramilitary traffic. One official promised that “paramilitary formations are prohibited in Serbia by law and their possible activity is strictly sanctioned,” adding that the government was undertaking measures to thwart attempts by “armed individuals from Serbia to take part in war clashes in Bosnia-Herzegovina.”⁵³ Serbian president Slobodan Milosevic noted that “[R]egarding the possibility of some irregular formations ... going there from Serbia, I can publicly say here that the organs of ... the Republic of Serbia fully control the territory of the Republic of Serbia and that there are no possibilities whatsoever of any groups ... inflicting some damage in this respect.”⁵⁴ Ultra-nationalist paramilitary commander Vojislav Seselj vowed that

he had “no paramilitary formations and no need to intervene militarily” in Bosnia.⁵⁵ Zeljko Raznjatovic or “Arkan,” leader of another Belgrade-based paramilitary, pledged that he had “no forces in Sarajevo,” since his “fighting men are on leave.”⁵⁶ Yugoslav authorities repeatedly wrote to international institutions in the spring of 1992, insisting that they would not tolerate cross-border infiltration into Bosnia.⁵⁷

Belgrade’s efforts publicly to respect the integrity of Bosnia’s new borders were boosted by Bosnian Serb politicians. Radovan Karadzic, president of the (Bosnian) Serbian Democratic Party, explained that his people did not “need Serbia except when it comes to moral support,” since the Bosnian Serb forces are “sufficiently strong … to determine our own destiny.”⁵⁸ Although Bosnia’s Serbs needed help and suggestions from Serbia, Karadzic said, “we are not blind operatives of their policy.” More importantly, perhaps, “Milosevic does not even know about many of our actions....”⁵⁹ As the Bosnian fighting intensified, Karadzic placed even more distance between himself and Belgrade. “We would like to categorically say … that Serbia has nothing to do with this. Serbia is not involved in this. We are not letting it get involved in this.... We are even avoiding contacts.”⁶⁰ Instead of clinging to Belgrade and insisting they remained part of the broader Serb nation, the Bosnian Serb leadership was cooperating with Yugoslavia’s attempts to remain distant.

Thus, by summer 1992, Yugoslav officials, operating under the threat of international sanctions, had publicly enacted Yugoslavia’s formal separation from Bosnia for both domestic and international audiences. As a result, two different types of social space had been created, distinguished from one another by the new Yugoslav/Bosnia divide. To the west of the internationalized boundary was an “externalized” Bosnia with no formal linkages to Yugoslavia. To the east, a Yugoslav “domestic” sphere lay under the control of Belgrade.

Yugoslavia’s clandestine cross-border activities

Although the Yugoslav government formally promised to respect the new boundary, national-patriotic activists both in and out of government resolved to intervene clandestinely across the border, sending irregulars, weapons, and supplies to help the Bosnian Serb fighters. They were aided in this by agencies of the Belgrade government, which shared their concern for ethnic Serbs in Bosnia.

The covert mechanisms linking Belgrade to the Bosnian fighting are still quite murky. According to some journalists, an unofficial system of coordination, composed of members of the ruling Socialist Party, interior ministry officials, policemen, and army officers, ran the program. British correspondent Tim Judah argues that a key group of officials known as the “Military Line” was devoted to helping Serbs in Bosnia and Croatia carve out enclaves that would eventually be annexed to Yugoslavia.⁶¹ Journalist Julian Borger suggested that the Military Line was a “parallel chain of command” that allowed Milosevic privately to control Yugoslavia-based paramilitaries and Bosnian Serb forces.⁶² In Borger’s account, the Military’s Line’s leader was Jovica Stanisic, then head of the interior ministry’s clandestine State Security division. Stanisic’s aides were Radovan Stojicic and Franko Simatovic, both interior ministry personnel. Another reporter, Misha Glenny, writes of a fourth coordinator of the secretive network, Mihalj Kertes, a Socialist Party official who organized weapons distribution networks in Bosnia and Croatia.⁶³

The notion that Belgrade contributed to the Serbian war effort in Bosnia through an unofficial but high-powered group enjoys support from other sources. Branislav Vakic, a Serbian parliamentarian and former commander in the Serbian Cetnik Movement, said he led thousands of fighters who received fuel and uniforms from the Yugoslav military police, naming a string of officers and officials.⁶⁴ Vojislav Seselj, Vakic’s political boss, told journalists that “[O]ur volunteers took part in combat as part of special units of the police from [Serbia], under the command of Mihalj Kertes.”⁶⁵ A former State Department official claimed in Washington, D.C. that he had seen classified intelligence information indicating that the Bosnian ethnic cleansing campaign was directed by agents from Serbian State Security, who “fanned out across Bosnia initiating, leading and controlling the fighting in different districts.”⁶⁶ Dejan Pavlovic, a Belgrade war correspondent, painted a similar picture during a Belgrade interview. “State Security sent men to each Bosnian municipality looking for trusted persons who would act as allies,” Pavlovic explained. These “persons would be told that the area needed to be secured for reasons of convoy security or military strategy, and that as a result, the Muslims needed to be cleared out.”⁶⁷

The most illuminating piece of evidence, however, was supplied to me by Daniel Snidden (“Kapetan Dragan”), an Australian of ethnic Serb origin who helped organize Serb militias in Croatia.⁶⁸ Snidden said he was sent by the Serbian intelligence services to train and lead Serbian

paramilitaries in the Krajina region, operating clandestinely across Serbia's official borders. According to one of Snidden's top lieutenants, salaries for Snidden's force came directly from Serbian State Security. "We had State Security cards and identification tags," the lieutenant said, adding that Snidden took his orders directly from Belgrade.⁶⁹ According to Snidden, he did not participate in the Bosnian fighting, largely because of his disapproval of the methods used there. Although there is little hard evidence to be found, most Serbian war correspondents in Belgrade – many of whom are highly critical of the Serbian war effort – support Snidden's account. Most also believe that some of Snidden's recruits in Croatia traveled to Bosnia to fight there as well, making the Snidden-Belgrade connection relevant to that war as well.

Based on journalistic research and my own interviews, it seems likely that senior Belgrade officials generated a series of relationships with individuals and groups capable of quietly transferring arms, men, and money across the Yugoslav/Bosnia border.

Ethnic cleansing on the Bosnian side of the boundary

Most observers agree that Yugoslavia-based paramilitaries played a key role in forcibly pushing out Muslims from eastern Bosnia during the spring of 1992.⁷⁰ The attack on Muslims in Zvornik, a Bosnian town located just over the border from Serbia, illustrates the paramilitary role, providing a stark contrast to Sandzak's less lethal ethnic harassment. Paramilitaries attacked Zvornik on April 8, 1992, crossing over from the adjacent Yugoslav river-bank.⁷¹ The town sat astride a vital transportation route, and Serbian activists apparently resolved to empty the area of its approximately 45,000 Muslim residents in an effort to secure the road. The initial attack was led by an irregular formation known as the Serbian Voluntary Guards, commanded by Zeljko Raznjatovic or "Arkan." The second assault wave included lesser paramilitaries such as the Serbian Cetnik Movement and the White Eagles.

Jovan Dulovic, a Serbian reporter from the Belgrade daily *Politika*, was on the Yugoslav side of the river when the fighting began, and followed the second wave into Zvornik. The paramilitaries, he recalled, "looked like a bunch of gangs. All the scum of Serbia were there, and it was total chaos."⁷² Dulovic made his way to the office of the chief of Zvornik's Bosnian Serb Territorial Defense but found him virtually

powerless, since none of the paramilitaries felt obliged to follow his instructions. “I felt almost sorry for him,” Dulovic said. “He didn’t have any of his own men and the paramilitaries weren’t listening to him. They were a bunch of bandits, threatening him as well.” The irregulars quickly subdued Muslim resistance and began to loot Muslim property, killing some civilians and detaining others.

Refugee testimony paints a picture of paramilitary-induced chaos: “The various para-military units maraudering [sic] around Zvornik all had unlimited freedom of action (terrorizing the civilian population, randomly performing executions and arrestations[sic]).” Refugee testimony indicated that “the … paramilitary units only accepted the authority of their own respective ‘leaders,’ … [while] many of the less strictly organized para-military groups regarded their complete freedom of action as a kind of ‘remuneration’ for their work.”⁷³ In his diary, Dulovic noted details of interviews with several paramilitary commanders whom he recognized from other battlefields. There was “Miroslav, from Seselj’s paramilitary, who was commander of a big unit,” as well as “Pedja, from Arkan’s unit.” Dulovic spoke with men who identified themselves as belonging to the White Eagles and Yellow Wasps, noting in his diary that were some 5,000 Serbian paramilitaries spread throughout Zvornik and its surroundings. When the fighting ended, the irregulars began loading trucks with looted goods. Dulovic noted a hierarchy of looters, with the elite, Arkan-led troops having first dibs on the most lucrative assets, gold and cash. The Serbian Cetnik Movement and White Eagles came later, looting large appliances, while the local Bosnian Serb militias came last, settling for “stripping wires out of the walls and dismantled windows and door frames.” The more prestigious the unit, the better access to valuable war booty.

The Zvornik model of violence spread throughout eastern Bosnia during the spring of 1992, as Yugoslavia-based paramilitaries swept through towns such as Foca, Gorazde, and Visegrad, as well as dozens of smaller villages. Departing from bases along the Bosnian border, men from the larger, Yugoslav-based irregular formations sallied forth to join smaller, local Bosnian Serb militias, jointly consolidating Serbian political and military power while forcing out the bulk of the Bosnian Muslim population.

This was the fate that did *not* befall Sandzak by virtue of its inclusion into the newly-reduced Yugoslavia in 1992. Had international forces

insisted on Sandzak's attachment to Bosnia, Zvornik-style violence might well have been Sandzak's fate.

Ethnic harassment in the Sandzak

Although Yugoslav officials helped the irregulars attack Bosnia from their Sandzak bases, local police and Yugoslav army troops prevented the paramilitaries from doing the same in Sandzak itself. Although state-tolerated violence did take place against Sandzak's Muslims, it never rose above the level of ethnic harassment. While the harassment was painful and terrifying, it did not lead to mass displacement, looting, or large-scale killings.

As noted above, many paramilitaries based themselves in the Sandzak because of its proximity to eastern Bosnia and its remote, mountainous terrain (See Map 2). Far from Belgrade-based diplomats and journalists, the irregulars could cross the Yugoslavia/Bosnia boundary on back roads, masking their violation of Yugoslavia's official zero-tolerance policy on cross-border infiltration. As the fighting continued through the summer and fall of 1992, however, the paramilitaries' increasingly resented exempting Sandzak's Muslims from attack. The Muslim population on both sides of the border shared family ties and political affiliations, some Sandzak Muslims had gone to Bosnia to fight Serbs, and Serbian nationalist propaganda did not distinguish carefully between "Yugoslav" and "Bosnian" Muslims. More importantly, perhaps, Muslims owned shops and businesses, presenting a lucrative economic target. From the paramilitary perspective, it was unclear why they should pursue two separate policies for what was essentially the same group of people.

Yugoslav police, local officials, and state politicians, on the other hand, felt differently. The Sandzak was located on the "internal" side of the border, and they had been charged with maintaining an image of law and order in the new Yugoslavia. Paramilitary free-lancing in the Sandzak would be a clear violation of that mandate. State and paramilitary interests thus converged when it came to Bosnia, where both supported ethnic cleansing, but diverged back in the Sandzak. As state representatives and paramilitaries tacitly negotiated the boundaries of legitimate violence in the Sandzak, practices of ethnic harassment emerged. The state would tolerate and perhaps even encourage low-level violence against Sandzak's Muslims, but would not let the



Map 2. Yugoslav/Bosnia border.

Serbian irregulars go too far. Once they threatened to seize control of Sandzak territory or move too blatantly against Muslims, the state would crack down. In what follows I explore the contours of the state-paramilitary relationship in depth, drawing on field interviews

conducted with Muslim political leaders, human rights activists, and local officials along the Yugoslav/Bosnia border during the winter of 1997.

Sandzak case study #1: Pljevlja's failed paramilitary coup

Events in Pljevlja, a small Sandzak town near the Bosnian border, dramatically illustrate state-paramilitary tensions during the 1992–1993 period. The government allowed irregulars to use Pljevlja as a staging ground, providing them with access to Yugoslav army barracks and, reportedly, to weapons. When Pljevlja's irregulars engaged in low-level harassment against local Muslims, the state turned a blind eye, perhaps even secretly hoping the violence would force Pljevlja's Muslims to flee. Once the paramilitaries made a more blatant move, however, taking control over the town and announcing their intent to throw its Muslims out forcibly, Yugoslav authorities sent in reinforcements and defused the attempted *mini-coup*. Although Pljevlja's Muslims were frightened and suffered material loss, they were not forcibly evicted from their homes.

Pljevlja's central paramilitary organizer was Ceko Dacevic, leader of the Pljevlja branch of the Serbian Cetnik Movement. "There were many paramilitaries at that time in the town," recalled Hosein Pelidija, a local Muslim political leader, "but Ceko brought them all together."⁷⁴ In addition to his own charismatic appeal, Ceko's ties to ultranationalist Vojislav Seselj, a leading nationalist figure, were crucial. "Ceko was Seselj's designated man in Pljevlja," recalled Montenegrin journalist Velijezer Brajovic, "and was also close to the Serbian Ministry of Interior."⁷⁵ That very same ministry, it will be recalled, housed the clandestine State Security apparatus, the linchpin of the Belgrade-to-Bosnia Military Line network. Ceko, in other words, was a low-level operative in the cross-border, paramilitary-state connection.

Estimates of Ceko's following vary from dozens to the thousands. In 1997, municipal authorities in Pljevlja said that Ceko had only a "few dozen unemployed people, riffraff from Pljevlja and from all across Serbia."⁷⁶ Muslim leaders in the town, however, put the numbers at several thousand. Ceko himself told a journalist he controlled 4,000 men, and acknowledged that he worked closely with nearby Bosnian Serb fighters.⁷⁷ According to that same report, Ceko and his men used Pljevlja as their rear base, traveling "regularly to the town of Gorazde,

just 40 miles away in Bosnia,” returning “with loot to sell in the local market, including video recorders and refrigerators.”

Pljevlja authorities now label Ceko a local troublemaker seeking to stir up anti-Muslim violence. Pljevlja’s mayor said that Ceko was a “criminal, pathological thief,” who falsely presented himself as a defender of the Serbian people, “but really only cared about stealing the homes and businesses of Muslims.”⁷⁸ The mayor’s aide labeled Ceko as “an ignorant, uneducated man who attracted stupid and violent criminals.” They recalled that Ceko used to “scream that all the Turks [Muslims] should get out, or be killed. He was trying to stir up the least educated, the unemployed, into attacking the Muslims.” Ceko’s favorite saying, according to the mayor, was that “Pljevlja was a small town, and that there was only room for Serbs, not Turks.” Ceko, it seemed, wanted to apply Bosnian frontier logic to Pljevlja, and it was unclear to him what difference it made if Muslims were living in the Sandzak or in Bosnia. Muslims were Muslims, and they should be forced to leave. The Yugoslav state, however, felt differently, distinguishing between Muslims on the Bosnian side of the border, whom Ceko was entitled to attack, and Muslims on the Yugoslav side, who were off-limits.

Muslim from Pljevlja believe that Ceko was politically powerful within Pljevlja. “Ceko did as he liked in town, and the state could do nothing about it,” said Hosein Pelidija, the Muslim political leader. “Even the mayor was afraid of him.” The authorities would not criticize him in public and did not protest when Ceko’s irregulars threatened Muslims in the street, smashed their store windows, and gave stridently anti-Muslim speeches. It seemed that in the summer of 1992, Ceko’s power was beginning to rival that of the mayor. “Increasingly, it looked like Pljevlja and the surrounding areas belonged to Ceko and others like him, not to the state,” recalled Brajovic, the Montenegrin journalist. As one contemporary report argued, “While the police say they could arrest him [Ceko] … if they wanted, he and his followers appear to do what they like. For example, despite a line of several hundred cars for gasoline at the local station – which had a sign up saying no gasoline was left – Mr. Ceko was able to go straight to the front of the line where he was immediately, and deferentially, served.”⁷⁹ Some Muslim leaders recalled that Ceko had even warned he might “annex” Pljevlja to the adjacent Bosnian Serb state. The Muslims believed that many of Pljevlja’s policemen admired Ceko’s beliefs.

The irregulars began a campaign of anonymous night-time bombings targeting Muslim businesses. “The Serbs wanted us out,” Hosein Pelidija said flatly. “The state, Ceko, the mayor, everyone, wanted no Muslims in Sandzak at all, and especially not in Pljevlja, so close to the border.” Some Muslims feared that ethnic cleansing was about to begin. Sevad Delic, a prominent Muslim businessman, recalled that “the state first fired Muslims from state businesses, then accused us of being disloyal secessionists, and finally turned to Ceko, telling him to terrify us into fleeing with his bombings. If that didn’t work, they were planning to kill us.”⁸⁰ Yet while local authorities may have wanted the Muslims to leave, they could not tolerate open attacks on Muslims on the Yugoslav side of the border, since that would directly violate Yugoslavia’s image as an orderly, law-abiding area. The paramilitaries seemed to have understood this constraint, targeting their bombs so as to cause no casualties. Their aim seemed to be causing maximum fear without provoking a vigorous state response.

In early August 1992, however, Ceko’s men went too far, triggering a Yugoslav crackdown. The drama began with Ceko’s arrest by local policemen for a minor infraction. When they learned the police might hold Ceko overnight, his fighters launched a *coup*. “It was a very precise military operation,” recalled Sukrije Hadjisatirovic, head of a local Muslim aid agency.⁸¹ “They seized the radio station, cut communications, blocked the roads leading into town, and even put machine gun nests in the hills above the town.” Pljevlja’s Muslim population was terrified, hiding in their homes as irregulars shouted slogans against the police, Yugoslavia and Muslims. “Ceko’s men were demanding that we leave and that our homes be given to Serbs,” Hadjisatirovic said. “They wanted this place to look like Bosnia, where Muslims’ property and lives are worthless.” Pljevlja seemed on the verge of slipping into “external,” Bosnia-like status. A wave of Bosnia-style ethnic cleansing seemed poised to begin.

The state’s response was swift and unequivocal. Montenegrin president Momir Bulatovic immediately flew to Pljevlja in a helicopter, accompanied by a high-ranking Yugoslav army officer. The two men negotiated with Ceko in the mayor’s office while Yugoslav military reinforcements deployed around the town. Yugoslav president Dobrica Cosic, a famous Serbian nationalist intellectual, provided moral support and pressed Vojislav Seselj, Ceko’s political superior in Belgrade, to restrain the paramilitary chieftain. The combined pressure worked, and the paramilitaries de-escalated in return for Ceko’s release. Yugoslav forces

continued to patrol the area, gradually re-asserting central state control. Ceko's fighters continued to sally forth into Bosnia, but refrained from threatening Pljevlja's Muslims too openly. Although some local Muslims decided to leave, others remained, and no homes were destroyed or looted.

The attempted paramilitary *coup* was a dramatic illustration of the state's concern to block ethnic cleansing in an area which the Yugoslav authorities regarded as being on the "internal" side of the Yugoslav/Bosnia divide. Ceko and his men were cross-border predators, attacking Muslims in Bosnia with Yugoslav state support. Inside Yugoslavia, however, local and national officials were both uncomfortable with the notion of an ethnic cleansing rampage against Sandzak's Muslims. Seeking to uphold Yugoslavia's lawful image at home and abroad, the officials felt the need to suppress blatant paramilitary activity in their own bailiwick. Although they were willing to tolerate night-time bombings, they would not allow more drastic measures. Officials effectively had set a "cap" on anti-Muslim violence in Pljevlja, blocking it from rising above the level of ethnic harassment. When Ceko's men threatened to tear Pljevlja physically from Yugoslavia and create a Bosnia-style "external" environment, state coercive agencies cracked down. The border thus functioned as a vital signaling mechanism for state officials, defining which geographic areas could be targeted for ethnic cleansing, and which could not.

Sandzak case study #2: Priboj's geographically-sensitized paramilitaries

Pljevlja was not the only Sandzak border town where cross-border paramilitaries tried to push the ethnic harassment envelope, attacking Sandzak Muslims "on the margins" in a tacit bargaining process with local and national Yugoslav authorities. Priboj, a mixed Muslim-Serb municipality located directly adjacent to the Yugoslav/Bosnia boundary, witnessed several cases of paramilitary intimidation and even murder. The most deadly attacks, however, took place in remote corners distant from Priboj town. By keeping to the geographic margins of Priboj municipality, the paramilitaries were making a concession to state officials concerned with Sandzak's "internal" status as a zone of "policing," rather than an external arena of "war."

I traveled to Priboj after first interviewing Muslim political leaders in Novi Pazar, the Sandzak capital, for whom distinctions between violence in Bosnia and the Sandzak are intensely problematic.⁸² In an effort to emphasize the intensity of the Sandzak Muslims' suffering, the leaders equated their community's fate with that of Bosnia's Muslims. "In 1992 and 1993, a nationalistic, dictatorial Serbian regime did not want to see Muslims living in the Sandzak," explained Safet Bandzovic, a key political leader.⁸³ "They did everything they could to kill us, murder our people, and thus force us to flee. What they did here is similar to what happened in Bosnia." The head of a local human rights office in Novi Pazar, Sefik Alomerovic, echoed Bandzovic's statements: "The state pretended that it was at peace, not at war, but they conducted a genocide right here in the Sandzak. They did it in Bosnia, and they did it here."⁸⁴ For Muslim leaders in Novi Pazar, the parallels with Bosnia were clear: Muslims were killed in Bosnia to force them from their homes, and Muslims were attacked in Sandzak for the same purpose.

Interestingly, however, both men realized the evidence did not entirely support their argument. Their home town of Novi Pazar, for example, was still a Muslim-majority city in 1997, signaling the Sandzak had not been emptied of its Muslim population, although some wealthier Sandzak Muslims had traveled abroad. Although Muslims had been intimidated, marginalized, and discriminated against during 1992 and 1993, most remained alive and well in their homes. The total wartime casualty rate for Sandzak's 200,000 Muslims, for example, was 50 persons. To resolve this apparent contradiction, the leaders encouraged me to travel to Sandzak's border regions, including both Priboj and Pljevlja. "Go there and you will see proof of the Serb genocide," Bandzovic urged. But the very fact that I had to go to Sandzak's *border* with Bosnia signaled that anti-Muslim violence *inside* Yugoslavia was heavily influenced by internal-external distinctions. Although Muslims throughout Sandzak had been harassed, evidence of direct violence could be found only along the border, where "outside" and "inside" touched.

Once I travelled to Priboj, moreover, I found the violence was even more targeted, discriminating, and calibrated than I had imagined. Not only was it restricted to Sandzak's border regions, but it had focused sharply on Muslims who fell into one of two categories: Persons caught by paramilitaries as they strayed onto Bosnian territory, or persons living in remote border villages. Other local Muslims were untouched, although many feared for their lives, were humiliated by

anti-Muslim propaganda, and lost their public sector jobs. Although local Muslims had clearly suffered enormously, they had not been exposed to the same lethal violence encountered by their co-nationals living only miles away in Bosnia.

In Priboj, I learned that White Eagles recruitment branch had transformed the town into a beehive of paramilitary activity in 1992. The town's proximity to the border, restaurants, and cafes contributed to its centrality, attracting Serb irregulars searching for rest and recreation. The paramilitaries' presence appeared acutely threatening to the 12,000 Muslims living in Priboj town, however, who represented less than a third of the 42,000-strong population. Ekram, a local Muslim politician, recalled that 1992 was a "terrifying period. Nationalist paramilitaries were everywhere, marching in the streets with their guns and uniforms. They cursed us and made all kinds of horrible statements about us."⁸⁵ A Muslim café owner recalled paramilitaries being "everywhere, often drinking and eating in the town. If they saw a Muslim in a café, they would say to the café owner. 'Why do you allow Turks in here?' And if they saw a Muslim and Serb together in a café, they said to the Serb, 'Why are you drinking with filthy Turks?'"⁸⁶ Dzemo Halilagovic, another local Muslim leader, said that Priboj was then a place of "state terror. Muslims were being killed without any compunction. Those so-called paramilitaries were all over, but in reality, they were an arm of the state."⁸⁷ According to a reporter visiting Priboj in November 1992, local Serbs believed that Muslims were terrorists, while Muslims felt terrorized by Serb paramilitaries. In Priboj, he wrote,

hate letters are circulating among Serbs ... "Serbs, you must leave Muslim cafes because they are preparing cocktails that will make you sterile," reads one of the hate letters. "Each Muslim has been assigned his own Serb to liquidate." ... The main Serb paramilitary force around Priboj is the White Eagles, a Belgrade-based group that last spring led assaults on Muslim towns in Bosnia. In August, an elderly man in ... Visegrad, 18 miles northwest of here, gave a detailed account of having watched members of the White Eagles take Muslim residents to a bridge, kill them and throw their bodies in the Drina river.⁸⁸

Yet while Priboj was a site of anti-Muslim intimidation and harassment, the violence never escalated into ethnic cleansing. Despite the heavy paramilitary presence, anti-Muslim propaganda, public sector discrimination and border proximity, Muslims were never killed within Priboj town itself.

Muslims were killed in the general *vicinity* of Priboj, however, in remote geographical and institutional corners. In choosing these sites, the attackers seemed to be signaling that their actions should not be interpreted as severe challenges to Sandzak's law-and-order image. As long as the assailants did not venture too far into Yugoslavia's domestic sphere, Sandzak could maintain its illusion of order and justice. In what follows, I describe two types of paramilitary "attacks on the margins": hit-and-run raids by "unidentified gunmen" on remote Muslim villages, and paramilitary abductions of Muslim commuters who strayed onto Bosnian territory.

Hit-and-run raids: In early October, 1992, unknown gunmen rampaged through Sjeverin, a remote Muslim village adjacent to the Bosnian border. Scores were wounded and substantial property was destroyed. Hundreds of villagers fled, walking on foot through the mountains to Priboj town. "The Muslims' flight," a reporter said, "alarmed the federal authorities in Belgrade, committed to preventing the spread of ethnic cleansing across the Bosnian border. Yugoslav army troops were ordered to reinforce special police units assigned to push the Serb irregulars out of the border villages."⁸⁸ Gunmen launched a second hit-and-run attack on February 18, 1993, firming mortars at Kukurovici, another remote village. Three Muslims were killed, others were wounded, and the village's 1,000 residents fled to Priboj. The displaced persons told human rights workers the attackers were Yugoslav army reservists trying to push them away from the Bosnian border,⁹⁰ but officials denied the charge, saying the attackers were paramilitary infiltrators from Bosnia.⁹¹ The government sent border reinforcements but said it was impossible to seal the area entirely to infiltration.⁹² By focusing on remote border villages, the attackers – whether or not they were sent by the Yugoslav state itself – were not challenging too blatantly Sandzak's lawful image. As long as the attackers did not descend from the mountains into central towns such as Priboj itself, the integrity of Yugoslavia's "domestic" sphere would remain intact.

Abductions on Bosnian territory: The second class of "attacks-on-the margins" was even more illustrative. In 1992 and early 1993, gunmen carried out two highly-publicized abductions of Sandzak Muslims near Priboj area, seizing a total of 38 men. Although the evidence is spotty, it is widely believed the men were subsequently killed. Significantly, the kidnapping sites were carefully chosen so that they took place on slivers of *Bosnian* territory protruding into Yugoslavia. The

victims had strayed across the slivers because of the Bosnia/Yugoslav boundary's circuitous trajectory, which forced Sandzak commuters to pass briefly through sovereign Bosnian land.

The first kidnapping took place on October 22, 1992, when a commuter bus *en route* to Priboj from a smaller border village was stopped by paramilitaries as it crossed Bosnian territory. The gunmen searched the bus and forced off 17 Muslim passengers, carting them off in a truck later identified as belonging to an ethnic Serb in nearby Priboj.⁹³ The second attack took place on February 27, 1993, in Strpce, a small village where the main Yugoslav railway traverses Bosnian territory momentarily. The gunmen boarded the train, searched for Muslim passengers, and pulled off 21 persons, who disappeared without a trace.⁹⁴

Milan Lukic, commander of a White Eagle contingent in the nearby Bosnian town of Visegrad, was suspected of organizing both kidnapping raids. His reasons are unclear, but locals offer different, equally plausible theories for which they have little hard evidence. Some say Lukic hoped to use the men for a prisoner swap that went bad; others say he hoped to ransom them off. Still others argue that Lukic, together with powerful patrons in the Belgrade establishment, was trying to drag Yugoslavia into the Bosnian war. Many Muslims in Priboj think the kidnapping was a tacit threat signaling them to flee the region. There is no clear evidence for any of the theories, however, and the real reasons for the abductions remain unknown. Reports suggest that Lukic came to Bosnia from Serbia early on in the war, embarking on an orgy of killings against Bosnian Muslims and Serbs who tried to restrain him. The paramilitary leader appeared to enjoy close relations with Yugoslav army officers based near Priboj, who supplied him with weapons and logistics.⁹⁵

Lukic's relations with Yugoslav officials were complex, however, exemplifying the paramilitary-state pattern of cooperation *and* conflict. Although the paramilitary commander had powerful patrons in Yugoslavia, other officials seemed concerned less Lukic import Bosnia-style methods into the Sandzak.⁹⁶ Yugoslav forces had a sharp confrontation with Lukic directly after the October 1992 Sjeverin bus abduction, for example, arresting him over the protests of his men who vowed to kill local Sandzak Muslims unless Lukic was freed. According to the paper, "Fingers were on the triggers all night" as the paramilitaries negotiated tensely with government forces.⁹⁷ Lukic was released and

was later seen to travel regularly between Bosnia and Yugoslavia, stopping off frequently in Priboj. Still, he seemed to respect the integrity of the Yugoslav state, ensuring the next abduction again took place in Bosnian territory.

The official response to the two abductions was sensitive to the institutional terrain in which they occurred, tacitly rewarding the paramilitaries for their care. In an interview, Priboj's former major was careful to stress the attacks took place in *Bosnia*, not *Yugoslavia*, and that they were thus not his responsibility. "Those terrible attacks were tragic," he said, "but it is important to remember they did take place on the sovereign territory of another country. We can't be responsible for that."⁹⁸ At the time of the incident, the major told local Muslims that "the kidnapping happened on the territory of an internationally recognized state over which we have no jurisdiction."⁹⁹ As one Belgrade parliamentarian pointed out at the time, "Bosnia-Hercegovina is a recognized country. Therefore, it is legally difficult to launch an investigation on its territory."¹⁰⁰ The Serb justice minister also noted the abductions had taken place on the territory of "another state which is recognized and sovereign," and where "Serbia had no jurisdiction."¹⁰¹ Serbia's president Milosevic also emphasized the legal limitations posed by the kidnappers use of Bosnian territory. "The moment I learned about the kidnapping," Milosevic told Muslim protestors, "I personally contacted the highest authorities of ... [Bosnia-Hercegovina] and received their firmest assurances ... that the kidnapped citizens should be found and returned and ... that the culprits should be caught and brought to trial." The problem, Milosevic noted, was that the Serbian or Yugoslav police were "powerless on the other side [of the border]."¹⁰² In stressing their inability to investigate crimes that took place inside *Bosnia*, the Yugoslav authorities were turning the tables on the international community, which had recognized Bosnian independence against their wishes in 1992. If Bosnia was separate from Yugoslavia, how could anyone hold Belgrade responsible for crimes committed on the wrong side of the Yugoslav/Bosnian boundary?

The kidnapping received significant domestic and international publicity, compromising the Belgrade authorities' law-and-order image. Sandzak Muslims demonstrated in front of officials' offices, demanding information,¹⁰³ while others protested in Belgrade and the Montenegrin capital. Anti-war groups in Belgrade rallied to the cause, using the train abduction as a *cause célèbre* in their own struggle against Serb nationalism. Yugoslav papers of all political persuasions

carried the story, which remained a mainstream Belgrade news item throughout 1993 and 1994. In response, Yugoslav officials reassured the public that they were doing everything they could to locate the missing men, even though matters were complicated by the fact the crimes had occurred on Bosnian territory. Slobodan Milosevic said he would move “heaven and earth, leaving no stone unturned” to find the abducted persons, and as far as one Muslim leader recalled, “everyone from the president on down made it very clear that they took this case seriously.”¹⁰⁴ The republican governments of Serbia and Montenegro created investigative commissions and checked with the Bosnian Serb authorities, but unearthed no new information. Muslim leaders suspect government officials know who the kidnappers are but refuse to prosecute for fear of revealing the depth of government’s relations with the unsavory irregulars. The discomfort felt by government officials in the wake of this blow to their law-and-order image was explained by Antonella Riha, a journalist and human rights investigator:

At that time, it was very unusual for 20 people to disappear like that in Serbia. You must understand how major an event it was. We were not at war, according to the government, and we were not involved in the Bosnian fighting. It is very important to realize that the people who disappeared were Serbian citizens, even if they were Muslims. Serbian citizens!! Milosevic promised the families of the missing that he would turn over heaven and earth to find their relatives. Given the circumstances, he of course had to say that.¹⁰⁵

Thus, the same state that secretly encouraged ethnic cleansing in Bosnia felt constrained to explain publicly what actions it was taking in response to the abduction of 37 of its own citizens.

The Yugoslav government had helped cross-border irregulars displace, kill, and wound tens of thousands of Muslims inside Bosnia. Inside the Sandzak, however, a total of 50 Muslims were killed from a potential list of 200,000 victims. Both Muslim communities lived in Serb-controlled space, but their fates had proved vastly different as a result of living on either side of the new border. Belgrade’s commitment to Serbian nationalism and covert cross-border operations was coupled with its desire to project an orderly, lawful image in its domestic sphere, and this had dramatic repercussions for repertoires of state violence inside Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav/Bosnia border, in other words, had powerfully shaped Serbian violence by creating “internal” and “external” arenas.

Extending the analysis

My focus on “policing” versus “war-making,” “infrastructural power” versus “despotic power,” borders, and statecrafting is useful for other conflicts, three of which I explore here: Israel, Turkey, and Kosovo.

Ever since Jewish settlers moved *en masse* into the West Bank and Gaza in the late 1970s, Israeli security forces blocked extreme Jewish nationalists from forcibly displacing Palestinian civilians, although they tolerated and often encouraged Jewish vigilantism.¹⁰⁶ The same Israeli state, however, simultaneously supported the activities of local paramilitaries fighting Palestinians in Lebanon, encouraging them to use despotic methods, including mass killings.¹⁰⁷ Why did Israel’s repertoires of violence vary so dramatically? Lebanon’s status vis-à-vis Israel was very different from that of Palestine, which had been gradually and tacitly incorporated into the fabric of the Israeli state ever since 1967.¹⁰⁸ The significance of the Palestine border was somewhat eroded as it came to be viewed as “internal” by its Israeli occupiers. Lebanon, on the other hand, remained firmly “external,” and thus subject to more despotic Israeli measures. Now that Palestine is emerging as a semi-sovereign territory of its own, Israeli methods of violence may change accordingly. Evidence of this emerged in 1996, when Israeli-Palestinian clashes led to the use of Israeli helicopter gun-ships and tanks in the West Bank for the first time since 1967. Prior to the emergence of a Palestinian authority, Israel had used “policing” tactics in the West Bank, treating Palestine more as an inner-city ghetto than an arena of military contestation.¹⁰⁹

The statecrafting logic suggests that states may police internal areas even when they do not enjoy high levels of infrastructural power, hoping thereby to reap symbolic and discursive rewards. When infrastructural power falls very low and the state’s monopoly over violence is acutely challenged, however, states may forego the statecrafting benefits of policing and seek to regain control through despotic violence.¹¹⁰ One such case is Turkey, where the southeastern region was subjected to drastic counterinsurgency measures during the early 1990s.¹¹¹ A decade earlier, the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) launched an insurgency to gain independence or autonomy for the southeast region. In the early 1990s the PKK achieved some crucial successes as a result of the Gulf War, which forced Iraqi troops out of the Kurdish-majority regions of northern Iraq. The PKK used the area as a staging ground for attacks on Turkish forces across the border, seizing control

of several key Turkish-Kurdish cities. PKK supporters openly defied Turkish authorities throughout the southeast, and multiple areas became “no go” zones for the Turkish forces.

In response to this sudden collapse of infrastructural power, the Turkish military launched an operation aimed at depopulating the southeast’s rural areas, targeting regions suspected of harboring PKK guerrillas. Hundreds of thousands of Kurds were forced from their homes, their villages were torched, and many suffered torture, rape, and summary killings. When those Kurds fled to cities in the west of Turkey, however, they were not similarly targeted. The southeastern zone was set apart from the rest of Turkey and was given its own rules and norms of appropriate state behavior. In the urban slums of western Turkey, where infrastructural state power remained high, the Turkish state relied on police-style techniques rather than despotic violence. In the southeast, however, despotism continued throughout the decade, largely as a result of the PKK’s initial success in weakening Turkish state power. The Turkish state, in other words, redrew the border between despotism and policing away from Turkey’s international boundaries, creating an internal boundary line between the southeast and the rest of the country. The southeast was transformed into the “external” zone of despotism, while the rest remained an “internal” zone of policing.

Events in Kosovo, the Albanian-majority region of Serbia, are another case in point. In 1989–1990 Kosovo’s autonomy was annulled by Serbia and the province was tightly controlled by Belgrade authorities.¹¹² Although Serbian nationalists periodically lobbied the government to push ethnic Albanians out of Kosovo, Belgrade officials kept the paramilitaries in check, much as they did in the Sandzak during 1992–1993. Instead, Serbian security forces adopted a repertoire of harsh “policing” tactics akin to Israeli methods in the West Bank/Gaza. The Serbian authorities did so because they enjoyed high levels of infrastructural power, having discouraged most Kosovar Albanians from launching an armed insurgency. Kosovo was internal to Serbia, moreover, and Belgrade advanced its statecrafting project by treating the region as an area of law-and-order, rather than a zone of war, much as it did in the Sandzak.

In late 1997 and early 1998, however, a small guerrilla group known as the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) launched a series of successful guerrilla raids on Serbian forces.¹¹³ As the KLA campaign gathered

steam, Serbia gradually lost control over rural areas and by summer of 1998 over half of Kosovo was in KLA hands. As Serbian infrastructural power waned, Belgrade increasingly viewed Kosovo as an area where war and despotic violence were appropriate, redrawing the boundary between policing and despotism so that rural areas became “externalized” zones.¹¹⁴ In the countryside, Serbian forces increasingly resorted to summary executions, indiscriminate shelling and village destruction, and rural Kosovo began to move from its previous West Bank/Gaza-like status to a position closer to that of Bosnia, Lebanon, or southeastern Turkey.

The transformation of urban Kosovo into a zone of despotism took place only in late March 1999, however, when NATO launched its air war against Serbia. The NATO attack threatened to tear Kosovo altogether from Serbia’s grasp and signaled Serbia’s international pariah status. Serbia’s infrastructural power in the province threatened to disappear altogether under the combined NATO and KLA assault, and Serbia no longer expected to earn credit internationally for displaying restraint. Serbian forces dramatically escalated the violence, targeting for the first time major urban areas such as Pristina, Pec, Prizren, and Djakovica, resulting in a massive and sudden bout of ethnic cleansing.¹¹⁵ The specter of a NATO-backed KLA takeover of Kosovo had transformed the province into a full-fledged arena of “despotic” power, something the Serbian government had resisted doing for over a decade. Interestingly for our purposes, however, the Serbian killing of ethnic Albanians did not spread over the Kosovo border into Serbia proper or Montenegro, despite an ethnic Albanian presence there. The line between policing and despotism had been redrawn so that all of Kosovo was in the despotic zone, but ethnic Albanians in Serbia proper were still subjected to harsh policing, rather than more acute violence.

Concluding remarks

This article seeks to explain an intriguing empirical puzzle in Serbia. Although the Belgrade government supported Serbian paramilitary violence in Bosnia during 1992–1993, it prevented those same forces from attacking Muslims in Serbia proper. This bifurcated strategy was of particular interest since many paramilitaries were based in the Sandzak, a region within Serbia that bordered on Bosnia and contained over 200,000 Muslims. Although Serbian officials promoted cross-

border sorties into Bosnia by the Sandzak-based Serbian irregulars, it prevented them from doing the same in Sandzak itself. I explained this anomaly by suggesting that modern states regard domestic areas as zones of law and order, even in moments of crisis and war, while regarding “foreign” territory as zones where other, more drastic methods are appropriate.

Modern states, I suggested, prefer to police rather than destroy their populations for a variety of reasons. According to Mann and Giddens, states do so because of tacit state-society power-sharing arrangements that evolved over centuries. As traditional states deepened their control over their domestic turfs, they became more heavily intertwined with civil society, forcing them to enter into a tacit compromise. States were allowed to enjoy greater “infrastructural” power over their populations, but were forced to forego the “despotic” methods of violence they had once used. I supplemented this argument with another stressing the importance of statecrafting, a modern practice aimed at bolstering the state’s identity through a variety of concrete and discursive practices. Even though some states do not enjoy high infrastructural power in all areas of their country, they may seek to project a law and order image because it supports their claim to territorial integrity, legitimacy, and statehood.

Ironically, Muslim Slavs in the former Yugoslavia enjoyed greater protection during 1992–1993 when they were fully controlled by the Serbian state. In Bosnia, where ethnic Serb control was contested and incomplete, the Serbian regime faced greater incentives to support state despotism. In Kosovo a similar paradox is apparent, since until the KLA insurgency of 1998, ethnic Albanians were trapped, but comparatively protected, within the Serbian state. The KLA insurrection weakened Serbia’s grip over the province and produced conditions for Serbian despotism. While Kosovo may yet gain internationally recognized independence, it has paid a terrible price.

Acknowledgments

I am grateful for the guidance of Michael Burawoy, Peter Evans, Ken Jowitt, and John Meyer on this project. Comments by Peter Andreas, Chuck Call, Craig Calhoun, Doug Guthrie, Emma Naughton, Nina Tannenwald, and several anonymous reviewers were also extremely helpful. For assistance and friendship in Serbia, I am indebted to

Dejan Anastasijevic, Sonja Bisserko, Dusan Janjic, Natasa Kandic, Jelena Pejic, Dejan Pavlovic, Vesna Vidujevic, Zoran Slavujevic, Filip Svarm, and Dijana Vukamanovic. This project was supported by fellowships from the Brookings Institution, Brown University's Watson Institute, and the Social Science Research Council/MacArthur Foundation's program in International Peace and Security.

Notes

1. For discussions of the supposed fading salience of borders in a globalizing world, see K. Ohmae, *The Borderless World* (New York: Harper Business, 1990); R. Rosecrance, "The Rise of the Virtual State," *Foreign Affairs* 75/4 (1996): 45–62; and S. Sassen, *Losing Control?: Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).
2. For theoretical and empirical discussions of borders, see M. Anderson, *Frontiers: Territory and State Formation in the Modern World* (Polity Press: Cambridge, 1996); P. Andreas, *Border Games: Policing the U.S.-Mexico Divide* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2000); P. Andreas and T. Snyder, editors, *Wall Around the West: State Borders and Immigration Controls in North America and Europe* (New Jersey: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000); P.G. Brown and H. Shue, editors, *Boundaries: National Autonomy and its Limits* (New Jersey: Rowman and Littlefield, 1981); J.R.V. Prescott, *Political Frontiers and Boundaries* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1987); and P. Sahlins, *Boundaries: The Making of France and Spain in the Pyrenees* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989). J. Torpey's "Coming and Going: On the State Monopolization of the Legitimate 'Means of Movement,'" *Sociological Theory* 16/3 (1998): 239–259, analyzes both international and internal borders. See also M. Matthews, *The Passport Society: Controlling Movement in Russia and the USSR* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993).
3. During the first five months of 1997, I conducted some 100 unstructured interviews in Serbia, Montenegro, and Bosnia. My interview subjects were war correspondents, state officials, paramilitary veterans, community leaders, and politicians, most of whom were located through a snowball sampling procedure. My approach was based on the extended case method developed by Michael Burawoy, who advocates the use of detailed micro-descriptions to analyze macro-structural processes. For details, see M. Burawoy, "The Extended Case Method," *Sociological Theory* 16/1 (1998): 4–33.
4. By focusing on Serbian violence in this article, I do not mean to suggest that Serbs were the only abusive parties, since Muslim – and especially Croat – forces also engaged in war crimes and ethnic cleansing. Good factual accounts of Bosnia's forced depopulation include N. Cigar, *Genocide in Bosnia: The Policy of "Ethnic Cleansing"* (College Station: Texas A & M Press, 1995); Helsinki Watch, *War Crimes in the Former Yugoslavia*, Vols. I and II (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1992–1993); United Nations, *Final Report of the U.N. Commission of Experts Established Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 780* (1992), (New York: United Nations, 1994); and United States Committee on Foreign Relations, *The Ethnic Cleansing of Bosnia-Herzegovina* (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1992). Two important theoretical perspectives on Bosnia's experience with

forced depopulation that are not addressed in this article include R. M. Hayden, "Schindler's Fate: Genocide, Ethnic Cleansing, and Population Transfers," *Slavic Review* 55/4 (1996): 727–778, and his "Imagined Communities and Real Victims: Self-Determination and Ethnic Cleansing in Yugoslavia," *American Ethnologist* 23/4 (1996): 783–801.

5. M. Andrejevich, "The Sandzak: The Next Balkan Theater of War?" *RFE/RL Research Report* (November 27, 1992): 26–34; Humanitarian Law Center, *Spotlight Report No. 22* (Belgrade: Humanitarian Law Center, 1994); and F. Schmidt, "The Sandzak: Muslims Between Serbia and Montenegro," *RFE/RL Research Report* (February 11, 1994): 29–35.
6. M. Sells, *The Bridge Betrayed* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995).
7. S. Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1995).
8. V.P. Gagnon, "Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict: The Case of Serbia," *International Security* 19/3 (1994–1995): 130–166.
9. The notion that sovereignty permits state elites to display greater brutality toward domestic populations seems intuitive to many scholars. See, for example, J.W. Meyer, "The World Polity and the Authority of the Nation-State," *Institutional Structure: Constituting State, Society and the Individual*, in G. M. Thomas, J.W. Meyer, F. O. Ramirez, and J. Boli, editors (Newbury Park: Sage, 1987), 41–71.
10. For a discussion of "appropriateness," see J.G. March and J.P. Olsen, *Rediscovering Institutions* (New York: The Free Press, 1989). For analyses stressing the institutional configuration of costs, benefits, and interests, see W.W. Powell and P.J. DiMaggio, editors, *The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1991).
11. See I.S. Lustick, *Unsettled States, Disputed Lands* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1993), for an exploration of efforts by nationalist entrepreneurs in Britain, France, and Israel to instill their vision of expanded borders in their society's collective consciousness.
12. The other five republics were Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia, and Montenegro. The latter two formed the new Yugoslavia in 1992, while the remaining four were recognized as independent, sovereign states.
13. Excellent discussions of the Yugoslav dissolution are L. Cohen, *Broken Bonds: Yugoslavia's Disintegration in Transition* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1995), and S. Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy*.
14. D. Owen, *Balkan Odyssey* (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1995).
15. For details of contemporary Serbian politics, see E.D. Gordy, *The Culture of Power in Serbia: Nationalism and the Destruction of Alternatives* (University Park: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999); R. Thomas, *The Politics of Serbia in the 1990s* (New York: Columbia University Press); V. Vujacic, *Communism and Nationalism in Russia and Serbia* (Berkeley: University of California at Berkeley, 1995), doctoral thesis; and S. Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy*.
16. For details of U.S. calculations on this issue, see W. Zimmerman, *Origins of a Catastrophe: Yugoslavia and its Destroyers* (New York: Random House, 1996).
17. The Sandzak of Novi Pazar, as it is often referred to in historical writings, was conquered by Serbian forces from the Ottomans during the 1912–1913 Balkan wars, and was then divided between Serbia and Montenegro. The region was part of the Ottoman empire until 1878, when it was seized by the Habsburgs, who then returned it to the Ottomans in 1908. During the first Yugoslavia (1914–1941) the

area was referred to by its medieval Serbian name, Raska, and remained part of Serbia and Montenegro. In 1943, the Yugoslav communist party recognized Sandzak as an autonomous region, but the party later reversed its decision, confirming Sandzak's incorporation into the Serbian and Montenegrin republics. In 1992 this decision proved decisive since Yugoslavia dissolved along republican lines. Sandzak thus remained within rump Yugoslavia. For details on Sandzak's history, see C. and B. Jelavich, *The Establishment of the Balkan National States, 1804–1920* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1977), and F. Schmidt, "The Sandzak."

18. Quoted in J. Rupert, "Borderland Braces for Ethnic War; Serb Militias Active in Muslim Region," *Washington Post*, May 29, 1993.
19. The League of Communists of Yugoslavia recognized a "Muslim nationality" in 1976. Thereafter, socialist Yugoslavia's constituent "nations" were Muslims, Serbs, Slovenes, and Croats, while its "national minorities" included ethnic Albanians, Hungarians, Macedonians, and others. For more on Muslims in Bosnia and the Sandzak, see T. Bringa, *Being Muslim the Bosnian Way: Identity and Community in a Central Bosnian Village* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999).
20. L. Cohen, *Broken Bonds*, 144.
21. S. Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy*, 301.
22. L. Cohen, *Broken Bonds*, 279.
23. M. Andrejevich, "The Sandzak."
24. "Sandzak Muslims Confer with Carrington," *Borba*, March 23, 1992 (FBIS–EEU-92-061, March 30, 1992).
25. Cited in A. Helfant-Budding, *Serb Intellectuals and the National Question, 1966–1991* (Cambridge: Harvard University, 1998), doctoral thesis, 395.
26. A. Helfant-Budding, *Serb Intellectuals*, 396.
27. "Sandzak Official Calls for Deployment of UN Forces Following Incidents," *Radio Belgrade*, February 20, 1993 (BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, EE/1619/C1, February 22, 1993).
28. Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization* (New York: Pantheon, 1964).
29. A. Giddens, *The Nation State and Violence* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987).
30. A. Giddens, *The Nation State and Violence*, 15.
31. A. Giddens, *The Nation State and Violence*, 187.
32. M. Mann, "The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms, and Results, *Archives Europeanes de Sociologie* 25 (1984): 185–213, and his *Sources of Social Power, Vol. 2: The Rise of Classes and Nation-States, 1760–1914* (New York: Cambridge University Pres, 1993), 60.
33. M. Mann, "The Autonomous Power of the State," 190.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid.
36. M. Foucault, *Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison* (New York: Vintage, 1979).
37. A. Silver, "The Demand for Order in Civil Society," *The Police: Six Sociological Essays*, in David Bordua, editor (New York: Wiley, 1967), 8.
38. S. Herbert, *Policing Space: Territoriality and the Los Angeles Police Department* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 3.
39. Z. Bauman, *Modernity and the Holocaust* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989). For details of campaigns by modern states to kill large numbers of their own

populations, see R. J. Rummel, *Death by Government* (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1994).

40. A. Lieven, *Chechnya: Tombstone of Russian Power* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999), 164. D. Bahry and B. D. Silver, "Intimidation and the Symbolic Uses of Terror in the USSR," *American Political Science Review* 81/4 (1987): 1065–1098, makes a similar argument for the Soviet Union. K. A. Chaudhry, "The Myths of the Market and the Common History of Late Developers," *Politics and Society* 21/3 (1993): 245–274, similarly suggests that economic nationalization and Stalinist violence were produced by the Soviet state's initial administrative weakness. Moshe Lewin, *The Gorbachev Phenomenon* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), concurs. In many ways, these arguments dovetail with the proposition of B. R. Brown, Y. Cohen, and A. F. K. Organski in their "Paradoxical Nature of State Making: The Violent Creation of Order," *American Political Review* 75/4 (1981): 901–910, who contend that substantial state violence is unavoidable during the early stages of state-building.
41. For discussions of statecrafting, the "art of the state," and discursive, state-centered projects, see Richard Ashley, "Living on Border Lines: Man, Poststructuralism, and War," in J. Der Derian and M. J. Shapiro, editors, *International/Intertextual Relations* (Lexington: Lexington Books, 1989); P. Andreas, *Border Games*; D. Carter, "The Art of the State: Difference and Other Abstractions," *Journal of Historical Sociology* 7/1 (1994): 73–102; M. Kearney, "Borders and Boundaries of the State and the Self at the End of Empire," *Journal of Historical Sociology* 4/1 (1991): 52–74; T. Mitchell, "The Limits of the State: Beyond Statist Approaches and Their Critics," *American Political Science Review* 85/1 (1991): 77–96; and N. Soguk, *States and Strangers: Refugees and Displacements of Statecraft* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999).
42. S. Herbert, *Policing Space*, 14.
43. T. Mitchell, "The Limits of the State," 91.
44. Strictly speaking, the preoccupation with territorial boundedness is also a key Weberian concern (see S. Herbert, *Policing Space*, 14–16). The "statecrafting" perspective builds upon the Weberian approach by highlighting the discursive and/or performative aspects of borders.
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47. "Customs Administration Sets Up New Checkpoints," *Tanjug*, March 23, 1992 (FBIS-EEU-92-057, March 24, 1992).
48. "International Border Crossings Set Up," *Tanjug*, April 30, 1992 (FBIS-EEU-92-085, May 1, 1992).
49. "Determination of New Borders of FRY Viewed," *Politika*, May 23, 1992 (FBIS-EEU-92-107, June 3, 1992).
50. "FRY Citizens to Leave Bosnia," *Tanjug*, May 4, 1992 (FBIS-EEU-92-087, May 5, 1992).
51. "Presidency Asks Bosnian Leaders to Absorb JNA," *Tanjug*, May 5, 1992 (FBIS-EEU-92-088, May 6, 1992).
52. "Army Not in Contact with Formations in Bosnia," *Tanjug*, June 7, 1992 (FBIS-EEU-92-110, June 8, 1992).

53. "Bozovic Denies Territorial Claim," April 22, 1992 (FBIS-EEU-92-078, April 22, 1992).
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55. "Seselj Denies Existence of Paramilitary Forces," *Tanjug*, April 23, 1992 (FBIS-EEU-92-080, April 24, 1992).
56. "Arkan: Only Bosnian SDG Members in Serajevo," *Borba*, May 30-31, 1992 (FBIS-EEU-92-112, June 10, 1992).
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58. "Karadzic Comments on Division of Republic," *Borba*, March 16, 1992 (FBIS-EEU-92-061, March 30, 1992).
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60. "Karadzic, Krajisnik Hold News Conference," *Radio Sarajevo Network*, April 18, 1992 (FBIS-EEU-92-076, April 20, 1992).
61. T. Judah, *The Serbs: History, Myth, and the Destruction of Yugoslavia* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997).
62. J. Borger, "Milosevic Case Hardens," *The Guardian*, February 3, 1997.
63. M. Glenny, *The Fall of Yugoslavia* (Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin Books, 1992), 150.
64. "Cetnik Duke," *Telegraf*, daily, September 28, 1994.
65. Cited in P. Williams and N. Cigar, *War Crimes and Individual Responsibility: A Prima Facie Case for the Indictment of Slobodan Milosevic* (Washington, D.C.: Balkan Institute, 1996), 7.
66. Interview in Washington, February 1998. The official requested anonymity.
67. Interview with Dejan Pavlovic in Belgrade, February 1997.
68. Interview with Daniel Smiden in Belgrade, March 1997.
69. Interview in Belgrade, February and March, 1997. The lieutenant requested anonymity.
70. For details see N. Cigar, *Genocide in Bosnia*; United Nations, *Final Report*; P. Williams and N. Cigar, *War Crimes and Individual Responsibility*.
71. Ludwig Boltzmann Institute for Human Rights, *Report on Ethnic Cleansing Operations in the Northeast-Bosnia City of Zvornik from April through June 1992* (Vienna: Boltzmann Institute), 1994.
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73. Ludwig Boltzmann Institute, *Report on Ethnic Cleansing*, 23.
74. Interview with Hosein Pelidija in Pljevlja, May 1, 1997.
75. Interview with Velijezer Brajovic in Podgorica, June 6, 1997.
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83. Interview with Safet Bandzovic in Novi Pazar, February 16, 1997.
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96. Zoran Saponjic: "Paramilitaries Are All Around," *Borba*, October 25, 1992; "Night of the Triggers," *Borba*, October 28, 1992; "No Witnesses Against Lukic," *Borba*, October 29, 1992.
97. Saponjic, "Night of the Triggers."
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108. I. S. Lustick, *Unsettled States, Disputed Lands*.

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110. William Stanley, *The Protection Racket State: Elite Politics, Military Extortion, and Civil War in El Salvador* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1996) opposes this logic, proposing instead that states use internal violence as part of a bargaining process between state factions and social elites. Objective threats to state infrastructural control, Stanley believes, are not correlated to actual levels of state violence. Although Stanley’s point is well taken – especially for his El Salvador

case – his interpretation is not universally valid. In Turkey and Kosovo, the state clearly did escalate its use of violence as a result of effective insurgent challenges. Stanley's interpretation might work better for Israeli policy in Lebanon, where shifts in Israeli bombing tactics often follow domestic political struggles rather than actual threats to Israel's well-being.

111. Turkish-Kurdish events are discussed in H. J. Barkey and G. E. Fuller, *Turkey's Kurdish Question* (New Jersey: Rowman and Littlefield, 1998); Human Rights Foundation of Turkey, *Turkey Human Rights Report: 1994* (Ankara: Human Rights Foundation, 1995); Human Rights Watch, *Forced Displacement of Ethnic Kurds from Southeastern Turkey* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1994), and *Violations of the War in Turkey* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1995); K. Kirisci and G. M. Winrow, *The Kurdish Question and Turkey* (London: Frank Cass, 1997); C. Panico, "Turkey's Kurdish Conflict," *Jane's Intelligence Review* 7/4 (1995); U.S. Department of State, *Report on Allegations of Human Rights Abuses by the Turkish Military and on the Situation in Cyprus* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. State Department, 1995).
112. For details on Serbia's policies in Kosovo during the 1989-1997 period, see Human Rights Watch, *Yugoslavia: Human Rights Abuses in Kosovo 1990-1992* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1992), and *Open Wounds: Human Rights Abuses in Kosovo* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1993); International Helsinki Federation for Human Rights, *From Autonomy to Colonization: Human Rights in Kosovo 1989-1993* (Vienna: International Helsinki Federation, 1993); T. Judah, *Kosovo: War and Revenge* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000); D. Kostavicova, *Parallel Worlds: Response of Kosovo Albanians to Loss of Autonomy in Serbia, 1986-1996* (Keele: Keele University Institute for European Studies, 1997); J. Mertus, *Kosovo: How Myths and Truths Started a War* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999); M. Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian: A History of Kosovo* (London: Hurst and Co., 1998).
113. For details of the KLA's political and military trajectory, see C. Chiclet, "Aux Origines de l'Armee de Liberation du Kosovo," *Le Monde Diplomatique*, weekly, May 6, 1999; C. Hedges, "Kosovo's Next Masters?" *Foreign Affairs* 78/3 (1999): 24-43; International Crisis Group, *Kosovo's Long, Hot Summer*, 1998, (available online at wysiwyg://report.346); T. Judah, "War By Mobile Phone, Donkey and Kalashnikov," *The Guardian*, August 29, 1998, "Inside the KLA," *New York Review of Books*, June 6, 1999, and *Kosovo: War and Revenge*; Z. Kusovac, "KLA Power Rising," *Jane's Defence Weekly* 30/1 (1998); "Different Realities Wrestle for Kosovo," *Jane's Intelligence Review* 10/9 (1998), and "The KLA: Braced to Defend and Control," *Jane's Intelligence Review* 11/4 (1999).
114. Amnesty International, *Kosovo: The Evidence* (London: Amnesty International; Human Rights Watch), *Humanitarian Law Violations in Kosovo* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1998), and *A Week of Terror in Drenica* (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999).
115. For details of the spring 1999 ethnic cleansing in Kosovo, which drove most of Kosovo's two million ethnic Albanians from their homes, see Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), *Kosovo/Kosova: As Seen, As Told: The Human Rights Findings of the OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission* (Vienna: OSCE, 2000). For a discussion of the debate still raging over the precise number of Serbian-induced Kosovar casualties during that operation, see S. Halima and D. Vidal, "Media and Disinformation," *Le Monde Diplomatique* (monthly), English vision, March 2000, 9-10. Although NATO estimates initially put the

number of Kosovar casualties in the tens of thousands, the estimates have since been reduced to 2,000–10,000, including Kosovar combatants. For an argument suggesting that Serbia would not have engaged in full-scale ethnic cleansing were it not for the NATO air attack, see N. Chomsky, *The New Military Humanism: Lessons from Kosovo* (Monroe: Common Courage Perss, 1999), and his “Another Way for Kosovo,” *Le Monde Diplomatique*, English version, March 2000, pp. 8–9.