

## Heidegger, Gendlin and Deleuze on the Logic of Quantitative Repetition

### Abstract:

Philosophers such as Nietzsche, Heidegger, Deleuze and Gendlin pronounce that difference must be understood as ontologically prior to identity. They teach that identity is a surface effect of difference, that to understand the basis of logico-mathematical idealities we must uncover their genesis in the fecundity of differentiation. In this paper, I contrast Heidegger's analyses of the present- to-hand logico-mathematical object, which he discusses over the course of his career in terms of the 'as' structure, temporalization and enframing , with the approaches of Gendlin and Deleuze, supplementing this discussion with Husserl's investigations of mathematical idealities. Gendlin distinguishes between the representational power a logical pattern has in itself, apart from its virtual generative source, to exactly repeat itself, and the way this self-same pattern is generated and changed by the larger situational texture within which it is embedded. In so doing, he misconstrues the temporalization of logical calculation as the explicitly preserving carrying-through of already instituted implicit sense. For Heidegger, by contrast, logical inference is less a supplement to or development of implicit experience than a narrowing of its scope , a deficient mode of handiness. Experiencing something as present to hand extension modifies the relevant usefulness of 'as' structured comportment by concealing what is meaningful in our relation with beings, and in the process stripping away its intelligibility. Thus, contrary to the assertion Gendlin, extensive repetition does not carry through intelligible, relevant meaning, it dissolves understanding into the confused indifference of empty calculation.

Deleuze's distinction between virtual intensities and actualized qualities and countable extensities retains the idea of instantaneous intrinsic presence. He puts into question most aspects of traditional notions of subjectivity, objectivity and causation, except instantaneous presence. Deleuze's notion of intrinsicality as a differential "produced in a time smaller than the minimum continuous time thinkable!" remains a notion of temporality as 'in-timeness', as the occupying of a moment of time by a present-at-hand being.

### Introduction:

In our era, philosophers such as Nietzsche, Heidegger, Foucault, Derrida, Deleuze and Gendlin pronounce that difference must be understood as ontologically prior to identity. They teach that identity is a surface effect of difference, that to understand the basis of logico-mathematical idealities we must uncover their genesis in the fecundity of differentiation. On the subject of the origin of logic and mathematics, I contend that Heidegger stands out among contemporary philosophers for his radicality. He ties together the notion of presence , logic and the mathematical in a new way. In recognition of the daunting task of dismantling the metaphysics of objective presence, Heidegger (2009) spoke of the necessity, in a confrontation with the tradition, to revolutionarily shake up the notion of logic from the ground up. "We want to shake up logic as such from its outset, from its ground".

Heidegger was far from alone in this mission. He was among a generation inspired by Husserl's and Nietzsche's decenterings of traditional approaches to logic. If we examine where philosophical thinking stands today in terms of an understanding of the basis of such concepts as number, measurement, extension and magnitude, will we find that Heidegger's most challenging questioning of logic has been absorbed into the larger philosophical community? Or do there remain important features of his confrontation with the tradition that have yet to be widely grasped? Among the questions Heidegger posed concerning the basis of logic, I want to focus on the following: What is the transcendental basis of the thinking of the changing behavior of an object in the world, or in our imagination, in terms of differences of degree? What are we doing when we speak of things persisting in self-identical presence as we calculate temporal instantiations of them?

In order to gain a better hold of the stakes involved in achieving the revolution in our thinking of logic that Heidegger had in mind, I want to compare Heidegger's thinking with the work of Eugene Gendlin and Giles Deleuze. Gendlin's psychotherapeutic work identifying, articulating and creatively integrating bodily feeling with respect to objective and interpersonal relationships is an outgrowth of an ambitious philosophical effort to critique and rethink assumptions held by a range of current philosophers. Among the assumptions Gendlin questions are current views on relevance and affective motivation, attention, reflection, the genesis of mathematically-based naturalism, and the relation between the body, language and culture. Gendlin shows that within many current accounts each of these aspects of human functioning gets its sense and is necessarily interlinked with all the others on the basis of an overarching model of temporality that splits up the flow of time into separated units of presence. Gendlin rejects this causal model of time in favor of a radically internal time that shares a number of features in common with the temporal model of Heidegger. Drawing from diverse influences spanning hermeneutics, existentialism, pragmatism and phenomenology, Gendlin's approach moves some distance toward the radicality of Heidegger in its situating of the genesis of meaning-making in an always-already self-temporalizing interaffecting whose unfolding precedes and overflows any notion of present to hand state or form. For Gendlin, the bodily process that effectuates change in behavior space possibilities is not a causally conditioning schematics, but the 'occurring into implying' of language and thought into an already inter-affected mesh of implicit understandings which is modified further by what occurs into it.

Gendlin(1997b) explains:

"In the old model one assumes that there must first be "it" as one unit, separate from how its effects in turn affect it.. In the process we are looking at there is no separate "it," no linear cause-effect sequence with "it" coming before its effects determine what happens. So there is something odd here, about the time sequence. How can "it" be already affected by affecting something, If it did not do the affecting before it is in turn affected?...With the old assumption of fixed units that retain their identity, one assumes a division between it, and its effects on others. (This "it" might be a part, a process, or a difference made.) In the old model it is only later, that the difference made to other units can in turn affect "it." (p.40)

If one assumes separate events, processes, or systems, one must then add their co-ordinations as one finds them, as if unexpectedly..."Inter-affecting" and "coordination" are words that bring the old

assumption of a simple multiplicity, things that exist as themselves and are only then also related. So we need a phrase that does not make sense in that old way. Let us call the pattern we have been formulating "original inter-affecting". This makes sense only if one grasps that "they" inter-affect each other before they are a they."

"This 'interaction' is prior to two separate things that would first meet in order to interact. I call it 'interaction first'."

'Interaction first' functions as what Gendlin(2008) calls implying into occurring, and in this way carrying forward a previous change.

"Implying is not an occurring that will happen. It is not an occurring-not-yet. It does not occupy a different time-position than the occurring. Rather, one implying encompasses all three linear time positions, and does not occupy an additional linear time position of its own. This is a more intricate model of time. It includes a kind of "future" and a kind of "past" that are not linear positions. This time model can be reduced back to the liner model by considering just occurring-occurring-occurring as if it were cut off from implying."

Concepts such as 'interaction first', 'already interaffected', and 'occurring into implying' share features with Heidegger's concerned dealing with entities oriented in relation to a pragmatic totality of relevance. Relevance is not imposed on an experience from the outside via a bodily feeling state, but is presupposed by the always already self-differentiating movement of experience

"A process is a relevant. This verb says both that a process occurs relevantly, and that the relevance is made by the process. What occurs makes itself relevant. So we cannot use relevance as if it were on another level from which one can pre-determine what will occur." (Gendlin 1997b)

Gendlin's occurring into implying process, like Heidegger's *Befindlichkeit*, guarantees that the relevance, significance, mattering, salience of experience is never in question. "Irrelevant events are not produced by the body." Gendlin struggled with the challenge of reconciling the working of logical patterns and forms with the generative fecundity of implicit intricacy. Heidegger similarly grappled with the need to explain how the present to handness of propositional logic is made possible within the more fundamental hermeneutic care structure of relevant and significance. The question for both is, what is it we are doing when we think the persisting self-identity of the elements of a logical pattern, what Heidegger sometimes exemplified by the image of simply staring at something? For Heidegger, does the present-at-handness of the elements of logical relations have a role within the hermeneutic care structure, such that contextual relevance presupposes and functions around these present elements? Is a present logical element an irreducible feature of the hermeneutic care structure of seeing something as something? Gendlin seems to read Heidegger this way, and appears to model his own approach on this understanding of the relation between what he calls the implicit and the explicit, the interactive crossing and the representationalism of formed patterns. Reminiscent of Heidegger's analysis of propositional statements, Gendlin writes concerning structurality "The notion of an imposed order splits everything into two sides: The order is considered as if it were independent. On the other side there is something passive and unordered, upon which order is imposed, something that does not feed back, because it has no order of its own." The essence of a pattern

for Gendlin(1991) is the self-identicality of representation.

"An imposed order is the sort of order that can be the same, here or there, so that it does not depend on what it is imposed upon. The very notion of "order" has come to mean the sort that can be imposed, that is to say it is assumed to function like a pattern. An order that can be imposed is inherently abstract, since it is the same in many places. So it is independent of the places and can omit everything that does not fit it. Therefore it can be put on something that did not have it from itself. Such an order seems to work alone."

"In terms of "crossing" we can define a machine as a set of known patterns separated from the thing in which other factors could cross with them. Now we can notice that science renders everything as a machine!... A machine embodies a set of externally imposed relations. Science transforms crossed internal relations into external relations between separable units." (Gendlin 1997c)

Logical patterns are meaningfully 'thin' he says, when they are taken in themselves, disconnected from a rich array of relevant aspects of a situation. Isn't this comparable to Heidegger saying that simply staring at something constitutes a failure to understand it anymore, that predicative statements flatten, distort and cover over the larger meaningful significance within which these present at hand elements function? At a glance, Gendlin's treatment of logical form, pattern and rule as cutting itself off from its meaning-giving context of relevance appears to jibe with Heidegger's notion of propositional logic as a deficient, derivative modification of primordial ontological interpretation. But in order to do justice to the relation between the thinking of these two writers on this issue , it is necessary to dig more deeply into Heidegger's work on present to handness. Heidegger derives mathematical and propositional logic, and theoretical science, from the mode of thinking he calls the present at hand. In order to reveal the primordial basis of presence, he embarks upon wide-ranging analyses that, over the course of three decades, gathers together his researches into the metaphysics of will and subjectivity, the means-end instrumentality and efficient causality of standing reserve, and the temporality of 'as' structured comportment. Let's look more closely now at the 'as' structure. I read Heidegger as arguing that what Gendlin calls a 'crossing', and the logical concepts, forms and patterns that are produced from such generative processes (and feeds back into them), are not separable phenomena, not two sides of an interface, as Gendlin calls the implicit-explicit divide. When Heidegger says the propositional 'is' structure is a modification of the hermeneutical 'as' structure, he is not inserting a present at hand 'is' identity into the larger 'as' structure and calling them inseparable. Rather, he is saying the 'is' is already a crossing. For something to be present to itself, to repeat itself identically, to persist as itself, as logical forms are traditionally assumed to do when we compare their elements, is to transform and displace itself, to continue to be itself differently , even as it is presumed to persist unchanged across comparisons. In a comment anticipating Derrida's notion of iterability, Heidegger(1999) states:

"Only what is unique is retrievable and repeatable. Only it carries within itself the ground of the necessity of going back to it and taking over its inceptuality. Repetition here does not mean the stupid superficiality and impossibility of what merely comes to pass as the same for a second and a third time. For beginning can never be comprehended as the same, because it reaches ahead and thus each time reaches beyond what is begun through it and determines accordingly its own retrieval."

The point isn't simply that there are no straight lines or perfect circles in nature, but that there is no MEANINGFUL self-identity in thought. The symbolic (signifier-signified) structure that Gendlin ascribes to logical patterns is deconstructed in Heidegger's analysis of propositional signification. When Heidegger says logical forms conceal and flatten, he means that when we think in terms of the present to hand, we don't notice these subtle transformations internal to the notion of a present identity. Heidegger(2010b) explains:

"In the first and authentic instance, this "as" is not the "as" of predication qua predication but is prior to it in such a way that it makes possible the very structure of predication at all. Predication has the as-structure, but in a derived way, and it has it only because the as-structure is predication within a [wider] experience. But why is it that this as-structure is already present in a direct act of dealing with something? The most immediate state of affairs is, in fact, that we simply see and take things as they are: board, bench, house, policeman. Yes, of course. However, this taking is always a taking within the context of dealing-with something, and therefore is always a taking-as, but in such a way that the as-character does not become explicit in the act.

The non-explicitness of this "as" is precisely what constitutes the act's so-called directness. Yes, the thing that is understood can be apprehended directly as it is in itself. But this directness regarding the thing apprehended does not inhibit the act from having a developed structure. Moreover, what is structural and necessary in the act of [direct] understanding need not be found, or co-apprehended, or expressly named in the thing understood. I repeat: The [primary] as-structure does not belong to something thematically understood. It certainly can be understood, but not directly in the process of focally understanding a table, a chair, or the like.

Acts of directly taking something, having something, dealing with it "as something," are so original that trying to understand anything without employing the "as" requires (if it's possible at all) a peculiar inversion of the natural order. Understanding something without the "as"—in a pure sensation, for example—can be carried out only "reductively," by "pulling back" from an as-structured experience. And we must say: far from being primordial, we have to designate it as an artificially worked-up act. Most important, such an experience is *per se* possible only as the privation of an as-structured experience. It occurs only within an as-structured experience and by prescinding from the "as"—which is the same as admitting that as-structured experience is primary, since it is what one must first of all prescind from."

The logical patterns and concepts which Gendlin distinguishes from the process which generates them are not inherently ready-to-hand or present-at-hand. Their mode of being depends on how one relates to them. When Gendlin connects the sense of the use of a logical pattern to the process which generates it, which he calls the experiential intricacy, he is treating that pattern in ready-to-hand terms. That is, he is understanding that pattern in terms of what we are using it for. When he talks about concepts and logical patterns in theoretical terms as the way that we let them 'work alone', he is treating these as present-at-hand. In doing so, he seems to believe it is possible or to peel away theoretical logic from its relation to a wider context of relevance. Gendlin risks giving the present-at-hand a kind of independent dignity, as if our experience oscillates between two equal modes, ready-to-hand and present-at-hand. For Heidegger, whenever we encounter something, it is already in a horizon of significance as hammer, as bench, as door. This "as" is not a predicative 'as' (like "the screwdriver is long"), but the prior, practical

“as” of equipmental involvement (“the screwdriver as something-to-tighten-with”). The ready-to-hand is primary. The present-at-hand is a derivative abstraction, arising only when equipmental involvement breaks down or is explicitly theorized. Gendlin, on the other hand, distinguishes between the representational power a logical pattern has in itself, apart from us, to exactly repeat itself, and how this self-same pattern is generated and changed by the larger situational texture within which it is embedded. The unseparated multiplicity is something we ‘dip into’ to create the logical patterns, and then to change their sense. But the logical pattern that is produced by this dipping is presumed as a temporary identity. There is representational logic on the one hand and the more-than-logical on the other.

“Patterns …are never alone; they always bring and work within a crossed situational texture. That is why the words that name those things can also work in new and more intricate ways, as we saw. We need not lose the pattern's power for inferring next steps logically; but we need not remain only within the pattern.”

“We need to go back and forth between logic and bodily-felt understanding. They build upon each other. It would be wrong to make an ideology of lauding one and pretending to do without the other.”...patterns work-in another, more intricate order which talks back...”(Gendlin 2012)

“To study the role played by implicit understanding in the coming of new concepts will not undermine the concepts we already have. Those concepts work explicitly, with logical implications. Logic is their own power for precise consequences. To use their power we must let them work as if they were alone, without us. Logical inference requires that we don't let anything upset the concepts. For example, while calculating our bank account we don't double one deposit because it came from a special source. All our technology depends on logical inference. Seven billion of us couldn't all live on the planet without it. To undermine logic and explicit concepts is not sensible. Of course we know that we operate the concepts. How they work ‘alone’ is something we let them do. Whatever else concepts are, they are tools. For example, a screwdriver must be allowed to keep its own narrow head, and to engage the screw with it. We are holding it, of course, but the screwdriver's own pattern turns the screw. Obviously, more complex machines produce their own results. Concepts similarly have their own logical inferences, quite apart from what is implicitly involved in the coming and having of concepts. We keep the system of existing concepts inviolate and separate. Then we can also have a second system in which we study how something implicit works in the coming of new concepts. We will be concerned throughout with the necessary separation, contrast, and relationship between the system of explicitly formed concepts and our second system about how something functions implicitly. Far from being in conflict, this article will show that if the two systems stay separate, they expand each other reciprocally.” (Gendlin 2009).

...Once we have logically linked terms, logic generates powerful inferences far beyond what can be found directly from experiencing.... logical inference is distinguishable from any other process. Postmodernism merges the two orders and loses them both”(Gendlin 1997)

Heidegger would not agree that concepts are tools that consist in their 'own' patterns and logical inferences, 'quite apart from what is implicitly involved in the coming and having of concepts'(Gendlin 2009). He would instead insist that ‘merging’ the orders of logic and non-logic is the only way to understand these modalities primordially. For him logical inference is less a supplement to direct experience than a narrowing of its scope , a deficient mode of

handiness. What is more than logic is hidden within and concealed by logic rather than external to it and surrounding it. It is not as though for Gendlin anything can be encountered as a valuatively neutral entity. The encounter with things begins as a creative crossing that produces the object's sense as already in a relation of significance and relevance. But this created sense functions as a temporary present at hand identity that can potentially be repeated indefinitely as itself in the form of a logical pattern. Of course, Heidegger doesn't deny that we can simply stare at a thing repeatedly, but when we isolate it as enduringly present at hand we are merely calculating. That is to say, the way that experiencing something as present to hand modifies the relevant usefulness of 'as' structured comportment is by stripping away what is meaningful our relation with beings, and in the process stripping away their intelligibility. This is why to merely stare at something present at hand is to no longer understand it. Heidegger(1982) depicts the nature of the priority of handiness over the present at hand as one of intelligibility.

"Equipment [useful thing] is "in order to." This proposition has an ontological and not merely an ontical meaning; a being is not what and how it is, for example, a hammer, and then in addition something "with which to hammer." Rather, what and how it is as this entity, its whatness and howness, is constituted by this in-order-to as such, by its functionality. A being of the nature of equipment is thus encountered as the being that it is in itself if and when we understand beforehand the following: functionality, functionality relations, functionality totality. In dealing with equipment we can use it as equipment only if we have already beforehand projected this entity upon functionality relation."

"The kind of being of these beings is "handiness" (Zuhandenheit). But it must not be understood as a mere characteristic of interpretation, as if such "aspects" were discursively forced upon "beings" which we initially encounter, as if an initially objectively present world-stuff were "subjectively colored" in this way. Such an interpretation overlooks the fact that in that case beings would have to be understood beforehand and discovered as purely objectively present, and would thus have priority and take the lead in the order of discovering and appropriating association with the "world." But this already goes against the ontological meaning of the cognition which we showed to be a founded mode of being-in-the-world. To expose what is merely objectively present, cognition must first penetrate beyond things at hand being taken care of. Handiness is the ontological categorial definition of beings as they are "in themselves"... The less we just stare at the thing called hammer, the more actively we use it, the more original our relation to it becomes and the more undisguisedly it is encountered as what it is, as a useful thing" "(Heidegger 2010)

But having arrived at the ontological priority of the ready-to-hand useful thing over the present-at-hand concept or pattern, we still are not in the vicinity of what for Heidegger is the primordial 'generating process' of meaning. Heidegger insists upon the primacy of world-disclosure (the truth of Being) over the ontic modes of presence (ready-to-hand and present-at-hand). Within Heidegger's analysis of everydayness in Being and Time, Division I, he insists that the ready-to-hand is more primordial than the present-at-hand. In our ordinary existence, we first encounter things as equipmental, not as mere objects. But this "primacy" is ontic-existential, not ultimate. Ready-to-hand itself is only intelligible within the wider horizon of the world as a whole. A tool is only a tool in relation to other equipment and within a meaningful context. This totality is not simply an aggregate but a referential nexus . That nexus is the structure of

worldhood, the clearing in which entities show up as “for something.” Thus, the screwdriver’s readiness-to-hand presupposes the disclosed world in which “repairing,” “fastening,” and “building” already make sense. The truth of Being is more primordial than this already existing totality of relevance. Heidegger explicitly says that worldhood is grounded in the truth of Being, the happening of unconcealment. World is the event of projection in which Dasein is disclosed as being-in-the-world. So the screwdriver’s being-ready-to-hand is not self-grounding. It is possible only within the opening of Being, the futural projection of a world that situates Dasein among beings. Analyzing the ‘as’ structure more closely in terms of a binding and separating which takes apart what it puts together, Heidegger(1995) says:

“...projection is an occurrence which, as raising us away and casting us ahead, takes apart as it were; -in that apartness of a raising away, yet as we saw, precisely in such a way that in this process there occurs an intrinsic turning toward on the part of whatever has been projected, such that that which has been projected is that which binds and binds together. Projection is that originally simple occurrence which-in terms of formal logic-intrinsically unites contradictory things: binding together and separating. Yet-as the forming of the distinction between possible and actual in its making-possible, and as irruption into the distinction between being and beings, or more precisely as the erupting of this 'between'-this projection is also that relating in which the 'as' springs forth.”

Notice that Heidegger says here projection 'takes apart'. This explains why the 'as' structure takes apart what it puts together. The taking apart is the raising us away and casting us ahead to what comes back to us from the future as the actual. What the ‘as’ ‘puts together’ is what Heidegger says it “binds and binds together”. He says this ‘binding together’ that projection accomplishes is in fact its “intrinsic turning toward”. It “brings us back into what... has been made possible”. It’s important to recognize that the tripartite moments that Heidegger says forms the structure of projection is non other than the three ecstacies of temporality. So the taking apart is the future that has pulled us away, and the binding together is the present that comes back toward us via the future on its way to having been. And that’s why he says that this taking apart and bind together is simultaneous, just as the tripartite moments of projection are simultaneous, and why projection is a unitary act, an occurrence.

“For the 'as' expresses the fact that beings in general have become manifest in their being, that that distinction has occurred. The 'as' designates the structural moment of that originally irruptive 'between'. We simply never first have 'something' and then 'something more' and then the possibility of taking something as something, but the complete reverse: something first gives itself to us only when we are already moving within projection, within the 'as'. In the occurrence of projection world is formed, i.e., in projecting something erupts and irrupts toward possibilities, thereby erupting into what is actual as such, so as to experience itself as having erupted as an actual being in the midst of what can now be manifest as beings. It is a being of a properly primordial kind, which has erupted to that way of being which we call Da-sein, and to that being which we say exists, i.e., ex-sists, is an exiting from itself in the essence of its being, yet without abandoning itself.” (Ibid)

## Temporality and the ‘As’ Structure

Gendlin, like Heidegger, appreciates the fundamental importance of the concept of temporality for the understanding of how senses of meaning are generated and continually transformed. I have written elsewhere about the commonalities between Gendlin and Heidegger concerning the inseparability of the functions of past, present and future within the tripartite structure of temporality. Gendlin (1997b) writes:

“The future that is present now is not a time-position, not what will be past later. The future that is here now is the implying that is here now. The past is not an earlier position but the now implicitly functioning past.”“.....the past functions to “interpret” the present,...the past is changed by so functioning. This needs to be put even more strongly: The past functions not as itself, but as already changed by what it functions in”.

Notice the similarity between the above and Heidegger’s(2010) depiction of the linkage between past, present and future:

“Temporalizing does not mean a “succession” of the ecstasies. The future is not later than the having-been, and the having-been is not earlier than the present. “Dasein ”occurs out of its future”. “Da-sein, as existing, always already comes toward itself, that is, is futural in its being in general.” Having-been arises from the future in such a way that the future that has-been (or better, is in the process of having-been) releases the present from itself. We call the unified phenomenon of the future that makes present in the process of having been temporality.”

At a glance, Gendlin’s model of temporality approximates Heidegger’s, but notice how Heidegger’s ‘as’-structure produces time as a simultaneous binding and separating, a returning back from a being-out-ahead.

“Because my being is such that I am out ahead of myself, I must, in order to understand something I encounter, come back from this being-out-ahead to the thing I encounter. Here we can already see an immanent structure of direct understanding qua as-structured comportment [my experience of something ‘as’ something], and on closer analysis it turns out to be time. And this being-ahead-of-myself as a returning is a peculiar kind of movement that time itself constantly makes, if I may put it this way.”(Heidegger 2010b)

The implicative inseparability of the temporal ecstasies apparently functions for Gendlin as the interaction between the implicit intricacy ( the unseparated multiplicity) and explicit occurrences. It does not pertain to the temporal repetition within the patterns produced by propositional logic. These repetitions , as identical iterations, imply no change of meaning in themselves. Furthermore, there could only be such pure repetition within logical structures if it were being assumed that all occurrences, whether logical or non-logical, persist as temporary self-identities. For Heidegger, however, the structure of temporal ecstasies of future and past dont revolve around a self-persisting present.

“It is therefore essential, in first defining the unity of temporality, to eliminate the notion of anything thing-like, present on hand, which is between, as it were, having-been-ness and the future.”(Heidegger 1984)

Gendlin says logical patterns “lead to the wonderful technology which enables billions more

people to live, and many of them better than ever before.” What is the source of these advantages? What makes technology wonderful springs from logic’s assumed ability to harness the qualitative power inhering and persisting within an identity? The condition of possibility of logical reproduction is Gendlin’s presupposition that to be an identity (explicit conceptual symbolization) is to already reproduce itself in self-affection. Whereas for Heidegger the mode of disclosure which thinks the temporal repetition of present at hand identity conceals within itself continuous affective transformation, Gendlin derives affective difference from logical identity. The creative becoming that the structure of temporality imparts to experience begins only after and around the temporary self-persistence of identities, whether these identities are formed into patterns of logic or subsist as implicit ‘felt’ meanings. In this way, Heidegger’s ‘as’ structure is degraded into a ‘taking as’ which begins from temporary identities which cross with each other to produce implicit affective feeling or explicit logical symbolization.

“This choice of various ways of taking as is another function performed by the subjective side, to let the same sentence function either taken as a same pattern, or as it might work in further word-use.” (Gendlin 1995)

For Heidegger, by contrast, temporality doesn’t function as the relation between an implicit felt multiplicity and an explicit symbolized occurrence. Rather, it is occurrence itself as binding and separating. This binding and separating futurally projects new possibilities, separating Dasein from former entanglements and binding it within the midst of a new totality of relevant ready-to-hand beings. This occurrence of world projection as temporality is what primordially grounds objects in their equipmental character as handy, useful things.

## **Technology and Standing Reserve**

I have thus far argued that it is not enough to say with Gendlin that a logical pattern, a piece of equipment, an instrument such as a screwdriver, gets its pragmatic sense and relevance from the implicit intricacy that generates it and which then holds itself steady while the instrument functions autonomously. I have claimed that this places the present-at-hand on the same ontological footing as the ready-to-hand instead of showing it to be a derivative modification of the ready-to-hand.

In his later work, Heidegger also writes about a way of thinking about tools closely related to the present-to-hand that he calls standing reserve. What characterizes standing reserve is the treatment of the producing process as efficient cause, and of the tool, instrument, equipment as a means to a pre-given end. Heidegger’s later writing identifies a change in the interpretation of presence that came with the advent of cybernetics, information technology and atomic physics, and from a focus on the steady presence of objects to the persisting presence of ordering schemes, what Gendlin describes in terms of repeatable logical patterns. In a 1965 address, On the Question Concerning the Determination of the Matter for Thinking, Heidegger says that with cybernetics, the final historical transformation of the interpretation of the presence of what is present has been fulfilled. It has “lost the meaning of objectivity and objectiveness...the standing-reserves do not possess constancy in the sense of a steady, unchanged presence. The kind of presencing of the standing-reserves is orderability... The transformation of the presence

of what-is-present from objectiveness to orderability is, however, also the precondition for the fact that something like the cybernetic way of representation can emerge and lay claim to the role of the universal science at all."

In *Science and Reflection*, a 1954 lecture, Heidegger writes:

"The subject-object relation thus reaches, for the first time, its pure "relational," ie., ordering, character in which both the subject and the object are sucked up as standing-reserves. That does not mean that the subject-object relation vanishes, but rather the opposite: it now attains to its most extreme dominance, which is predetermined from out of Enframing. It becomes a standing-reserve to be commanded and set in order."

"What is the instrumental itself? Within what do such things as means and end belong? A means is that whereby something is effected and thus attained. Whatever has an effect as its consequence is called a cause. But not only that by means of which something else is effected is a cause. The end in keeping with which the kind of means to be used is determined is also considered a cause. Wherever ends are pursued and means are employed, wherever instrumentality reigns, there reigns causality... For a long time we have been accustomed to representing cause as that which brings something about. In this connection, to bring about means to obtain results, effects. The *causa efficiens*, but one among the four causes, sets the standard for all causality." (Heidegger 1977)

As a means to a pre-given end, a tool such as a screwdriver persists as a present orderable configuration, as standing by ready to be used. In modern technology,

"Everywhere everything is ordered to stand by, to be immediately at hand, indeed to stand there just so that it may be on call for a further ordering. Whatever is ordered about in this way has its own standing. We call it the standing-reserve."

"... an airliner that stands on the runway is surely an object. Certainly. We can represent the machine so. But then it conceals itself as to what and how it is. Revealed, it stands on the taxi strip only as standing-reserve, inasmuch as it is ordered to ensure the possibility of transportation. For this it must be in its whole structure and in every one of its constituent parts, on call for duty, i.e., ready for takeoff. Here it would be appropriate to discuss Hegel's definition of the machine as an autonomous tool. When applied to the tools of the craftsman, his characterization is correct. Characterized in this way, however, the machine is not thought at all from out of the essence of technology within which it belongs. Seen in terms of the standing-reserve, the machine is completely unautonomous, for it has its standing only from the ordering of the orderable." (Ibid)

In sum, standing reserve implies efficient causality, making, instrumentality, a remaining present at hand. It would be a mistake to think that Heidegger's questioning of modern technology is aimed at advocating a lessening of our reliance on technology in order to protect our planet from degradation. Advocates of a pullback from machine-based ways of living for the purpose of saving the planet's species and climate stability could achieve all of their goals and still remain within a machinational thinking. Heidegger's main concern is not about our dependence on machines but how we are disclosing being when we construct them, and, most crucially, how this way of thinking degrades us, aside from how our machines affect the planet.

Just because our modern technology works doesn't mean that there is only one way to understand HOW it works. Heidegger is offering a different way to explain how modern technology works, what he calls meditative rather than calculative thinking. Heidegger insists that the way of understanding how technology and theory works that most in the modern world adhere to has had devastating consequences for us. It has turned nature and humans into standing reserve. It is not our technology and our machines which have done this, but our theoretical, subject-object way of understanding how they work. Heidegger derives the technological thinking of enframing from the metaphysics of the world as picture, which he traces back to Descartes. At the heart of this metaphysics is the modern notion of the subject-object relation, in which the subject is seen as a self-reflective consciousness that posits and represents the object before itself.

"Thinking becomes I-think; the I-think becomes: I unite originally, I think unity (in advance). By virtue of the guiding-thread that already dominates, knowing as self-knowing is the utmost identity, i.e., what is an actual being; and as such a being it is at the same time in the possibility for conditioning every other objectness in its manner as knowing..." (Heidegger 1999).

Heidegger considers this self-presencing certainty of the subject as the basis of modern mathematical thinking. That is, as the certainty of calculation. Only because being is understood via the mathematical present-at-handness of subject and object can the technological be disclosed as enframing and standing reserve. Contrary to Gendlin's assertion that "mathematics would be true even if there were no people", it is not the case that for Heidegger mathematical knowledge is a neutral phenomenon and it is what we do with it that counts. That is, for Heidegger freeing ourselves from technological enframing is not a matter of the reform of technological practices, of deploying the resources of modern science and technology in new ways. Numeric calculation is not neutral with respect to metaphysics but predetermines a particular disclosure of being as the objectness of what is represented by a subject. The consequence of Heidegger's (1971) grounding of identity in affective difference is that neither the identity of the subject nor that of the object is simply present to itself, but differs from itself as the same.

"The same never coincides with the equal, not even in the empty indifferent oneness of what is merely identical...The same...is the belonging together of what differs, through a gathering by way of the difference. We can only say "the same" if we think difference." (Heidegger 2015)

Every enumerable difference in degree is at the same time a difference in kind; every increment of a counting of the duration of an entity gets its sense from the uncanny and incalculable occurrence of world projection. Calculative thinking

"is unable to foresee that everything calculable by calculation - prior to the sum-totals and products that it produces by calculation in each case - is already a whole, a whole whose unity indeed belongs to the incalculable that withdraws itself and its uncanniness from the claws of calculation."

(Heidegger 1998)

Ecologically-minded reforms of technological practices, regardless of their success in overcoming exploitation and abuse, remain forms of technological machination as long as they

disclose beings in terms of calculative values and lived experience.

Heidegger's (1967) analysis goes to the grounding of method itself. "Method is not one piece of equipment of science among others but the primary component out of which is first determined what can become object and how it becomes an object..." . What is presupposed about method when we say that a tool like a screwdriver is executing a ground-plan by the way that its pre-designed shape is put into use in turning screws? The screwdriver's function is presumed as the effect of an efficient instrumental cause. The effect can be repeated identically for an indefinite period as it carries through time the substantive meaning generated by the cause. But as Heidegger has argued in his account of the 'as' structure of handiness and its rootedness in temporality, mechanical repetition does not carry through intelligible, relevant meaning, it dissolves understanding into the confused indifference of empty calculation. But it is important to appreciate that in treating beings as calculative patterns, it is only our explicit awareness which is deficient. The implicit functioning of primordial temporality remains operative in even the most reductively present-at-hand thinking. This means that, whether we know it or not, the condition and ground of sense of a present-hand thing is in its use within a totally contexture of relevance, and the total contexture of relevance only gets its sense in and through the unique occurrence of world projection.

In shifting our mode of disclosure from objectively present thing to ready to hand contexture to extant beings as a whole to the projective occurrence of making possible, we are not each time supplementing or enriching a form of meaning which subsists independently of the change in mode of disclosure. The authentic truth of Being is not a categorical supplement to or container of beings. It is "not merely becoming conscious of what is—and thereby meaning that because knowledge is a "more" and an "in addition" it therefore would already be a transformation" (Heidegger 2016). The present at hand and ready to hand are derivative modes which always imply, as intrinsic to the nature of their own being-in-itself, what they conceal from explicit awareness (projective transcendence). The critical distinction between the authentic and the inauthentic lies with the difference between implicit and explicit understanding. The fact that we aren't explicitly aware of our Dasein's incessant self-othering transit doesn't mean that such displacing transit doesn't underlie the apparent self-identical persistence of an object we stare at. "The nothing nihilates incessantly without our really knowing of this occurrence in the manner of our everyday knowledge." (Heidegger 1998b). Das man's not knowing about the incessant occurrence of the self-transcending movement of the nothing expresses the fact that in everydayness the integral and intimate movement of authentic Dasein deteriorates into a fragmented, arbitrary form of transit. Everyday familiarity has this quality of the fragmented and arbitrary.

It's not as though the concept of a present at hand hammer, with its properties and attributes, has any intelligibility whatsoever in itself, apart from its role in a contexture of functionality. And it's not as though this equipmental contexture, and the totality of relevance of beings as a whole, has any meaning in itself persisting beyond the fleeting, anxious, uncanny, finite, unique moment of its establishment as this whole in projection. We must know all of these facets of the threefold grounding implicitly, simultaneously, in order to know what a hammer is, even when all we know explicitly is the present at hand hammer seemingly subsisting in itself emptily, arbitrarily,

indifferently ‘in the now’. When we disclose the world in the terms of standing reserve, this arbitrary indifference is the case not just for the object but also for the subject. To be a subject is to act as cause in producing instrumental effects. The screwdriver in Gendlin’s example of a logical pattern function as standing reserve, brought to a stand as a steadily remaining presence through representing. It is ordered to ensure the possibility of turning screws. And for this, it must be in its whole structure and in every one of its constituent parts, on call for duty, ready for screwing or unscrewing. Furthermore, the implicit intricacy which generates the meaning of what it sets in front of itself, is present to itself and remains so as the steadily remaining sense that it posits (i.e. the temporally enduring pattern of the screwdriver). As Gendlin says, “This choice of various ways of taking as is another function performed by the subjective side, to let the same sentence function either taken as a same pattern, or as it might work in further word-use.” Gendlin here thinks presencing in terms of what Heidegger calls enframing, “which assembles and orders. It puts into a framework or configuration everything that it summons forth, through an ordering for use that it is forever restructuring anew.”

## Nietzschean Subjectivity and Presence

Heidegger’s analyses of the metaphysics of subjectivity in Nietzsche’s principles of Will to Power and Eternal Return show the dependence of present objects and standing reserve on a present subject. The tool which is set in place as standing reserve is posited via a representing by a subject. The subject, in order to represent, to place in front of itself values and instruments, must first represent itself to itself, to be present to itself.

“...inasmuch as within modern metaphysics the Being of whatever is has determined itself as will and therewith as self-willing, and, moreover, self-willing is already inherently self-knowing-itself, therefore that which is, the hypokeimenon, the subiectum, comes to presence in the mode of self-knowing-itself. That which is (subiectum) presents itself [präsentiert sich], and indeed presents itself to itself, in the mode of the ego cogito. This self-presenting, this re-presentation [Re-präsentation] (set-ting-before [Vor-stellung]), is the Being of that which is in being qua subiectum. Self-knowing-itself is transformed into subject purely and simply. In self-knowing-itself, all knowing and what is knowable for it gathers itself together. It is a gathering together of knowing, as a mountain range is a gathering together of mountains. The subjectivity of the subject is, as such a gathering together, co-agitatio (cogitatio), conscientia, a gathering of knowing [Ge-wissen], consciousness (conscience).” But the co-agitatio is already, in itself, willing. In the subject-ness of the subject, will comes to appearance as the essence of subjectness. Modern metaphysics, as the metaphysics of subjectness, thinks the Being of that which is in the sense of will.”(Heidegger 1977)

In his essay The Word of Nietzsche, Heidegger locates the metaphysics of presence as standing reserve in Nietzsche’s philosophy:

“The essence of value lies in its being a point-of-view. Value means that upon which the eye is fixed. Value means that which is in view for a seeing that aims at something or that, as we say, reckons upon something and therewith must reckon with something else. Value stands in intimate

relation to a so-much, to quantity and number. Hence values are related to a "numerical and mensural scale" (Will to Power, Aph. 710, 1888)

"Through the characterization of value as a point-of-view there results the one consideration that is for Nietzsche's concept of value essential : as a point-of-view, value is posited at any given time by a seeing and for a seeing. This seeing is of such a kind that it sees inasmuch as it has seen, and that it has seen inasmuch as it has set before itself and thus posited what is sighted, as a particular something. It is only through this positing which is a representing that the point that is necessary for directing the gaze toward something, and that in this way guides the path of sight, becomes the aim in view-i.e., becomes that which matters in all seeing and in all action guided by sight...All being whatever is a putting forward or setting forth..."

The preservation of the level of power belonging to the will reached at any given time consists in the will's surrounding itself with an encircling sphere of that which it can reliably grasp at, each time, as something behind itself, in order on the basis of it to contend for its own security. That encircling sphere bounds off [encloses] the constant reserve of what presences that is immediately at the disposal of the will.

"This that is steadily constant, however, is transformed into the fixedly constant, i.e., becomes that which stands steadily at something's disposal, only in being brought to a stand through a setting in place. That setting in place has the character of a producing that sets before. That which is steadily constant in this way is that which remains. True to the essence of Being (Being = enduring presence) holding sway in the history of metaphysics, Nietzsche calls this that is steadily constant "that which is in being." Often he calls that which is steadily constant-again remaining true to the manner of speaking of metaphysical thinking—"Being".' (Heidegger 1977)

We can clearly see the parallel between Nietzsche's depiction of value as the positing of a point of view by which the subject represents and sets in place before itself that which stands steadily constant, and Gendlin's depiction of logical pattern as a persisting identity 'positioned' and 'informed' by the implicit intricacy. It is crucial to the functioning of a logical pattern that the affectively meaningful sense of its component parts be kept identical over the course of the unfolding of the pattern as a whole. As Gendlin insists: "One slight shift in the implicit meaning of any one unit can utterly undo a logical conclusion." But for Heidegger shifts in meaning do not occur merely around and subsequent to the self-presencing of units and patterns of logic, as though there were a separation between what occurs and what transforms occurrence which needed to be bridged. Instead, transformation functions already prior to self-presence, deconstructing propositional logic from within its own resources before it has a chance to repeat itself as a static identity. As Heidegger(1999) explains:

In philosophy, propositions are never subject to proof. This is so not only because there are no highest propositions, from which others could be derived, but because here "propositions" are not at all what is true, nor are propositions simply that about which they speak. All "proving" presupposes that those who understand, as they come to stand before the represented content of the proposition, remain the same, unaltered in following the representational nexus that bears the proof. And only the "result" of the course of the proof can require a changed mode of representation or, rather, require the representing of something previously unheeded. In philosophical knowledge, on the contrary, the very first step sets in motion a transformation of the one who understands, and this not in the moral—"existentiell" sense, but rather with respect to Da-sein. In other words, the relation to

beyng and, ever prior to that, the relation to the truth of beyng are transformed in the mode of the transposition into Da-sein itself. Because, in philosophical knowledge, in each case everything is transformed at once—the being of humans into its standing in the truth, the truth itself, and thereby the relation to beyng—and because, accordingly, an immediate representation of something objectively present is never possible, philosophical thinking will always seem strange.

Especially in the other beginning, the leap into the "between" must be carried out instantly—in pursuit of the question of the truth of beyng. The "between" of Da-sein overcomes the "separation" not by slinging a bridge between beyng (beingness) and beings as if they were two objectively present riverbanks but by transforming together, into their simultaneity, both beyng and beings. The leap into the "between" is what first reaches and opens Da-sein and does not occupy a ready-made standpoint.

## **Heidegger, Nietzsche and Deleuze on Temporalization**

While Heidegger's critique of the subject-object, affect-identity split appears to find its target in Gendlin's thinking, Heidegger's assertion that Nietzsche remains within a metaphysics of subjectivity and objective presence would seem to fly in the face of the implications of the latter's doctrine of the Eternal Return, that subjects and objects are illusory effects of differential forces. After all, isn't it the case that for Nietzsche, and writers like Foucault and Deleuze who stay close to his thinking, every difference of degree is at the same time a difference in kind, every quantitative repetition a qualitative change? As Nathan Widder(2008) explains:

“...the thesis from Deleuze's late 1960s writings holds identity to be a simulation or optical illusion...identity and fixed markers, which may be considered natural and pre-given or contingently constructed but indispensable, are surface effects of difference. Identities and fixed markers, I want to say, are like patterns on the surface of water, which appear fixed when seen from a great distance, such as from the window of an airplane in flight: their stability and substantiality, in short, are a matter of perspective.”

“Nietzsche declares that ‘everything for which the word “knowledge” makes any sense refers to the domain of reckoning, weighing, measuring, to the domain of quantity’ (Nietzsche 1968: §565); but he also maintains that ‘we need “unities” in order to be able to reckon: that does not mean we must suppose that such unities exist’ (§635). Mechanism begins with unities that can be quantified or counted, but the idea of unity applies to abstract things and objects, not to forces. On a more concrete level, where there are no unities or things pre-existing their relations but only incongruent relations of force, quantity cannot be a number but only a relation: as Deleuze argues, there is no ‘quantity in itself’, but rather ‘difference in quantity’, a relation of more and less, but one that cannot be placed on a fixed numerical scale. Forces are determined quantitatively – ‘Nietzsche always believed that forces were quantitative and had to be defined quantitatively’ (NP 43) – and this determination takes the form of relative strength and weakness. But this difference does not entail fixed numerical values being assigned to each force, as this can only be done in abstraction, when, for example, two forces are isolated in a closed system, as mechanism does when it examines the world. A quantitative difference between forces is therefore on the order of an intensive difference à la Leibniz, an intensive quantity in which forces vice-dict rather than contradict one another.”(Widder 2012)

Deleuze's (1994) commitment to the radically desubjectivating implications of Nietzsche's Eternal Return prompts him to point out what he sees as a parallel gesture in Heidegger's work.

"In accordance with Heidegger's ontological intuition, difference must be articulation and connection in itself; it must relate different to different without any mediation whatsoever by the identical, the similar, the analogous or the opposed. There must be a differentiation of difference, an in-itself which is like a differenciator, a Sich-unterscheidende, by virtue of which the different is gathered all at once rather than represented on condition of a prior resemblance, identity, analogy or opposition. As for these latter instances, since they cease to be conditions, they become no more than effects of the primary difference and its differentiation, overall or surface effects which characterize the distorted world of representation, and express the manner in which the in-itself of difference hides itself by giving rise to that which covers it."

Given the fact that both Heidegger and Nietzsche fragment the self-persisting identity of subject and object, how can Heidegger claim that Nietzsche, and by implication, Foucault and Deleuze, remain within the metaphysics of subjectivity and the calculative present at handness of beings in themselves? For his part, Deleuze grapples with the issue of the relation between an implicit creative dimension of sense and an explicitly logical, extensive field of actuality by proposing to think the two aspects together in a transcendental-empirical synthesis. The transcendental dimension is represented by an anonymous, pre personal field of reciprocally interacting differences from which emerge singularities and intensities. These structures are actualized on the empirical dimension as wholes and parts, qualities and extensities. Deleuzian intensities are external to actualized extensity and quality as their generative cause and impetus of transformation. Intensities affirm the paradoxical, the heterogeneous, the singular, the incompossible, the Eternal Return of the different, the indeterminate, the non-sensical, the roll of the dice within sense, the object=x as difference in general, the virtual event of sense as intensity, the verb underlying the sleight of hand of the axiomatic, converging, referential functions of actualizing predication. Deleuze (1987) aligns his intensive-extensive duality with Bergson's distinction between duration and the empirical multiplicity of magnitude.

"Bergson presents duration as a type of multiplicity opposed to metric multiplicity or the multiplicity of magnitude. Duration is in no way indivisible, but is that which cannot be divided without changing in nature at each division. On the other hand, in a multiplicity such as homogeneous extension, the division can be carried as far as one likes without changing anything in the constant object; or the magnitudes can vary with no other result than an increase or a decrease in the amount of space they strike. Bergson thus brought to light "two very different kinds of multiplicity," one qualitative and fusional, continuous, the other numerical and homogeneous, discrete. It will be noted that matter goes back and forth between the two; sometimes it is already enveloped in qualitative multiplicity, sometimes already developed in a metric "schema" that draws it outside of itself."

What is the transcendental basis of Deleuze's thinking concerning the changing behavior of an object in the world, or in our imagination, in terms of differences of degree? What are we doing when we speak of things persisting in self-identical presence as we calculate temporal instantiations of them? For Deleuze, logic and extension by degree are developments and explications (secondary degradations) of the implicit (Virtual). The illusion is confusing the

implicit and the explicit, the intrinsic and the extrinsic. The implicit intensities (Eternal Return) generate the logical, conceptual, theoretical, lawful principles for empirical domains, and then are held steady in the background, beyond the reach of the conceptual and logical patterns. which cancel them by freezing and isolating them.

“The transcendental principle does not govern any domain but gives the domain to be governed to a given empirical principle; it accounts for the subjection of a domain to a principle. The domain is created by difference of intensity, and given by this difference to an empirical principle according to which and in which the difference itself is cancelled. It is the transcendental principle which maintains itself in itself, beyond the reach of the empirical principle. Moreover, while the laws of nature govern the surface of the world, the eternal return ceaselessly rumbles in this other dimension of the transcendental or the volcanic spatiuum.”(Deleuze 1994)

Deleuze’s distinction between the first and second passive synthesis of time reflects his separation of an implicit unseparated multiplicity from an explicit actual identity. For Heidegger, by contrast, identity, analogy and opposition are not surface effects of intensities. The condition of possibility of being a surface effect for Deleuze is a capacity located within virtual difference, the capacity to represent itself as a present entity. For Deleuze, the creative becoming that the virtual structure of temporality imparts to experience begins only after and around the temporary self-persistence of identities. These identities don’t only appear as secondary, derived phenomena in actualized material such as extensities and qualities. The condition of possibility of quality and extension, of molarity, arborescence and striation is a presupposed identity within the virtual parts of desiring machines, a temporary self-reproduction and self-affection within and as original difference-in-itself. Deleuze’s desiring differences each ‘take time’, albeit a very small quantity of time. Difference-in-itself occupies time, is present in time as this ‘now’. Only that which first inheres as itself (even if what inheres is dubbed as difference in itself) in a countable time can undergo change. Deleuze’s virtual-actual, smooth-striated, rhizomatic-arborescent, singular-multiple, temporally coexistent-sequential binaries ground themselves in this dual nature of difference as change, and inhering identity or presencing. Deleuze’s virtual syntheses of production can only ‘let themselves be taken’ as actual species and quantities because difference in itself is already self-calculation as repeatable self-identity. By contrast, for Heidegger taking something as something temporalizes itself via the hermeneutic ‘as’ structure. Letting something be taken as a qualitative species or quantitative part prescinds from the ‘as’ structure. That is, it is a deficient mode of relation, a meaningless staring at something by treating it as a present to hand ‘is’ rather than a circumspective ‘as’.

“It is therefore essential, in first defining the unity of temporality, to eliminate the notion of anything thing-like, present on hand, which is between, as it were, having-been-ness and the future.”(Heidegger 1984)

Heidegger doesn’t deny that we can simply stare at a thing repeatedly, but when we isolate it as enduringly present at hand we are merely calculating. That is to say, the way that experiencing something as present to hand modifies the relevant usefulness of ‘as’ structured comportment is by stripping away what is meaningful in our relation with beings, and in the process stripping away their intelligibility. This is why to merely stare at something present at hand is to no longer understand it. It is not enough to say with Deleuze that an actualized qualitative whole’s

extensive duration gets its sense and relevance from the virtual intensities that generate it and which then hold themselves steady while the calculative iteration functions autonomously. Heidegger writes about this way of thinking in terms of his notion of standing reserve. In Heidegger's terms, Deleuzian intensities function as subjective enframings of the species and parts that develop from them. Intensive processes posit, set in place and represent the qualities that steadily remain throughout the calculation of difference in degree. Such instrumental repetition does not carry through intelligible, relevant meaning, it dissolves understanding into the nihilism of empty calculation. This is the case not only for the created object but also for the subject. To be a subject is to act as cause in producing instrumental effects. As Heidegger(2015) explains, disclosing beings by counting the repetition of identical increments of the same qualitative substance is a forgetting of the truth of Beyng.

“The most insidious manner of forgetting is the progressive "repetition" of the same. One says the same with a constantly new indifference; the mode of saying and interpreting changes.”

Every enumerable difference in degree is at the same time a difference in kind; every increment of a counting of the duration of a thing gets its sense from the uncanny and incalculable occurrence of world projection. Calculative thinking

“is unable to foresee that everything calculable by calculation - prior to the sum-totals and products that it produces by calculation in each case - is already a whole, a whole whose unity indeed belongs to the incalculable that withdraws itself and its uncanniness from the claws of calculation. Yet that which everywhere and always from the outset has closed itself off from the intent behind calculation, and yet, in its enigmatic unfamiliarity, is at all times nearer to the human being than all those beings in which he establishes himself and his intentions, can at times attune the essence of the human being to a thinking whose truth no "logic" is capable of grasping.” (Heidegger 1998)

Deleuzian difference can only assume countable duration and extension within the domain of the actual to the extent that such possibilities are grounded in a metaphysical conception of virtuality which, while “changing everything” via the eternal return of the different, retains the idea of instantaneous intrinsic presence. Even though the virtual denudes everything from traditional notions of presence and cause in an entity except instantaneous identity, Deleuze's notion of intrinsicality as a differential “produced in a time smaller than the minimum continuous time thinkable!” remains a notion of temporality as ‘in-timeness’, as the occupying of a moment of time by a content. Only an element which takes a moment of time to inhere as what it is can interact in a causal way within an assembly of differential relations. Each element in reciprocal inter-causation exists instantaneously as an intrinsic content before and outside of its being affected by its relation with other elements. Each element's intrinsic differential effect is presupposed as a briefly persisting self-identity co-existing among a multiplicity of other briefly, independently self-identical differences, which then affect each other. It is the presumption of brief self-identity within each irreducible element of singular difference (the grounded is identical with the grounding) shared by Deleuze and Nietzsche that Heidegger characterizes as belonging to a metaphysics of presence. A perspectival point of view manifesting as a system of values is not the product of a self-identical subject. It is instead is the productive achievement of a concatenating process of relations among heterogeneous affective drives (what Deleuze calls

desiring partial objects). These drives are differences in themselves rather than substantial objects, and yet, even as differences, they occupy time as presences within it. For Deleuze the singularities of a multiplicity of desiring elements exist simultaneously in a freeze-frame moment, in the form of multiplicities made up of differential relations and variations of relations, distinctive points and transformations of points.”...ideas are complexes of coexistence. In a certain sense all Ideas coexist...” “the Idea is made up of reciprocal relations between differential elements, completely determined by those relations....” Synthetic processes of connection, disjunction and conjunction , and the structures produced by these processes (plane of immanence, singularities, intensities, concepts) relate externalities to each other.

“...every partial object emits a flow, it is also the case that this flow is associated with another partial object and defines the other's potential field of presence, which is itself multiple... The synthesis of connection of the partial objects is indirect, since one of the partial objects, in each point of its presence within the field, always breaks the flow that another object emits or produces relatively, itself ready to emit a flow that other partial objects will break.” (Deleuze and Guattari 1983)

By contrast , the becoming of Heidegger's being-as-a-whole expresses the genesis of singular sense rather than the reciprocal transformations among a multiplicity of co-existences. Existence becomes by temporalizing itself rather than via interactions among its component parts. Being as a whole has no component parts. Time for Heidegger must be singularly genetic rather than co-existent because fecundity is singular. There cannot be multiple times for him because that assumes independently experienced differentials (Deleuzian singularities). If I posit the existence or reality of, two times, indicating two differentials that co-exist, I am failing to take account of their genesis, the fact that one and only one of these gives birth to the other. In Heidegger's thinking, elements inter-affect each other before they are a they. This 'interaction' is prior to two separate things that would first meet in order to interact. A difference is a crossing of past and present such that both are already affected and changed by the other. In Nietzsche and Deleuze , a singular difference is not already changed by what it interacts with , but exists first instantaneously as an intrinsic content , a direction of affective difference, before it is then changed by what it interacts with. In Deleuze's multiplicities, no part belongs to the same whole, since each interaction qualitatively differentiates differences in themselves. But this relation between parts within the internally self-self-differentiating multiplicity takes time. It takes place in time, not allowing the multiplicity to manifest as a single whole but only from one singular element to the next. Each differential element of a heterogeneous ensemble already has its own instantaneous extension that is only secondarily changed by relation with its neighbors. This is the distinction between reciprocal inter-causation and temporalization.

In the reciprocally affecting models of Nietzsche and Deleuze, pre-personal interchanges impinge on each other 'externally', in semi-arbitrary ways. They are not external in Deleuze's sense of a difference that is external to an identity, but they are external to each other in that each difference occupies its own increment of time , and these times are external to each other. Deleuze and Nietzsche assume that in order for there to be change, difference, transit, there must first be something (partial object, drive, desire, the 'now' ) to undergo such processes, even if such singular entities only ever exist inseparably from the multiplicities and assemblages they belong to. Something must first be what it is by appearing 'at rest' in the present tense, before it

can undergo transformation.

"In accordance with metaphysics, all beings, changeable and moved, mobile and mobilized, are represented from the perspective of a "being that is at rest," and this even where, as in Hegel and Nietzsche, "being" (the actuality of the actual) is thought as pure becoming and absolute movement." (Heidegger 1998c)

Reciprocally causal beings (drives, forces, partial objects of desire) are external to each other in that they affect each other without each completely expressing the meaning of a whole. Instead, the multiplicity is treated as a concatenation of chains of relations among temporality present subsistences, functioning as temporary 'micro' subjects. Interaction spreads in a reciprocally causal fashion as feed forward-feedback loops according to an inauthentic temporality of punctual nows appearing and passing away. These temporarily existing micro-subjects strike up against each other, affect and are affected by each other, akin to the way Heidegger(1999) depicts a subject's experience of an object as

"striking up against something and indeed something that strikes us; having to take in something that comes upon us and does something to us, "affects" us, encounters us without our complicity."

By contrast, for Heidegger each extant being and functional relation that is actualized out of the possibilities projected by beings as a whole is internal to every other being and equipmental relation within a totality of relevance. Heidegger also refers to beings as a whole as 'world', the 'being of beings', and the ontological-ontic difference between being and beings, which pertains to the distinction between the possibilities projected by worldmaking and the specific beings that are actualized out of these possibilities. Each being within the whole meaning organization always already "knows", expresses and carries forward the meaning of every other being, rather than each thing or equipmental nexus subsisting in itself and only externally affecting and being affected by other elements. It is not simply that the whole precedes the parts, but that each 'part' is already the whole in its totality, disclosed in a peculiarly forgetful manner. The difference between authentic and inauthentic unconcealment of being is not that in the latter case Dasein fails to comport toward beings as a whole. Rather, our awareness of this whole remains only tacit and implicit while our explicit attention is narrowed down to what obtrudes as present to hand.

"...in all comportment we become aware of comporting ourselves in each case from out of the 'as a whole', however everyday and restricted this comportment may be...However concerned we are to comport ourselves with respect to various issues and to speak in terms of individual things, we nevertheless already move directly and in advance within a tacit appeal to this 'as a whole'...We are always called upon by something as a whole. This 'as a whole' is the world." (Heidegger 1995)

"No matter how fragmented our everyday existence may appear to be, however, it always deals with beings in a unity of the "whole," if only in a shadowy way. Even and precisely then when we are not actually busy with things or ourselves this "as a whole" overcomes us - for example in genuine boredom."(Heidegger 1998b)

Heidegger's task in introducing the notion of Das Man is not to warn us of the dangers of falling

into normalizing social practices and discursive value systems, or to teach us how to escape them, but to explain how it is that we come to believe that we can be conditioned by introjected norms and practices in the first place. With regard to Deleuze's Nietzschean model, it is his belief in the undeconstructable reality of present at hand differences, desires, drives or flows, occupying their own discrete moment of time, co-existing and interaffecting with their neighbors within a multiplicity that is repressive and, not the alleged reality of such assemblages.

## **Animality vs the 'As' Structure**

At this point we must bring into view an aspect of Heidegger's work that would appear to complicate the distinction I have been making between the 'as' structure and Gendlin's implicit-explicit. Thus far I have been interpreting Heidegger as arguing that in positing something like a screwdriver as standing reserve, as remaining present to be used, Gendlin is expressing a mode of comportment concealing within itself a more primordial structure of meaning. But in his comparison of animality with Dasein, Heidegger articulates the relation between the animal and its world in a way that bears a superficial resemblance to his notion of enframing, the setting of objects in place within the ordering scheme of an encircling sphere. If we were to hold to a reading of the basis of animality as the subjective enframing of objectively present instruments, it would put into question the ontological priority of handiness over the objectively present. However, Heidegger's complex interpretation of animality prevents us from reaching this simplistic conclusion. For instance, he says animals don't have 'as' structured comportment, and as such do not relate to world as Dasein does. Furthermore, the relation of organism to environment is neither that of objective presence, nor a comportment of handiness and equipmentality. Although Heidegger's analysis of rocks and animals makes little mention of time, given that temporality is linked to the 'as' structure, animals cannot have time in the way that Dasein does.

“...organ and equipment relate precisely to time in fundamentally different ways. And it is this which first grounds an essential distinction in their respective manners of being, if we accept that the temporal aspect is metaphysically central for each manner of being .” (Heidegger 1995)

But if Dasein is positing a being without Dasein's form of time, then Dasein is thinking this non-as-structured time. This means that as-structured time must contain within itself what is not yet or other than it. In the case of the animal, there is instinctively driven behavior within an environment, which Heidegger articulates in terms of captivation by an encircling ring, the “fundamental capability for self-encirclement, and thus for a quite specific openness for a circumscribed range of possible disinhibition.” Notice that what is missing here is time as continual regrounding. Animal behavior doesn't reflectively redefine the ground of what it relates to, but instead responds selectively to the environment on the basis of pre-established capabilities of action.

“... individual animals and species of animal are restricted to a quite specific manifold of possible stimuli, i.e., that their ring of possible disinhibition is distributed in quite specific directions with regard to receptivity or non-receptivity.”(Ibid)

What are we doing when we think animal behavior in terms of a structurally guided

self-repeating thematic such as an encircling ring? How does the restricted ‘bringing forth’ of an animal’s development differ from Dasein’s bringing forth of useful things, and why is the animal’s pre-circumscribed set of capabilities not comparable to the enframing positing of a present-to-itself subject? To begin with, Heidegger does not mean for us to derive this thinking of enduring capabilities from a more fundamental thinking of the ‘as’ structure, as if to deconstruct what appears as bare repetition (or assimilation dominating accommodation). On the contrary, Heidegger’s ‘as’ structured temporality must ground its displacing transformations on whatever it is in Dasein’s thinking of animality that makes intelligible their ‘specific manifold’ of capabilities. I do not mean to say that when we do something like just stare fixedly at a present at hand thing we are doing something comparable to what we are doing when we think the enduring nature of an animal’s sphere of capabilities. Heidegger doesn’t construe the animal’s behavior as simply ‘staring at’ its environment through the filter of its encircling ring. Furthermore, we can’t simply equate an animal’s encircling ring of instinctual drives with what Heidegger calls the encircling sphere posited by Nietzsche’s Will to Power, which sets in place a standing reserve of enduringly present instrumental capacities. So how does Dasein’s thinking of the self-persistence of the capabilities produced by an animal’s encircling ring differ from the persistence of a present to hand object such that Heidegger finds it necessary to deconstruct the latter but not the former mode of understanding as derivative and deficient? It doesn’t appear that the determinate ecological behavior of animals within their encircling ring is comparable to the pragmatic functioning of the fixed shape of a screwdriver for Gendlin. In the former case, there is a self-consistency but not self-identity to the repetition of behavior:

“this captivation should not be interpreted simply as a kind of rigid fixation on the part of the animal as if it were somehow spellbound. Rather this captivation makes possible and prescribes an appropriate leeway for its behaviour, i.e., a purely instinctual redirecting of the animal’s driven activity in accordance with certain instincts in each case... the animal does announce itself as something that relates to other things, and does so in such a way that it is somehow affected by these other things.”(Heidegger 1995)

For Gendlin, a quantitative self-identity maintains itself through the repetition of the pattern as it is being used as a logical tool. Put differently, the screwdriver’s pattern, as standing reserve ordered within a subject’s encircling sphere, steadily remains as a continually present ordering for the use of the subject. The animal’s encircling ring, however, does not put the animal in relation to anything that has the character of a steadily remaining object or instrument. Nor does the animal’s behavior in its environment take the form of reflexive mechanism or subjective self-presence. The animal is not present to itself like Nietzsche’s value-positing subject. Rather, the animal’s capacities to behave are inhibited or disinhibited by its environment as a function of what its encircling ring makes it open for. What ‘steadily remains’, then, for the animal is the encircling ring’s capabilities. I suggest a way to think about the distinction between an objectively present object or subject, and the self-remaining of the animal capability is that objective presence presupposes the repetition of self-identity. The thematic continuity of life’s encircling ring is not a repetition of self-identity but instead a persisting self-similarity without a subject.

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