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Ontological Axiology in Nikolai Lossky, Max Scheler, and Nicolai Hartmann

Abstract: The prominent Russian philosopher Nikolai Lossky and his ex-student Nicolai Hartmann shared many metaphysical and epistemological views, and Lossky is likely to have influenced Hartmann in adopting several of them. But, in the case of axiological issues, it appears that Lossky also borrowed from the axiologies of Hartmann and the latter's Cologne colleague, Max Scheler. The links between the theories of values of Scheler and Hartmann have been studied abundantly, but never *in relation to Lossky*. In this paper, I examine the manifold relationships – similarities, differences, borrowings, criticisms, and possible influences – between Lossky's axiology and those of Scheler and Hartmann on four key interweaving issues: (1) their ontological realism with regards to the objectivity of values, (2) their epistemological theories of the intuition of values, (3) their ontological definitions of “value”, i.e., whether values are relations, qualities, essences, powers, meanings, etc., and (4) their theories of the stratification of values.

Keywords: Nikolai Lossky, Max Scheler, Nicolai Hartmann, Ontology, Axiology, Theory of Values, Material Value Ethics, Value Realism, Intuitivism, Stratification of Values

Introduction

The Russian philosopher Nikolai Lossky – whom Joseph Dieška called “the greatest living metaphysician of our century” (Dieška 1961, 38) – and his ex-student Nicolai Hartmann, who studied with Lossky at the Saint Petersburg Imperial University, shared many metaphysical and epistemological views, and Lossky is likely to have influenced Hartmann in adopting several of them.¹ But, in the case

¹ Hartmann had been a student of Lossky at the Department of Classical Philology and Philosophy at the Saint Petersburg Imperial University for some time between 1903 and 1905. In support of this claim, I rely principally on unpublished notes that Herbert Spiegelberg took when interviewing Lossky for the book that he was then writing on the phenomenological movement (Spiegelberg 1982). In these notes, Spiegelberg writes that the relationship “with Nicolai Hartmann, who studied under L[ossky] in St. Petersburg, was strong” (Spiegelberg 1960). For indications concern-

of axiological issues, it appears that Lossky also borrowed from Hartmann. When developing his ontological theory of values in *Freedom of Will* (*Свобода воли*, 1927), *Value and Being* (*Цѣнность и бытие*, 1931), and *Conditions of the Absolute Good* (*Условия абсолютного добра*, 1949), Lossky took Hartmann and the latter's Cologne colleague – Max Scheler – as his interlocutors and found support for his own views in their axiologies. Scheler was aware of the impact that he had on Lossky. In the “Vorwort” (written in 1921) to the second edition of *Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik*, he lists Hartmann and Lossky among the philosophers whom he thought had been influenced by the first edition. But, although he discussed Hartmann at great length, his remark concerning Lossky is limited to saying that, in “a work written in Russian” (*einer russisch geschriebenen Arbeit*), Lossky was one of those who provided positive stimulation to further his own work through their acceptance of his results, their continuation of his thought, as well as its simplification and popularization (Scheler 1921, ix). By “*einer russisch geschriebenen Arbeit*” Scheler was most probably referring to Lossky's *Fundamental Questions of Gnoseology* (*Основные вопросы гносеологии*, 1919a), in which the Russian philosopher discusses Scheler in relation to his own intuitivism (Lossky, 1919a, 97–98, 101, 103–104).² It is worthy of note, also, that Lossky claims to have met Scheler in person at the fifth International Congress of Philosophy in Naples in 1924, where the former was presenting “L'intuitivisme et le réalisme contemporain”.³ As to Lossky and Hartmann, their paths would have crossed again at the eight International Congress of Philosophy in Prague in 1934.⁴ This being said, the links between the philosophies of Scheler and Hartmann – and especially their axiologies – have been studied abundantly and I claim no originality in my own comparison of their views.⁵ But they have never been studied *in relation to Lossky*. In this paper, I examine the manifold relationships – similarities, differences, borrowings, criticisms, and

ing Lossky's influence on Hartmann, see: Tremblay 2017a, 138–139 and Tremblay 2017b, 198–199, 204.

² On Scheler's influence on Lossky, see also: Navickas 1978.

³ Herbert Spiegelberg wrote that Lossky told him that “he remembers Scheler well from an international congress in Naples in 1923, [and] likes particularly his emotional intuition in ethics as an extension of his own intuitionism” (Spiegelberg 1960). The note says “1923”, but the congress was held in 1924. Although Scheler figures on the list of the people who took part to the congress, his paper was not published in the proceedings.

⁴ They each submitted a paper for the “Actes du Congrès”; Hartmann submitted “Das Wertproblem in der Philosophie der Gegenwart” (Hartmann 1936) and Lossky “Die christliche Weltanschauung als allseitige Synthese” (Lossky 1936).

⁵ E. g., Koehle 1941; Kelly 2008; Kelly 2011a; Kelly 2011b; Prusik 2011; Ehrl 2012; Fischer 2011; Fischer 2012; Römer 2012.

possible influences – between Lossky’s axiology (theory of values) and those of Scheler and Hartmann on four key interweaving issues: (1) their ontological realism with regards to the objectivity of values, (2) their epistemological theories of the intuition of values, (3) their ontological definitions of “value”, i. e., whether values are relations, qualities, essences, powers, meanings, etc., and (4) their theories of the stratification of values.

1 The Objectivity of Values

In *Value and Being* (*Цѣнность и бытие*, 1931) and other places, Lossky developed an ontological axiology according to which values exist independently of whether they are experienced or known by a feeling or thinking subject. He held the view that “[v]alues are objectively-real aspects of existence” (Lossky 1937, 154). Lossky recognized that his realist axiology bears similarities with that of Scheler in this regard. As he wrote, it is “clear that Scheler is a determined defender of the *objectivity* of values”.⁶ To support this claim, Lossky quotes *Formalismus*, in which Scheler says something to the effect that “the *existence* of the many values there are is not at all connected to the psychophysical organization of human beings, and does not even presuppose the I or subject: values exist in all of nature”.⁷ Lossky’s reading finds reinforcement from various passages throughout Scheler’s works. In *Das Ressentiment im Aufbau der Moralen* (1915), Scheler says that “[c]ontrary to what Nietzsche thought, genuine morality does not spring from *ressentiment*. It rests on an eternal hierarchy of values, and its preferential laws are as objective and as clearly ‘evident’ as mathematical truths”.⁸ In fact, it is often the man of *ressentiment* who, in his torment, because of his *désordre du cœur*, denies the objective existence of values, and subjectivizes and relativizes them (Scheler 1915a, 223–224).

Scheler makes similar claims one year later in the second part of *Formalismus* (1916), where he writes that “[v]alues can be neither created nor destroyed.

6 “Изъ всего сказаннаго ясно, что Шелеръ рѣшительный защитникъ *объективности* цѣнностей” (Lossky 1931, 14).

7 “Но *существованіе* многихъ цѣнностей вовсе не связано съ психофизическою организациею челоѡѡка и даже вообще не предполагаетъ я или субъекта: цѣнности существуютъ во всей природѡѡ” (Lossky 1931, 14).

8 “Nicht die echte Sittlichkeit – wie Nietzsche meint – gründet sich auf Ressentiment. Diese beruht auf einer Rangordnung der Werte und ihr entsprechenden evidenten Vorzugsgesetzen, die so objektiv und so streng ‘einsichtig’ sind, wie die Wahrheiten der Mathematik” (Scheler 1915a, 100).

They exist independently of the organization of any particular spiritual beings”.⁹ Still in *Formalismus*, he says that, “[i]nsofar as the being of values is concerned, it does not matter whether an ego ‘has’ or ‘experiences’ values. [...] The being of values no more presupposes an ego than does the existence of objects (e.g., numbers), or nature as a whole”.¹⁰ And, again, he says that “values *subsist* in all of nature – irrespectively of our comprehension of them”.¹¹

In his short posthumously published text, “Ordo amoris”, Scheler characterizes the realm of values as “thinglike” (*sachlich*) (Scheler 1957a, 360). In the same text, he makes the claim that “there is an *ordre du cœur*, a *logique du cœur*, a *mathématique du cœur* as rigorous, as strict, as objective, as absolute, and as inviolable as the propositions and inferences of deductive logic”.¹² This realm is “independent of the psychological organization of human beings”¹³ and it would “persist in the universe even if *Homo sapiens* disappeared”.¹⁴ It is as independent of thinking subjects “as the truth of the proposition $2 \times 2 = 4$ ”.¹⁵ And, just as some people are more disposed than others to miscalculate, a *désordre du cœur*, he says, disposes one to “misintuit” this universally valid *ordo amoris* (Scheler 1957a, 350).

Scheler’s value-objectivism was in tune with his anti-Kantianism. With regards to axiological matters, Kantianism was one of Scheler’s two main enemies. As Hartmann remarks in his obituary of Scheler: “Scheler marshaled the new theory of values on two fronts: against Nietzsche’s moral relativism and against the Kantian formalism of the moral law”.¹⁶ Kant, Scheler says, “believed that the nature of the ‘world’ itself could be reduced to an ‘idea’. However, ‘the world’ is by no means an idea, but rather an absolute, always concrete, individual

9 “Werte können nicht geschaffen und vernichtet werden. Sie bestehen unabhängig von aller Organisation bestimmter Geisteswesen” (Scheler 1916a, 268).

10 “Ob also ein Ich überhaupt Werte ‘hat’, oder ‘erfährt’, ist für deren Sein überhaupt ganz gleichgültig. [...] Das Sein des Wertes setzt so wenig ein Ich voraus, als die Existenz von Gegenständen (z.B. Zahlen), oder als die gesamte Natur ein ‘Ich’ voraussetzt” (Scheler 1916a, 273).

11 “Abgesehen vom Auffassen der Werte – *bestehen* die Werte auch an der gesamten Natur” (Scheler 1916a, 274).

12 “Es gibt einen *ordre du cœur*, eine *logique du cœur*, eine *mathématique du cœur*, die so streng, so objektiv, so absolut und unverbrüchlich ist wie die Sätze und Folgerungen der deduktiven Logik” (Scheler 1957a, 362).

13 “von der psychologischen Menschenorganisation unabhängige” (Scheler 1957a, 362).

14 “die auch bei Aufhebung des *homo sapiens* im All bestehen bliebe” (Scheler 1957a, 362).

15 “so wie die Wahrheit des Satzes $2 \times 2 = 4$ ” (Scheler 1957a, 362).

16 “Nach zwei Fronten hin grenzte Scheler hier den neuen Wertgedanken ab: gegen den Wertrelativismus Nietzsches und gegen den Kantischen Formalismus des Sittengesetzes” (Hartmann 1928, XII). For a translation of Hartmann’s obituary of Scheler, see: Hartmann 2019.

being”.¹⁷ Although there is still, as Eugene Kelly says, “a residue of idealism in Scheler” (Kelly 2011b, 190), in “Die Sonderstellung des Menschen” (1927), later re-published as *Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos* (1947), Scheler argues that, unlike (other) animals, who are completely immersed in their environment (*Umwelt*), the human being is relatively free from it (*umweltfrei*); it stands “open to the world” (*weltoffen*) (Scheler 1927, 195; Scheler 1947, 37). But that the human being is “world-open” or that it has “world-openness” (*Weltoffenheit*) (*ibid.*) implies that *there is* a world – of inorganic, organic, psychic, and spiritual beings – that exists independently of it.¹⁸

Scheler adopted the view – which he traced back to Maine de Biran, Friedrich Bouterwek, and others – that reality is given in our experience of resistance. In *Probleme einer Soziologie des Wissens* (1926), he says that “reality, in all modes of perception and remembrance, is given only as ‘resistance’ against dynamic, drive-like attentiveness”.¹⁹ The year after, in “Die Sonderstellung des Menschen”, he writes that “[w]hat gives us existence is the experience of *resistance*”.²⁰ In “Idealismus–Realismus” (1928), he claims again that reality is apprehended through our “experience of resistance” (*Widerstandserlebnis* or *Widerstandserfahrung*).²¹ And, in the posthumously published “Phänomenologie und Erkenntnistheorie”, he says that, in principle, the world is given to us through experience both “as a ‘bearer of values’ and as ‘resistance’”.²² Our experience of reality is thus akin to hitting a “stone wall”, to use Dostoevsky’s metaphor from *Notes from the Underground*.²³

17 “Kants, der ja das Wesen der ‘Welt’ selbst zu einer ‘Idee’ herabsetzen zu dürfen glaubte. ‘Die Welt’ ist aber durchaus keine ‘Idee’, sondern ein absolutseiendes, überall konkretes, individuelles Sein” (Scheler 1916a, 409).

18 In “Die Sonderstellung des Menschen”, Scheler identifies four essential stages on the spectrum between immersion in the environment and detachment from it, namely inorganic beings, plants, animals, and human persons: “es vier Wesensstufen sind [...]. *Anorganische* Gebilde [...] der *Pflanze* [...] *Tiere* [...]. Die *Person* im Menschen” (Scheler 1927, 197–198). In the revised edition, Scheler puts the emphasis on “man” rather than on the “person”: “Vier Wesensstufen sind es [...]. *Anorganische* Gebilde [...] der *Pflanze* [...] *Tiere* [...]. Der *Mensch*” (Scheler 1947, 39–40).

19 “Nur als “Widerstand” [...] ist Realität in allen Modi der Wahrnehmung und der Erinnerung gegeben” (Scheler 1926, 161).

20 “Was uns das Dasein gibt, das ist vielmehr das Erlebnis des *Widerstandes*” (Scheler 1927, 208). In the 1947 revised edition, Scheler amended this sentence as follows: “Was uns das Dasein (= Wirklichsein) gibt, das ist vielmehr das Erlebnis des *Widerstandes*” (Scheler 1947, 49).

21 It is noteworthy that in “Idealismus–Realismus” Scheler profusely engages with Hartmann’s *Grundzüge einer Metaphysik der Erkenntnis*. For Scheler’s “Widerstandstheorie der Realitätsgegebenheit”, see: Scheler 1928, 285–293; Scheler 1947, 16.

22 “als ‘Wertträger’ und als ‘Wider-stand’ gegeben” (Scheler 1957b, 384).

23 “каменная стѣна” (Dostoevsky 1866, 14–15).

But Scheler's views on the issue of the ontological status of values seem to have vacillated. In the "Vorwort" (written in December 1926) to the third edition of *Formalismus*, reacting to criticisms that Hartmann had made to *Formalismus in Ethik* (1926), Scheler charges Hartmann with the heresy of quasi-medievalism and accuses his theory of values of being overly realistic: "Hartmann's return to an all-too-palpable real-ontologism and value-essence-objectivism, which seem almost medieval, appears to me to be an exaggerated *reaction* to the typical Marburgian excesses of 'creative thinking' and the 'law-bound', 'pure' willing that creates values".²⁴ Here Scheler warns that "we should not fall back into an objectivism and ontologism that stifles the *living spirit*".²⁵ Scheler may have been accusing Hartmann out of spite, to get back at him, even if this meant contradicting himself (five years earlier, in the second "Vorwort" to *Formalismus*, he had claimed that his own view was a "strict ethical absolutism and objectivism"²⁶). But he might also have changed his mind in earnest. This *volte-face* brought Eckhard Koehle to speak of Scheler's "double standard" with regards to the ontological status of ethical values (Koehle 1941, 228).

On the question of the existence of the external world in general, in "Idealismus-Realismus", Scheler takes a stance beyond the "idealism of consciousness" (*Bewußtseinsidealismus*) and "critical realism" (*kritischen Realismus*). And, in a manuscript posthumously published as an addendum to a reedited version of "Idealismus-Realismus" ("Aus Teil V. Das emotionale Realitätsproblem"), he takes a stance straddling between Heidegger's "solipsism" (*Solipsismus*), or what he also calls his *Daseinssolipsismus*, and Hartmann's "critical realism" (*kritischen Realismus*) (Scheler 1976, 260–265). Yet, Scheler clearly stands on the side of realism more than on that of idealism, because he explicitly maintains "[t]he independence of the external world from the internal world".²⁷ So, despite the fact that he is distinctly closer to realism than he is to idealism on the idealism-realism spectrum, including with regards to the ontological status of values, Scheler's "double standard" compels us to use caution when using the word "realism" to refer to his theory of values. What we can say with certain-

24 "Es erscheint mir eine übertriebene *Reaktion* gegen die maßlosen Marburger Überspannungen eines 'erzeugenden Denkens' und eines die Werte erst erzeugenden 'gesetzmäßigen' 'reinen' Wollens, wenn Hartmann nun auf einen allzu handgreiflichen Realontologismus und Wertwesenobjektivismus zurückgeht, der fast mittelalterlich anmutet" (Scheler 1954, 22).

25 "sollen wir nicht in einen den *lebendigen Geist* erstarrenden Objektivismus und Ontologismus zurückfallen" (Scheler 1954, 21).

26 "Der Geist, der die hier vorgelegte Ethik bestimmt, ist der Geist eines strengen ethischen Absolutismus und Objektivismus" (Scheler 1921, XI).

27 "Die Selbständigkeit der Außenwelt [...] vor der Innenwelt" (Scheler 1928, 268).

ty, however, is that, *at least in one of his phases* (namely, before 1926), Scheler held values to be objective, mind-independent, as endowed with being as numbers, and held their interrelations to be as valid as mathematical inferences.

I spent more time on Scheler, because of the ambivalence in his thought, than is needed for Hartmann and Lossky, whose views were more stable. Much the same as Scheler (although perhaps not the Scheler of late 1926 who charges him of quasi-medievalism), Hartmann agreed that “values actually have an autonomous existence, independent of all cognizing and desiring”.²⁸ At the beginning of *Ethik*, he speaks of values as “real”.²⁹ But one must keep in mind that Hartmann here uses the word “real” in the broad sense, which includes both real and ideal being. Because, for Hartmann, values are not “real” in the narrow sense of the word; they are rather ideal beings. As he says, the “mode of being of values is that of Platonic Ideas”.³⁰ For Hartmann, axiology is akin to pure mathematics in that it only retrieves contents already subsisting prior to consciousness, which means that he agreed with the Scheler of “Ordo amoris” that values are as objective as logical and mathematical inferences. For him, “[v]alues subsist independently of their degree of realization in reality”.³¹ They “are independent of consciousness”.³² Hartmann also took an anti-Kantian stance and turned the world back on its feet, i.e., on its ontological foundation, and resorted to the argument from our experience of resistance in *Zum Problem der Realitätsgegebenheit* (1931) as well as in *Grundlegung der Ontologie* (1935), where he in fact also refers to Scheler on this issue (Hartmann 1931, 23; Hartmann 1935, 184).

Lossky was also a committed realist with regards to the existence of the external world in general. He had decided early on that his own philosophical mission was “to overcome Hume and Kant, and to develop a theory of knowledge that would explain how it is possible to have knowledge of things in themselves, and would justify the pursuit of metaphysics”.³³ Ontologism was in fact a distinc-

28 “Werte tatsächlich ein selbständiges, von allem Erdenken und Ersehen unabhängiges Wesen haben” (Hartmann 1926, 47).

29 “Durch sein Vorhandensein unterscheidet sich ethische Wirklichkeit von der ontologischen. Beide sind gleich real” (Hartmann 1926, 53).

30 “Werte sind der Seinsweise nach Platonische Ideen” (Hartmann 1926, 108).

31 “Werte bestehen unabhängig vom Grade ihres Erfülltseins im Wirklichen” (Hartmann 1926, 52).

32 “Werte bestehen unabhängig vom Bewußtsein” (Hartmann 1926, 134).

33 “преодолеть Юма и Канта, именно развить теорию знания, которая объяснила бы, как возможно знание о вещах в себе и оправдала бы занятия метафизикою” (Lossky 1968, 87).

tive feature of Russian philosophy since as early as the Slavophile movement in the nineteenth century. Lossky himself says that the

view that the external world is knowable is widely prevalent in Russian philosophy, and indeed is often stated in its extreme form, namely, as the doctrine of intuition or immediate contemplation of objects as they are in themselves. A keen sense of reality, opposed to regarding the contents of external perception as mental or subjective, seems to be a characteristic feature of Russian philosophy (Lossky 1952, 403).

Lossky was not alone in this assessment. Semyon Frank, for example, also wrote, in *Die russische Weltanschauung* (1926), that one of the main tendencies among Russian philosophers is “their leaning toward realism, or better said, toward *ontologism*, the impossibility for them of being satisfied with any form of idealism or subjectivism”.³⁴

The realism of Lossky, Scheler, and Hartmann, their anti-Kantianism and anti-subjectivism in general (with a proviso in Scheler’s case), was not limited to their epistemological and metaphysical views, but also had implications for their axiologies and ethics. Lossky, for one, wrote that

exaggerated concern with the subjective aspect of conduct, shifting the centre of gravity to one’s own inner life, may easily lead to the moral perversion called *pharisaism*. It consists in a man doing good for ‘the sake of the good’ and not out of real love for his fellow creatures; his attention is occupied not with the person he loves or pities, but with his own efforts to be ‘good’, ‘righteous’, and ‘just’ [...] (Lossky 1939, 289–290).

And he comments, while also seeking support for his own view, that “Scheler thinks that Kant’s ethics come dangerously near to this, in so far as Kant maintains that the morally good man in the true sense of the term in rendering help to another is concerned not with that person’s welfare but with carrying out his own duty” (Lossky 1939, 290). This holds true for Hartmann, too, who equally criticizes the tendency toward pharisaism in *Ethik* (Hartmann 1926, 433). And, insofar as Scheler’s and Hartmann’s ethics are “material value ethics” precisely because they are anti-Kantian, i.e., non-formal, not rule-based, ethics, Lossky’s ethics may also be considered a “material value ethics”.

A criticism of the formalist aspect of the Kantian philosophy was already to be found in Lossky’s *Foundations of Intuitivism* (*Обоснование интуитивизма*,

³⁴ “ihr Hang zum Realismus oder, besser gesagt, zum *Ontologismus*, die Unmöglichkeit für sie, sich mit irgendeiner Form von Idealismus oder Subjektivismus zu befriedigen” (Frank 1926, 11). For further characterizations of Russian philosophy as inclining toward ontologism, see, e.g.: Radlov 1925, esp. 11–12; Zenkovsky 1948, esp. 17.

1906), which appeared in German translation in 1908.³⁵ It was in fact also already to be found in other Russian philosophers.³⁶ Kantian moral formalism was an object of criticism for Vladimir Solovyov – the first great Russian philosopher –, who made such criticisms throughout his career, from *The Crisis of Western Philosophy* (*Кризисъ западной философи*, 1874), in which he criticizes Kant for “the complete emptiness of formalistic morality”,³⁷ to *Justification of the Good* (*Оправдание добра*, 1899), in which he writes that “in morality, as in everything else, form and matter are equally necessary”.³⁸ This raises the question whether Hartmann – and perhaps also Scheler – found inspiration in Lossky or in Russian philosophy in general for their critical stance toward Kantian formalism and intellectualism (in ethics and elsewhere). In Russian thought, except for a handful of relatively faithful Russian Neo-Kantians, the emphasis was on the “living experience” and “living knowledge” of values and ethical demands that are felt in one’s guts, so to say, that are immediately given through emotions, rather than on the dry and lifeless respect for abstract rules (formal ethics). Early inoculation by Lossky could explain why Hartmann remained unaffected, while in Marburg, by the Neo-Kantian formalist legalistic ethics of his professor Hermann Cohen. For Cohen, “[t]he law is the foundation of human morality”.³⁹ In fact, Cohen had himself been a target of criticism in Russia, including by Lossky, who attacked his “abstract ideal-realism”, to which he opposed his own “concrete ideal-realism” (Lossky 1922, 7 ff.).

Moreover, since, on Lossky’s account, the existence of values is not “relative” to a feeling or thinking subject, he characterizes objective values as “absolute”. And, seeking support in Scheler, he says that “[b]y asserting the objectivity of values, Scheler also defends the existence of *absolute values*”.⁴⁰ This is consistent with the remark in the “Vorwort” to the second edition of *Formalismus*, where Scheler writes: “The spirit behind my ethics is the spirit of a strict ethical

35 Losskij 1908a, Chapter 4.

36 On the Russian general aversion to Kantian formalism, see Thomas Nemeth’s *Kant in Imperial Russia*, 2017. See also my review of Nemeth’s book: Tremblay 2018.

37 “совершенная пустота формалической нравственности” (Solovyov 1874, 118).

38 “такъ какъ въ нравственности, какъ и во всемъ остальномъ, форма и матерія одинаково необходимы” (Solovyov 1899, 611). See also: *Critique of Abstract Principles* (*Критика отвлеченныхъ началъ*, 1880), Chapters VI-VIII. On Solovyov in relation to Kantian ethics, see: Nemeth 2014, §. 5.4; Nemeth 2017, §§. 8.7–8.8.

39 “Das Recht ist die Grundlage der menschlichen Sittlichkeit” (Cohen 1919, 386). On Cohen’s legalistic ethics, see also: Zank 2004.

40 “Утверждая объективность цѣнностей, Шелеръ отстаиваетъ также существованіе абсолютныхъ цѣнностей” (Lossky 1931, 14).

absolutism and objectivism”.⁴¹ And, referring to Hartmann’s *Ethik*, Lossky says that “Hartmann in many essential points agrees with Scheler. [...] By defending the objectivity of values, N. Hartmann, like Scheler, asserts the existence of absolute values”.⁴² And, indeed, although he claimed that values are in a sense beyond the dichotomy between subjectivity and objectivity (Hartmann 1926, 167), Hartmann admitted the existence of absolute values:

The existence of values of goods is [...] not in the least affected by the relativity of these goods to a subject. *Vis-à-vis* the subject and its valuing-feeling, it has the character of being-in-itself (*Ansichseins*). Its absoluteness includes the being-in-itself (*Ansichseins*) of that relatedness. To state this formally: the being-for-me (*Fürmichsein*) of the goods depends on the being-in-itself (*Ansichsein*) of the values of the goods.⁴³

For Hartmann, thus, values have being-in-themselves (*Ansichsein*), and this thesis is in fact, he says, “simply the positive formulation of what has resulted [...] from our criticism of Kantian subjectivism”.⁴⁴

2 The Axiological Intuition

According to Lossky’s metaphysics, which he calls “ideal-realism”, being is divided into ideal being, the criterion of which is to be non-spatial and non-temporal, and real being, the criterion of which is to be spatial and temporal. These criteria are mentioned, for instance, at the beginning of “Concrete and Abstract Ideal-Realism” (Конкретный и отвлеченный идеал-реализм, 1922), where Lossky says that “noticeable in contemporary philosophy is a growing interest for the *ideal* in the exact, Platonic sense of the word, i. e., for the realm of *super-temporal and superspatial* principles. On this ground emerge systems that may be called *ideal-realistic*, since they take the ideal to lie at the foundation of real (i. e.,

⁴¹ “Der Geist, der die hier vorgelegte Ethik bestimmt, ist der Geist eines strengen ethischen Absolutismus und Objektivismus” (Scheler 1921, XI).

⁴² “Гартманъ въ весьма существенныхъ пунктахъ согласенъ съ Шелеромъ. [...] Отстаивая объективность цѣнностей, Н. Гартманнъ, какъ и Шелеръ, утверждаетъ также существованіе абсолютныхъ цѣнностей” (Lossky 1931, 14–15).

⁴³ “Das Sein der Güterwerte ist [...] durch die Relativität der Güter auf ein Subjekt nicht im mindesten tangiert. Es hat dem Subjekt und seinem Wertgefühl gegenüber den Charakter eines Ansichseins. Seine Absolutheit schließt das Ansichsein jener Bezogenheit mit ein. Um es formelhaft zu sagen: das Fürmichsein der Güter beruht schon auf dem Ansichsein der Güterwerte” (Hartmann 1926, 127).

⁴⁴ “Werte haben ein Ansichsein. Diese These ist zunächst einfach die positive Formulierung dessen, was sich [...] in der Kritik des Kantischen Subjektivismus ergab” (Hartmann 1926, 134).

spatiotemporal) being”.⁴⁵ Hartmann’s criterion for determining what belongs to reality appears to be a refinement of Lossky’s own criterion. Based on considerations on his theory of levels of reality, Hartmann recognizes that everything spatial is temporal, whereas not everything temporal is spatial. He thus grants reality to everything temporal, which also encompasses the mereologically subordinate region of everything spatiotemporal.

With the aim of justifying his ideal-realism, Lossky developed an epistemology – or rather “gnoseology” (гносеология), to use the Russian terminology (handed-down to Hartmann) – that he calls “intuitivism”. This gnoseology was principally developed in his *Foundations of Intuitivism (Обоснование интуитивизма, 1906)*, but its main theses are also to be found in other, shorter writings. According to his intuitivism, real beings are intuited by way of sensory intuition and ideal beings by intellectual intuition. Lossky characterizes intellectual intuition as the “knowledge consisting in the processing of non-sensory experience”.⁴⁶ By knowledge of the non-sensory he means “cases in which knowledge requires complete abstraction from sensory experience, and in which it is hindered by sensory experience”.⁴⁷ An example would be the intuition involved in “the deductive inferences of pure mathematics”.⁴⁸ Intellectual intuition is also the mode of intuition of the self-evidence of mathematical “axioms and postulates”.⁴⁹ When someone understands the self-evidence of such axioms and postulates, there “is an *immediate intellectual vision, or intuition*, by which the truth is apprehended with perfect clearness” (Lossky 1919b, 366).⁵⁰

This being said, for Lossky the realm of ideal beings includes the subrealm of values, which is intuited by way of an “axiological intuition”. The axiological

45 “В современной философии заметен возрастающий интерес к идеальному в точном, платоновском смысле слова, т. е. к царству *сверхвременных и сверхпространственных* начал. На этой почве возникают системы, которые можно назвать *идеал-реалистическими*, так как они полагают в основу реального (пространственно-временного) бытия – идеальное” (Lossky 1922, 4).

46 “Знание, состоящее въ обработкѣ нечувственного опыта” (Lossky 1906, 325).

47 “когда знание требуетъ особенно полнаго отвлеченія отъ чувственного опыта, когда оно встрѣчаетъ только помѣху въ чувственномъ опытѣ” (Lossky 1906, 326).

48 “дедуктивныя умозаключенія чистой математики” (Lossky 1906, 326).

49 “аксіомъ и постулатовъ” (Lossky 1906, 326). Needless to say, Lossky has in mind self-evidently true axioms and postulates, and not hypotheses and assumptions the truth of which remains to be verified.

50 I here use Nathalie Duddington’s 1919 translation, which makes use of the terminology of “intuition”, instead of the 1906 original, in which Lossky used the word *умозрѣніе*, which is best translated as “speculation”. Since Duddington’s translation was made in consultation with Lossky, we have to infer that Duddington’s terminology reflects Lossky’s mature conception.

intuition is immediate contemplation of moral and aesthetic values. In this regard, Lossky remarks that, for Scheler also, “some special kind of perceiving is required by which values may be *discovered*”.⁵¹ But, whereas for Lossky values are apprehended by an intellectual intuition, for Scheler they “are perceived not by theoretic, but by emotional-intentional functions, by the activities of feeling (*Fühlen*)”.⁵² Lossky says that what Scheler calls “emotional intuitivism” is the “theory that values are perceived by means of feeling, as a special function directed toward them”.⁵³ Scheler’s emotional intuitivism, he adds, is a theory that claims “the immediate givenness of transsubjective values in the feelings of the subject”.⁵⁴ And Lossky fully concurs with Scheler “that feeling is a special kind of cognition in which values are given”.⁵⁵

Hartmann, too, admitted the presence of a similar intuition. He partly sought the solution of the problem of the teachability of values and virtue in the ἀνάμνησις (*anamnesis*) of Plato’s *Meno*, which is an aprioristic kind of apprehension. In fact, for Hartmann “[a]prioristic knowledge is always *inherently intuitive*”.⁵⁶ But, as is the case with Lossky, for Hartmann there is a ratiocinative *a priori* and an emotional one, an *a priori* of thinking and one of feeling, which must be distinguished. Just like the rational *a priori*, “[a]ll moral preference is intuitive, is immediately there, and is always contained in the grasping of a given situation [...]. It does not first wait for a judgment of the understanding”.⁵⁷ This kind of “aprioristic insight” (*apriorische Einsicht*, e.g.: Hartmann 1926, 27, 28, 56, 102) or “aprioristic intuition” (*apriorische Intuition*, e.g.: Hartmann 1926, 56) through which values are revealed, Hartmann sometimes calls “value-feeling” (*Wertgefühl*, e.g.: Hartmann 1926, 482–483), as Scheler does,

51 “Необходимъ, правда, особый видъ сознанія, посредствомъ котораго цѣнности могутъ быть найдены” (Lossky 1931, 14).

52 “Воспріятіе цѣнностей осуществляется не посредствомъ теоретическихъ, а посредствомъ эмоциональныхъ интенціональныхъ функций, посредствомъ дѣятельностей чувства (*Fühlen*)” (Lossky 1931, 13).

53 “ученіе о томъ, что цѣнности постигаются посредствомъ чувства, какъ особой направленной на нихъ функциі” (Lossky 1931, 14).

54 “непосредственную данность транссубъективныхъ цѣнностей въ чувствѣ субъекта” (Lossky 1931, 123).

55 “Нельзя не согласиться съ Шелером, что чувство есть особый видъ сознанія, въ которомъ даны цѣнности” (Lossky 1931, 123). Lossky is here referring to: Scheler 1916, xi, 64, 261–269.

56 “Apriorische Erkenntnis ist vielmehr immer *ursprünglich intuitiv*” (Hartmann 1926, 103).

57 “Alle moralische Stellungnahme ist vielmehr intuitiv, ist unmittelbar da und immer im Erfassen der gegebenen Sachlage [...] bereits enthalten. Sie wartet nicht erst auf den urteilenden Verstand” (Hartmann 1926, 104).

but also “valuational insight” (*Werteinsicht*, e.g.: Hartmann 1926, 101), and “emotional apriorism” (*emotionaler Apriorismus*, e.g.: Hartmann 1926, 104).

According to Scheler, not only values, but also the relations between values are apprehended by way of intuition. As he says, “the rank order of values can never be *deduced* or *derived*. Which value is ‘higher’ can only be grasped through acts of preferring and pursuing. There is here an *intuitive ‘evidence of preference’* that cannot be replaced by logical *deduction*”.⁵⁸ Although Lossky accepts Scheler’s emotional intuitivism, he considered – perhaps unfairly – his account incomplete and one-sided. Because, even though values are given *via* emotions, they are not properly speaking *known* through emotions. *Knowledge* (as justified true belief) of values requires the involvement of a theoretical or ratiocinative activity just as much as any other kind of knowledge – just as much as, say, geometrical knowledge. On this point, Lossky sides with Hartmann, for whom the “knowledge” of values is also a theoretical activity. As Lossky says, unlike Scheler, for Hartmann values “are accessible not to thought, but to an emotional, intuitive *Schau* [...]”. However, knowledge of them, as any other knowledge, has a theoretical character”.⁵⁹

Thus relying on Hartmann, Lossky says that “distinguishing in this way the practical experience of values by means of feelings from their theoretical identification by means of knowledge, we may accept Scheler’s emotional intuitivism for the practical sphere of action and, at the same time, speaking of the *cognition* of values, we may affirm that it can be obtained by a *theoretical intuition*”.⁶⁰ This is because, he says, the

awareness and the experiences thus far mentioned are not as yet knowledge. They have a primary *practical* importance as possible directors of our behavior. But in order for them to gain *theoretical* importance, i.e., to become knowledge, intentional acts of cognition are necessary on the part of the observer. These intentional acts must be directed both upon the outer object and upon the feelings with which the object is clothed in consciousness.

58 “daß die Rangordnung der Werte niemals *deduziert* oder *abgeleitet* werden kann. Welcher Wert der ‘höhere’ ist, das ist immer neu zu erfassen durch den Akt des Vorziehens und Nachsetzens. Es gibt hierfür eine *intuitive ‘Vorzugsevidenz’*, die durch keinerlei logische *Deduktion* zu ersetzen ist” (Scheler 1916a, 87).

59 “Доступны они не мысли, а видѣнію, ‘Schau’, емоціальному, інтуїтивному [...]. Однакo знаніe о нихъ, какъ и всякое другое знаніe, имѣетъ теоретическій характеръ” (Lossky 1931, 15). Lossky is here referring to the 1926 edition of Hartmann’s *Ethik*, p. 108.

60 “Разграничивая, такимъ образомъ, практическое переживаніe цѣнностей чувствомъ и теоретическое различеніe ихъ знаніемъ, мы можемъ принять емоціoнальный інтуїтивизмъ Шелера для практической сферы и въ то-же время, говоря о *познаваніи* цѣнностей, утверждать, что оно осуществляется посредствомъ такой же *теоретической інтуїціи*” (Lossky 1931, 125).

These acts are differentiation, abstraction, inference, etc., and they result in the *judgment of value, the knowledge of value*.⁶¹

Moreover, Lossky and Scheler both distinguish the intuition of values from the intuition of the objects of religion. In *On the Eternal in Man (Vom Ewigen im Menschen, 1923)*, Scheler speaks of a “religious act” (*religiöser Akt*), which is acquaintance with the “religious object”. The religious act “transports the subject directly into a sphere of existence and of values accessible to him only”.⁶² This act appears to be distinct from the “emotional act” (*emotionaler Akt*) (Scheler 1923a, 89). This distinction is quite similar to that which Lossky makes between the “axiological” and the “mystical” intuition, about which he works out his ideas in “Mystical Intuition” (1938a) and *Sensual, Intellectual, and Mystical Intuition (Чувственная, интеллектуальная и мистическая интуиция, 1938b)*. Needless to say, Hartmann resorts neither to a religious act nor to a mystical intuition given that he does not have recourse to the God hypothesis in the first place.⁶³

According to Lossky, the objectivity and absoluteness of values combined with the intuitivist gnoseological approach has the advantage of ruling out axiological relativism and, thereby, moral relativism such as that of Nietzsche. In this respect, he agrees with Scheler, for whom, Lossky says, “from the subjectivity of the *choice* does not follow the subjectivity of what is *chosen*”.⁶⁴ In order to avoid relativism, he says,

we should distinguish, as Scheler explained, between the norms of behavior and the values corresponding to them, and keep in mind that one and the same value under different con-

61 “Перечисленныя сознаванія и переживанія еще не суть знаніе; они имѣютъ перевенствующее *практическое* значеніе, какъ возможные руководители нашего поведенія. Но для того, чтобы они получили *теоретическое* значеніе, т. е. стали знаніемъ, необходимы еще интенціональные познавательные акты наблюдателя, направленные и на внѣшній предметъ и на чувства, которыми онъ одѣтъ въ сознаниі; эти акты суть различеніе, отвлеченіе, обсужденіе т. п.; въ результатѣ ихъ является *сужденіе оцѣнки, знаніе о цѣнности*” (Lossky 1931, 124).

62 “er versetzt sich als religiöser Akt auf unmittelbare Weise in eine nur ihm zugängliche Daseins- und Wertsphäre” (Scheler 1923, 350).

63 Concerning his Christian beliefs, Lossky is certainly closer to Scheler than he is to Hartmann, who was rather on the agnostic – if not on the atheist – side of the religious spectrum. On the question of Hartmann’s religious beliefs or lack thereof, see also: Scheler 1929, 43–46 (“Mensch und Geschichte”, §. V); Breton 1951; Zwinger 1958; Galecki 1971; Buch 1983; Reinhard 1995; Jordan 2002.

64 “изъ субъективности *выбирания* вовсе не вытекаетъ субъективность *выбраннаго*” (Lossky 1931, 134).

ditions can be the source of different, sometimes even contradictory norms. So, for example, the contention that ‘the personal value of one person is equal to that of another person’ under different conditions can give rise to two contradictory norms: ‘take care of others’ and ‘take care of yourself’.⁶⁵

Lossky believes that the intuitional approach to axiology has also the advantage of avoiding the pitfalls of the axiological psychologism developed by members of the Austrian School of the theory of values, namely by the early Alexius Meinong in *Psychologisch-ethische Untersuchungen zur Werththeorie* (1894) and by Christian von Ehrenfels in *System der Werttheorie* (1897/1898).⁶⁶ Such theories, he says, are subjective and thus have to renounce any commitment to the existence of absolute values. As Barry Smith says, “for Ehrenfels value is itself just the relation of desirability of an object for a subject” (Smith 1994, 296). In contrast, Lossky claims,

the proponents of intuitivism (e.g., Scheler [...], and also the author of this book [i.e., Lossky himself]) can escape falling into psychologism especially well. In fact, the proponents of intuitivism argue that besides the individual psychical experiences of the subject there may also be present in consciousness many parts of the external world and different species of being – material being, the psychic being of others, ideal being, etc. Understanding the structure of consciousness in this way, it is natural to look for values not in the subjective feelings caused by them, but deeper, namely moving in the direction of the objects of the feelings.⁶⁷

65 “слідуеть различать, какъ это разъяснено М. Шелеромъ, нормы поведения и соответствующія имъ цѣнности и отдавать себѣ отчетъ въ различныхъ условіяхъ быть источникомъ различныхъ, даже иногда противоположныхъ нормъ. Такъ, напр., положеніе ‘собственная цѣнность личности равна цѣнности другой личности’ можетъ дать начало въ различныхъ условіяхъ двумъ противоположнымъ нормамъ: ‘заботься о другихъ’ и ‘заботься о себѣ’” (Lossky 1931, 119). Here Lossky is referring to Scheler 1916a, 219, 306–320.

66 I say the “early” Meinong, because he will later change his mind and defend an anti-psychologistic axiology in *Zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen Werttheorie* (1923).

67 “особенно четко отграничиться отъ впаденія въ психологизмъ могутъ сторонники интуитивизма (напр., Шелеръ [...], а также авторъ этой книги). Въ самом дѣлѣ, сторонники интуитивизма утверждаютъ, что въ сознаниі, кромѣ индивидуально – психическихъ переживаній субъекта, могутъ наличествовать любые отрѣзки внѣшняго міра и любые виды бытія – матеріальное бытіе, чужое психическое бытіе, идеальное бытіе и т. п. При такомъ пониманіи строенія сознания естественно искать цѣнности не въ субъективномъ чувствѣ, вызываемомъ ею, а глубже, именно идя въ направленіи къ предмету чувства” (Lossky 1931, 25–26).

3 The Definition of Values

Lossky is not only interested in knowing *that* values are, but also *what* they are – not only *quod sit*, but also *quid sit*. Are values relations, qualities, essences, powers, meanings, or something else? To tackle this issue, he begins by surveying previous definitions of values. He considers the position of the German philosopher and psychologist Johannes Heyde as he developed it in *Wert: Eine philosophische Grundlegung* (1926) and according to whom a value is a *relation* between a subject and some object (Lossky 1931, 26–27). For Lossky, such theory has the advantage of not being purely subjective, because the relation between the subject and the object already extends outside the subject. And, for sure, a relation between the subject and some kind of object is necessary in the apperception of values. But, even if the concept of value is closely related to that of relation, for Lossky, Heyde mistakes the relation between the subject and the valuable object for the value itself; a value may or may not stand in a relation, but it is a categorical mistake to take the relation for the value itself. The value must rather be on the side of the valuable being (Lossky 1931, 27–28). Thus, he concludes, “no matter how much we agree with Heyde that the concept of value is very closely connected with the concept of *relation* [...], still we cannot accept as true the fundamental assertion of Heyde that ‘value is a relation’”.⁶⁸

In contrast to the definition of value as relation is that of Scheler, for whom values are qualities (*Qualitäten*) (Scheler 1916a, 249). But Scheler also characterizes values as *Urphänomene* (Scheler 1916a, 260).⁶⁹ This terminology is likely to have been borrowed – directly or indirectly – from Goethe, who was seeking, throughout his scientific writings (on mineralogy, botany, osteology, anatomy, the theory of colors, etc.), what he called the *Urphänomen*. The prefix *Ur-* takes the sense of “primordial”. The word can thus be translated as “primordial phenomenon” or “proto-phenomenon”. The *Urphänomen*, that Goethe also occasionally called the *Urform*, is similar to Plato’s intelligible Forms in that it is an original model or plan that nature expresses in an infinite number of variations through the multiplicity of natural phenomena.⁷⁰ It is in this sense, I think, that one must understand Scheler’s conception of values. That is why Scheler says

⁶⁸ “какъ бы далеко мы ни шли за Гейде, соглашаясь, что понятіе цѣнности тѣснѣйшимъ образомъ связано съ понятіемъ *отношенія* [...], все же нельзя признать истиннымъ основное утверждение Гейде, что ‘цѣнность *есть* отношеніе’” (Lossky 1931, 27). In his rejection of the definition of values as relations, Lossky agrees with Scheler 1916a, 248–249.

⁶⁹ “Werte als *Urphänomene*” (Scheler, 1916a, p. 260). On Scheler’s characterization of values as *Urphänomene*, see: Zhang 2010, 180–183.

⁷⁰ On Goethe’s theory of the *Urphänomen*, see, e.g.: Henel 1956; Hennigfeld 2015.

that values “as *Urphänomene*, do not admit of any further explanation”.⁷¹ As *Urphänomene*, as primordial forms, these qualities are the beginning of a series – they have no cause –, so their being cannot be explained.

Concerning the latter definition of values as urphenomenal qualities, Lossky says that, for Scheler, “values, for instance, ‘pleasant, charming, delightful, noble’, etc., are not relations, but peculiar *qualities* forming a special realm of objects”.⁷² He interprets Scheler as reducing values to such qualities as ‘pleasant’, ‘charming’, ‘delightful’, ‘noble’, and so on, and he disagrees with this reduction. Although values are “given as feeling and may be expressed in such words as pleasant, noble, sweet, delightful, tender, sublime, [...] and so on [...], value cannot be reduced simply to these moments: these are only the symptomatic moments of value”.⁷³ He explains that, when we use words such as ‘pleasant’, ‘charming’, ‘delightful’, and ‘noble’ in order to express our axiotic experience of an object, these words denote a

complex fact of cognition that has both a subjective and a transsubjective side: the subjective side consists in the fact that the observer experiences his own subjective ‘feeling of delight’, ‘feeling of exaltedness’, ‘feeling of beauty’, ‘feeling of nobleness’, etc., whereas the transsubjective side is the perceived object of the external world with its colors, sounds, and activities in that wholeness that imparts it its specific worth and specific meaning for the plenitude of being, the meaning that is experienced by the observer in the ‘feeling of delightfulness’, the ‘feeling of nobleness’, etc.⁷⁴

71 “die Werttatsachen als *Urphänomene*, die keiner weiteren Erklärung zugänglich sind” (Scheler 1916a, 259).

72 “цѣнности, напрімѣръ, “пріятный, милый, восхитительный, благородный” и т. п. суть не отношенія, а своеобразныя *качества* образующія особое царство предметовъ” (Lossky 1931, 12).

73 “данный въ развитомъ сознаниі въ чувствѣ и выразимый такими словами, какъ пріятный, милый, благородный, нѣжный, восхитительный, возвышенный, [...] и т. п. [...], цѣнность не сводится только къ этимъ моментамъ: это симптоматическіе моменты ценности” (Lossky 1931, 79–80).

74 “сложный фактъ сознанія, имѣющій субъективную и трансубъективную сторону: субъективная сторона состоитъ въ томъ, что наблюдатель переживаетъ свое субъективное ‘чувство восхитительности’, ‘чувство возвышенности’, ‘чувство красоты’, ‘чувство благородства, мужества’, и т. п., а трансубъективная сторона есть сознаваемый предметъ внѣшняго міра съ его красками, звуками, дѣятельностями въ той ихъ цѣлости, которая придаетъ имъ специфическое достоинство и специфическое значеніе для полноты бытія переживаемое наблюдателемъ въ ‘чувствѣ восхитительности’, ‘чувствѣ благородства’ и т. п.” (Lossky 1931, 124).

For Hartmann, values have a mode of being other than that of reality.⁷⁵ Now, as I already mentioned in the section on the objectivity of values, he does say on occasion that values are “real” (Hartmann 1926, 53). But one must differentiate between “real” in the broad sense of what is in general and “real” in the narrow sense of that which exists in time. Because, for Hartmann, what is real in the narrow sense of the term is that which is temporal. As he says in *Philosophie der Natur*, “temporality is the main characteristic of reality”.⁷⁶ This is the only way to make sense of other claims, such as the following, where Hartmann says that “[v]alue-structures are ideal objects, beyond all real being and nonbeing”.⁷⁷ Scheler has a slightly narrower criterion than Hartmann for determining what is real. For him, what is real is not what is temporal, but rather what is causally efficient. In “Idealismus–Realismus”, he says that, “[f]or us, reality and causality belong essentially together. That which is not effective (*wirkfähig*) is also not real (*wirklich*)”.⁷⁸ Commitment to this criterion compels him to reject the reality of such things as space, shadows, rainbows, and... values.⁷⁹ Although Scheler and Hartmann have different criteria for determining what is “real”, they nevertheless both agree that values are unreal. As Kelly says, “[f]or Scheler and Hartmann, values are not ontologically real” (Kelly 2008, 5). But, again, this is true only insofar as we understand “real” in the narrow sense that they attribute to this term in accordance with their respective criteria.

Values are not real, yet they still constitute some form of being. For Hartmann, they are not *categories* of being, because categories have no existence separate from the *concretum* in which they exist.⁸⁰ They are rather ἀρχαί, *principles* (*Prinzipien*)⁸¹ of being in the sense that they are a *prius*, in the sense that they exist *prior* to the valued things – a characterization that is not without resemblance to Scheler’s own characterization of values as *Urphänomene*. As such, they belong to a different realm of being, namely the realm of *ideal being*: “there is a *self-ex-*

75 “Haben sie also ein Sein, so jedenfalls ein anderes als Realität” (Hartmann 1936, 976).

76 “daß Zeitlichkeit geradezu das Hauptmerkmal des Realen ist” (Hartmann 1950, 217). For Hartmann’s criterion of reality as that which is temporal, see: Hartmann 1935, 185; Hartmann 1938, 9; Hartmann 1942, 218; Hartmann 1949, 784.

77 “Wertstrukturen sind eben ideale Gegenstände, jenseits alles realen Seins und Nichtseins” (Hartmann 1926, 107).

78 “Realität und Kausalität gehören für uns wesensmäßig zusammen. Was nicht wirkfähig ist, ist auch nicht wirklich” (Scheler 1928, 318).

79 For more examples of what Scheler deems unreal, see: Scheler 1928, 292; Scheler 1957b, 387.

80 “Kategorien nicht ein Sonderdasein neben dem Concretum haben” (Hartmann 1942, 257).

81 “ethische Prinzipien sind nicht Kategorien” (Hartmann 1926, 51).

isting ideal sphere, in which values are at home”.⁸² It is this realm that Plato called the realm of Ideas, that Aristotle called that of the εἶδος, the Scholastics that of *essentia*, and which made a comeback, Hartmann says, with the phenomenological movement under the guise of the *Reich der Wesenheiten* (Hartmann 1926, 108).⁸³ The word *Wesenheit* being the German translation of the Latin word *essentia*, we may say that Hartmann defines values as “essences”. For him, as Lossky points out,

to the realistic experience of that which ought to be corresponds an ideal moment, an *ideal of that which ought to be*, necessarily connected with the eidetic structure of the will; and the will is governed by a normative idea of the individual participation in the absolute plenitude of being. This is the moment that N. Hartmann calls *ideales Seinsollen*.⁸⁴

Lossky remarks that

Hartmann in many essential points agrees with Scheler. Values, he says, are not laws, but objective formations possessing material content. They are ideal (i. e., they belong to the *an sich seiende ideale Sphäre* [...]), their being does not have an ‘existence’ (*Existenz*), but their matter can be realized [...]. Values are essences (*Wesenheiten*); they represent a specific quality of things, relations, or persons. They are those essences thanks to which everything that is connected with them is valuable.⁸⁵

So, as with Scheler, Hartmann considers values *qua* essences as existing in the “ideal realm” rather than in the “real realm”. And, again like Scheler, he takes values to have a status analogical to logical and mathematical objects.⁸⁶ A

82 “es eine an sich seiende ideale Sphäre gibt, in der die Werte ursprünglich heimisch sind” (Hartmann 1926, 96).

83 On the rebirth of the doctrine of *essentia* in phenomenology, see also: Hartmann 1942, 207.

84 “Реальному переживанію долженствованія соотвѣтствуетъ въ идеальномъ единствѣ воли и цѣнности идеальный моментъ, идеальное долженствованіе, необходимо связанное съ эйдетическою структурою воли, руководимой нормативною идеею индивидуальнаго участія въ абсолютной полнотѣ бытія. Это тотъ моментъ, который Н. Гартманнъ называетъ *ideales Seinsollen*” (Lossky 1931, 129).

85 “Гартманнъ въ весьма существенныхъ пунктахъ согласенъ съ Шелеромъ. Цѣнности, говоритъ онъ, суть не законы, а содержательно-матеріальныя, объективныя образованія. Они идеальны (принадлежать къ *an sich seiende ideale Sphäre* [...]), ихъ бытіе не имѣетъ ‘существованія’ (*Existenz*), но матерія ихъ доступна реализаціи [...]. Цѣнности – сущности (*Wesenheiten*), они представляю собою специфическое качество вещей, отношеній, лицъ. Они такія сущности, благодаря которымъ все, что имъ причастно, цѣнно” (Lossky 1931, 14–15).

86 “Die Parallele mit den logischen und mathematischen Gegenständen ist für den Seinscharakter der Werte außerordentlich lehrreich” (Hartmann 1926, 137).

value, he says, “has as much an ideal being-in-itself as a mathematical law”.⁸⁷ But values are nevertheless gnoseologically different from logical and mathematical objects insofar as they are objects of an emotional rather than intellectual intuition. As such, they must belong to a different structure and constitute a sub-realm of the ideal realm – “the ideal realm of values”.⁸⁸ And Lossky largely agrees with these definitions.

Hartmann also considers values to be principles in the sense that they have a certain “power” of determination (Hartmann 1926, Kap. 17). They do not have a power of determination as efficient causes, but rather as final causes – in the same way that the Aristotelian prime mover determines by way of attraction. For this reason, Hartmann further characterizes values as “prime movers” (*erste Beweger*) (Hartmann 1926, 172). This suggests that Hartmann defines values as powers or as having powers. Lossky notes in this regard that “Hartmann [...] says that value is a power (сила) that causes existence to lose its balance and to strive beyond itself, *tendiert über hinaus*”.⁸⁹ To this definition, Lossky formulates the following objection: “Values in themselves contain no power (силы) that could cause or create the strivings and actions of the subject. The dynamic moment of striving and action belongs to the subject himself, to the substantial agent, and to nothing else”.⁹⁰ He explains that the “illusion that value is itself a power arises because the substantial agent is not an abstract bearer of power, abstracted from its experiences, but a concrete individual whole, imbued with the fundamental striving for the absolute plenitude of being”.⁹¹ Lossky remarks, however, that, on this issue, Hartmann has been inconsistent and that his last word went in the sense of his own view: “However, page 701 [of *Ethik – FT*],

87 “[Der Wert] hat ein ebenso echtes ideales Ansichsein wie ein mathematisches Gesetz” (Hartmann 1926, 140).

88 “der idealen Welt der Werte” (Hartmann 1926, 122).

89 “Гартманнъ [...] говоритъ, что цѣнность есть сила, благодаря которой бытіе теряетъ равновѣсіе и устремляется за предѣлы себя самого, *tendiert über hinaus*” (Lossky 1931, 126).

90 “Сами цѣнности не содержатъ въ себѣ никакой силы, которая могла бы причинить, творчески породить стремленія субъекта и его дѣятельности; динамическій моментъ стремленія и дѣятельности принадлежитъ самому субъекту, самому субстанціальному дѣятелю и никому больше” (Lossky 1931, 125).

91 “Иллюзія, будто сама цѣнность есть сила, возникаетъ потому, что субстанціальный дѣятель есть не оторванный отъ своихъ переживаній абстрактный носитель силы, а конкретное индивидуальное цѣлое, проникнутое основнымъ стремленіемъ къ абсолютной полнотѣ бытія” (Lossky 1931, 126).

Hartmann says that values have no power, that power belongs to the human will”.⁹²

Lossky agrees that values are ideal beings. And he is much closer to the Schelerian and the Hartmannian definitions than to, say, Ehrenfels’s and Heyde’s definitions, because at least for Scheler and Hartmann values are on the side of the object. Lossky nevertheless proposes a different definition. For him, values are not simply properties or qualities or essences (even urphenomenal or archetypal ones) of *what is* – they are *the same* as *what is*, only conceived from a different perspective. Here is some textual evidence (in order of appearance in the text):

- “According to the ontological theory of values that I am developing, being itself is not only a bearer of values, but is itself a value, if taken in its meaning; it is itself either good or evil”.⁹³
- “each substantival agent, each actual and even each potential person, is an absolute intrinsic value potentially all-embracing. Thus, the whole primeval world created by God consists of beings that are not means to some ends and values, but are absolute intrinsic values in themselves”.⁹⁴
- “in keeping with our own ontological ideal-realistic axiology, [...] being itself in its meaning for the plenitude of life is a value”.⁹⁵
- “value is not an addition to being, not a quality which it has alongside of other qualities, but the organic unity of existence and meaning” (Lossky 1952, 258).

The identification of value and being applies also to aesthetic values, which Lossky – in his posthumously published book on aesthetics *The World as the Realization of Beauty: The Foundations of Aesthetics* (*Мир как осуществление*

92 “однако стр. 701, гдѣ Гартманнъ говоритъ, что цѣнности не имѣють силы, что сила принадлежитъ человѣческой волѣ” (Lossky 1931, 126).

93 “Согласно развиваемой мною онтологической теоріи цѣнностей, бытіе не есть только носитель цѣнностей, оно само, будучи взято въ его значительности, есть цѣнность, оно само есть добро и зло” (Lossky 1931, 80).

94 “каждый субстанціальныи дѣятель, каждая дѣйствительная и даже каждая потенциальная личность есть абсолютная самоцѣнность, потенциально всеобъемлющая. Такимъ образомъ, всѣ дѣятели, т. е. весь первозданныи міръ, сотворенный Богомъ, состоитъ изъ существъ, которые суть не средства для какихъ нибудь цѣлей и цѣнностей, а самоцѣнности абсолютныя” (Lossky 1931, 90).

95 “придерживаясь своей онтологической идеаль-реалистической аксиологии, [...] само бытіе въ его значеніи для полноты жизни есть цѣнность” (Lossky 1931, 123–124).

красоты: *Основы эстетики*, 1998) – classifies as species of value in general.⁹⁶ “Beauty”, he says, “is not some addition to being, but being itself”.⁹⁷

But, unlike those – such as Lev Shestov and Emmanuel Lévinas – who would like to see ontology abdicate the imperial throne of first philosophy and cede it to ethics, Lossky is not, for that matter, subordinating being to value and ontology to axiology. Piama Gaidenko says of Lossky that “it would not be an exaggeration to say that his metaphysics is ontologized ethics”.⁹⁸ But, at the same time, Lossky claims that metaphysics remains the queen philosophical science.⁹⁹ For him, a value is an ideal being, more specifically a meaning (значение). But this meaning is simply “being” conceived from the perspective of its meaningfulness for substantial agents: “Meaning and sense are the *ideal* aspect of value. Therefore, every value is either wholly ideal, or at least contains an ideal aspect within itself. If valuable being is itself ideal being, then value is wholly ideal”.¹⁰⁰ Lossky gives the following examples:

the substantial agent, as a supertemporal and superspatial source of activity, is a wholly ideal value. If the valuable being is a real being, then the corresponding value is ideal-real: such is, for instance, the aria performed by a singer. The idea of the aria, the idea of a shrine, the idea of a deed, and so on, is wholly an ideal value that can be realized. The performed aria, the built temple, or the committed deed, are ideal-real values.¹⁰¹

96 “Beauty is a value” (Красота есть ценность) (Lossky 1998, 15). Hartmann, too, classified aesthetic values as species of values in general. On this, see especially his “Über die Stellung der ästhetischen Werte im Reich der Werte überhaupt” (1927), which is concerned with the specific difference between aesthetic and moral values. The same subordination of the various species of value to value in general may be found in the thought of Semyon Frank, for whom “[w]hatever may be the defining characteristic of moral value in contrast to the other species of objective value, moral value is only one of the possible manifestations of *value as such*” (“В чем бы ни заключался определяющий признак нравственной ценности в ее отличии от других видов объективной ценности – во всяком случае, нравственная ценность есть только одно из возможных обнаружений *ценности как таковой*”) (Frank 1990, 398).

97 “красота есть не какая-либо прибавка к бытию, а само бытие” (Lossky 1998, 19).

98 “не будет преувеличением сказать, что его метафизика – это онтологизированная этика” (Gaidenko 2016, 46).

99 “According to my view, metaphysics is the most important philosophical science” (Lossky 1934, 266).

100 “Значение и смыслъ есть идеальнѣйшій аспектъ цѣнности. Такимъ образомъ, всякая цѣнность или сполна идеальна или, по крайней мѣрѣ, заключаетъ въ себѣ идеальнѣйшій аспектъ. Если само цѣнное бытiе есть бытiе идеальное, то цѣнность сполна идеальна” (Lossky 1931, 80).

101 “субстанціальнѣйшій дѣятель, какъ свѣрхвременнѣйшій и свѣрхпространственнѣйшій источникъ дѣйствованiй, есть сполна идеальная цѣнность. Если цѣнное бытiе есть бытiе реальное, то соотвѣтствующая цѣнность идеально-реальна: такова, напр., исполняемая

Now, one of the difficulties with this definition is that it is not a standard kind of definition *per genus proximus et differentia specifica*; the word “value”, according to Lossky, does not let itself be defined by the Aristotelian method of definition. As he says, the

whole difficulty lies in the definition of primary, supercosmic, absolute positive value. It is [...] the absolute plenitude of being. It possesses within itself the meaning that justifies it, makes it an object of approval, gives it the absolute right to be realized and preferred above everything else. In this definition, there is no division into elements [...]. Likewise, the definition of derivative value does not contain a division into *genus* and *differentiae*.¹⁰²

On this view, “being” is not a *genus* that would include the *species* “value”.¹⁰³ Value is rather “an organic unity, including in itself as elements being and meaning (бытие и значение), which, although it is based on these elements, represents a novel aspect of the world, different from its elements”.¹⁰⁴

In identifying value with being, Lossky claims to be following a line of thinkers including Dionysius the Areopagite, Scotus Eriugena, Albertus Magnus, and Thomas Aquinas, who, according to him, all more or less understood *ens* and *bonum* as the same thing conceived from different perspectives (Lossky 1931, 31–32). Such identification is commonplace in the Christian Neo-Platonism that Lossky embraces. The identification of value and being is possible only insofar as there is identification (confusion?) of what *ought to be* with what *is*, which implies also an identification of what *ought not to be*, i. e., evil (negative values), with *nonbeing*, where the attainment of the hypostatized Good is synonymous with the absolute plenitude (*pleroma*, πλήρωμα) of being, as opposed to the deficiency of being. In the teleologically realized world, there is thus no difference between value and being, because the plenitude of being is also the plenitude of the Good (positive values) (Lossky 1931, 52).

пѣвцомъ арія. Идея арии, идея храма, идея поступка и т. п. есть сполна идеальная цѣнность, могущая быть реализованною; исполняемая арія, построенный храмъ, совершаемый поступокъ есть цѣнность идеально-реальная” (Lossky 1931, 80).

102 “Вся трудность заключается въ опредѣленіи первичной сверхміровой абсолютной положительной цѣнности: это [...] абсолютная полнота бытія, сама въ себѣ имѣющая смыслъ, оправдывающій ее, дѣлающій ее предметомъ одобрения, дающій ей безусловное право на осуществленіе и предпочтеніе чему бы то ни было другому. Въ этомъ опредѣленіи нѣтъ разложенія на элементы [...]. Также и опредѣленіе производной цѣнности не содержитъ въ себѣ разложенія на родъ и видовой” (Lossky 1931, 78–79).

103 “‘бытіе’ не есть родъ, подъ который подходитъ понятіе цѣнности” (Lossky 1931, 79).

104 “органическое единство, включающее въ себя, какъ элементы бытіе и значеніе, но, опираясь на эти элементы, она представляетъ собою новый аспектъ міра, отличный отъ своихъ элементовъ” (Lossky 1931, 79).

The Losskyan philosopher John Marshall recapitulates *in nuce* Lossky's innovation as follows:

Max Scheler and Nicolai Hartmann give us a new type of absolute. They give us values that are qualities, material qualities that may be added to existents. These qualities are borne by existences. In a sense values exist in their purity only in a very unreal sense. It would be better to say that pure value subsists rather than exists. An existent *per se* is not valuable, it only bears values. Pure value may have reality apart from existence (Marshall 1935, 203).

The theory of Scheler and Hartmann is problematic, Marshall thinks, insofar as

it deprives existence itself of intrinsic worth. If we are dealing with a beautiful object we ask ourselves [...] if the picture itself is not beautiful apart from the adding of a quality called beauty. If we take the position that a tertiary quality is the only value, we must ask ourselves whether there is not a value that lies in the bearer of the quality in addition to the quality borne (Marshall 1935, 203–204).

Marshall's interpretation seems accurate. Scheler did affirm the independence of values from the bearers of values. As William Werkmeister says, for Scheler the

order of rank [is] independent of the existence of 'goods' and [is], in fact, [...] determinative of the various value levels of the actual 'goods'. What Scheler underscores here is the fact that value is one thing and a 'bearer of a value' (*Wertträger*) is quite another. This distinction underlies his whole argument (Werkmeister 1970, 290).

As to Hartmann, he explicitly declared the independence of values from the valued things.¹⁰⁵ But Hartmann, who claimed that values are principles, will also later claim in "Neue Wege der Ontologie" (1942) that principles are universal,¹⁰⁶ and he will dissociate himself from doctrines that hypostatize universals.¹⁰⁷ This would seem to imply a dissociation from his earlier thesis that values are existentially independent. In any case, on the interpretation that they take values to be independent of the valued things, Scheler and Hartmann would be guilty, according to Marshall, of a sort of duplication or reification (hypostatization) – a fallacy that Vladimir Solovyov identified as the chief tendency of Western philosophy, which consists in "the one-sided predominance of rational analysis, af-

105 "Werte sind nicht nur unabhängig von Wertdingen Gütern, sondern sind auch positiv deren Bedingung" (Hartmann 1926, 109).

106 "alles Prinzipielle allgemein ist" (Hartmann 1942, 207).

107 "Man muß überhaupt gegen die Wesenslehre Abstand gewinnen; und zwar nicht nur, weil man sich mit ihr wieder allen Umständen eine Verselbständigung des 'Allgemeinen' hängt..." (Hartmann 1942, 207).

firming abstract concepts in their separateness and thence necessarily hypostatiz[ing] them”.¹⁰⁸ On Marshall’s view, the Losskyan solution avoids this fallacy.

4 The Stratification of Values

Scheler and Hartmann both developed theories of the strata of values and of the strata of feelings coordinated to them. In *Formalismus*, these strata of feelings are identified as follows: (1) sensory feelings, (2) bodily feelings (as conditions) and vital feelings (as functions), (3) pure psychical feelings (pure feelings of the I), and (4) spiritual feelings (feelings of personhood).¹⁰⁹ Each one of these levels of feelings follows its own laws and is coordinated to a respective set of values. Sensory feelings apprehend the bodily agreeable and disagreeable, as well as their species. Vital feelings apprehend vital values, such as health, vigor, strength, and their opposites, i. e., illness, tiredness, and weakness. Psychic feelings apprehend values pertaining to the ego, such as happiness and sadness. Spiritual feelings, which pertain to the person (in relation to family, friends, society, etc.), apprehend spiritual values, i. e., beautiful and ugly, right and wrong, shame, remorse, etc. Spiritual values belong to a rank of values higher than purely psychical values, psychical values are higher than vital values, and the latter are higher than sensory values (Scheler 1916a, 109).¹¹⁰

Likewise, for Hartmann the lower values are stronger and bear weaker yet higher and nobler ones. For instance, friendship and love are nobler than and preferable to the more mundane and commonplace respect for the life of other human beings, but there cannot be friendship or love without respect for human life in the first place. The higher values are more preferable, but necessitate the lower ones in order to be realized. Thus, Hartmann says, to “sin against a lower value is in general more grievous than to sin against a higher one; but the realization of a higher is morally more valuable than that of a lower one. Murder is considered to be the most grievous offense, but respect for another’s life is not on that account the highest moral *habitus* – not compa-

108 “одностороннее преобладание разсудочного анализа, утверждающего отвлеченный понятия въ ихъ отдѣльности и вслѣдствіе этого необходимое ихъ гипостазирующаго” (Solovyov 1874, 76).

109 “Es gibt: 1. *Sinnliche Gefühle* oder ‘Empfindungsgefühle’ (Carl Stumpf), *Leibgefühle* (als Zustände) und *Lebensgefühle* (als Funktionen), 3. *rein seelische Gefühle* (reine Ichgefühle), 4. *geistige Gefühle* (Persönlichkeitsgefühle)” (Scheler 1916a, 344).

110 For a study of Scheler’s theory of the stratification of emotional life, see: Werkmeister 1970, 287–313; Geniusas 2015.

rable to friendship [and] love”.¹¹¹ Murder is thus a most grievous offense insofar as it is a sin against the foundational (lowest-level) value of “vitality” or “aliveness”, without which one is deprived of the possibility to realize higher, nobler values.¹¹²

I mentioned what Lossky calls “the plenitude of being” (*Seinsfülle*), which is a stage that remains to be realized. The teleological view that the activity of substantial agents is directed at the realization of the plenitude of being implies a conception of the stages of evolution leading to that ultimate state. On this issue, Lossky relies partially on Scheler and Hartmann, but his earliest – and thus most formative – influence was Solovyov’s theory of the stages of being (Lossky 1931, 54). Lossky’s theory of levels is not, like that of Hartmann, a theory of static strata, but rather of evolutionary stages toward the attainment of the plenitude of being. And, in the same way that the most fundamental levels of being are necessary conditions for the possibility of higher levels of being, the most fundamental values are necessary conditions for the possibility of higher values. As Lossky says,

[a]mong relative values the ranks (ранги) are determined in part by the steps of normal evolution. Thus, for instance, on earth the biological values are in general higher than the values of inorganic nature, the values of the social process are higher than the biological ones. To classify values into groups according to their rank would be possible only by having a thoroughly developed theory of the system of values.¹¹³

Instead of reinventing the wheel, Lossky invokes the work of Scheler and Hartmann: “Not intending to develop such a system, I limit myself to a defense of the theory of ranks. Many of its aspects have been elucidated by M. Scheler in his *Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik* [and] by N. Hartmann in his *Ethik*”.¹¹⁴

111 “Die Versündigung am niederen Wert ist im allgemeinen schwerer als die am höheren; die Erfüllung des höheren aber ist moralisch wertvoller als die des niederen. Der Mord gilt als schwerstes Vergehen, aber die Respektierung fremdem Lebens ist deswegen nicht der höchste moralische Habitus – nicht zu vergleichen mit Freundschaft [und] Liebe” (Hartmann 1926, 252).

112 For a study on the theory of lower and higher values in Hartmann, see: Hübler 1950.

113 “Среди относительных цѣнностей ранги опредѣляются, между прочимъ, ступенями нормальной эволюціи; такъ, напр., у насъ на землѣ цѣнности біологическія въ общемъ выше цѣнностей неорганической природы, цѣнности соціального процесса выше цѣнностей біологическихъ. Попытку расположить цѣнности въ ряды по рангамъ можно было бы осуществить не иначе, какъ имѣя обстоятельно разработанное ученіе о системѣ цѣнностей” (Lossky 1931, 120).

114 “Не собираясь разрабатывать такую систему, я ограничиваюсь также и въ ученіи о рангахъ только защитой этого понятія. Многія стороны его выяснены М. Шелеромъ въ

Lossky agrees with Scheler and Hartmann that

in choosing between several values under the conditions of psycho-material being we have to be guided not only by the rank, but also by other properties of values, as, for example, by the fact that the non-realization of some inferior positive value (say, nutrition) leads to the appearance of different destructive negative values (illness, death, etc.).¹¹⁵

Lossky is here referring to “Hartmann’s theory of the existence of two laws of preference: the preference of value in virtue of its height, and the preference of value in virtue of its strength”.¹¹⁶ And in *Conditions of the Absolute Good* (*Условия абсолютного добра*, 1949), he makes use of “the law formulated by M. Scheler and N. Hartmann, [according to which] the greater the value of a being, the weaker it is, the more it depends on a being the value of which is lower than itself”.¹¹⁷

Lossky admits the Hartmannian *Schichtenlehre* insofar as it applies to values, but his conception of the axiotic levels as stages toward the completion of the plenitude of being only makes sense within an evolutionary-teleological worldview. Hartmann did not oppose to a genetic interpretation of his theory of strata. “The categorial laws as such”, he says in “*Neue Wege der Ontologie*”, “absolutely allow for a genetic interpretation of the sequence of strata”.¹¹⁸ But he staunchly rejected teleologism, which, according to him, makes the categorial mistake of giving primacy to axiological principles over ontological ones. As Hartmann says in “*Wie ist kritische Ontologie überhaupt möglich?*”,

его ‘Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik’, Н. Гартманом въ его ‘Этикѣ’” (Lossky 1931, 120).

115 “при выборѣ между нѣсколькими цѣнностями приходится въ условіяхъ психо-матеріальнаго бытія руководствоваться не только рангомъ, но и другими свойствами ихъ, напр. тѣмъ, что неосуществленіе какой-лидо низшей положительной цѣнности (скажемъ, сытости) ведетъ за собою появленіе разрушительныхъ отрицательныхъ цѣнностей (болѣзни, сметри и т. п.)” (Lossky 1931, 121). Scheler also speaks in terms of “positive and negative values” (*positiven und negativen Werten*) in Scheler 1916a, 368 ff.

116 “ученіе Н. Гартмана о наличіи двухъ законовъ предпочтенія: о предпочтеніи цѣнности въ зависимости отъ ея высоты и предпочтеніи цѣнности въ зависимости отъ ея силы” (Lossky 1931, 121).

117 “Согласно закону, установленному М. Шелером и Н. Гартманом, чем более ценно какое либо бытие, тем более оно хрупко, тем более оно зависит от бытия, низшего по своей ценности” (Lossky 1949, 201).

118 “die kategorialen Gesetze als solche eine genetische Auffassung der Schichtenfolge durchaus zulassen” (Hartmann 1942, 286–287). See also: Hartmann 1942, 284.

[a]ll teleological thinking is axiologically determined, because the being-a-finality of a content is necessarily rooted in its quality of having a value. So, by implication, a teleological worldview gives categorial primacy to values rather than to ontological principles, and allows the latter to be determined by the former.¹¹⁹

But there is no reason why the *ens perfectissimum* should be prior to the *ens realissimum*, or why the axiological principle should also be the principle of everything else (Hartmann 1926, 152). Axiology does not have priority over the strictly ontological matters of the real sphere (Hartmann 1926, 153).

Scheler was much closer to Lossky than he was to Hartmann with regards to his cosmogenetic conception. As Hartmann writes in his obituary of Scheler, “[a]ccording to him, the secret of the world was a world-development on a grand scale, from the alogical and blind urge for being up to the fulfilling of value and meaning in pure spiritual being. But this was also at the same time the secret of the divine essence, because he understood this very process as the becoming of God in the world”.¹²⁰ Yet, with his characteristic constant inconsistency, on this issue Scheler nevertheless sided with Hartmann in “Die Sonderstellung des Menschen”, where he says that Hartmann very aptly stated the same thought as his own with regards to “the untenable nonsense of a so-called ‘teleological’ worldview, which has dominated the entire theistic philosophy of the West”.¹²¹

Hartmann further argues – in *Ethik* as well as in other places – that within a teleologically-determined world, the gift of freedom would be wasted, because in such a world there would be no wiggle room for freedom of choice; in such a world even the smallest decisions would be predetermined by the final cause, and such freedom would only be an apparent one:

The metaphysical primacy of the axiological determination implies a perfect determinism, in which man is deprived of all wiggle room for any determination that could come from

119 “Alles teleologische Denken ist axiologisch bedingt, denn das Zwecksein eines Inhaltes wurzelt notwendig in seinem Wertcharakter. Ein teleologisches Weltbild also gibt ohne weiteres den Werten den kategorialen Primat vor den Seinsprinzipien, läßt diese durch jene bedingt sein” (Hartmann 1924, 134).

120 “Eine Weltentwicklung großen Stils, vom alogischen und blinden Seinsdrang bis hinauf zur Wert- und Sinnerfüllung im reinen geistigen Sein, schwebte ihm als das Geheimnis der Welt vor. Zugleich aber auch als das Geheimnis des göttlichen Wesens. Denn eben diesen Prozeß verstand er als das Werden Gottes in der Welt” (Hartmann 1928, xiv).

121 “dem haltlosen Un-Sinn einer sogenannten ‘teleologischen’ Weltanschauung, wie sie die gesamte theistische Philosophie des Abendlandes beherrscht” (Scheler 1927, 219). This passage is also to be found on page 60 of the 1947 re-edited version published under the title *Die Stellung des Menschen im Kosmos*.

himself. The finalistic nexus determines differently from the causal nexus; it fixes the ends, thus the results of all processes, in advance. Against such determination, a finite being such as man, embedded in the cosmic process itself, cannot rise up. He is over his head unconditionally at the mercy of his bondage to the fixed goals of the world.¹²²

Lossky replied to Hartmann's criticism by saying that his

objections against world-teleology, in particular his assertion that world-teleology would take away from man the power of determining anything, because in such a case everything would have been predetermined for him, are unconvincing, because in discussing this issue he has in mind only two possibilities: teleological determinism and causal determinism. He misses the third possibility: free purposive activity, i.e., an indeterministic teleology in which it is possible to have wrong aims, unsuccessful attempts, trials, falling into blind alleys, with a return to the same position for new attempts, etc.¹²³

Moreover, it is the above-mentioned law of strength that, for Hartmann, makes freedom possible. And, in *Freedom of Will* (1932), Lossky accepts Hartmann's conception of the relationship between the lower and higher levels as well as of the possibility of categorial freedom, which is the relative freedom that categories of a higher stratum enjoy over the categories of lower strata. He explains that

inanimate nature with its mechanical uniformity enters as a component part into the system of animate nature that is determined biologically. The higher categories do not cancel the lower but give the lower realm new forms, creating new syntheses wherever the lower system leaves room for it. The lower realm is raised to a higher level through *Überformung*

122 “Ein solcher metaphysischer Primat der axiologischen Determination bedeutet aber einen vollkommenen Determinismus, in welchem dem Menschen der Spielraum für jede von ihm ausgehende Determination benommen ist. Der Finalnexus determiniert ja anders als der Kausalnexus; er legt die Ziele, also die Resultate aller Prozesse, zum Voraus fest. Gegen solche Festlegung kann ein endliches, in den Weltprozeß selbst eingebettetes Wesen wie der Mensch nicht mehr aufkommen. Er ist der über seinen Kopf weg bestehenden Bindung an die festgelegten Weltzwecke bedingungslos ausgeliefert” (Hartmann 1926, 184). For the full criticism, see: Hartmann 1926, 183–184. See also: Hartmann 1953, 435.

123 “Возраженія Н. Гартманна противъ міровой телеологіи, между прочимъ, утверженіе его, что міровая телеологія отняла бы у человѣка силу детерминировать что бы то ни было, такъ какъ и безъ него все напередъ было бы предопредѣлено, не убѣдительно, такъ какъ при обсужденіи этого вопроса онъ имѣетъ въ виду только двѣ возможности – телеологическій детерминизмъ и причинный детерминизмъ, упуская изъ виду третью возможность – свободную цѣлестремительность, т. е. индетерминистическую телеологію, при которой возможна постановка ложныхъ цѣлей, неудачныя попытки, пробы, попаданія въ тупикъ, возвраты на прежнія позиціи для новыхъ попытокъ и т. п.” (Lossky 1931, 127–128).

or *Überdeterminierung* by the higher categories. The higher realm is something new in relation to the lower, which does not oppose new forms imposed upon it; in this sense, the higher may be said to be free in relation to the lower. This is precisely what categorial freedom means: it is not the absence of law, but a plurality of necessary determinations, the higher of which do not cancel the lower but combine them in an infinite number of new ways. In that sense they are free in relation to the lower and contain ‘the law of freedom’ (*Gesetz der Freiheit*) (Lossky 1932, 132–133).¹²⁴

Yet Lossky accuses Hartmann’s theory of freedom of failing to be what it claims to be, namely a theory of freedom. He considers that Hartmann’s theory “is really a species of the most thoroughgoing determinism” (Lossky 1932, 133). Because, on his view, Lossky says,

everything is determined through and through. Moral freedom is, according to N. Hartmann, merely a special variety of categorial freedom and may be described as follows. Man’s empirical will is determined in two ways: from without (by external conditions) and from within (by motives, feelings, etc.) (Lossky 1932, 132–133).

This kind of freedom, Lossky objects, can only be a mere *titulus sine re*, i.e., a mere name without reality (Lossky 1932, 134). So, both Lossky and Hartmann ended up accusing each other of determinism on different grounds.

We have seen that, despite these disagreements, Lossky borrowed from the *Schichtenlehre* of Scheler and Hartmann, and especially from that of the latter. But, once more, the borrowing was probably not unilateral. Hartmann was himself most likely already under the influence of the Solovyovian and Losskyan theory of the realms (царств) of being ever since his studies in Saint Petersburg.¹²⁵ Solovyov divided the world into five more or less discrete realms corresponding to the five stages of the cosmic process ascending toward perfection: the mineral or inorganic realm, the vegetal realm, the animal realm, the realm of natural-humanity, and the realm of divino-humanity (Solovyov 1899, 238). Since these are teleological stages of re-ascension of the fallen man from the depths of nonbeing and evil toward Being and the absolute Good, they also thereby consist in stages in an axiomatic hierarchy of positive and negative values, where monads evolve or devolve depending on the choices that they make in selecting values. Selecting positive values

¹²⁴ This passage consists in an addendum that is absent from the Russian original (*Свобода воли*, 1927).

¹²⁵ For a presentation of Solovyov’s theory of *Seinsstufen* by Lossky, who adopted the latter, see: Lossky 1930. For a comparison of Solovyov’s theory of the realms of being with Hartmann’s theory of the levels of reality, and for an argument in favor of the probability of an influence, see: Tremblay 2017a.

(e.g., altruism) leads to evolution (i.e., re-ascension), whereas selecting negative ones (e.g., selfishness) leads to devolution. Solovyov distinguished four ordered ranks of values in *Critique of Abstract Principles* (*Критика отвлеченных началъ*, 1880), each one of which is a necessary step: “first, the human being’s material pleasure as an animal organism; second, aesthetical enjoyment; third, intellectual enjoyment, and finally, fourth, the enjoyment of the will or properly moral enjoyment”.¹²⁶ Lossky largely espoused Solovyov’s theory of the realms of being and of its concomitant hierarchy of values as testifies his *Freedom of Will* (*Свобода воли*, 1927, esp. 170–174).

Early acquaintance with this worldview most likely played a formative role in the development of Hartmann’s theories of ontological and axiological levels. And this probable influence well predates the one that Scheler’s theory of the strata of values could have had on Hartmann. Eugene Kelly expressed surprise that

Hartmann uses the word ‘stratum’, which clearly refers to Scheler’s phenomenology of the stratification of emotional life without crediting him for the insight. He may be borrowing the term from his own ontological notion of levels or strata, but that is from another context, and its use does not apply here (Kelly 2011, 221).

But, on the one hand, as we have just seen, Hartmann had other, earlier sources and, on the other hand, it was not uncommon at the time to apply the *Schichtenlehre* to a wide range of contexts.¹²⁷ It was also customary to omit mentioning influences beyond the top-ten philosophers (Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Hegel, etc.). So, it seems natural that Hartmann would have tried to apply the *Schichtenlehre* to his axiological research without crediting anyone, as he also did in fact in his works on aesthetics (Hartmann 1927, 432; Hartmann 1953, esp. Chap. 11–15).

126 “Мы находимъ въ опытѣ что человѣку свойственны наслажденія или удовольствія четырехъ родовъ: вопервыхъ, матеріальныя наслажденія человѣка какъ животнаго организма; вовторыхъ, наслажденія эстетическія; втретьихъ, наслажденія умственныя, и наконецъ вчетвертыхъ – наслажденія воли или наслажденія собственно-нравственныя” (Solovyov 1880, 19). For a brief comparison of Solovyov’s ranks of values with Scheler’s *ordo amoris*, see: Dahm 1975, 127–135.

127 See, for instance, volume 9 of the journal *Studium Generale* edited by Karl Bauer *et al.*, which was entirely devoted to the *Schichtenlehre* and its application to the various sciences, including meteorology, geology, ethnology, psychology, the theory of personhood, characterology, history, law, economy, etc. Many of the authors contributing to this volume were, in fact, under the influence of Hartmann’s *Schichtenlehre*.

Conclusion

To sum up, in his works on freewill and axiology Lossky relies on Scheler and Hartmann for their ontological realism with regards to values, as well as on their gnoseological theories of the intuition of values. Concerning their ontological definitions of the word “value”, Lossky thinks that they approach the truth more than the other contemporary definitions, because they take values to be on the side of the valued goods (and not on that of the subject or of the relation between the subject and the object). Yet he considers that they have the disadvantage of depriving beings of their intrinsic worth. For Lossky, beings are themselves values and *vice versa*. Since, for him, the plenitude of being is also the plenitude of positive values, and since this state is yet to be realized, his axiology implies a teleological scale of values *à la* medieval *scala naturae* with an evolutionary spin. For this scale of values, he stands on the shoulders of Scheler and Hartmann. But with regards to the teleological aspect, he criticizes Hartmann’s “new ontology”, which he accuses of not being new at all, but of being just “the old ontology of naturalism” (Lossky 1954, 163).

Kelly claimed that a comparison of the theories of values of Scheler and Hartmann is profitable, because “in ethics the doctrines of the two men supplement each other and are generally consistent with the thought on ethics of at least two of their contemporaries, Husserl and [Dietrich] von Hildebrand” (Kelly 2011, 233). Given the overall similarities between the theories of values of Scheler, Hartmann, and Lossky, I think that the latter’s name could be added to this list. In comparing Scheler, Hartmann, Husserl, and Hildebrand, Kelly was seeking to construct a “philosophical platform upon which the work of axiology, deontology, virtue-theory, and social philosophy can be fruitfully conducted” (Kelly 2011, 233). From what we have seen, it appears that Lossky’s work on axiology, too, could have something to contribute to such a project.

But Lossky’s significance may not lie solely in the mere similarities and differences that his axiology has with those of Scheler and Hartmann; it lies also in the potential influence that it had on them, and thus in the potential that it has in explaining the historical genesis of their views. Although Lossky borrows from Scheler and Hartmann, the borrowing may not have been as unilateral as it might seem at first glance. The Hartmannian theses on which Lossky relies might very well have been suggested to Hartmann at the outset of his philosophical development by the intuitivism that Lossky defended – among other places – in *Foundations of Intuitivism: Propaedeutic to the Theory of Knowledge* (*Обоснование интуитивизма: Пропедевтическая теория знания*), which was already

published in 1906, and which was also published as a series of articles in the journal *Questions of Philosophy and Psychology* (*Вопросы философии и психологии*) in 1904 and 1905 (i.e., precisely when Hartmann was studying in Saint Petersburg, well before the publication of the first part of Scheler's *Formalismus* in 1913). Hartmann – who could read Russian – expressed in print adhesion to a Losskyan-style intuitivism at least as early as 1921 in *Grundzüge einer Metaphysik der Erkenntnis* (Chap. 18, §. “Deskriptiver Apriorismus und Intuitivismus”) – a book that, I might add, Scheler “valued highly”, if we are to believe Hans-Georg Gadamer's recollections in *Philosophische Lehrjahre*.¹²⁸

Lossky himself noted the possibility that his intuitivism had exerted an influence on Scheler. In *History of Russian Philosophy*, he writes: “Russian young men studying philosophy in Germany were in lively contact both with their teachers and with the German students, and imparted to them information about Russian philosophy. It may therefore be said that at that time not only the German philosophy affected the Russian, but also Russian ontologism and intuitivism began to influence the German. This probably is the source of the ‘emotional intuitivism’ in M. Scheler's theory of values.” (Lossky 1952, 319)

In a brief article on Lossky, Eugene Assmann – who was a personal acquaintance of Lossky and Hartmann – said that Lossky had been a source of inspiration for *both* Scheler and Hartmann: “That he was a source of inspiration for contemporary German philosophy, one can see from his relations with Max Scheler and Nicolai Hartmann. This is especially true of Lossky's early contribution to gnoseological intuitivism and critical ontology”.¹²⁹ That Lossky exerted an influence on Hartmann is becoming increasingly conspicuous as the scholarship grows on this subject. That Lossky had been a “source of inspiration” for Scheler, however, is a more unexpected claim, although one that could have considerable explanatory power. If Assmann is correct, i.e., if Lossky's intuitivism

128 Gadamer relates the following anecdote about Scheler: “It is said that his reading so devoured him that whenever he met a colleague he would compel his participation simply by ripping pages out of whatever book he was reading and pressing them into their hands. In this way, he is said to have used up several copies of Nicolai Hartmann's *Metaphysik der Erkenntnis*, which he valued highly” (“Man erzählt sich, daß die jeweilige Lektüre, die er verschlang, ihn so einnahm, daß er Kollegen, die er traf, dadurch zur Teilnahme zwang, daß er aus dem Buch, das er las, ganze Bögen einfach herausriß, um sie dem Überraschten in die Hand zu drücken. Von Nicolai Hartmanns ‘Metaphysik der Erkenntnis’, die er sehr schätzte, soll er auf diese Weise mehrere Exemplare verbraucht haben”) (Gadamer 1977, 77).

129 “Daß er der zeitgenössischen deutschen Philosophie einige Anregungen zu bieten hatte, erfährt man aus seinen Beziehungen zu Max Scheler und Nicolai Hartmann. Dies gilt insbesondere für Losskys frühe Zuwendung zum gnoseologischen Intuitivismus und zur kritischen Ontologie” (Assmann 1961, 50).

also exerted an influence on Scheler, it would be no wonder, then, that Lossky found in the latter's works so many points of contact with his own philosophy.

An unacknowledged influence from Lossky unto Scheler's *Formalismus*, especially with regards to the theory of intuition, is indeed conceivable; some of Lossky's works on intuitivism and cognate topics had already been published in German translation prior to the publication of the first part of *Formalismus* (which was published in the *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung* in 1913). These works include *Die Grundlehren der Psychologie vom Standpunkte des Voluntarismus* (1904), the fifth chapter of which (entitled "Die Intuition") is devoted to the theory of intuition, *Die Grundlegung des Intuitivismus* (1908a), "Thesen zur Grundlegung des Intuitivismus" (1908b), "Die Erkenntnis und das Problem des Erkenntnisursprungs" (1911), and "Die logische und die psychologische Seite der bejahenden und verneinenden Urteile" (1912).

Moreover, Scheler wrote a positive review – published in 1914 – of the first volume of Thomas Masaryk's book on Russian philosophy (*Zur russischen Geschichts- und Religionsphilosophie*, 1913), in which, I should add, Scheler mentions Solovyov. Scheler also mentioned Solovyov in 1927 in a speech entitled "Der Mensch im Zeitalter des Ausgleichs" (Scheler 1929, 67), where he sought support in the latter's conception of the "eternal feminine" or "divine Sophia". In fact, Scheler mentioned Solovyov in more or less seven places throughout his work.¹³⁰ We may thus surmise that, despite his remarks about the differences between the Germanic and Slavic cultures in general in his books on war (Scheler 1915b; Scheler 1916b), Scheler may have been, at the time, nourishing an interest in Russian philosophy. And Hartmann could certainly have introduced the philosophy of his Russian teacher to his German colleague, especially given the concordances between their reciprocal philosophies. So, if Assmann is right, Lossky may only have taken back what Scheler borrowed from him in the first place, and the influence may not have been as unidirectional as Joseph Navickas paints it to be in his study of Lossky and Scheler (Navickas 1978). And, since Lossky was a follower of Solovyov, this could also help explaining the "striking similarities" (Shein 1976, 357) between the philosophies (especially the gno-seologies) of Solovyov and Scheler, which have been extensively studied by Helmut Dahm in *Vladimir Solovyev and Max Scheler: Attempt at a Comparative Interpretation* (1975).

130 For a list with references, see: Dahm 1975, 177–178. Dahm lists only six occurrences, but he omitted Scheler's review of Masaryk's *Zur russischen Geschichts- und Religionsphilosophie* (Scheler 1914).

It is tempting to seek an influence with regards to the theory of emotional intuition in Husserl. But, on the one hand, as Manfred Frings says, Scheler has falsely been labeled as a student of Husserl and remained independent from the phenomenological movement his whole life (Frings 2002, 172). And, when Husserl and Scheler met in person and had their first live discussion, they “both realized they had expanded the phenomenological notion of intuition independently of each other” (Frings 2002, 173). On the other hand, Husserl was not the only other philosopher developing a theory of intuition at the time (e.g., Bergson) and, in fact, the emphasis on intuition was much stronger in Lossky. The same could be said also of the distinction between real and ideal being.¹³¹ At any rate, the importance of Lossky for twentieth-century philosophy has certainly been unintentionally downplayed. We might not go so far as to say, with Sergei Levitzky, that “[n]o true philosopher can avoid studying Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Hegel, and – last but not least – Lossky” (Levitzky 1963, 82). But the father of Russian intuitivism certainly deserves to be paid greater attention, even if only from the point of view of intellectual history.

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¹³¹ For a comparison of Bergson and Lossky with a focus on the issues of intuition, ideal being, and real being, see: Tremblay 2017c.

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