Abstract

Structuralism, as I will use the term, is the view that phenomenal character is fully determined by the similarity relations between experiences – that, for instance, the way an orange experience feels is entirely a matter of its relational profile within the space of color experiences. This theory has been criticized because it seems to leave out what is sometimes referred to as the intrinsic character of experience. However, these critiques have failed to convince numerous scholars, largely due to their reliance on intuition, a tool that many consider unreliable. Here, I present two objections to structuralism that rest on firmer ground. The starting point is certain structural features of color experience that are widely accepted in the science and philosophy of color, despite some criticisms that I discuss and reject. Then, playing the structuralist game through and through, I defend the claim that the structure of color experience is incompatible with structuralism, which is ironic if one considers that structuralism should be expected to account at least for the structural features of experience. I formulate two arguments to show this incompatibility: one focusing on the unique hues (red, green, yellow, and blue), and a second focusing on the rule regulating how the pure colors (red, green, yellow, blue, black, and white) combine in the composite colors. I consider some possible counterarguments, provide rebuttals, and conclude that structuralism should be rejected.