When Justice Feels Good: Moral Anger, Pleasure, and the Governance of Dissent

Abstract

This article develops the concept of 'manufacture of dissent ' and ‘moral outrage networks ’ to explain how righteous anger is transformed from a morally oriented response to injustice into a managed, pleasurable, and self-reinforcing form of dissent within digital media environments. Drawing on moral philosophy, psychology, neuroscience, religious ethics, and media sociology, the article argues that righteous anger possesses a distinctive affective appeal rooted in both evolutionary alarm mechanisms and reward-related neural processes. Moral anger not only signals norm violation and motivates corrective action; it also restores a sense of agency, reinforces moral identity, and produces emotional gratification. This hedonic dimension helps explain why righteous anger is difficult to relinquish, even when it no longer leads to effective action or repair. The article traces how digital platforms amplify this dynamic by rewarding outrage with visibility, affirmation, and social belonging, converting moral judgement into a repeatable emotional loop. Through analyses of moral panic, indignation, addiction-like outrage patterns, and distinctions between righteous and entitled anger, the article shows how ethical concern can be redirected toward performative condemnation and identity formation. Classical and religious traditions on anger, alongside Aristotelian moderation, are revisited to demonstrate that the moral value of anger depends not on its intensity but on its orientation, limits, and willingness to dissolve once justice is pursued. The article concludes that contemporary media systems increasingly govern dissent not by suppressing anger, but by sustaining its pleasurable form, detaching moral energy from responsibility and embedding outrage within the political economy of attention.

Author's Profile

Peter Ayolov
Sofia University

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Added to PP
2026-02-01

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