Abstract

A comprehensive analysis of the history of science requires careful consideration of a concept’s origin, scope, application, impact, and defining characteristics. Without a systematic historical inquiry, any resulting interpretation may be inaccurate, leading to a distorted understanding of the scientific past. In this study, we examine the concept of impetus -an idea that occupies a significant position in the history of science- by addressing its development, usage, implications, and theoretical foundations. The notions of impetus and separate forced motion emerged as conceptual challenges within Aristotle’s natural philosophy, particularly demanding clarification during Late Antiquity and the Middle Ages. Although attempts to elucidate these issues extended over centuries, the prevailing historical narrative credits Buridan in the 14th century with their definitive resolution. Despite the broad acceptance of this view, we argue that Avicenna is a crucial yet insufficiently recognized figure. Long before Buridan, Avicenna provided a conceptual framework that explained the operation of separate forced motion and effectively addressed the associated problem. Accordingly, this study aims to demonstrate -contrary to dominant accounts in the historiography of science and from the joint perspectives of the history and philosophy of science -that Avicenna offered a coherent and comprehensive account of both separate forced motion and the impetus problem well before Buridan, and that any discussion of impetus should begin not with Buridan, but with Avicenna.