Abstract

In this paper I investigate the relationship between moral bioenhancement and the actual-sequence account of moral responsibility (AS). I first provide definitions of the notions of moral bioenhancement and moral responsibility that I use in this paper, where these notions are based on the capacity definition put forward by DeGrazia (2012) and the guidance theory account of responsibility developed by Fischer and Ravizza (1998) respectively. I then address some shortcomings in these accounts and offer improvements. Thereafter, I explore the relationship between them along two dimensions: backward-looking and forward-looking responsibility. On the backward-looking path I contend that, when assessed through the lens of the AS, moral bioenhancement is permissible only provided that it does not override or degrade the reasonsresponsiveness of the enhanced agent. However, if these conditions are met, such enhancement will in many cases be normatively desirable, and in perhaps some cases –when the foreseen threat of harm resulting from the absence of enhancement is sufficiently great– even obligatory. Along the forward-looking track, I argue that moral bioenhancement is permissible, ceteris paribus, and normatively desirable given there is a pro tanto reason to pursue promotions of reasons-responsiveness. Finally, I argue that the demands of moral responsibility do not – on their own terms – rule out the possibility that moral bioenhancement can sometimes be obligatory.