Abstract

This paper reconstructs and critically evaluates Robert Nozick’s entitlement theory of justice as presented in Anarchy, State, and Utopia. Rejecting patterned and end-state principles of distribution, Nozick argues that justice in holdings depends exclusively on historical processes of just acquisition and voluntary transfer. Through his critique of patterned principles and his defense of self-ownership, Nozick contends that redistributive taxation beyond the minimal functions of the state constitutes an unjust form of coercion analogous to forced labor. The paper argues that Nozick’s entitlement theory offers a powerful and morally illuminating defense of individual liberty and voluntary exchange, successfully exposing the tension between liberty and distributive patterns. At the same time, it contends that the theory relies on idealized assumptions about historical acquisition, background justice, and social cooperation that limit its plausibility in non-ideal conditions. The paper concludes that while Nozick provides a stringent constraint on state action and a compelling critique of redistribution, his entitlement theory falls short as a comprehensive account of distributive justice in societies shaped by structural inequality and historical injustice.