Abstract

Many foundational concepts in machine learning have been criticized as inadequate. Philosophers have therefore taken it upon themselves to sort out the conceptual terrain—with conceptual engineering being the method of choice. This paper takes a step back to provide theoretical and methodological grounding for future work on conceptual engineering in machine learning. To this end, we consider the functional roles of concepts in machine learning, the underlying causes and types of deficiency, and map out criteria for the successful propagation of reengineered concepts within and beyond the machine learning community. Moreover, we discuss how the space of viable conceptual revisions in machine learning is constrained by the need for operationalization, and how tensions can occur between the sociopolitical desirability and the computational implementability of relevant conceptual engineering projects. Overall, our goal is to delineate how conceptual work in philosophy ought to be if the goal is for our contribution to permeate through the science and practice of machine learning.