Against Adoption‐Based Objections to Procreation

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 105 (4):541-554 (2024)
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Abstract

Many philosophers and members of the public think it is wrong to procreate. If one wants children, it is permissible to adopt. But procreation is allegedly impermissible because there is some respect in which adoption is better than procreation. There are two prominent variants of such objections. First, we have a duty to help others. Adopting a child from a poor country satisfies that duty. But procreation does not. Second, adding another person to a wealthy nation through procreation contributes to climate change. But adopting does not. I show that such objections are unsound.

Author's Profile

Scott Hill
Wichita State University

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