Honesty and Bad Faith

Political Philosophy (forthcoming)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

An appealing account of dishonesty subsumes it under the paradigm of lying. However, the account faces clear trouble from a wide range of cases, including cases of bullshit and brazen dishonesty. Such cases show not only that lying is inessential to dishonesty but also that honesty requires more than the absence of dishonesty. We propose an alternative account grounded in norms associated with games. On our account, dishonesty is better understood in terms of cheating or of breaking the rules of a game; being honest requires upholding those rules.

Author Profiles

Nathan Robert Howard
University of Toronto, St. George Campus
N. G. Laskowski
University of Maryland, College Park

Analytics

Added to PP
2026-01-22

Downloads
108 (#115,577)

6 months
108 (#82,945)

Historical graph of downloads since first upload
This graph includes both downloads from PhilArchive and clicks on external links on PhilPapers.
How can I increase my downloads?