Abstract

Many meta-ethical theorists have proposed solutions to ‘the problem of Creeping Minimalism’, i.e., the problem that expressivism appears to lose its distinctiveness relative to realism when expressivists adopt minimalism. In this paper, I categorise potential solutions to the problem of Creeping Minimalism into three types: to reject minimalism outright, to accept minimalism in part, and to reinterpret expressivism within a global minimalist semantics. Mainstream solutions in the literature fall into the third category. I argue that those solutions fail for the same reason. That is, the semantics in which they reinterpret expressivism is not minimalist. Those solutions will collapse once we adopt a minimalist approach to essential notions, such as explanation, representation, and truth-making. My conclusion is thus that, so far, mainstream solutions to the problem of Creeping Minimalism by reinterpreting expressivism within a global minimalist semantics have failed, and it is unlikely that a successful solution of the same type will be forthcoming.