Abstract

Many philosophers hold that at least one necessary condition for a picture to depict an object is that the picture’s maker held a relevant intention regarding that object appearing in the picture. This is called the “intentional standard of correctness.” In this paper, I argue that AI-generated synthetic images provide strong counterexamples to the intentional standard of correctness. I then argue that we have three possible routes for a theory of depiction in synthetic images: (1) a non-intentionalist theory of depiction, (2) an alternative intentionalist theory of depiction, or (3) synthetic images do not depict anything. I explore each of these options. First, I argue that non-intentionalist views of depiction still face serious counterexamples from synthetic images in addition to other well-known problems. Second, I consider several potential routes for an alternative intentionalist account of depiction for synthetic images, raising doubts about their plausibility. Finally, I argue that while depictive eliminativism for synthetic images avoids troubling counterexamples, it carries counterintuitive implications, including for our ethical practices. I thus argue that none of these options satisfactorily accounts for depiction in synthetic images. I end by providing a diagnosis of why synthetic images in particular pose challenges for a theory of depiction.