Abstract

Some scholars have lauded “decapitation tactics” as a legitimate approach by countries such as Nigeria, the United States of America, and Israel in their struggle against the expansion and influence of terrorist groups. The decapitation tactic implies, basically, three routes: killing, capturing, or capturing and then killing the leader(s) of terrorist cells. Through a critical analysis of the arguments for such a tactic, this article contends that the approach will not stem the proliferation of terrorist groups. The elimination of the leader(s) of terrorist groups does not play a decisive role in mitigating terrorism but has rather contributed to its surge in places with links to cells like Al-Qaeda. Also, the article defends the position that it is morally unjustified to kill terrorist leaders without a fair trial in a competent court of law. Using Boko Haram and Hamas as illustrations, the article contends that targeted killings subvert the existence and essence of the criminal justice system. Taking inspiration from deterrence theory, this article suggests that the decapitation tactic has served as a basis for escalation and proliferation of terrorist groups rather than serving as deterrence against the possibility of recurrence.