Excuse, Capacity and Convention

In Maximilian Kiener, The Routledge Handbook of Philosophy of Responsibility. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge. pp. 299-310 (2023)
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Abstract

There are considerations – excuses – which reduce or eliminate responsibility for wrongdoing and so shield us from blame without casting doubt on the wrongfulness of our conduct. Many think that these excuses reflect the agent's incapacity to do the right thing in the face of duress, provocation, exhaustion etc. I shall suggest that the crucial thing is rather how much control one ought to exercise over one’s action, a requirement specified in a standard of culpability. This standard is distinct from the rules of conduct that determine what is right or wrong and it is often conventional. For example, social roles like that of soldier, engineer or parent have distinctive standards of culpability as well as rules of conduct associated with them and it is these standards which determine the range of excuses available to those who breach the rules of conduct.

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