Abstract

This paper examines Ibn Taymiyya’s (1263–1328) critique of the Aristotelian logical tradition, with a particular focus on his theory of definition (ḥadd). Ibn Taymiyya argues that Aristotelian logic, premised upon fixed metaphysical categories, fails to serve as a practical instrument for epistemic inquiry and knowledge production, as it claims. Ibn Taymiyya’s critique can be divided into two main classes: general and metaphysical. His general criticisms undermine the validity of Aristotelian definitions through multiple dialectical arguments such as regress, disagreement, and redundancy, showing that definitions are not epistemically useful. His metaphysical criticisms, on the other hand, strike at the foundations of Peripatetic metaphysics by rejecting the distinctions between a) quiddity and its existence, and between b) essential and concomitant predicates. I have also argued that Ibn Taymiyya’s position cannot be reduced to nominalism, empiricism, or conventionalism. Rather, his theory of meaning aligns more closely with modern pragmatics, wherein speech acts derive their meaning from their communicative, intentional, and contextual functions.