Abstract

This paper demonstrates that experience is the complete ground of all possible inquiry. Through four converging lines of argument, we show that (1) all data is experiential, (2) all meaning requires experiencers, (3) the logic of "outside experience" collapses into incoherence, and (4) asking what causes experience commits the same category error as asking why 1+1=2. These arguments establish that experience is not merely epistemically foundational but logically primordial. Any attempt to ground experience in something more fundamental uses experiential tools to deny the primacy of those tools, committing performative contradiction. This recognition dissolves persistent confusions in philosophy by revealing that questions like "what causes experience?" or "why does experience have structure?" mistake features intrinsic to experiencing for effects requiring external explanation. Building on Experiential Empiricism's axiomatic framework (Sergent, n.d.), we demonstrate that the appropriate response to experience's primacy is not constructing explanatory ontologies but recognizing that all ontological claims are themselves patterns within the experiential field they purport to explain.