Abstract

This chapter examines the longstanding philosophical issue of how to define sport. It begins by presenting the challenge that there may be no single set of necessary and jointly sufficient conditions, which adequately captures the meaning and range of activities commonly grouped under the term, including McBride’s argument that both the intension and extension of ‘sport’ are inherently vague, rendering attempts to produce a classical definition futile. For contrast, the chapter presents Suits’ influential account, according to which sports are goal-directed, rule-bound, voluntarily hindered, physical skill-based activities with stable popularity. To scrutinize Suits’ classical account, the chapter provides an overview of a wide array of “hard cases”, and shows how these cases generate persistent ambiguities for Suits’ conditions, particularly with respect to rule-boundedness, the nature and degree of physical skill, and the relevance of popularity or historical stability. The chapter argues, that some ambiguities and disagreements arise because participants rely on different notions of what it is to define, and distinguishes four types of definitions: idealist, lexical, stipulative, and explicative. It further argues that differences in the approach to defining are often motivated by the practical purposes a definition of sports serves. The chapter concludes that definitions remain useful tools for structuring inquiry and clarifying arguments, but cannot by themselves resolve normative questions concerning how various activities should be labelled or treated. Instead, clarity about the purpose of a definition, and humility regarding its limits, are essential for productive conceptual analysis of sport.