Abstract

Suppose soldiers invade your community, murder your loved ones, burn homes, and commit unspeakable atrocities without hesitation. As you still struggle to comprehend the horror, you are told that your attackers should not be blamed, for they, too, are victims—of war’s psychological toll, which has stripped them of the clarity necessary for moral agency. According to John Doris and Dominic Murphy (2007), war impairs soldiers to such an extent that their actions, though horrific, are not fully their own. Conditioned by combat stressors and rendered morally blind, such soldiers should not be blamed for the atrocities they commit. This paper challenges that conclusion. I argue that Doris and Murphy’s framework dissolves responsibility precisely when it is most appropriate—when the atrocities unfold. Their account shifts focus away from victims and onto perpetrators, treating soldiers as passive instruments of circumstance rather than as moral agents. First, I challenge their claim that war erases moral agency, demonstrating that even in combat, soldiers exhibit moral selectivity. Second, I argue that their framework erases the victim’s perspective, prioritizing the wrongdoer’s cognitive state over the reality of those they harm. Third, I point the flaws in their distinction between excusing conditions and unjustified exemptions.