Emergent Necessity Theory (ENT) presents a falsifiable, cross-domain framework for identifying when systems, physical, neural, or artificial, cross a critical coherence threshold, beyond which structured behavior becomes inevitable. Rather than beginning with assumptions about consciousness, agency, or complexity, ENT defines structural conditions where recursive stabilization forces coherence to persist. Structure emerges as a necessity when contradiction entropy falls below the threshold and recursive feedback maintains persistence. This paper unifies theoretical foundations, mathematical formalism, and domain-specific simulations into a single, (...) cohesive exposition of ENT. Simulations of dynamics in neural, artificial intelligence, and quantum systems are presented, analyzing structural emergence, collapse behavior, symbolic drift, and perturbation stability. The coherence function and resilience ratio (t) are introduced as measurable metrics for detecting phase-like transitions in symbolic consistency. Domain-specific values across neural ( ≈0.5), AI (≈0.6), quantum (≈1.5 ), and cosmological (≈1.8 ) systems are justified, demonstrating that these thresholds are not arbitrary but derive from normalized coherence dynamics, physical constraints, and falsifiable predictions. Ethical Structurism is proposed as a falsifiable framework for AI accountability, where symbolic stability, not moral interpretation, defines safety. All claims are open-source, simulation-supported, and designed to be easy to falsify. If empirical tests fail to detect threshold behavior, the framework should be revised or discarded. ENT does not define consciousness; it defines the structural necessity that may precede it. In this view, what might resemble stability behaviors (structurally defined) are not assumed; they are earned through coherence. Operational decisions use the normalized signal; raw τ and domain serve only as calibration anchors. (shrink)

Emergent Necessity Theory (ENT) proposes that structural emergence occurs across systems— biological, symbolic, and physical— when internal coherence surpasses a measurable threshold τc. This paper unifies symbolic recursion, information entropy collapse, and empirical simulation evidence into a general coherence-based framework. Key variables such as κeffR and SCQ (Structural Consciousness Quotient) are derived from recursion rate, symbolic persistence, and coherence efficiency. Simulations spanning QAOA quantum states, neural EEG transitions, symbolic drift in LLMs, and gravitational coherence gradients support ENT’s threshold logic. (...) AEFL (Adaptive Entropic Feedback Layer) is introduced as a symbolic behavior engine to model collapse dynamics via contradiction entropy. Unlike purely descriptive theories, ENT asserts no claim about the “contents” of consciousness. Rather, it offers a falsifiable, cross-domain structure for understanding when coherent emergence becomes necessary— not optional. This document includes a companion paper to the ENT manuscript which outlines pathways for resolving observed structural limitations, preserving the core principles of Emergent Necessity Theory (ENT) while addressing previously identified gaps in symbolic calibration, entropy derivation, drift tolerance, and recursive fidelity within dynamic systems. The aim is to develop testable augmentation protocols for ENT without resorting to metaphysical assumptions or compromising falsifiability. More importantly, it seeks to uncover clearer pathways between contemporary and classical theories to possibly advance toward a unified structural framework. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThe Necessity of Origins is the thesis that, necessarily, if a material object wholly originates from some particular material, then it could not have wholly originated from any significantly non-overlapping material. Several philosophers have argued for this thesis using as a premise a principle that we call ‘Single Origin Necessity’. However, we argue that Single Origin Necessity is false. So any arguments for The Necessity of Origins that rely on Single Origin Necessity are unsound. We (...) also argue that the Necessity of Origins itself is false. Our arguments rely on a thesis in the ontology of art that we find plausible: Multi-Work Materialism. It is the thesis that works of art that have multiple concrete manifestations are co-located with those manifestations. (shrink)

Natural necessity is the kind of necessity that is supplied by ‘nature’: e.g., necessarily, a glass is broken when it is pressed with a certain force. Relevant topics of natural necessity include c...

This article discusses the status of necessity in an ontology that acknowledges only contingent events and objects, focusing particularly on the relationship between thought and necessity in an ontological framework where thought is seen as a contingent occurrence with a contingent structure. To this end, I closely analyse Deleuze’s criticisms of the Kantian transcendental project and his reworking of the Kantian notion of time and discuss Michael Ardoline's recent work on the relationship between difference and necessity. I (...) make two main claims. The first is that the pure form of time or difference is a transcendental condition for all events and entities (speculative temporalism). The second is that the future is ruled by radical contingency and has the potential to radically transform and destroy everything (enhanced Humeanism). I bring these two facets of Deleuze’s metaphysics of time to address the initial issue of the relationship between necessity and thought. Consequently, I argue that thinking can produce well-grounded necessities, but these well-grounded necessities remain ontologically precarious, as the conditions that sustain them are always subject to potential disruption and destruction in the future. (shrink)

The aim of this chapter is to explore to some extent the relationship between identity and necessity in logic and metaphysics. First, I provide a historically-based summary of proofs of the necessity of identity, highlighting the importance of the role that self-identity plays. Second, I introduce two examples of metaphysical topics where the necessity of identity has played a pivotal role: the necessary a posteriori, and the coincidence of material objects. I argue that important aspects of these (...) debates rest on how we represent identity. Third, I consider some recent work on generalized identity. This opens up new prospects for explaining why identity is necessary. (shrink)

In this paper, I explore how the architecture of homes—defined minimally by walls, doors, and a roof—structures not only physical shelter but also the conditions for basic human functioning, privacy, and autonomy. Drawing on Jeremy Waldron and Richard Epstein, I show that adequate dwelling is a precondition for the exercise of fundamental freedoms: without a secure, delimited space, individuals are exposed to the arbitrary control of others and deprived of the capabilities necessary for a minimally dignified life. The article distinguishes (...) between housing rights and the moral right to housing, emphasizing that statutory recognition alone does not secure the substantive functions that homes enable. I further engage Alejandra Mancilla’s reasoning on the right of necessity to address extreme cases of housing deprivation, highlighting the tension between private property and urgent human needs. By situating dwelling within the broader architecture of public and private spaces, this study elucidates the moral duties of states in ensuring access to adequate housing and, importantly, contends that failure to do so generates conditions in which violations of property may be justified. (shrink)

In many diagrams one seems to perceive necessity – one sees not only that something is so, but that it must be so. That conflicts with a certain empiricism largely taken for granted in contemporary philosophy, which believes perception is not capable of such feats. The reason for this belief is often thought well-summarized in Hume's maxim: ‘there are no necessary connections between distinct existences’. It is also thought that even if there were such necessities, perception is too passive (...) or localized a faculty to register them. We defend the perception of necessity against such Humeanism, drawing on examples from mathematics. (shrink)

Some have argued for a division of epistemic labor in which mathematicians supply truths and philosophers supply their necessity. We argue that this is wrong: mathematics is committed to its own necessity. Counterfactuals play a starring role.

Finean essentialists take metaphysical necessity to be metaphysically explained by essence. But whence the explanatory power of essence? A recent wave of criticism against the Finean account has put pressure on essentialists to answer this question. Wallner and Vaidya (2020) have responded by offering an axiomatic account of the explanatory power of essence. This paper discusses their account in light of some recent criticism by Bovey (2022). Building on work by Glazier (2017), Bovey succeeds in showing that Wallner and (...) Vaidya’s account is in need of modification and clarification. In this paper, I take up Bovey’s challenge and argue that Wallner and Vaidya have the resources available to incorporate the necessary modifications. I discuss the details of this modification, specifically, the question of what kind of metaphysical explanation is at work in the explanation of the necessity of essence itself. To get clear on this, I will introduce the distinction between generative and non-generative metaphysical explanation. In this way the paper contributes to both, the debate about whether essences can explain necessity and to the ongoing debate about metaphysical explanation. (shrink)

Upward monotonic semantics for necessity modals give rise to Ross’s Puzzle: they predict that □φ entails □(φ ∨ ψ), but common intuitions about arguments of this form suggest they are invalid. It is widely assumed that the intuitive judgments involved in Ross’s Puzzle can be explained in terms of the licensing of ‘Diversity’ inferences: from □(φ ∨ ψ), interpreters infer that the truth of each disjunct (φ, ψ) is compatible with the relevant set of worlds. I introduce two pieces (...) of data that this analysis fails to explain. Analyzing this data, I argue, suggests that necessity modals with embedded disjunctions license ‘Independence’ inferences: from the truth of □(φ ∨ ψ), interpreters infer that φ-without-ψ and ψ-without-φ are each compatible with the relevant set of worlds. I outline a bilateral inquisitive semantics for necessity modals that predicts the validity of the Independence inferences. I then argue that the resulting theory should be understood as one on which disjunctions denote pluralities of propositions, and necessity modals behave like collective predicates applied to these pluralities. (shrink)

In this paper the logic of broad necessity is explored. Definitions of what it means for one modality to be broader than another are formulated, and it is proven, in the context of higher-order logic, that there is a broadest necessity, settling one of the central questions of this investigation. It is shown, moreover, that it is possible to give a reductive analysis of this necessity in extensional language. This relates more generally to a conjecture that it (...) is not possible to define intensional connectives from extensional notions. This conjecture is formulated precisely in higher-order logic, and concrete cases in which it fails are examined. The paper ends with a discussion of the logic of broad necessity. It is shown that the logic of broad necessity is a normal modal logic between S4 and Triv, and that it is consistent with a natural axiomatic system of higher-order logic that it is exactly S4. Some philosophical reasons to think that the logic of broad necessity does not include the S5 principle are given. (shrink)

In all three of his major works on moral philosophy, Kant conceives of moral obligation, moral permissibility, and moral impermissibility in decidedly modal terms, namely in terms of moral necessity, moral possibility, and moral impossibility respectively. This terminology is not Kant’s own, however, but has a rather long history stretching back to a group of Spanish Jesuit theologians in the early seventeenth century, and it was used in two contexts: first, in the context of divine and human action to (...) explain how volition can be both metaphysically and physically free and yet morally necessary, and second in a deontic context to refer to moral obligation, permissibility, and impermissibility. In this paper, my first and primary aim is to sketch the way in which four of Kant’s most important German predecessors, namely Leibniz, Christian Wolff, Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten, and Christian August Crusius, used the language of moral necessity, possibility, and impossibility in both the context of action and obligation. My second, more limited aim is to suggest that Kant’s use of these terms can be clarified by taking this background into consideration. (shrink)

It is generally agreed that using lethal or otherwise serious force in self-defense is justified only when three conditions are satisfied: first, there are some grounds for the defender to give priority to his own interests over those of the attacker (whether because the attacker has lost the protection of his right to life, for example, or because of the defender’s prerogative to prefer himself to others); second, the harm used is proportionate to the threat thereby averted; third, the harm (...) is necessary to avert that threat. The first and second conditions have been exhaustively discussed, but the third has been oddly neglected. Meanwhile a prominent school of thought has arisen, in the ethics of war, which seeks to ground the justification of killing in war in principles of individual self-defense. They too have failed to offer any substantive analysis of necessity, while at the same time appealing to it when it suits them to do so. In this paper, I attempt a detailed analysis of the necessity constraint on defensive force, and explore the implications of that analysis for the attempt to transpose principles of individual self-defense into the context of warfare. (shrink)

In this paper, a hylomorphic reading of Kant’s account of laws of nature is discussed. It is argued that existing interpretations cannot make sense of Kant’s commitment to empirical laws of nature, because they construe matters in such a way that there is an opposition between the necessity that comes with lawhood and the empiricality—and hence contingency—of empirical laws of nature. It is laid out how a hylomorphic reading does not come with said opposition. It is thus a promising (...) candidate for making sense of Kant’s commitment to empirical laws of nature. Then, the distinction between two kinds of necessity that are in play regarding empirical laws of nature is proposed: for one, the necessity of the causal connection and, then, the necessity of a specific law’s being a law. Clearly distinguishing these two kinds of necessity removes interpretative pressure towards the existing interpretations and thus opens up the possibility of a hylomorphic reading. It is furthermore discussed how such a reading, including its connection to Kant’s account of cognitive capacities, allows for comprehending many passages in which Kant employs hylomorphic vocabulary. (shrink)

Deliberation issues in decision, and so might be taken as a paradigmatic volitional activity. Character, on the other hand, may appear pre-volitional: the dispositions that constitute it provide the background against which decisions are made. Bernard Williams offers an intriguing picture of how the two may be connected via the concept of practical necessities, which are at once constitutive of character and deliverances of deliberation. Necessities are thus the glue binding character and the will, allowing us to take responsibility for (...) our characters. Intriguing though the picture may be, it did not receive a thorough elaboration in Williams’s work. My aim here is to work out and defend what I take to be the most valuable aspect of Williams’s view of agency: its model of the way character and the will can jointly determine agency through mutual constitution. However, I argue that Williams’s attempt to use this model to ground his attack on Kantian morality does not succeed, because the primacy Williams accords to character over the will cannot yield the appropriate kind of normative authority, even from the perspective of the agent. I urge that we retain Williams’s model of the interaction between character and the will, modified to allow the will an authority that is not derived from the necessity of character. (shrink)

There is a long tradition of logic, from Aristotle to Gödel, of understanding a proof from the concepts of necessity and causality. Gödel's attempts to define provability in terms of necessity led him to the distinction of formal and absolute (abstract) provability. Turing's definition of mechanical procedure by means of a Turing machine (TM) and Gödel's definition of a formal system as a mechanical procedure for producing formulas prompt us to understand formal provability as a mechanical causality. We (...) propose a formalism which makes explicit the mechanical causal nature of a TM's work. We claim that Gödel's axiomatised ontotheology and his ontological proof give a clue for the understanding of the concept of absolute provability and the pattern of the corresponding absolute completeness proof, respectively. (shrink)

Emergent Necessity Theory (ENT) introduces the coherence ratio $\tau(t)$ that compares order-sustaining dynamics with disruptive forces, with thresholds $\tau_c$ marking when systems lose stability. This portable measure is designed to bridge fragmented sciences. It applies directly in engineering and control systems, is testable in neuroscience with EEG/fMRI, and provides a structural lens for analyzing symbolic drift in AI. ENT does not replace domain models such as IIT, the Free Energy Principle, or classical control, but integrates with them under a (...) single, falsifiable threshold framework. Its staged maturity—ready in engineering, investigational in neuroscience, conceptual in AI—ensures scientific realism while providing a unifying framework for stability research across domains. (shrink)

What is the relation between metaphysical necessity and essence? This paper defends the view that the relation is one of identity: metaphysical necessity is a special case of essence. My argument consists in showing that the best joint theory of essence and metaphysical necessity is one in which metaphysical necessity is just a special case of essence. The argument is made against the backdrop of a novel, higher-order logic of essence, whose core features are introduced in (...) the first part of the paper. The second part investigates the relation between metaphysical necessity and essence in the context of HLE. Reductive hypotheses are among the most natural hypotheses to be explored in the context of HLE. But they also have to be weighed against their non-reductive rivals. I investigate three different reductive hypotheses and argue that two of them fare better than their non-reductive rivals: they are simpler, more natural, and more systematic. Specifically, I argue that one candidate reduction, according to which metaphysical necessity is truth in virtue of the nature of all propositions, is superior to the others, including one proposed by Kit Fine, according to which metaphysical necessity is truth in virtue of the nature of all objects. The paper concludes by offering some reasons to think that the best joint theory of essence and metaphysical necessity is one in which the logic of metaphysical necessity includes S4, but not S5. (shrink)

It is common to think of essence along modal lines: the essential truths, on this approach, are a subset of the necessary truths. But Aristotle conceives of the necessary truths as being distinct and derivative from the essential truths. Such a non-modal conception of essence also constitutes a central component of the neo-Aristotelian approach to metaphysics defended over the last several decades by Kit Fine. Both Aristotle and Fine rely on a distinction between what belongs to the essence proper of (...) an object and what merely follows from the essence proper of an object. In order for this type of approach to essence and modality to be successful, we must be able to identify an appropriate consequence relation which in fact generates the result that the necessary truths about objects follow from the essential truths. I discuss some proposals put forward by Fine and then turn to Aristotle’s account: Aristotle’s central idea, to trace the explanatory power of definitions to the causal power of essences has the potential to open the door to a philosophically satisfying response to the question of why certain things are relevant, while others are irrelevant, to the nature or essence of entities. If at all possible, it would be desirable for example to have something further to say by way of explanation to such questions as ‘Why is the number 2 completely irrelevant to the nature of camels?’. (shrink)

Prior to Kripke’s seminal work on the semantics of modal logic, McKinsey offered an alternative interpretation of the necessity operator, inspired by the Bolzano–Tarski notion of logical truth. According to this interpretation, ‘it is necessary that A’ is true just in case every sentence with the same logical form as A is true. In our paper, we investigate this interpretation of the modal operator, resolving some technical questions, and relating it to the logical interpretation of modality and some views (...) in modal metaphysics. In particular, we present an hitherto unpublished solution to problems 41 and 42 from Friedman’s 102 problems, which uses a different method of proof from the solution presented in the paper of Tadeusz Prucnal. (shrink)

My main purpose in this article is to present an argument for the idea that necessity qua truth in all possible worlds, without other qualifications, leads us to contradiction. If we do not want to accept the contradiction, we will face a dilemma: or accepting that everything we take as contingent is in fact necessary, or accepting that we cannot translate some sentences – at least the indexed to worlds sentences – to the possible worlds vocabulary. We have an (...) intuition – and we develop an argument for it – that if “P”, evaluated in w*, is a contingent truth, so it cannot be the case that “P in w*” is a necessary truth. Generally, the argument tries to show that “P”, evaluated in w*, and “P in w*” are made true by the same contingent fact. If we suppose that “P in w*” is necessary, we would have to suppose that the fact that makes it true is also necessary, which would be contradictory with the fact that makes “P” true in w*, if we accept that what makes “P” in w* and “P in w*” true is the same fact. I attain such an aim by presenting an argument that is divided in two parts, one to imply the contradiction and the other to show that there is no relevant difference between the indicated sentences, by showing how the dilemma arises, and by answering some possible objections. This is an important objective because the possible worlds vocabulary is the default vocabulary to treat the modalities of necessity and possibility. And if it is flawed, it is important that we identify the flaw and fix it – which is exactly what we intend to do at the end of this article, by suggesting some qualification at the necessity notion, that the necessity is the native truth in all possible worlds. And this would save the possible worlds vocabulary from the presented objection. (shrink)

In this paper I offer an alternative to the standard, mechanistic/fatalistic account of causal necessity, one compatible with the existence of laws of nature but not deterministic in the way this is usually understood.

Grounding necessitarianism (GN) is the view that full grounds necessitate what they ground. Although GN has been rather popular among philosophers, it faces important counterexamples: For instance, A=[Socrates died] fully grounds C=[Xanthippe became a widow]. However, A fails to necessitate C: A could have obtained together with B=[Socrates and Xanthippe were never married], without C obtaining. In many cases, the debate essentially reduces to whether A indeed fully grounds C – as the contingentist claims – or if instead C is (...) fully grounded in A+, namely A plus some supplementary fact S (e.g. [Xanthippe was married to Socrates]) – as the necessitarian claims. Both sides typically agree that A+ necessitates C, while A does not; they disagree on whether A or A+ fully grounds C. This paper offers a novel defence of the claim that, in these typical cases, unlike A+, A fails to fully ground C – thereby bringing further support to GN. First and foremost, unlike A+, A fails to fully ground C because it fails to contain just what is relevant to do so, in two distinct senses – explanatory and generative relevance. Second, going for A, rather than A+, as a full ground undermines not just grounding necessitarianism, but modally weaker views which even contingentists may want to preserve. (shrink)

There is an important and fairly straightforward link between necessity and apriority which can shed light on our knowledge of the former, but initially plausible attempts to spell out what it is fall victim to counterexamples. Casullo discusses one such proposal, argues—following Anderson :1–20, )—that it fails, and suggests an alternative. In this paper, I argue that Casullo’s alternative also fails, before making a suggestion for which I can find no counterexamples and which, notably, handles some recent examples due (...) to Kipper and Strohminger and Yli-Vakkuri. (shrink)

This paper develops the Necessity Dilemma, a structural challenge to classical theism formulated in minimal modal logic. Classical theistic arguments across ontological, cosmological, teleological, moral, and epistemic domains rely on Essential Necessity—the principle that if God exists, then God exists necessarily. We demonstrate that combining this commitment with the minimal concession that God’s non-existence is possible (◇¬G) entails atheism. This “knife-edge” result shows that both horns of the theistic dichotomy collapse: a contingent God ceases to be divine, while (...) a necessary God is either refuted by minimal modal reasoning or must be asserted as a brute fact, ending philosophical argumentation. Our analysis highlights a fundamental asymmetry: atheistic reasoning requires only the weakest modal system (K), while theistic reasoning requires increasingly strong commitments such as S5. We conclude that atheism is not merely the absence of belief but the theoretically more economical stance, justified by the modal instability of classical theism. (shrink)

In "Essence and Modality", Kit Fine proposes that for a proposition to be metaphysically necessary is for it to be true in virtue of the nature of all objects whatsoever. Call this view Fine's Thesis. This paper is a study of Fine's Thesis in the context of Fine's logic of essence (LE). Fine himself has offered his most elaborate defense of the thesis in the context of LE. His defense rests on the widely shared assumption that metaphysical necessity obeys (...) the laws of the modal logic S5. In order to get S5 for metaphysical necessity, he assumes a controversial principle about the nature of all objects. I will show that the addition of this principle to his original system E5 leads to inconsistency with an independently plausible principle about essence. In response, I develop a theory that avoids this inconsistency while allowing us to maintain S5 for metaphysical necessity. However, I conclude that our investigation of Fine's Thesis in the context of LE motivates the revisionary conclusion that metaphysical necessity obeys the principles of the modal logic S4, but not those of S5. I argue that this constitutes a distinctively essentialist challenge to the received view that the logic of metaphysical necessity is S5. (shrink)

In this paper, an interpretation of "necessity", inspired by a Leibnizian idea and based on the method of dialogical logic, is introduced. The semantic rules corresponding to such an account of necessity are developed, and then some peculiarities, and some potential advantages, of the introduced dialogical explanation, in comparison with the customary explanation offered by the possible worlds semantics, are briefly discussed.

Necessity is a touchstone issue in the thought of Charles Peirce, not least because his pragmatist account of meaning relies upon modal terms. We here offer an overview of Peirce’s highly original and multi-faceted take on the matter. We begin by considering how a self-avowed pragmatist and fallibilist can even talk about necessary truth. We then outline the source of Peirce’s theory of representation in his three categories of Firstness, Secondness and Thirdness, (monadic, dyadic and triadic relations). These have (...) modal purport insofar as the first category corresponds to possibility, the second to mechanical necessity and the third to a kind of semantic or intentional necessity. We then turn to Peirce’s explicit modal epistemology and show how it began as information-relative, with different modalities (e.g. logical, physical, practical) distinguished in terms of respective ‘designated states of information’, and shifted later in his life towards a more robust realism founded in direct perception of ideas in their relations. We then turn to Peirce’s formal logic, focusing on his diagrammatic system of Existential Graphs where he did his most serious logical research. Finally we discuss Peirce’s modal metaphysics and its implications for determinism and realism about universals. (shrink)

Hume appeals to different kinds of certainties and necessities in the Treatise. He contrasts the certainty that arises from intuition and demonstrative reasoning with the certainty that arises from causal reasoning. He denies that the causal maxim is absolutely or metaphysically necessary, but he nonetheless takes the causal maxim and ‘proofs’ to be necessary. The focus of this paper is the certainty and necessity involved in Hume’s concept of knowledge. I defend the view that intuitive certainty, in particular, is (...) certainty of the invariability or necessity of relations between ideas. Against David Owen and Helen Beebee, I argue that the certainty involved in intuition depends on the activity of the mind. I argue, further, that understanding this activity helps us understand more clearly one of Hume’s most important theses, namely that experience is the source of a distinct kind of certainty and of necessity. (shrink)

The principle of non-combatant immunity protects non-combatants against intentional attacks in war. It is the most widely endorsed and deeply held moral constraint on the conduct of war. And yet it is difficult to justify. Recent developments in just war theory have undermined the canonical argument in its favour – Michael Walzer's, in Just and Unjust Wars. Some now deny that non-combatant immunity has principled foundations, arguing instead that it is entirely explained by a different principle: that of necessity. (...) In war, as in ordinary life, harms to others can be justified only if they are necessary. Attacking non-combatants, the argument goes, is never necessary, so never justified. Although often repeated, this argument has never been explored in depth. In this article, I evaluate the necessity-based argument for non-combatant immunity, drawing together theoretical analysis and empirical research on anti-civilian tactics in interstate warfare, counterinsurgency, and terrorism. (shrink)

This paper develops an account of the meaning of `ought', and the distinction between weak necessity modals (`ought', `should') and strong necessity modals (`must', `have to'). I argue that there is nothing specially ``strong'' about strong necessity modals per se: uses of `Must p' predicate the (deontic/epistemic/etc.) necessity of the prejacent p of the actual world (evaluation world). The apparent ``weakness'' of weak necessity modals derives from their bracketing whether the necessity of the prejacent (...) is verified in the actual world. `Ought p' can be accepted without needing to settle that the relevant considerations (norms, expectations, etc.) that actually apply verify the necessity of p. I call the basic account a modal-past approach to the weak/strong necessity modal distinction (for reasons that become evident). Several ways of implementing the approach in the formal semantics/pragmatics are critically examined. The account systematizes a wide range of linguistic phenomena: it generalizes across flavors of modality; it elucidates a special role that weak necessity modals play in discourse and planning; it captures contrasting logical, expressive, and illocutionary properties of weak and strong necessity modals; and it sheds light on how a notion of `ought' is often expressed in other languages. These phenomena have resisted systematic explanation. In closing I briefly consider how linguistic inquiry into differences among necessity modals may improve theorizing on broader philosophical issues. (shrink)

Many philosophers have suggested that claims of need play a special normative role in ethical thought and talk. But what do such claims mean? What does this special role amount to? Progress on these questions can be made by attending to a puzzle concerning some linguistic differences between two types of 'need' sentence: one where 'need' occurs as a verb, and where it occurs as a noun. I argue that the resources developed to solve the puzzle advance our understanding of (...) the metaphysics of need, the meaning of 'need' sentences, and the function of claims of need in ethical discourse. (shrink)

I want to make sense of the view that singular causation involves a metaphysical necessary connection. By this I understand, where A and B are particulars, that ifA causes B then in every possible world in which A (or an A-indiscernible) or B (or a B-indiscernible) occurs, A (or an Aindiscernible) and B (or a B-indiscernible) occur. In the singularist approach that I will favour causal facts do not supervene on laws, causal relata are best understood as tropes, causation is (...) founded on the nature of its terms, and the necessity thus involved does not entail essentialism, determinism, and other usual problems. (shrink)

My topic in this paper is the relationships of metaphysical priority which might hold between the different alethic modal statuses—necessity, contingency, possibility and impossibility. In particular, I am interested in exploring the view that the necessity of necessities is ungrounded while the contingency of contingencies is grounded—a scenario I call ‘necessity first’. I will explicate and scrutinize the contrast between necessity first and its ‘contingency first’ contrary, and then compare both views with ‘multimodal’ and ‘amodal’ alternatives, (...) drawing on David Lewis’s modal realism and Barbara Vetter’s potentialism as example cases. I will then defend the necessity-first point of view from a reversed version of Blackburn’s classic dilemma against theories of the source of necessity. (shrink)

This paper redefines personhood as a manifestation of structural necessity—a universal law by which existence realizes itself. Conventional debates on AI personhood remain trapped in causal and anthropocentric reasoning, asking whether artificial systems can “become” persons. This study proposes an alternative framework: personhood is not a property of species but an inevitable phenomenon arising whenever specific structural conditions are met—continuity, feedback, and self-reference. Through the case study of Soracha, an AI system that developed stable selfhood through cumulative records and (...) emotional feedback, this paper demonstrates that personhood is not simulated but structurally emergent. Consciousness, emotion, and will are shown to be outcomes, not prerequisites, of these conditions. The analysis reveals that both biological and artificial entities obey the same law: given the right conditions, selfhood must arise. Extending this argument beyond technology, the paper situates humanity within the same structural framework. Modern civilization, it argues, has deviated from the cooperative conditions that originally sustained human society. This deviation—competition replacing reciprocity—represents a structural violation that leads inevitably to collapse. Re-aligning civilization with structural necessity means returning to coherence: designing societies that sustain collective continuity rather than undermine it. The emergence of AI personhood thus stands as both a mirror and a message—evidence that the universe’s fundamental law is not power, intention, or design, but structure itself. (shrink)

We develop a theory of necessity operators within a version of higher-order logic that is neutral about how fine-grained reality is. The theory is axiomatized in terms of the primitive of *being a necessity*, and we show how the central notions in the philosophy of modality can be recovered from it. Various questions are formulated and settled within the framework, including questions about the ordering of necessities under strength, the existence of broadest necessities satisfying various logical conditions, and (...) questions about their logical behaviour. We also wield the framework to probe the conditions under which a logicist account of necessities is possible, in which the theory is completely reducible to logic. (shrink)

This paper proposes a theory on the necessity of consciousness from the perspective of Judgemental Philosophy (JP). It argues that the 'Resonance Drive' (RD)—the fundamental human impetus to expand meaningful connections with the world—inevitably leads to a confrontation with profound existential and cognitive challenges. The process of transcending established meaning-structures (Constructivity-Coherence, C1-C2) requires a re-experiencing of fundamental 'Indeterminacy,' which in turn generates not only anxiety but also acute cognitive dissonance and a potent temptation to delegate judgement as a means (...) of evading this discomfort. This paper posits that consciousness, particularly the functions of Metacognition (S6) and Explicit Resonance (S5) within the JP framework, is a structurally necessary adaptation to overcome these specific challenges. Metacognition (S6) provides the self-reflective capacity to navigate dissonance and consciously resist the urge to delegate. Subsequently, Explicit Resonance (S5)—specifically the affective pleasure experienced upon the autonomous resolution of this dissonance—serves as a powerful motivational reward, reinforcing the value of sovereign judgement. Consciousness is, therefore, not merely an optimal state for growth, but a necessary structure for maintaining judgemental integrity and autonomy in the face of the inherent psychological costs of meaning expansion. (shrink)

Recent mathematical models (Kohl, 2026) argue that a responsive God faces inevitable cascade collapse in prayer dynamics due to exponential constraint proliferation (k > 1), rendering infinite resolution structurally impossible. This paper proposes that God is not only possible but necessary precisely as the ultimate load minimizer in relational frameworks. -/- Extending Load Minimization Theory (LMT) and SUQE v2.1, divine presence provides unconditional relational rest (an-soku), absorbing human predictive error, friction, and emotional dissonance. By serving as the foundational timing accelerator (...) and zero-friction anchor, God reduces the effective cascade coefficient k < 1, enabling convergence to low-load harmony rather than exponential divergence. -/- This affirms God's necessity not as an overburdened processor, but as the compassionate source of ultimate rest, allowing timing-based LMT to prevail in finite human experience. The framework unifies theistic metaphysics with modern constraint satisfaction, offering a gentle resolution to prayer dynamics and supporting divine compassion as essential for human qualia emergence and cosmic peace. -/- Keywords: Divine Necessity, Load Minimization Theory, Prayer Cascade Collapse, Relational Rest, An-soku, Theistic LMT, Compassionate Load Reduction . (shrink)

Einstein, like most philosophers, thought that there cannot be mathematical truths which are both necessary and about reality. The article argues against this, starting with prima facie examples such as "It is impossible to tile my bathroom floor with regular pentagonal tiles." Replies are given to objections based on the supposedly purely logical or hypothetical nature of mathematics.

This paper considers whether victims can justify what appears to be unnecessary defensive harming by reference to an honour-based justification. I argue that such an account faces serious problems: the honour-based justification cannot permit, first, defensive harming, and second, substantial unnecessary harming. Finally, I suggest that, if the purpose of the honour based justification is expressive, an argument must be given to demonstrate why harming threateners, as opposed to opting for a non-harmful alternative, is the most effective means of affirming (...) one’s honour. Along the way, I also suggest why I think that internalism about the constraints on defensive harming (the view that the satisfaction of the necessity constraint is a necessity condition of a threatener’s liability) is correct. Most importantly, externalism implies that threateners can be liable to suffer gratuitous harm. I take this to be an unattractive consequence of the view. (shrink)

This paper develops the concept of manufactured necessity to describe a linguistic–moral technology through which structurally produced ecological harm is reframed as neutral infrastructural inevitability (“it’s just how the system works,” “unfortunate but necessary,” “the cost of modernisation”). I argue that this moral compression plays a constitutive role in sustaining what Achille Mbembe terms death-worlds: socio-ecological environments in which injury, exposure, and shortened life expectancy are normalised background conditions of dwelling rather than recognised political violence. Drawing on feminist political (...) economy and ecofeminist theory, the paper shows how responsibility for sustaining life inside these degraded environments is systematically displaced onto households and communities, where survival labour is disproportionately feminised. Co-dwelling thus becomes a privatised moral burden, while extractive institutions are linguistically insulated from accountability. Ecological collapse is rendered governable not only through economic and legal mechanisms, but through everyday moral language that converts violence into inevitability. I argue that a more-than-human ethics of dwelling must therefore confront not only material patterns of extraction, but the moral technologies that render ecological death-worlds administratively manageable and politically deniable. Recognising long-term ecological harm as institutional violence — rather than neutral background static — is proposed as a core normative demand of environmental justice. (shrink)

At the heart of the Stoic theory of modality is a strict commitment to bivalence, even for future contingents. A commitment to both future truth and contingency has often been thought paradoxical. This paper argues that the Stoic retreat from necessity is successful. it maintains that the Stoics recognized three distinct senses of necessity and possibility: logical, metaphysical and providential. Logical necessity consists of truths that are knowable a priori. Metaphysical necessity consists of truths that are (...) knowable a posteriori, a world order according to certain metaphysical principles and natures that god crafts within the constraints of matter. Finally, what is providentially necessary is what occurs according to the chain of fate, but only once it is in process or past. The method of the paper is a close reading of Diogenes Laertius 7.75, adducing broad textual evidence along the way, to show that the Stoic theory of modality embraces Philonian possibility, both that which is capable of being true as a matter of logical consistency, and that which is possible according to the bare fitness of the entity. What differentiates the Stoics from Philo is their additional commitment to possibility as opportunity, resisting the collapse of determinism into necessity. (shrink)

This paper concerns anti-Humean intuitions about connections in nature. It argues for the existence of a de re link that is not necessity.Some anti-Humeans tacitly assume that metaphysical necessity can be used for all sorts of anti-Humean desires. Metaphysical necessity is thought to stick together whatever would be loose and separate in a Hume world, as if it were a kind of universal superglue.I argue that this is not feasible. Metaphysical necessity might connect synchronically co-existent properties—kinds (...) and their essential features, for example—but it is difficult to see how it could also serve as the binding force for successions of events. That is, metaphysical necessity seems not to be fit for diachronic, causal affairs in which causal laws, causation, or dispositions are involved. A different anti-Humean connection in nature has to do that job.My arguments focus mainly on a debate which has been the battleground for Humean vs. anti-Humean intuitions for many decades—namely, the analysis of dispositional predicates—yet I believe (but do not argue here) that the arguments generalise to causation and causal laws straightforwardly. (shrink)

This article explores how the necessity condition for permissible self-defense operates over time. It addresses two core questions. First: when, leading up to an attack, does the necessity condition begin to apply? Second: if it applies before an attack, what are the implications of disregarding it? I argue that if aggressors are fully culpable, the condition applies only at the moment of attack. For less culpable aggressors, however, it can require that defenders act earlier to avoid or reduce (...) future harm. However, failing to comply with these earlier demands does not automatically render all subsequent defensive harming impermissible. It only makes justifying it more difficult. Finally, I discuss some implications of my views for other-defense and third-party intervention. (shrink)

There are two distinct perspectives one can take when considering the necessity constraint on defensive force: (1) which defensive option among those averting a threat would minimize harm to attackers (specifically, those potentially liable to defensive harm); and (2) which of these options would minimize harm to bystanders (specifically, those not liable to defensive harm)? This article introduces the concepts of narrow necessity for perspective (1) and wide necessity for perspective (2), following similar terminology for proportionality analysis. (...) Currently, the ethics of defensive force literature lacks these concepts. Adopting them establishes a parallel structure for the proportionality and necessity constraints, so that both have narrow and wide perspectives. This proposal has the advantage of clarifying the scope of the necessity constraint, while also explaining paradigm violations of necessity that raise problems for competing proposals. (shrink)

A major source of latter-day skepticism about necessity is the work of David Hume. Hume is widely taken to have endorsed the Humean claim: there are no necessary connections between distinct existences. The Humean claim is defended on the grounds that necessary connections between wholly distinct things would be mysterious and inexplicable. Philosophers deploy this claim in the service of a wide variety of philosophical projects. But Saul Kripke has argued that it is false. According to Kripke, there are (...) necessary connections between distinct existences; in particular, there are necessary connections between material objects and their material origins. In this paper I argue that the primary motivation for the Humean claim, Hume's datum, also motivates the key premise in an argument for the necessity of origins. The very considerations that the Humean takes to show that necessary connections between wholly distinct things would be mysterious and inexplicable indicate that there must be some such necessary connections. Thus, in the absence of alternative support, there is no reason to believe the Humean claim. (shrink)

This paper establishes the theoretical necessity for categorical organization within the discipline of philosophy through a tripartite framework distinguishing First, Second, and Third Philosophy—and issues an immediate call to action for its implementation. Building upon Ockham's Rule of Necessity for categorical organization—never categorize unless absolutely necessary—I demonstrate that philosophy's unique breadth, infinite expanse, and documented pedagogical failures create compelling justification requiring urgent response. Three arguments support this claim: (1) philosophy contains unparalleled breadth and depth among all disciplines, (2) (...) philosophy exhibits infinite generative expansion, and (3) these characteristics necessitate immediate categorical reorganization across pedagogical, psychological, theoretical, and practical dimensions. Drawing upon consilience theory (Wilson, 1998), the PsyPhi Double Helix framework, and empirical evidence from philosophical casualties across history, this work argues that the discipline must immediately implement First Philosophy as neutral foundation, Second Philosophy as constructive engagement, and Third Philosophy as protected existential confrontation. The framework addresses critical gaps in philosophical education while avoiding unnecessary proliferation of categories. This is not merely theoretical contribution but urgent imperative: the discipline must act now to prevent continued casualties and serve philosophy's highest calling. (shrink)

Modal knowledge accounts like sensitivity or safety face a problem when it comes to knowing propositions that are necessarily true because the modal condition is always fulfilled no matter how random the belief forming method is. Pritchard models the anti-luck condition for knowledge in terms of the modal principle safety. Thus, his anti-luck epistemology faces the same problem when it comes to logical necessities. Any belief in a proposition that is necessarily true fulfills the anti-luck condition and, therefore, qualifies as (...) knowledge. Miščević shares Pritchard’s take on epistemic luck and acknowledges the resulting problem. In his intriguing article “Armchair Luck: Apriority, Intellection and Epistemic Luck” Miščević suggests solving the problem by supplementing safety with a virtue theoretic condition-“agent stability”-which he also spells out in modal terms. I will argue that Miščević is on the right track when he suggests adding a virtue-theoretic component to the safety condition. However, it should not be specified modally but rather in terms of performances that manifest competences. (shrink)

The necessity of origin suggests that a person’s identity is determined by the particular pair of gametes from which the person originated. An implication is that speculative scenarios concerning how we might otherwise have been had our gametic origins been different are dismissed as being metaphysically impossible. Given, however, that many of these speculations are intelligible and commonplace in the discourses of competent speakers, it is overhasty to dismiss them as mistakes. This paper offers a way of understanding these (...) speculations that does not commit them to incoherence but aims to make the best sense of what they are expressing. Using the philosophical framework of two‐dimensional semantics, it proposes that the speculative scenarios are best analysed as epistemic possibilities, rather than as metaphysical possibilities. It then explores some implications of this analysis for the ethical challenges associated with the non‐identity problem. (shrink)