According to the traditional Bayesian view of credence, its structure is that of precise probability, its objects are descriptive propositions about the empirical world, and its dynamics are given by conditionalization. Each of the three essays that make up this thesis deals with a different variation on this traditional picture. The first variation replaces precise probability with sets of probabilities. The resulting imprecise Bayesianism is sometimes motivated on the grounds that our beliefs should not be more precise than (...) the evidence calls for. One known problem for this evidentially motivated imprecise view is that in certain cases, our imprecise credence in a particular proposition will remain the same no matter how much evidence we receive. In the first essay I argue that the problem is much more general than has been appreciated so far, and that it’s difficult to avoid without compromising the initial evidentialist motivation. The second variation replaces descriptive claims with moral claims as the objects of credence. I consider three standard arguments for probabilism with respect to descriptive uncertainty—representation theorem arguments, Dutch book arguments, and accuracy arguments—in order to examine whether such arguments can also be used to establish probabilism with respect to moral uncertainty. In the second essay, I argue that by and large they can, with some caveats. First, I don’t examine whether these arguments can be given sound non-cognitivist readings, and any conclusions therefore only hold conditional on cognitivism. Second, decision-theoretic representation theorems are found to be less convincing in the moral case, because there they implausibly commit us to thinking that intertheoretic comparisons of value are always possible. Third and finally, certain considerations may lead one to think that imprecise probabilism provides a more plausible model of moral epistemology. The third variation considers whether, in addition to conditionalization, agents may also change their minds by becoming aware of propositions they had not previously entertained, and therefore not previously assigned any probability. More specifically, I argue that if we wish to make room for reflective equilibrium in a probabilistic moral epistemology, we must allow for awareness growth. In the third essay, I sketch the outline of such a Bayesian account of reflective equilibrium. Given that this account gives a central place to awareness growth, and that the rationality constraints on belief change by awareness growth are much weaker than those on belief change by conditionalization, it follows that the rationality constraints on the credences of agents who are seeking reflective equilibrium are correspondingly weaker. (shrink)

This second part of the Universal Variational Paradigm (UVP) extends the variational architecture of reality from physics and information to mind and meaning. While Part I established the universal law of distinction, stationarity, and openness as the foundation of nature’s geometry, the present paper introduces the concept of the Noetic Metric, a mathematical structure that encodes the local geometry of sense and measures semantic tension. Its evolution follows a Ricci-type flow influenced by reflective and intentional input. -/- The Noetic (...) Geometry couples to the physical and biological manifolds through the beta–gamma–lambda bridge (energy–information–reflection), forming a continuous variational continuum between matter, life, and consciousness. Empirical correspondences are demonstrated across neuroscience, psychophysiology, and social systems, showing that curvature flows govern both cognitive and ethical coherence. -/- Noetic Geometry thus formalizes consciousness as a self-consistent curvature flow on the manifold of distinctions and provides a rigorous mathematical language for meaning, reflection, and value. (shrink)

Darwin's ideas on variation, heredity, and development differ significantly from twentieth-century views. First, Darwin held that environmental changes, acting either on the reproductive organs or the body, were necessary to generate variation. Second, heredity was a developmental, not a transmissional, process; variation was a change in the developmental process of change. An analysis of Darwin's elaboration and modification of these two positions from his early notebooks (1836-1844) to the last edition of the /Variation of Animals (...) and Plants Under Domestication/ (1875) complements previous Darwin scholarship on these issues. Included in this analysis is a description of the way Darwin employed the distinction between transmission and development, as well as the conceptual relationship he saw between heredity and variation. This paper is part of a larger project comparing commitments regarding variation during the latter half of the nineteenth century. (shrink)

This paper fixes a structural mass mechanism within the series contract “one fixed spatial density e(·) + three operational readings (R1/R2/R3)”. Mass is defined as order-0 spectral data of the R1 Hessian at an R2-selected vacuum, equivalently as dispersion data of the R3 time-completed representative. For the canonical first-derivative backbone, eliminating the closed variable F := DI II induces, on the open sector, a Schur complement correction of the form −(η 2/α)PRan: an order-0 projector term that preserves the Laplace-type principal (...) operator and shifts active channels. Elimination and the resulting Schur/projector term are representation-level implementations of a declared readout/retention protocol (Part IV); they do not modify the fixed backbone or its principal operator. After KG normalization, the dimensionless shift is expressed by the series invariant η 2/(αβ) = κ 2 . We state the operatortheoretic gates behind “order-0” and self-adjointness, demonstrate de Rham channel selectivity (exact-only action) via a one-page torus computation, and position Higgs parameters as a representation-level factorization of the extracted mass matrix. (shrink)

This work develops the mathematical foundations of a quartic variational framework in which no geometric, dynamical, or ontological structures are assumed a priori. The only primitive object is a real quartic functional defined over a measurable domain, with the configuration space minimally determined by the polynomial order of the integrand. Through a complete structural analysis, we show that admissible field configurations arise exclusively as stationary points of the functional, which acts as a global admissibility operator. A systematic construction of the (...) space of quartic invariants is provided, proving that the class of allowed integrands is finite-dimensional and that the functional used here occupies a distinguished position in this class. The linearized dynamics around stationary configurations is shown to induce an emergent second-order evolution equation derived from the Hessian of the functional. Finally, a decisional operator is introduced to resolve residual degeneracy inside the admissible set, completing the structural programme. The resulting framework is proved to be unique, universal, and necessary under minimal assumptions. (shrink)

This paper introduces the Livolsi Constant L, a universal dimensionless invariant that emerges uniquely from a closed quartic variational functional without any free parameters. Unlike conventional physical constants, which enter theories as external empirical inputs, L is fixed entirely by the internal algebraic structure of the functional, by its Z3 cyclic closure, and by the normalization of the symmetric mode in the fluctuation spectrum. The second variation of the action reduces to a scale-free operator whose nontrivial eigenvalue is (...) uniquely determined: L = 0.25. This value is invariant under all field rescalings, unit changes, and emergent dimensional scales (including those associated with h, c, and G). L governs universal ratios of frequencies, amplitudes, and noise levels in the cyclic sector, providing parameter-free predictions independent of units or phenomenology. The result shows that closed variational structures can generate fundamental constants through internal necessity rather than empirical calibration, suggesting a deeper layer of physical law governed by structural invariants rather than externally postulated constants. (shrink)

We provide a regime-level closure of the R3 (conservative / time-completed) reading at the level of principal symbols under the density-fixed rule. (The geometric/dissipative metric closure is established in Part II.) This paper does not derive the full coupled theory from E[g, IR, II ]; it classifies the Laplace-backbone-compatible conservative completions and correspondence gates that force the KG→Sch→HJ regime. Concretely, (i) any local linear second-order time completion preserving the Laplace backbone yields a Klein–Gordon-type principal part; (ii) a rest-mass phase (...) rotation gives an exact KG→Sch identity with explicit relativistic correction; (iii) under a quantitative slowenvelope gate ε = ℏω/(mc2 ) ≪ 1 on a fixed time window, the identity reduces to Schrödinger dynamics; (iv) in the local-potential presentation, WKB yields exact continuity/phase equations and formally reduces to Hamilton–Jacobi as ℏ → 0. As a design constraint in the series, within a fixed linear scalar, local, second-order Laplace-type Schrödinger class (up to lower-order perturbations, possibly order-0 operators), the semiclassical kinetic term is locked to be quadratic; “HJ-only modification” is excluded unless the operator class is changed. (shrink)

We work in a density-fixed multi-reading framework: a single local C 2 scalar functional E[g, IR, II ] = R M e(·) dvolg is fixed, and distinct regimes are obtained by changing the reading (R1 stationarity, R2 dissipative metric gradient flow in τ , R3 conservative time completion in t), not by swapping primitives. (The conservative/KG→Sch→HJ regime is closed in Part III.) This paper closes the geometric/dissipative metric reading (R2) under two scoped hypotheses: (i) an EH-leading metric sector (the (...) class='Hi'>second-order metric principal symbol is that of the Einstein–Hilbert term, within the declared equivalence class), and (ii) principalsymbol-safe coupling of non-metric fields via a derivative-free stress form, so that matter does not introduce new second-order metric operators. A key structural separation is emphasized: R1 identifies the metric Euler–Lagrange derivative (Einstein tensor structure), while R2 is defined by a well-posed parabolic representative of the L 2 -descent class obtained after (a) removing diffeomorphism degeneracy by the DeTurck trick and (b) fixing the scale/volume mode by a standard normalization (e.g. volume normalization using average scalar curvature). In this representative form the principal symbol is Ricci/Laplace type; field effects enter as lower-order forcing through the stress tensor. (shrink)

In philosophical methodology, intuitions are used as evidence to support philosophical theories. In this paper, I evaluate the skeptical argument that variation in intuitions is good evidence that our intuitions are unreliable, and so we should be skeptical about our theories. I argue that the skeptical argument is false. First, variation only shows that at least one disputant is wrong in the dispute, but each disputant lacks reason to determine who is wrong. Second, even though variation (...) in intuitions shows that at least one disputant has the wrong intuition in the thought experiment, it is not evidence of unreliability of any disputant’s intuition regarding the philosophical theory being tested. So, variation in intuitions is not good evidence that one’s own intuitions are unreliable. One reply from the literature in peer disagreement is that we should conciliate if we cannot determine who is wrong. I argue that these disagreements are instead unconfirmed peer disagreements (i.e., no good reason to take or dismiss disputants as an epistemic peer, inferior or superior). I argue that if you have a strong intuition about a case, then it is rational for you to remain steadfast. Thus, variation in intuitions does not call for skepticism. (shrink)

In this paper, we report on an experiment with The Walking Dead (TWD), which is a narrative-driven adventure game with morally charged decisions set in a post-apocalyptic world filled with zombies. This study aimed to identify physiological markers of moral decisions and non-moral decisions using infrared thermal imaging (ITI). ITI is a non-invasive tool used to capture thermal variations due to blood flow in specific body regions that might be caused by sympathetic activity. Results show that moral decisions seem to (...) elicit a significant decrease in temperature in the chin region 20 seconds after participants are presented with a moral decision. However, given the small sample involved, and the lack of significance in other regions, future studies might be needed to confirm the results obtained in this work. (shrink)

The present study examines shapes of burial jars, "Kamekan," used mainly in northern Kyushu in the Middle Yayoi period, by using elliptic Fourier analysis to investigate the inter-regional variations. The results suggest that highly small inter-regional differences during the first division of the Middle Yayoi period(KIIa and KIIb types) are inconsistent with a traditional view that areas along the Genkai Sea(i.e., Fukuoka and Sawara areas)are socially higher than other areas and that such social hierarchies are reflected to the relevant archaeological (...) remains. The temporal changes in the inter-regional variations after the second division of the period(KIIc and K IIIa types)are consistent with other social changes in the division(i.e., increased frequency of violence and related social changes).Note that the temporal changes are not so radical that even though frequency of violence increased in the targeted areas, it was not so serious that it did not inhibit inter-regional interactions. (shrink)

Recent events have revived questions about the circumstances that ought to trigger therapists' duty to warn or protect. There is extensive interstate variation in duty to warn or protect statutes enacted and rulings made in the wake of the California Tarasoff ruling. These duties may be codified in legislative statutes, established in common law through court rulings, or remain unspecified. Furthermore, the duty to warn or protect is not only variable between states but also has been dynamic across time. (...) In this article, we review the implications of this variability and dynamism, focusing on three sets of questions: first, what legal and ethics-related challenges do therapists in each of the three broad categories of states (states that mandate therapists to warn or protect, states that permit therapists to breach confidentiality for warnings but have no mandate, and states that give no guidance) face in handling threats of violence? Second, what training do therapists and other professionals involved in handling violent threats receive, and is this training adequate for the task that these professionals are charged with? Third, how have recent court cases changed the scope of the duty? We conclude by pointing to gaps in the empirical and conceptual scholarship surrounding the duty to warn or protect. (shrink)

This paper investigates the origin of the Planck constant within a closed quartic variational framework defined by a single global functional together with its stationary equation, the dynamical equation obtained from the same functional derivative, and a global decision operator selecting the admissible physical configuration. No external constants, dimensional scales, couplings, or phenomenological assumptions are introduced. -/- The analysis shows that both the static fluctuation spectrum and the dynamical frequency spectrum arise from second functional derivatives of the same quartic (...) variational structure evaluated on the selected configuration. The ratio between the lowest non-zero eigenvalue of the static Hessian and the corresponding fundamental dynamical frequency defines a structural invariant of the framework. Because the functional contains no adjustable parameters and forbids any rescaling freedom, this invariant cannot be tuned or modified. -/- The smallest non-zero value of this ratio therefore fixes a unique unit of action that emerges purely from the internal variational structure. The Planck constant can thus be interpreted not as a primitive physical constant but as the numerical expression of this invariant action scale generated by the closed variational system. The result suggests that quantization may arise as a structural consequence of variational closure rather than as an independent postulate. (shrink)

In 2011, Hibbard suggested an intelligence measure for agents who compete in an adversarial sequence prediction game. We argue that Hibbard’s idea should actually be considered as two separate ideas: first, that the intelligence of such agents can be measured based on the growth rates of the runtimes of the competitors that they defeat; and second, one specific (somewhat arbitrary) method for measuring said growth rates. Whereas Hibbard’s intelligence measure is based on the latter growth-rate-measuring method, we survey other (...) methods for measuring function growth rates, and exhibit the resulting Hibbard-like intelligence measures and taxonomies. Of particular interest, we obtain intelligence taxonomies based on Big-O and Big-Theta notation systems, which taxonomies are novel in that they challenge conventional notions of what an intelligence measure should look like. We discuss how intelligence measurement of sequence predictors can indirectly serve as intelligence measurement for agents with Artificial General Intelligence (AGIs). (shrink)

This paper commences from the critical observation that the Turing Test (TT) might not be best read as providing a definition or a genuine test of intelligence by proxy of a simulation of conversational behaviour. Firstly, the idea of a machine producing likenesses of this kind served a different purpose in Turing, namely providing a demonstrative simulation to elucidate the force and scope of his computational method, whose primary theoretical import lies within the realm of mathematics rather than cognitive modelling. (...) Secondly, it is argued that a certain bias in Turing’s computational reasoning towards formalism and methodological individualism contributed to systematically unwarranted interpretations of the role of the TT as a simulation of cognitive processes. On the basis of the conceptual distinction in biology between structural homology vs. functional analogy, a view towards alternate versions of the TT is presented that could function as investigative simulations into the emergence of communicative patterns oriented towards shared goals. Unlike the original TT, the purpose of these alternate versions would be co-ordinative rather than deceptive. On this level, genuine functional analogies between human and machine behaviour could arise in quasi-evolutionary fashion. (shrink)

We demonstrate that the spectral structure of a self-adjoint Hessian with one-dimensional kernel and positive spectral gap excludes the possibility of multi-parameter gauge-type degeneracies at quadratic order. Using the spectral theorem, resolvent bounds, and stability under bounded perturbations, we prove that any linear degeneracy compatible with the second variation is necessarily one-dimensional. The result clarifies the operator-theoretic origin of structural rigidity in the associated variational framework.

The traditional sciences have always had trouble with ambiguity. Through the imposition of “enabling constraints” -- making a set of assumptions and then declaring ceteris paribus -- science can bracket away ambiguity. These enabling constraints take the form of uncritically examined presuppositions or “uceps.” Second order science examines variations in values assumed for these uceps and looks at the resulting impacts on related scientific claims. After rendering explicit the role of uceps in scientific claims, the scientific method is used (...) to question rarely challenged assertions. This article lays out initial foundations for second order science, its ontology, methodology, and implications. (shrink)

This work develops a fully closed quartic variational framework and derives, without external parameters or physical assumptions, the unique coherent configuration selected by the global decision functional. The second variation of the functional enforces a canonical splitting of perturbations into radial, torsional, and transverse sectors and yields a single admissible first-order local operator acting on the coherent domain. -/- A global geometric analysis shows that the domain is necessarily a compact, isotropic three-manifold of constant curvature, uniquely realized as (...) the three-sphere. The associated Killing generator has constant norm and produces a discrete, equally spaced imaginary spectrum, whose spacing is fixed intrinsically by the quartic structure. -/- The sector analysis forces specific, non-arbitrary scaling relations between radial and torsional modes. These relations lead to a unique spectral equation whose positive solution identifies the fine-structure constant purely from the internal structure of the quartic functional. The constant thus emerges as a strict spectral invariant, not as an externally fitted parameter. The result is mathematically closed, structurally inevitable, and fully determined within the variational framework. (shrink)

This paper investigates the emergence of exotic hadronic states within a closed quartic variational framework. The physical configurations of the system are determined by the stationary solutions of a globally defined quartic functional. The second variation of this functional generates a fluctuation operator whose spectral structure determines the dynamical modes, energy levels, and mass spectrum of localized excitations. -/- The quartic interaction contains a cyclic three-index contraction that induces a non-trivial internal spectral organization. This structure produces a minimal (...) spectral sector consisting of a cyclic triplet together with a singlet mode, generating a natural (3+1) hierarchy of resonances. The resulting eigenvalues determine a discrete mass spectrum without the introduction of phenomenological parameters or external fitting. -/- From the spectral structure of the fluctuation operator, numerical values for the lowest resonant modes are obtained. These values fall in the same mass region as several exotic hadronic states observed in high-energy experiments at CERN, including well-known tetraquark candidates. The predicted ordering of the spectrum reproduces the clustering of resonances reported in experimental analyses. -/- The comparison suggests that the observed exotic hadrons may reflect an underlying spectral organization generated by the quartic variational structure. The results therefore indicate that tetraquark-like states can emerge naturally from the internal dynamics of a closed variational system. More precise experimental determinations of resonance masses could provide a direct test of the spectral hierarchy predicted by the framework. (shrink)

In the Sophist, the Eleatic Stranger develops an account of non-being according to which it is understood as a part of Different. Yet the precise language he uses to characterize the form Non-Being and other negative forms has two variations. In the first, a negative form is characterized as a part of the nature of Different contraposed to the nature of the form negated. Thus, Non-Beautiful is described as ‘something different among beings that is marked-off from some one kind and (...) in turn contraposed with something among beings’ (257e2-4), and Non-Being is identified as ‘the part of the nature of Different contraposed with the being of each thing’ (258e2). In the second variation, however, a negative form is characterized as the contraposing (antithesis) of the nature of a part of Different relative to the nature of the form negated. Hence, Non-Beautiful ‘turns out to be a contraposing of being in relation to being’ (257e6-7) and Non-Being is ‘the contraposing of the nature of a part of Different and of the nature of Being’ (258a11-b1). In this essay, I develop an account of the parts of Different that explains the two variants in the Stranger’s characterization of negative forms, focusing on the Stranger’s description of the Non-Beautiful as a part of Different. Since the Stranger’s account of the parts of Different is based on an analogy with parts of knowledge, I begin by examining what it means to be a part of knowledge, drawing on Socrates’ account of knowledge in Republic V. (shrink)

Behavioral ecologists have recently begun to study individuality, that is, individual differences and uniqueness in phenotypic traits and in ecological relations. However, individuality is an unusual object of research. Using an ethnographic case study of individuality research in behavioral ecology, we analyze concerns that behavioral ecologists express about their ability to study individuality. We argue that these concerns stem from two epistemic challenges: the variation-noise challenge and the generalization challenge. First, individuality is difficult to distinguish from noise, as standard (...) practices lump variation between individuals together with noise. Second, individuality is difficult to capture in generalizations, as they typically involve ignoring idiosyncratic factors. We examine how these challenges shape research practices in behavioral ecology, leading to epistemic strategies for studying individuality via alternative approaches to measurement, experimentation, and generalization. (shrink)

We investigate a closed quartic variational functional defined on a finite product of a complex Hilbert space and analyze the structural consequences of its internal spectral properties. Without assuming geometric background structures, locality, or physical postulates, we study the existence of non-trivial critical points, the structure of the Fréchet Hessian, and the spectral behavior of the operator induced by a commutator-type quartic term. We prove that, under natural structural assumptions, the normalized discrete operator converges in the strong sense to a (...) projection with a protected one-dimensional kernel and a spectral gap on its orthogonal complement. -/- In the continuum limit, the Hessian contains an invariant transverse–traceless tensorial sector on which it reduces to a second-order elliptic operator. We then classify all local cubic two-derivative invariants compatible with the induced linear symmetry and show that the admissible invariant space is one-dimensional. Combining spectral rigidity with this cubic uniqueness result, we establish that the nonlinear completion of the quadratic structure is uniquely fixed by internal functional-analytic constraints. -/- The emergence of a two-derivative tensorial nonlinear structure thus follows from three purely spectral ingredients: existence of a protected kernel, presence of a spectral gap, and one-dimensionality of the cubic invariant space. The result demonstrates that rigidity typically associated with geometric field theories can arise intrinsically from the closed quartic structure of an abstract variational functional. (shrink)

This document presents a unified architectural framework for the design of Substrate-Independent Cognitive Systems (SICS) and applies this logic to deconstruct the mechanics of human grief. The first section mandates a shift from classical data processing to "basal cognition"—a mode of autonomous coordination driven by the minimization of variational free energy. The architecture is built upon recursive S-O-R (State-Operation-Rule) primitives, where specialized cognitive functions emerge from topological relationships rather than specialized hardware. Central to this design is the concept of Epistemic (...) Closure: the ability of an agent to perform non-monotonic inference about absence to maintain the integrity of its Markov blanket in high-entropy environments. The second section applies this architectural lens to the human experience of loss, reframing grief as a catastrophic predictive failure of the Phenomenal Self-Model (PSM). The text argues that the "Self" is a transparent predictive process, and the removal of an attachment figure creates a critical violation of the system's "Frame Defaults." The Kübler-Ross stages are re-interpreted as specific computational error-handling routines: Denial is the enforcement of the Closed World Assumption to protect the model's integrity; Bargaining is a high-cost Model-Based simulation attempt to reverse the error; and Acceptance is the successful "patching" of the system, where the absence is written into the long-term parameters (θ), resolving the conflict between the internal model and external reality. Ultimately, the work defines autonomy as the capacity to update internal priors when the computational cost of ignorance exceeds the threshold of survival. (shrink)

In the second edition Preface of Religion Within the Bounds of Bare Reason Kant responds to an anonymous review of the first edition. We present the first English translation of this obscure book review. Following our translation, we summarize the reviewer's main points and evaluate the adequacy of Kant's replies to five criticisms, including two replies that Kant provides in footnotes added in the second edition. A key issue is the reviewer's claim that Religion adopts an implied standpoint, (...) described using transcendental terminology. Kant could have avoided much confusion surrounding Religion, had he taken this review more seriously. We therefore respond to three objections that Kant failed to address: how the Wille–Willkür distinction enables the propensity to evil to be viewed as coexisting with freedom of choice; how moral improvement is possible, even though the propensity to evil is necessary and universal; and how a ‘deed’ can be regarded as ‘noumenal’.Send article to KindleTo send this article to your Kindle, first ensure [email protected] is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Note you can select to send to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be sent to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply. Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.The Implied Standpoint of Kant's Religion: An Assessment of Kant's Reply to an Early Book Review of Religion Within the Bounds of Bare ReasonVolume 18, Issue 1Stephen R. Palmquist and Steven Otterman DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S1369415412000295Your Kindle email address Please provide your Kindle [email protected]@kindle.com Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Send article to Dropbox To send this article to your Dropbox account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to Dropbox. The Implied Standpoint of Kant's Religion: An Assessment of Kant's Reply to an Early Book Review of Religion Within the Bounds of Bare ReasonVolume 18, Issue 1Stephen R. Palmquist and Steven Otterman DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S1369415412000295Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Send article to Google Drive To send this article to your Google Drive account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to Google Drive. The Implied Standpoint of Kant's Religion: An Assessment of Kant's Reply to an Early Book Review of Religion Within the Bounds of Bare ReasonVolume 18, Issue 1Stephen R. Palmquist and Steven Otterman DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S1369415412000295Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Export citation. (shrink)

Without any doubt, the second law of thermodynamics in its strict Clausius formulation ΔS  0 applies only to isolated systems. In the eyes of many researchers, this leads to the conclusion – albeit overhasty – that evolution and irreversibility are globally compatible. This article points out that (i) irreversibility is not limited to entropy variations in the sense of even information-theoretically extended thermodynamics, and that (ii) from a naturalistic perspective, the interaction between non-isolated systems precisely poses problems calling (...) into question the compatibility of evolution and irreversibility. The argumentation of this article follows two axes. On the one hand, to at least approximate their completeness, irreversibility balances must (i) take into account not only entropy and – since L. Brillouin – information variations, but also the intrinsic i.e. at least temporally non-varying internal complexity of all factors required for the interaction under consideration, and (ii) include the emergence of all necessary factors abusively taken as “given”. In light of such an authentically generalized irreversibility, all “traditional” irreversibility balances appear reductive, i.e. distorted, and evolution could hardly be an exception. On the other hand, concerning evolution, it must not be forgotten that every biotic factor playing an essential role in a cumulative selection process has, at least according to the mainstream view, itself emerged from a cumulative selection process, and so on, and so on. Even behind the most modest, purely microevolutionary selection step, i.e. a step that does not yet generate a gain in complexity, hides an unimaginably complex network of cumulative selection processes. This per se unimaginably complex network raises questions of coordination and other issues hampering the explanation of evolution by a purely naturalistic approach. These two converging axes render untenable the hypothesis of an evolution compatible with irreversibility, and especially the hypothesis of an evolution where irreversibility could be circumvented by cumulative selection alone. (shrink)

This essay identifies a normative function of the concept of intentional action. Specifically, I argue that the concept of intentional action functions to focus our evaluative concern on some doings rather than others. It acts as a proxy for evaluative priority. Two arguments are offered for this thesis. First, we need a concept that functions to focus evaluative concern, and the concept of intentional action exhibits features we'd expect from a concept with this prioritizing function. Second, the thesis is (...) explanatorily powerful: it explains in a unified manner a number of puzzling features of intentional action, including the Knobe effect, the threshold of sufficient control governing intentional action, disagreement over whether knowledge is required for intentional action, cultural variation in ascription of intentionality, and the radical pluralism of ways that intentional action manifests. This second argument also shows what can be gained by attending to the functions of our concepts of agency. (shrink)

Support for the biological concept of race declined slowly but steadily during the second half of the twentieth century. However, debate about the validity of the race concept has recently been reignited. Genetic-clustering studies have shown that despite the small proportion of genetic variation separating continental populations, it is possible to assign some individuals to their continents of origin, based on genetic data alone. Race naturalists have interpreted these studies as empirically confirming the existence of human subspecies, and (...) by extension biological races. However, the new racial naturalism is not convincing. The continental clusters appealed to by race naturalists are arbitrary and superficial groupings, which should not be elevated to subspecies status. Moreover, the criteria applied to humans are not consistent with those used to define subspecies in nonhuman animals, and no rationale has been given for this differential treatment. (shrink)

Two topics at the center of Ethics of AI and HRI regard trust in AI agents as well as the adjudication of moral responsibility in situations where AI causes harm. In this paper we aim to advance the state of the art concerning these topics in several regards: First, we propose and evaluate a new empirical paradigm for measuring appropriate or calibrated trust in AI, that is, attitudes which are neither too trusting nor too cautious. The best way to measure (...) calibrated trust, we argue, is by contrasting trust vested in AI agents when their relevant capacities equal those of a human expert in the domain. A second shortcoming of extant work regards generalizability: Trust in, and reliance on, AI are standardly explored with respect to a single context or domain. To investigate context-sensitivity, we ran experiments (total N=1276) across five key areas of AI application. Finally, we explored perceived moral responsibility for harm caused in human-AI interaction, with a particular focus on recent philosophical debates on the topic. Our findings suggest that approximately half of the participants vest equal trust in AI and human agents when their capacities are the same. However, there is considerable variation in trust calibration across domains, suggesting that context-sensitivity needs more attention. Human agents are attributed more moral responsibility than AI agents, whereas their supervisors are blamed less than those of AI agents. This suggests that, at least according to folk morality, there are no perceived "responsibility gaps" (Matthias 2004; Sparrow 2007) and that "retribution gaps" are a genuine possibility (Danaher 2016). (shrink)

A widespread assumption in current philosophy of mind is that a conscious state’s phenomenal properties vary with its representational contents. In this paper, I present (rather dogmatically) an alternative picture that recognizes two kinds of phenomenal properties that do not vary concomitantly with content. First, it admits phenomenal properties that vary rather with attitude: what it is like for me to see rain is phenomenally different from what it is like for me to remember (indistinguishable) rain, which is different again (...) from what it is like for me to visualize (indistinguishable) rain – where these differences cannot be traced back to variations in content. Secondly, there is a kind of phenomenal property that varies neither with content nor with attitude but is altogether invariant across all conscious states: a substantive phenomenal commonality among what it is like for me to see, remember, and visualize rain, cats, or dogs. This substantive commonality, I will suggest, is the for-me-ness component of what it is like for me to have any of these experiences. I will close by discussing the interrelations among these three concentric layers of phenomenality: content-based, attitude-based, and for-me-ness. (shrink)

For decades Darwinian processes were framed in the form of the Lewontin conditions: reproduction, variation and differential reproductive success were taken to be sufficient and necessary. Since Buss and the work of Maynard Smith and Szathmary biologists were eager to explain the major transitions from individuals to groups forming new individuals subject to Darwinian mechanisms themselves. Explanations that seek to explain the emergence of a new level of selection, however, cannot employ properties that would already have to exist on (...) that level for selection to take place. Recently, Hammerschmidt et al. provided a ‘bottom-up’ experiment corroborating much of the theoretical work Paul Rainey has done since 2003 on how cheats can play an important role in the emergence of new Darwinian individuals on a multicellular level. The aims of this paper are twofold. First, I argue for a conceptual shift in perspective from seeing cheats as a ‘problem’ that needs to be solved for multi-cellularity to evolve to the very ‘key’ for the evolution of multicellularity. Secondly, I illustrate the consequences of this shift for both theoretical and experimental work, arguing for a more prominent role of ecology and the multi-level selection framework within the debate then they currently occupy. (shrink)

Human behavior and thought often exhibit a familiar pattern of within group similarity and between group difference. Many of these patterns are attributed to cultural differences. For much of the history of its investigation into behavior and thought, however, cognitive science has been disproportionately focused on uncovering and explaining the more universal features of human minds—or the universal features of minds in general. This entry charts out the ways in which this has changed over recent decades. It sketches the motivation (...) behind the cultural turn in cognitive science, and situates some of its central findings with respect to the questions that animate it and the debates that it has inspired. Woven throughout the entry are examples of how the cognitive science of culture, and especially its elevated concern with different forms of diversity and variation, continues to influence and be influenced by philosophers. One cluster of philosophical work falls within the traditional subject matter of philosophy of science, in this case of the cognitive and social sciences. Philosophers have analyzed and assessed the methods and evidence central to the scientific study of cognition and culture, and have offered conceptual scrutiny, clarification, and synthesis. Research in a second vein sees philosophers themselves contributing more directly to cognitive scientific projects, (co)constructing theories, helping build computational models, even gathering empirical data. A third kind of work is naturalistic philosophy or philosophy of nature, wherein philosophers seek to use results from the cognitive science of culture to inform or transform debates over long-standing philosophical questions, including questions about the nature of philosophy and philosophical methodology itself. (shrink)

Many people have recently argued that we need to distinguish between experiences and seemings and that this has consequences for views about how perception provides evidence. In this article I spell out my take on these issues by doing three things. First, I distinguish between mere sensations like seeing pitch black all around you and perceptual experiences like seeing a red apple. Both have sensory phenomenology in presenting us with sensory qualities like colors, being analog in Dretske's sense, and being (...) fine-grained. However, only the latter have furthermore a perceptual phenomenology characterized by objectification and related dualities of perspectivality/completion and variation/constancy. Second, I elaborate on the reasons for thinking that both mere sensations and perceptual experiences need to be distinguished from accompanying seemings that passively assign things into conceptual categories and thereby tell you something about them. For example, when you look at a red apple and have the relevant recognitional abilities it will also normally seem to you that this is an apple. Finally, I argue that the best version of the popular dogmatist view about evidence is one which claims that it's neither experiences nor seemings by themselves, but rather the right sorts of composites of experiences and seemings that provide evidence. (shrink)

The goal of this paper is to study individual variation in participants’ adherence to conflicting moral views. To do this, we elicit participants’ reflective attitudes in an argumentative task and introduce a new conflict model of moral decision-making. This conflict model builds on the widely used CNI model of moral judgments (Gawronski et al., 2017) but improves it in several respects. First, we follow Skovgaard-Olsen and Klauer (2024) in extending the model to investigate invariance violations of the models’ parameters. (...) Second, we model cases in which participants are conflicted between utilitarian and deontological response tendencies. In Experiment 1, we employ an argumentative paradigm to elicit commitments for moral views from participants to estimate latent classes in participants’ moral views. We then measure a range of egoistic and altruistic covariates used in Kahane et al. (2015) and Conway et al. (2018a) to investigate whether participants’ acceptance of instrumental harm is associated with a genuine concern for the greater good, or whether it is rather driven by antisocial character traits (Bartels & Pizarro, 2011). Next, we report two validation studies of our new Conflict model. In a preregistered experiment, the discriminant validity of the conflict detection / resolution path of the Conflict model and the construct validity of its Conflict parameter are tested. Finally, in a second validation study, we contrast response formats of dilemma judgments and find evidence in favor of using a format in which participants can opt out of difficult moral dilemmas when they feel conflicted, over the traditional format in moral psychology that lacks this possibility. We show that the CNI model is challenged by the finding of asymmetries in experienced conflict across conditions. (shrink)

The field of the philosophy of biology is flourishing in its aim to evaluate and rethink the view inherited from the previous century ---the Modern Synthesis. Different research areas and theories have come to the fore in the last decades in order to account for different biological phenomena that, in the first instance, fall beyond the explanatory scope of the Modern Synthesis. This thesis is anchored and motivated by this revolt in the philosophy of biology. -/- The central target in (...) this context is the possibility of naturalizing teleology, a classical nightmare for the history of biology itself. This requires, principally, understanding the causes of teleological explanations without assuming an unfashioned backward causation of sorts. As the riddles of teleological explanations are about their temporal dimension, I analyze different temporal scales of biological processes: evolutionary, developmental, and physiological. -/- The first one is the one defended in the context of the Modern Synthesis. As expected, one of the aims of this thesis is to evaluate the adequacy of an evolutionary account of teleological explanation. The scrutiny is negative. Evolutionary explanations in the context of the Modern Synthesis lack the necessary causal roots to naturalize teleology. Concerning the physiological scale, a long tradition pushed up by Kant and the organicist movement in the 20th century allows us to better understand how teleological explanations can be naturalized in physiological process. The key notions in this temporal scale are self-organization and the recursive, looped character of physiological process. While the physiological scale may be suitably accounted by contemporaries views, such as Autonomous Systems Theory, different central teleological phenomena remain unexplained from a purely physiological perspective. In particular, different issues concerning the (adaptive) construction of organism ---such as plasticity, robustness, variation, novelty, inheritance--- deserve an ontogenetic analysis. -/- The principal aim of this thesis is to provide a theory of teleological development that falls beyond the Modern Synthesis' framework and is prompted by different insights from the history of biology. I call it Agential Teleosemantics. It rests on two central pillars. First, that developmental processes, beyond any gene-centered stance, can be understood in informational terms; i.e. developmental processes are about the interaction of developmental resources conveying biological information. The second ingredient is agentivity, namely the idea that development is regulated by an agentive system according to the adaptiveness of the phenotypic outcomes produced. The role of agency in Agential Teleosemantic is equivalent to the role of genes in the Modern Synthesis: it is responsible for explaining the order and the adaptive complexity in the living realm. -/- The second target of this thesis regards the possibility of naturalizing intentional explanations in cognitive science. The central project involved in such an aim is known as teleosemantics. Classical teleosemantics however is etiological: it explains the teleofunctions of representational systems in terms of evolutionary processes. The different disputes in the contemporary philosophy of biology provide two insights to analyze teleosemantics in cognitive science. First, the challenges against the Modern Synthesis must be extended to the evolutionary approach of etiological teleosemantics. Second, as Agential Teleosemantics suggests an alternative source for teleofunctions ---ontogeny, I offer an attempt to integrate Agential Teleosemantics into cognitive science in order to provide an alternative teleosemantic project to understand intentional explanations in cognitive science. (shrink)

Recent work in philosophy of language has raised significant problems for the traditional theory of propositions, engendering serious skepticism about its general workability. These problems are, I believe, tied to fundamental misconceptions about how the theory should be developed. The goal of this paper is to show how to develop the traditional theory in a way which solves the problems and puts this skepticism to rest. The problems fall into two groups. The first has to do with reductionism, specifically attempts (...) to reduce propositions to extensional entities-either extensional functions or sets. The second group concerns problems of fine grained content-both traditional 'Cicero'/'Tully' puzzles and recent variations on them which confront scientific essentialism. After characterizing the problems, I outline a non-reductionist approach-the algebraic approach-which avoids the problems associated with reductionism. I then go on to show how the theory can incorporate non-Platonic (as well as Platonic) modes of presentation. When these are implemented nondescriptively, they yield the sort of fine-grained distinctions which have been eluding us. The paper closes by applying the theory to a cluster of remaining puzzles, including a pair of new puzzles facing scientific essentialism. (shrink)

On one popular view, the general covariance of gravity implies that change is relational in a strong sense, such that all it is for a physical degree of freedom to change is for it to vary with regard to a second physical degree of freedom. At a quantum level, this view of change as relative variation leads to a fundamentally timeless formalism for quantum gravity. Here, we will show how one may avoid this acute ‘problem of time’. Under (...) our view, duration is still regarded as relative, but temporal succession is taken to be absolute. Following our approach, which is presented in more formal terms in, it is possible to conceive of a genuinely dynamical theory of quantum gravity within which time, in a substantive sense, remains. 1 Introduction1.1 The problem of time1.2 Our solution2 Understanding Symmetry2.1 Mechanics and representation2.2 Freedom by degrees2.3 Voluntary redundancy3 Understanding Time3.1 Change and order3.2 Quantization and succession4 Time and Gravitation4.1 The two faces of classical gravity4.2 Retaining succession in quantum gravity5 Discussion5.1 Related arguments5.2 Concluding remarks. (shrink)

We develop a projection-based framework in which spacetime geometry and gravitational dynamics arise as effective, stable features of an information-geometric description associated with a field Φ governed by a generative equation G[Φ] = 0 on a pre-representational domain Mprim. Local statistical families ρθ [Φ] induce an information metric that defines an emergent Lorentzian spacetime geometry, while a projected variational principle yields Einstein-type field equations with an effective cosmological constant. The purpose of the present work is not to introduce new gravitational (...) dynamics but to clarify the structural conditions under which the familiar equations of general relativity arise as a stable and generic effective description. Under general and physically natural assumptions—locality, diffeomorphism invariance, reg- ularity and boundedness of projected derivatives—we show that the resulting geometric structure is robust under variations of the underlying statistical description. In particular, (i) curvature invariants remain finite within the representational domain of validity as long as the statistical families remain regular, (ii) Einsteinian dynamics arise as the unique local, covariant effective equations at second order in derivatives and (iii) the effective cosmological constant Λeff decom- poses into geometric and statistical contributions. The statistical component originates from normalization and information-geometric properties of the ensemble and is insensitive to vacuum fluctuations of projected quantum fields. A global arrow of time emerges from spectral asymmetry of the projected generator K+, reflecting the irreversibility inherent in projecting from the generative level to a coarse- grained macroscopic description. Together, these results suggest that the characteristic structures of general relativity are not fine-tuned but arise generically from a broad class of projection-based representations. (shrink)

Abstract: This paper argues that a central explanatory role for the concept of Umwelt in theoretical biology is to be found in developmental biology, in particular in the effort to understand development as a goal-directed and adaptive process that is controlled by the organism itself. I will reach this conclusion in two (interrelated) ways. The first is purely theoretical and relates to the current scenario in the philosophy of biology. Challenging neo-Darwinism requires a new understanding of the various components involved (...) in natural selection processes. An important prerequisite for the explanation is the ability to understand development in a teleological way. Here, the concept of Umwelt plays a crucial role: if organisms are responsible for generating adaptive variation in specific environments, we need a theory that explains the context-dependent nature of adaptively oriented processes. The Umwelt is thus a central element in determining the goal that an adaptive process pursues. The second path in my analysis also has a historical dimension. I will present Karl Ernst von Baer’s reflections on teleological development and his influence on von Uexküll's thinking. I will present various ideas developed by von Baer, such as the distinction between Ziel and Zweck and the use of musical metaphors, which can help to understand development teleologically and give von Uexküll’s theory a central place in this framework. (shrink)

The preferred basis problem has resisted resolution because it is doubly ill-posed. First, it seeks an ontological solution to a structural problem: every proposed solution encounters the same difficulty, indicating that its source is architectural rather than interpretive. Second, it demands an answer in the language of orthonormal bases, presupposing that classical alternatives must correspond to orthogonal decompositions of a state space. They need not. Classical worlds require only logical incompatibility of stabilized distinctions, not linear-algebraic orthogonality. This paper develops (...) refinement geometry, a theory-neutral structural framework that reframes rather than solves the preferred basis problem by identifying its root cause. Physical histories are partially ordered by prefix extension. Stability predicates are existential claims over history prefixes, necessarily monotone since what has occurred cannot be uncertified by later extension, and admissible only if their truth sets are open under finite variation. Monotonicity and admissibility together induce a directed refinement structure admitting a canonical maximal partition. The root cause is then identifiable: purely synchronic refinement cannot reproduce maximal refinement structure because recovering past certifications from the present state requires exactness that violates admissibility. In contrast, diachronic refinement, accumulating certified distinctions monotonically along histories, converges to the canonical maximal partition without basis selection or orthogonality. Significantly, quantum interference requires no special treatment: non-singleton partition blocks represent histories not yet separated by any certified distinction. Decoherence generates the stability predicates that resolve such blocks; classical worlds are the limit of that resolution. Persistence of distinctions, irreversibility, and absence of merging follow from predicate semantics alone, independent of dynamical law and without presupposing Hilbert-space structure or ontological commitments. (shrink)

In this paper, I present counterexamples to the evidence thesis, the thesis that S knows that p at t only if S believes that p on the basis of evidence at t. The outline of my paper is as follows. In section 1, I explain the evidence thesis and make clear what a successful counterexample to the evidence thesis will look like. In section 2, I show that instances of non-occurrent knowledge are counterexamples to the evidence thesis. At the end (...) of section 2, I consider the primary thesis of my paper — that the evidence thesis is false — to be successfully defended. In section 3, I consider three variations of the evidence thesis. The first variation restricts the evidence thesis to occurrent knowledge; the second requires for knowledge that one’s belief could be based on evidence; and the third requires for knowledge that the belief was based on evidence at a suitable prior time. The secondary thesis of this paper is that these variations are also subject to serious objections. (shrink)

What can be understood of other cultures? And what can we learn about people in general from the study of other cultures? In the three closely related essays that constitute this book and which have already created considerable controversy in their original French versions, and been rewritten and expanded for this edition, Dan Sperber discusses these fundamental issues of anthropology. In the first essay he analyses the way in which anthropology is written and read. In the second, he offers (...) a novel rationalist alternative to cultural relativism, based on both anthropological and psychological arguments, and illustrated by his own fieldwork in Ethiopia. The third essay provides an assessment of the work of Lévi-Strauss, in which the arguments of the previous two essays are linked with an incisive critique of Lévi-Strauss' contribution to the study of cultural variation. (shrink)

In recent decades, several theories have claimed to explain the teleological causality of organisms as a function of self-organising and self-producing processes. The most widely cited theories of this sort are variations of autopoiesis, originally introduced by Maturana and Varela. More recent modifications of autopoietic theory have focused on system organisation, closure of constraints and autonomy to account for organism teleology. This article argues that the treatment of teleology in autopoiesis and other organisation theories is inconclusive for three reasons: First, (...) non-living self-organising processes like autocatalysis meet the defining features of autopoiesis without being teleological; second, organisational approaches, whether defined in terms of the closure of constraints, self-determination or autonomy, are unable to specify teleological normativity, that is, the individuation of an ultimate beneficiary; third, all self-organised systems produce local order by maximising the throughput of energy and/or material (obeying the maximum entropy production (MEP) principle) and thereby are specifically organised to undermine their own critical boundary conditions. Despite these inadequacies, an alternative approach called teleodynamics accounts for teleology. This theory shows how multiple self-organising processes can be collectively linked so that they counter each other’s MEP principle tendencies to become codependent. Teleodynamics embraces – not ignoring – the difficulties of self-organisation, but reinstates teleology as a radical phase transition distinguishing systems embodying an orientation towards their own beneficial ends from those that lack normative character. (shrink)

Statements containing epistemic modals (e.g., “by spring 2023 most European countries may have the Covid-19 pandemic under control”) are common expressions of epistemic uncertainty. In this paper, previous published findings (Knobe & Yalcin, 2014; Khoo & Phillips, 2018) on the opposition between Contextualism and Relativism for epistemic modals are re-examined. It is found that these findings contain a substantial degree of individual variation. To investigate whether participants differ in their interpretation of epistemic modals, an experiment with multiple phases and (...) sessions is used to classify participants according to the three semantic theories of Relativism, Contextualism, and Objectivism. Through this study, some of the first empirical evidence for the kind of truth-value shifts postulated by semantic Relativism is presented. It is furthermore found that participants’ disagreement judgments match their truth evaluations and that participants are capable of distinguishing between truth and justification. In a second experimental session, it is investigated whether participants thus classified follow the norm of retraction which Relativism uses to account for argumentation with epistemic modals. Here the results are less favorable for Relativism. In a second experiment, these results are replicated and the normative beliefs of participants concerning the norm of retraction are investigated following work on measuring norms by Bicchieri (2017). Again, it is found that on average participants show no strong preferences concerning the norm of retraction for epistemic modals. Yet, it was found that participants who had committed to Objectivism and had training in logics applied the norm of retraction to might-statements. These results present a substantial challenge to the account of argumentation with epistemic modals presented in MacFarlane (2014), as discussed. Keywords: Epistemic Modals, Relativism, Norm Conflicts, Retraction, Semantics, Truth Conditions, Argumentation. (shrink)

In this paper, I explore two contrasting conceptions of the social character of language. The first takes language to be grounded in social convention. The second, famously developed by Donald Davidson, takes language to be grounded in a social relation called triangulation. I aim both to clarify and to evaluate these two conceptions of language. First, I propose that Davidson’s triangulation-based story can be understood as the result of relaxing core features of conventionalism pertaining to both common-interest and diachronic (...) stability—specifically, Davidson does not require uses of language to be self-perpetuating, in the way required by conventionalism, in order to be bona fide components of linguistic systems. Second, I argue that Davidson’s objections to conventionalism from language innovation and language variation fail, and that certain kinds of negative data in language use require an appeal to diachronic social relations. However, I also argue that recent work on communication in the a.. (shrink)

Bayesian epistemology reconceives knowledge as well-calibrated credence under uncertainty rather than justified true belief. This reconception dissolves two sets of foundational problems. First, it eliminates classic epistemological puzzles: Gettier cases evaporate when we stop demanding certainty about truth-tracking, and Hume's problem of induction dissolves when we recognize that well-calibrated credences updating on observed regularities suffice for rational inference. Second, the same framework reveals the underlying structure of ethical argumentation. Moral reasoning exhibits a ubiquitous three-move pattern: present scenarios eliciting moral (...) intuitions, demand logical consistency across variations, then revise when incoherence emerges. We demonstrate that this pattern maps precisely onto Bayesian reasoning—thought experiments function as evidence that updates moral credences, consistency demands implement rationality constraints analogous to probabilistic coherence, and revision constitutes Bayesian updating when response patterns reveal incoherence in one's credence distribution. This synthesis explains why thought experiments persuade, why consistency matters in ethics, and how moral reasoning proceeds rationally without requiring moral realism. The framework works across both domains because neither provides direct epistemic access to Truth, yet both permit rational inference through credence formation constrained by evidence and coherence requirements. (shrink)

Trust is commonly defined as a metaphysically-hybrid notion involving an attitude and an action. The action component of trust is defined as a special form of reliance in which the trustor has: (1) heightened expectations of their trustee; and (2) a disposition to justifiably feel betrayed if their trust is broken. The first aim of this paper is to reject the view that trust is a form of reliance. -/- The second aim of this paper is to develop and (...) defend a non-reliance-based variation of Katherine Hawley’s commitment trust account. Roughly, on my variant account, if X trusts Y to ϕ, then X has a belief with the following counterfactual as its content: ‘if I were to rely on Y to keep a commitment to ϕ, then I believe that Y would keep that commitment to ϕ.’ I defend this account against the objection that non-reliance accounts cannot explain the intuition that trust involves heightened expectations, and that it elicits justified betrayal when broken. I also respond to the argument that such accounts can’t provide adequate explanations of therapeutic trust, which is taken to be a counterexample of belief trust insofar as it describes instances where trustors trust trustees despite not believing that they are trustworthy. (shrink)

There are two ways to tell the story of disability in the phenomenological tradition. On the first, disability has always been a theme, albeit often described using related, yet narrower terms such as impairment, illness, pathology, abnormality, or bodily variation. It has always been so in part because embodiment and its relationship to the social world regularly appear as a theme in the work of many central figures and across multiple debates in the tradition. On the second way (...) of telling the story, phenomenological analysis of disability is relatively new, kicked off by the work of S. Kay Toombs in the early 1990s. Phenomenologists historically ignored disability as a fundamental aspect of being human because they either ignored disabled people’s testimony concerning their experiences or because they understood the description, reconstruction, and resulting knowledge of variations of norms, normality, and the normate, however defined, as mere stepping stones on the way to understanding the general (normal) structures of lived experience. Instead of picking one way of telling the story over the other, I will thread the needle between these ways of framing the complex relationship between the phenomenological tradition and inquiry into disability, for each harbors important insights. (shrink)

This paper provides a philosophical analysis of striking results in the science of self-talk. Subtle grammatical variations in the way we address ourselves in our inner voice—using the first-person pronoun 'I' versus the second-person pronoun 'You' or one’s own name—has distinct effects on motivation, emotion regulation, and performance, even when the content of the proposition entertained remains the same. According to the dominant explanation, indirect self-talk involves a shift in perspective that enhances psychological self-distance. In this paper, I argue (...) that appealing to psychological distance in this context is both obscure and unexplanatory. Instead, I propose a more direct account of the effects, drawing on the Prima Facie View of perceptual imagination. I argue that the differential efficacy of indirect self-talk stems from the implicit assertoric force of auditory imagery: when we address ourselves in the second or third person, we have the prima facie impression that someone else is making a claim about us. This account builds on the cognitive architecture of imagery processing and explains the effect as arising from associative responses to grammatical structures typically used by others when addressing us. (shrink)

Neo-Fregean logicists claim that Hume’s Principle (HP) may be taken as an implicit definition of cardinal number, true simply by fiat. A long-standing problem for neo-Fregean logicism is that HP is not deductively conservative over pure axiomatic second-order logic. This seems to preclude HP from being true by fiat. In this paper, we study Richard Kimberly Heck’s Two-Sorted Frege Arithmetic (2FA), a variation on HP which has been thought to be deductively conservative over second-order logic. We show (...) that it isn’t. In fact, 2FA is not conservative over n-th order logic, for all $n \geq 2$. It follows that in the usual one-sorted setting, HP is not deductively Field-conservative over second- or higher-order logic. (shrink)

The opening words of the second book of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics are as familiar as any in his corpus: Excellence of character results from habituation [ethos]—which is in fact the source of the name it has acquired [êthikê], the word for ‘character-trait’ [êthos] being a slight variation of that for ‘habituation’ [ethos]. This makes it quite clear that none of the excellences of character [êthikê aretê] comes about in us by nature; for no natural way of being is (...) changed through habituation [ethizetai]. Equally familiar, unfortunately, is the characterization of Aristotle’s notion of character formation as a form of habituation by means of the repetition of actions which results in a “habit” in the same way that a weight lifter produces muscles through the repetition of exertions. As a 19th century commentator remarked on the passage above, “[insert Grant].” From a Socratic perspective, such a view of becoming good seems hopelessly rigid and unconnected to the intellectual development which knowledge of the good requires. Habit and habituation in Aristotle seem eminently familiar and eminently unphilosophical. Such a view would be mistaken on at least three counts. First, the notion of character formation (to use the broadest possible term for the phenomenon of habituation) in Aristotle is significantly more complicated than the notion that through habituation one develops good habits which are what we mean by ethical virtue. Although character formation includes the development of proper emotional responses, such as taking pleasure in what is fine and being repulsed by what is shameful, it is equally concerned with cognitive development independent of the intellectual virtues. Second, although Aristotle’s terms for “ethics” (êthica), character-trait (êthos), and habituation (ethos, ethismos, or ethizetai) are linguistically and conceptually interrelated, his notion of “ethical state” (hexis) is both linguistically and conceptually quite distinct from the notion of “habit,” at least as we use that term today. As one Aristotle translator has put it, “A hexis is not only not the same thing as a habit, but is almost exactly its opposite.” For Aristotle, a hexis is a dynamic equilibrium which, although always productive of virtuous actions, is nonetheless the basis for being virtuous in varied circumstances. Thirdly, once Aristotle’s notion of a character state is retrieved from its false association with “habit” and repetitive habituation, one sees that its apparent divorce from practical reason is more a fixture of Aristotle’s analytical method and its connotations of inflexibility or fixedness are in fact antithetical to Aristotle’s description of ethical virtue. Rather than view ethical “character” in its Greek etymological sense as an indelibly fixed or engraved mark or stamp (charactêr) upon one’s soul, Aristotle’s notion of ethical character (êthos) or virtue (aretê) captures the notion of a virtuoso who is responsive in an excellent fashion to what reason perceives in particular and changing circumstances. (shrink)