Biological atomism postulates that all life is composed of elementary and indivisible vital units. The activity of a living organism is thus conceived as the result of the activities and interactions of its elementary constituents, each of which individually already exhibits all the attributes proper to life. This paper surveys some of the key episodes in the history of biological atomism, and situates cell theory within this tradition. The atomistic foundations of cell theory are subsequently dissected and discussed, (...) together with the theory’s conceptual development and eventual consolidation. This paper then examines the major criticisms that have been waged against cell theory, and argues that these too can be interpreted through the prism of biological atomism as attempts to relocate the true biological atom away from the cell to a level of organization above or below it. Overall, biological atomism provides a useful perspective through which to examine the history and philosophy of cell theory, and it also opens up a new way of thinking about the epistemic decomposition of living organisms that significantly departs from the physicochemical reductionism of mechanistic biology. (shrink)

Although continued investments in nanotechnology are made, atomically precise manufacturing (APM) to date is still regarded as speculative technology. APM, also known as molecular manufacturing, is a token example of a converging technology, has great potential to impact and be affected by other emerging technologies, such as artificial intelligence, biotechnology, and ICT. The development of APM thus can have drastic global impacts depending on how it is designed and used. This paper argues that the ethical issues that arise from APM (...) - as both a standalone technology or as a converging one - affects the roles of stakeholders in such a way as to warrant an alternate means furthering responsible innovation in APM research. This paper introduces a value-based design methodology called Value Sensitive Design (VSD) that may serve as a suitable framework to adequately cater to the values of stakeholders. Ultimately, it is concluded that VSD is a strong candidate framework for addressing the moral concerns of stakeholders during the preliminary stages of technological development. (shrink)

Between 1653 and 1655 Margaret Cavendish makes a radical transition in her theory of matter, rejecting her earlier atomism in favour of an infinitely-extended and infinitely-divisible material plenum, with matter being ubiquitously self-moving, sensing, and rational. It is unclear, however, if Cavendish can actually dispense of atomism. One of her arguments against atomism, for example, depends upon the created world being harmonious and orderly, a premise Cavendish herself repeatedly undermines by noting nature’s many disorders. I argue that (...) her supposed difficulties with atomism expose a deeper tension in her work between two fundamental metaphysical commitments each of which has substantial philosophical support: her monist theory of the material world (which maintains that there exists just one natural substance which is the single principal cause) and her occasional theory of causation (which requires multiple finite principal causes in nature -- causes that might be considered individual substances). Her monism undermines atomism while her theory of occasional cause seems to rest on a conception of nature that would be especially friendly to atomism. I argue further that we can solve this tension within a Cavendishian framework in such a way as to preserve her theory of causation and her monism, but that this solution depends upon our taking her monism in a particular (and weak) form. I finally note that we can best make sense of her unique and interesting form of monism by acknowledging her social-political motivations in addition to her motivations in natural philosophy. (shrink)

The original conception of atomism suggests “atoms”, which cannot be divided more into composing parts. However, the name “atom” in physics is reserved for entities, which can be divided into electrons, protons, neutrons and other “elementary particles”, some of which are in turn compounded by other, “more elementary” ones. Instead of this, quantum mechanics is grounded on the actually indivisible quanta of action limited by the fundamental Planck constant. It resolves the problem of how both discrete and continuous (even (...) smooth) to be described uniformly and invariantly in thus. Quantum mechanics can be interpreted in terms of quantum information. Qubit is the indivisible unit (“atom”) of quantum information. The imagery of atomism in modern physics moves from atoms of matter (or energy) via “atoms” (quanta) of action to “atoms” (qubits) of quantum information. This is a conceptual shift in the cognition of reality to terms of information, choice, and time. (shrink)

Jerrold J. Katz often explained his semantic theory by way of an analogy with physical atomism and an attendant analogy with chemistry. In this chapter, I track the origin and uses of these analogies by Katz, both in explaining and defending his decompositional semantic theory, through the various phases of his work throughout his career.

In this paper it is argued that, under a number of quite generic background assumptions, mereological atomism (i.e., the thesis that every composite object is composed of simple objects) and causalism (i.e., the thesis that every object is either caused by or the cause of another object) together imply the existence of a first cause of reality. The presented argument does not rely on the principle of sufficient reason or on any restricted version of it. Nor does it depend (...) on modal notions such as necessary or contingent truths, or on necessarily or contingently existing objects. Hence, the proposed argument is quite different from other contemporary first cause arguments, notably those of Koons (1997), Gale and Pruss (1999), and Rasmussen (2010). Although this paper introduces a new first cause argument, its primary aim is not particularly to argue for the existence of a first cause, but, instead, to show that someone who embraces both atomism and causalism cannot deny the existence of a first cause. (shrink)

An essay examining logical atomism as it arises in Russell and the early Wittgenstein.

There are at least three vaguely atomistic principles that have come up in the literature, two explicitly and one implicitly. First, standard atomism is the claim that everything is composed of atoms, and is very often how atomism is characterized in the literature. Second, superatomism is the claim that parthood is well-founded, which implies that every proper parthood chain terminates, and has been discussed as a stronger alternative to standard atomism. Third, there is a principle that lies (...) between these two theses in terms of its relative strength: strong atomism, the claim that every maximal proper parthood chain terminates. Although strong atomism is equivalent to superatomism in classical extensional mereology, it is strictly weaker than it in strictly weaker systems in which parthood is a partial order. And it is strictly stronger than standard atomism in classical extensional mereology and, given the axiom of choice, in such strictly weaker systems as well. Though strong atomism has not, to my knowledge, been explicitly identified, Shiver appears to have it in mind, though it is unclear whether he recognizes that it is not equivalent to standard atomism in each of the mereologies he considers. I prove these logical relationships which hold amongst these three atomistic principles, and argue that, whether one adopts classical extensional mereology or a system strictly weaker than it in which parthood is a partial order, standard atomism is a more defensible addition to one’s mereology than either of the other two principles, and it should be regarded as the best formulation of the atomistic thesis. (shrink)

Atomic organization is modeled as a downstream expression of coherence geometry rather than a collection of independent particle‑level mechanisms. The paper frames atoms as stable attractors within a discrete generative architecture, where electron configurations, shell structure, and bonding behavior arise from invariant coherence constraints rather than ad hoc rules. -/- The framework is developed across three layers: the gradient‑driven formation of stable atomic attractors, the persistence operators that maintain coherent electron distributions under perturbation, and the metabolic redistribution dynamics that govern (...) transitions such as excitation, ionization, and bond formation. This structure explains periodicity, valence patterns, and the stability of chemical species without appealing to teleological or instruction‑based models. -/- The result is a unified account of atomic structure that situates familiar chemical regularities within a broader coherence geometry, clarifying how stable matter emerges from simple generative rules operating across scales. (shrink)

Within much contemporary social ontology there is a particular methodology at work. This methodology takes as a starting point two or more asocial or atomic individuals. These individuals are taken to be perfectly functional agents, though outside of all social relations. Following this, combinations of these individuals are considered, to deduce what constitutes a social group. Here I will argue that theories which rely on this methodology are always circular, so long as they purport to describe the formation of all (...) social groups, as they must always presuppose a pre-existing collectivity. Such methodology also produces various distortions in our theories, such as voluntarism. I focus on the workings of Plural Subject Theory as laid out by Margaret Gilbert in On Social Facts. I show that the formation of a plural subject always requires communication, and that communication always requires a pre-existing collectivity. i examine the elements within Plural Subject Theory which protect gilbert from these accusations of circularity, and argue against them. I finalise by suggesting that what Plural Subject Theory, and social ontology in general, requires as a theoretical starting point is not atomic individuals and their combinations, but rather combinations of already socialised or embedded individuals. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to examine the theoretical architecture of semantic atomism and its consequences with respect to natural language. In particular, it looks to explore the notion of possible concepts using the fundamental distinction between simple and complex concepts and expressions in Jerry Fodor’s atomism. The distinction is exploited to produce an unusual type of concept referred to as a correlate, which effectively mirrors complex concepts while maintaining a distinct underlying structure. Though harmless in and (...) of themselves, their presence in the context of polymorphemic expressions suggests that atomism harbors a tacit and unintuitive form of polysemy that is problematic in its own right and that leads to other complications, some of which may be demonstrated on the example of communication. These issues are tied to the way atomism is structured, and although they seem to have gone largely unnoticed, they appear to bear negatively on the adequacy of atomism where natural language is concerned. (shrink)

Event concepts are unstructured atomic concepts that apply to event types. A paradigm example of such an event type would be that of diaper changing, and so a putative example of an atomic event concept would be DADDY'S-CHANGING-MY-DIAPER.1 I will defend two claims about such concepts. First, the conceptual claim that it is in principle possible to possess a concept such as DADDY'S-CHANGING-MY-DIAPER without possessing the concept DIAPER. Second, the empirical claim that we actually possess such concepts and that they (...) play an important role in our cognitive lives. The argument for the empirical claim has the form of an inference to the best explanation and is aimed at those who are already willing to attribute concepts and beliefs to infants and nonhuman animals. Many animals and prelinguistic infants seem capable of re-identifying event-types in the world, and they seem to store information about things happening at particular times and places. My account offers a plausible model of how such organisms are able to do this without attributing linguistically structured mental states to them. And although language allows adults to form linguistically structured mental representations of the world, there is no good reason to think that such structured representations necessarily replace the unstructured ones. There is also no good reason for a philosopher who is willing to explain the behavior of an organism by appealing to atomic concepts of individuals or kinds to not use a similar form of explanation when explaining the organism's capacity to recognize events. -/- We can form empirical concepts of individuals, kinds, properties, event-types, and states of affairs, among other things, and I assume that such concepts function like what François Recanati calls ‘mental files’ or what Ruth Millikan calls ‘substance concepts’ (Recanati 2012; Millikan 1999, 2000, 2017). To possess such a concept one must have a reliable capacity to re-identify the object in question, but this capacity of re-identification does not fix the reference of the concept. Such concepts allow us to collect and utilize useful information about things that we re-encounter in our environment. We can distinguish between a perception-action system and a perception-belief system, and I will argue that empirical concepts, including atomic event concepts, can play a role in both systems. The perception-action system involves the application of concepts in the service of (often skilled) action. We can think of the concept as a mental file containing motor-plans that can be activated once the individual recognizes that they are in a certain situation. In this way, recognizing something (whether an object or an event) as a token of a type, plays a role in guiding immediate action. The perception-belief system, in contrast, allows for the formation of beliefs that can play a role in deliberation and planning and in the formation of expectations. I distinguish between two particular types of belief which I call where-beliefs and when-beliefs, and I argue that we can model the formation of such perceptual beliefs in nonlinguistic animals and human infants in terms of the formation of a link between an empirical concept and a position on a cognitive map. According to the account offered, seemingly complex beliefs, such as a baby's belief that Daddy changed her diaper in the kitchen earlier, will not be linguistically structured. If we think that prelinguistic infants possess such concepts and are able to form such beliefs, it is likely that adults do too. The ability to form such beliefs does not require the capacity for public language, and we can model them in nonlinguistic terms; thus, we have no good reason to think of such beliefs as propositional attitudes. Of course, we can use sentences to refer to such beliefs, and thus it is possible to think of such beliefs as somehow relations to propositions. But it is not clear to me what is gained by this as we have a perfectly good way to think about the structure of such beliefs that does not involve any appeal to language. (shrink)

According to anti-atomism, we represent color properties (e.g., red) in virtue of representing color relations (e.g., redder than). I motivate anti-atomism with a puzzle involving a series of pairwise indistinguishable chips. I then develop two versions of anti-atomism.

This paper proposes that energy is not a fundamental substance but the physical manifestation (embodiment) of information within the Time Field. We argue that every fundamental particle acts as a primordial storage unit, and as these units aggre- gate into atoms, molecules, and biological systems, their capacity to store and process information increases exponentially. We redefine Entropy as the accumulation of pro- cessed historical data within the present energy state. By bridging physics, chemistry, and biology, we demonstrate that evolution is (...) a guided, directional process fueled by “Atomic Memory”the inherent ability of matter to store its own past states. This framework culminates in the emergence of consciousness and artificial intelligence as the next logical stages in the universe’s drive toward higher informational density. (shrink)

Many philosophers reject the view that well-being over a lifetime is simply an aggregation of well-being at every moment of one's life, and thus they reject theories of well-being like hedonism and concurrentist desire satisfactionism. They raise concerns that such a view misses the importance of the relationships between moments in a person's life or the role narratives play in a person's well-being. In this article, we develop an atomist meta-theory of well-being, according to which the prudential value of a (...) life depends solely on the prudential value of each moment of that life. This is a general account of momentary well-being that can capture different features of well-being that standard atomistic accounts fail to capture, thus allowing for the possibility of an atomism that is compatible with a variety of well-being theories. Contrary to many criticisms leveled against momentary well-being, this well-being atomism captures all of the important features of well-being. (shrink)

In this paper I address two important objections to the theory called ‘ Composition as Identity’ : the ‘wall-bricks-and-atoms problem’, and the claim that CAI entails mereological nihilism. I aim to argue that the best version of CAI capable of addressing both problems is the theory I will call ‘Atomic Composition as Identity’ which consists in taking the plural quantifier to range only over proper pluralities of mereological atoms and every non-atomic entity to be identical to the plurality of atoms (...) it fuses. I will proceed in three main steps. First, I will defend Sider’s Composition as identity. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 211–221, 2014) idea of weakening the comprehension principle for pluralities and I will show that :219–235, 2016a) it can ward off both the WaBrA problem and the threat of mereological nihilism. Second, I will argue that CAI-theorists should uphold an ‘atomic comprehension principle’ which, jointly with CAI, entails that there are only proper pluralities of mereological atoms. Finally, I will present a novel reading of the ‘one of’ relation that not only avoids the problems presented by Yi Composition as identity. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 169–191, 2014) and Calosi :429–443, 2016b, Am Philos Q 55:281–292, 2018) but can also help ACAI-theorists to make sense of the idea that a composite entity is both one and many. (shrink)

Francis Bacon’s theory of matter is a controversial topic among historians. I agree with the viewpoint, which suggests that although Bacon changed his views on atomism repeatedly, he never rejected it completely (Partington, Urbach, Gemelli). I will substantiate this interpretation by paying more attention to the usually neglected allegorical works and by investigating why Bacon changed his mind on atomism in his Novum organum. I shall reconstruct Bacon’s various opinions in chronological order to establish his final evaluation of (...) atomism and his reasons for it. Given that Bacon never embraced a matter theory identical with Greek atomism, I shall here define atomism in the broadest sense, as a corpuscular matter theory that posits final and indivisible particles. Following this semantic delimitation, two successive Baconian opinions will be distinguished: the first took the atom to constitute an ontological and causative-operational principle; the second deprived the atom of this causative-operational ability, but did not touch its ontological priority. At the same time, I will investigate the question concerning the coexistence of atomism and pneumatism in Bacon’s theory, a point that has been discussed in the influential interpretations by Kargon and Rees. I shall argue that Bacon did not regard these two doctrines as incompatible. (shrink)

I characterize and argue against the standard interpretation of logical atomism. The argument against this reading is historical: the standard interpretation of logical atomism (1) fails to explain how the view is inspired by nineteenth-century developments in mathematics, (2) fails to explain how logic is central to logical atomism, and (3) fails to explain how logical atomism is a revolutionary and new "scientific philosophy." In short, the standard interpretation is a bad history of logical atomism. (...) A novel interpretation of the view that repairs these difficulties is sketched in the concluding section. (shrink)

While holism and atomism are often treated as mutually exclusive approaches to semantic theory, the apparent tension between the two usually results from running together distinct levels of semantic explanation. In particular, there is no reason why one can’t combine an atomistic conception of what the semantic values of our words are (one’s “descriptive semantics”), with a holistic explanation of why they have those values (one’s “foundational semantics”). Most objections to holism can be shown to apply only to holistic (...) version of descriptive semantics, and do not tell against any sorts of holistic foundational semantics. As Davidson’s work will be used to illustrate, by clearly distinguishing foundational and descriptive semantics, one can capture the most appealing features of both holism and atomism. (shrink)

Atomic stability is one of the most firmly established results of quantum mechanics. The spectral and variational formalism rigorously accounts for the impossibility of electronic collapse into the nucleus. However, this explanation remains primarily structural: it establishes an energetic constraint without explicitly identifying the physical mediation responsible for making such stability effective. This study adopts an explicit ontological perspective according to which physical stability presupposes the existence of real mediation. It explores the hypothesis that the quantum vacuum — understood not (...) merely as an abstract ground state but as a physically structurable substrate — may admit local topological organizations capable of mediating atomic stability. Within this framework, a dynamic vacuum vortex is proposed as a structural hypothesis compatible with quantum field theory. A minimal variational formalization indicates that a topologically stable configuration can be introduced without contradicting currently known experimental constraints. The aim of this contribution is not to modify the predictive framework of quantum mechanics, but rather to open a research program oriented toward a deeper causal intelligibility of quantum phenomena. This approach aligns with a critical scientific realist perspective and suggests that quantum mechanics may represent an effective description of a deeper dynamical organization of the vacuum. (shrink)

This chapter is divided into two parts: first, in order to understand how a geometric atomistic view of reality emerges in the Timaeus, a close look will be given to the structure of Plato’s story about the constitution of the universe. More precisely, the narration of the myth will be distinguished from its doctrinal content. Second, a description of Plato’s geometric atomism will be offered by considering its specific context. To conclude, following the results of the two first parts, (...) I will briefly address three puzzles: the origin of motion, the nature of the Receptacle and the relationship between Plato’s geometric atomism and the Theory of Forms as it appears in the Timaeus. (shrink)

The research is a comparative study of the atomic theories of Kanada and Democritus. Because of their pluralistic tendencies, emphasis on causality, materialistic account of sense knowledge, and attempt to explain the physical system by means of reduction to the configuration of its constitutive elements, both philosophers present an epistemological base that could accommodate scientific inquiry. Notwithstanding the early and expansive beginning of Indian atomism, modern scientific atomic theory traces its origin to Democritus. Through cross-cultural critical engagement with parallel (...) ideas between Kanada and Democritus, the paper aims to discover the common problems they dealt with in order to further our understanding of the early history of atomic theory, to evaluate the relative merits and limitations of their proposed solutions, to resolve some difficulties that each account faces by appealing to the other, and to highlight their contributions to the emergence of the atomic worldview. (shrink)

This paper proposes a geometric interpretation of atomic structure and of the regularities governing electronic transitions, based on the cubic-ellipsoid nuclear model. The model reveals a direct correspondence between the geometry of the nucleus and that of the atom and its properties, from which a spatial description emerges that may qualitatively account for the patterns of atomic transitions. The proposal does not reject quantum physics but offers a complementary interpretation: quantum rules may be understood as expressions of a deeper geometric (...) organization rather than as purely computational or probabilistic results. The transition laws may be interpreted not only as external mathematical rules but as expressions of an inner order and geometric form inherent in matter. This reveals the possibility of structural reduction, a shift from a dynamic understanding of physical laws to a morphological one, where form itself plays a role in shaping physical lawfulness. (shrink)

When (1) the axioms of a formal system are stipulated to be exactly Russell's set of "atomic facts" (AF). (2) The system anchored in proof theoretic semantics such that a notion of TRUE always correctly determines "true on the basis of meaning expressed in language". Then the body of knowedge expressed in language includes (AF) or anything derived from (AF). It only excludes unknowns and truth that cannot be expressed in language.

Atomically precise manufacturing (APM) is the assembly of materials with atomic precision. APM does not currently exist, and may not be feasible, but if it is feasible, then the societal impacts could be dramatic. This paper assesses the net societal impacts of APM across the full range of important APM sectors: general material wealth, environmental issues, military affairs, surveillance, artificial intelligence, and space travel. Positive effects were found for material wealth, the environment, military affairs (specifically nuclear disarmament), and space travel. (...) Negative effects were found for military affairs (specifically rogue actor violence and AI. The net effect for surveillance was ambiguous. The effects for the environment, military affairs, and AI appear to be the largest, with the environment perhaps being the largest of these, suggesting that APM would be net beneficial to society. However, these factors are not well quantified and no definitive conclusion can be made. One conclusion that can be reached is that if APM R&D is pursued, it should go hand-in-hand with effective governance strategies to increase the benefits and reduce the harms. (shrink)

Functional decomposition is an important goal in the life sciences, and is central to mechanistic explanation and explanatory reduction. A growing literature in philosophy of science, however, has challenged decomposition-based notions of explanation. ‘Holists’ posit that complex systems exhibit context-sensitivity, dynamic interaction, and network dependence, and that these properties undermine decomposition. They then infer from the failure of decomposition to the failure of mechanistic explanation and reduction. I argue that complexity, so construed, is only incompatible with one notion of decomposition, (...) which I call ‘atomism’, and not with decomposition writ large. Atomism posits that function ascriptions must be made to parts with minimal reference to the surrounding system. Complexity does indeed falsify atomism, but I contend that there is a weaker, ‘contextualist’ notion of decomposition that is fully compatible with the properties that holists cite. Contextualism suggests that the function of parts can shift with external context, and that interactions with other parts might help determine their context-appropriate functions. This still admits of functional decomposition within a given context. I will give examples based on the notion of oscillatory multiplexing in systems neuroscience. If contextualism is feasible, then holist inferences are faulty—one cannot infer from the presence of complexity to the failure of decomposition, mechanism, and reductionism. (shrink)

The aim of my paper is to describe and evaluate different conceptions of holism in Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. I distinguish three readings of holistic elements in this work: i) Minimal Holism (E. Anscombe, M. Black, D. Pears); ii) Moderate Holism (J. Conant, C. Diamond, G. Ryle); and iii) Radical Holism (G. Bar-Elli, M. Kremer, P. Livingston). The conclusion is that the most viable option is Moderate Holism since it embraces the logico-syntactical notion of use, rejects an anachronistic interpretation of (...) Tractatarian ontology and allows us to see that the holistic elements are complementary to the initial atomism of the work. Moreover, I point to the consequences of the topic for the overall reading of Wittgenstein’s early and late work. (shrink)

The recent advent of high-resolution imaging and force spectroscopy using atomic force mi- croscopy (AFM) in organic and inorganic solutions opens the way to imaging a wide variety of surfaces and their solvent structure. However, to take full advantage of the high resolution and provide signicant new analytical capability, a detailed understanding of the background contrast mechanisms that lead to atomic and molecular resolution is critical. Without a theory that connects the measured force to atomic models of the surface and (...) tip of the microscope, the information that can be distilled from these measurements is limited. Molecular dynamics simulations show that the forces acting on the microscope tip result from the direct interaction between a tip and a surface and are entirely due to the structure of water around the tip and surface. (shrink)

Mereological nihilism is the philosophical position that there are no items that have parts. If there are no items with parts then the only items that exist are partless fundamental particles, such as the true atoms (also called philosophical atoms) theorized to exist by some ancient philosophers, some contemporary physicists, and some contemporary philosophers. With several novel arguments I show that mereological nihilism is the correct theory of reality. I will also discuss strong similarities that mereological nihilism has with empirical (...) results in quantum physics. And I will discuss how mereological nihilism vindicates a few other theories, such as a very specific theory of philosophical atomism, which I will call quantum abstract atomism. I will show that mereological nihilism also is an interpretation of quantum mechanics that avoids the problems of other interpretations, such as the widely known, metaphysically generated, quantum paradoxes of quantum physics, which ironically are typically accepted as facts about reality. I will also show why it is very surprising that mereological nihilism is not a widely held theory, and not the premier theory in philosophy. (shrink)

Ksenija Atanasijevic was not only the first female lecturer at the University of Belgrade but also the first expert in the Ancient Greek Philosophy. In this paper, I will not engage with all of her writings about Ancient Greek thought. Instead, I will place the emphasis on her interpretation of Epicurus, because her best and most profound works are dedicated to his philosophy, including her book on the Epicurus’s atomism written in French under the title L’atomisme d’Épicure. I will (...) critically discuss the consistency, plausibility, and relevance both of her interpretations of Epicurus, and his ethics and doctrine of minima. (shrink)

This study seeks to place Laozi, the seminal Chinese Daoist thinker, in conversation with Democritus, the Greek atomist, as representatives of two distinct yet resonant cosmological traditions. Both philosophers grappled with the fundamental question of origins, nature, and the order of the cosmos, yet their answers diverged in striking ways. Laozi articulated a vision of Dao as a holistic, ineffable, and dynamic unity that gives rise to the multiplicity of existence through spontaneous unfolding. Democritus, by contrast, developed a theory of (...) atoms and the void, proposing a discrete, mechanistic framework for explaining change and permanence. While their conceptual frameworks differ, both share a naturalistic orientation and a commitment to explaining the world without recourse to anthropomorphic gods or divine teleology. By situating Laozi and Democritus within a cross-cultural dialogue, this paper aims to illuminate their convergences and divergences, showing how early Greek and Chinese cosmological thought can mutually enrich comparative philosophy today. (shrink)

We introduce Saturated Hierarchical Atomic Incremental Learning (sHAIL), a learning paradigm in which complex tasks are approached through a sequence of simpler atomic subtasks, each mastered to saturation before progression. The central mechanism is a saturation criterion that detects when learning dynamics enter a plateau region, triggering consolidation and subsequent ascent to a higher level of task complexity. We develop a theoretical framework for sHAIL and show that it naturally gives rise to \emph{staircased convergence}: alternating phases of rapid improvement and (...) genuine plateau. Within each level, classical convergence guarantees apply under standard smoothness conditions, while the hierarchical transitions are driven by saturation rather than by time or iteration budget. Empirical illustrations demonstrate two characteristic behaviours of sHAIL: staircased loss trajectories during training and improved sample-efficiency relative to conventional flat learning strategies. These experiments are intended as qualitative evidence consistent with the theory rather than as exhaustive benchmarks. We interpret sHAIL as a first representative of a broader class of \emph{behavioral learning machines}, in which consolidation, staged progression, and hierarchical structure are treated as fundamental elements of learning dynamics. The framework opens several directions for future work, including principled hierarchy design, extensions to deep and reinforcement learning, and connections with biological and cognitive models of learning. (shrink)

Now entertain bold conjecture on the time of an instant and the problem of motion, when setting the rational endeavour of modern physics, with a focus on Bohr's complementarity, before the logical challenge of ancient paradox, specifically Zeno's Flying Arrow, and so for demonstrating and developing the philosophical power of reason over such combinatory reflection as may thereby yield novel scientific insight. By addressing the arrow argument precisely on its own logical terms, and by adaptively applying a core principle of (...) quantum mechanical theory, the study purposes to identify the basic spatial and temporal conditions for the possibility of motion, across the realms of little atoms to large arrows, that are to be recognised by any scientific theory of motion. In laying the basis for such physical theory, the reasoning engages with the pertinent thought of influential philosophers, mathematicians and physicists, both past and present, hence drawing the ‘common science’ issue of an emphatic quantitative mindset into the identification of a Kantian-style antinomy of the pure quantum instant. As may serve the current conundrum of quantum gravity, with so many conflicting conceptions of space, time and motion dividing the canonical, covariant and other approaches – here is thus posed the challenge of a fundamentally qualitative instant of motion. (shrink)

We develop a quaternion-based model of atomic structure in which orbitals (s,p,d,f) are linear combinations of fundamental vectors. This approach provides a unified explanation for the distribution of electrons, the stability of noble gases, the structure of lanthanides and actinides, and the natural limit of elements in the periodic table. We use geometric reasoning (unit-circle integrals), combinatorial logic (minimum spanning tree), and linear algebra to justify the model, yielding insight into both observed chemical patterns and theoretical constraints.

Kant linked the necessary and the a priori, taking them to be equivalent in extension. In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein, I argue, severed this Kantian link decades before Kripke. This is because, I explain, Wittgenstein held that even though the categories of atomic objects are necessary, they aren’t a priori, but, in a certain sense, a posteriori. To make my case I develop an interpretation of the ontology and epistemology of the Tractatus before charting the philosophical route whereby Wittgenstein travelled from (...) his starting position in the ‘Notes on Logic’ (1913) via the Notebooks (1914–1916) to arrive at his destination, his conception of the categories in the Tractatus. (shrink)

We present a parameter-free variational derivation of atomic core–shell structure from a closed quartic functional framework. Starting exclusively from a globally defined Ψ–Γ variational principle, together with its static Euler equation, dynamic equation, and global decisional selection operator, we show that any finite coherent domain must reduce to a two-phase configuration separated by a spherical interface. The result follows through a rigorous chain: coherent reduction to an $S^1$-valued phase field, Γ-convergence to the Dirichlet energy, BV compactness, exclusion of diffuse Young-measure (...) limits under a global complex constraint, and geometric rigidity of perimeter minimizers. No phenomenological potentials, boundary conditions, empirical inputs, or fitting parameters are introduced at any stage. -/- We then extend the structural result to nuclear density distributions and demonstrate that the same core–shell decomposition induces a quantitative modification of short-range two-body correlations. By deriving the deep inelastic scattering (DIS) operator expectation in an effective QCD framework and reducing the many-body cluster expansion to its two-body dominant sector under explicit $L^1$ bounds, we obtain a linear relation between the EMC slope and the short-range correlation (SRC) integral. The EMC effect emerges as a geometric consequence of density partitioning rather than as intrinsic nucleon modification. -/- The analysis establishes that atomic and nuclear structure are not imposed by symmetry ansätze but arise as unavoidable minimizers of a globally coherent variational object. The resulting framework unifies atomic geometry, short-range correlations, and nuclear DIS phenomenology within a single closed mathematical structure. (shrink)

In this paper, the ethical and spiritual aspects of the trolley problem are discussed in connection with the dropping of atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. First, I show that the dropping of atomic bombs was a typical example of the events that contained the logic of the trolley problems in their decision-making processes and justifications. Second, I discuss five aspects of “the problem of the trolley problem;” that is to say, “Rarity,” “Inevitability,” “Safety Zone,” “Possibility of Becoming a Victim,” (...) and “Lack of Perspective of the Dead Victims Who Were Deprived of Freedom of Choice,” in detail. Third, I argue that those who talk about the trolley problem are automatically placed in the sphere of the expectation of response on the spiritual level. I hope that my contribution will shed light on the trolley problem from a very different angle, which has not been made by our fellow philosophers. (shrink)

This article proposes the first formally derived structural law of international relations. The New Multipolar Convergence (NMC) Theory argues that the post-1945 international system is governed by a geometric constraint generated by the nuclear–technological threshold: the world is too large to sustain unipolarity and too strategically compressed to sustain more than two fully autonomous poles. From this boundary condition emerges a stable bipolar attractor that has persisted across all systemic configurations from 1945 to 2025. -/- NMC axiomatically formalizes this structure (...) through a three-object ontology (Poles, Pseudo-Poles, Gray Zones) and a set of twelve axioms (C1–C12) that specify the necessary and sufficient conditions under which actors are absorbed, subordinated, or structurally prevented from achieving pole status. These axioms generate determinate implications for alliance formation, technological competition, resource chokepoints, institutional behavior, and gray-zone dynamics. -/- The theory is validated through four independent modes of demonstration: (1) long-horizon empirical invariance across eight decades of geopolitical evolution; (2) cross-regional and cross-actor applicability; (3) counterfactual robustness, including scenarios involving hypothetical third-pole formation; and (4) computational falsification via large-scale AI models capable of searching for structural violations across thousands of historical cases and synthetic simulations. Taken together, these tests show that bipolarity is not a contingent outcome but a domain-bounded structural necessity of the post-atomic world. NMC therefore functions as a meta-grand theory: it subsumes realism, liberalism, constructivism, and critical approaches by specifying the structural limits within which their claims can hold. The article concludes that NMC establishes an autonomous science of structural power for the atomic era, providing both a unifying theoretical framework and a predictive geometry for understanding systemic evolution in the twenty-first century. -/- Keywords: Bipolarity, Structural Law, International Relations Theory, Nuclear Threshold, Systemic Constraints, NMC Theory, Post-Atomic Order. -/- . (shrink)

Contemporary philosophy and theoretical psychology are dominated by an acceptance of content-externalism: the view that the contents of one's mental states are constitutively, as opposed to causally, dependent on facts about the external world. In the present work, it is shown that content-externalism involves a failure to distinguish between semantics and pre-semantics---between, on the one hand, the literal meanings of expressions and, on the other hand, the information that one must exploit in order to ascertain their literal meanings. It is (...) further shown that, given the falsity of content-externalism, the falsity of the Computational Theory of Mind (CTM) follows. It is also shown that CTM involves a misunderstanding of terms such as "computation," "syntax," "algorithm," and "formal truth." Novel analyses of the concepts expressed by these terms are put forth. These analyses yield clear, intuition-friendly, and extensionally correct answers to the questions "what are propositions?, "what is it for a proposition to be true?", and "what are the logical and psychological differences between conceptual (propositional) and non-conceptual (non-propositional) content?" Naively taking literal meaning to be in lockstep with cognitive content, Burge, Salmon, Falvey, and other semantic externalists have wrongly taken Kripke's correct semantic views to justify drastic and otherwise contraindicated revisions of commonsense. (Salmon: What is non-existent exists; at a given time, one can rationally accept a proposition and its negation. Burge: Somebody who is having a thought may be psychologically indistinguishable from somebody who is thinking nothing. Falvey: somebody who rightly believes himself to be thinking about water is psychologically indistinguishable from somebody who wrongly thinks himself to be doing so and who, indeed, isn't thinking about anything.) Given a few truisms concerning the differences between thought-borne and sentence-borne information, the data is easily modeled without conceding any legitimacy to any one of these rationality-dismantling atrocities. (It thus turns out, ironically, that no one has done more to undermine Kripke's correct semantic points than Kripke's own followers!). (shrink)

This dissertation defends the existence of relations and their role in constructing structural universals—complex, multiply-located properties. Chapter 1 reviews historical debates on the existence of relations, advocates for a truth-making approach to ontology, and argues that relations are required as truth-makers for relational claims. Chapter 2 examines two competing theories of relations—Positionalism and Anti-Positionalism—as potential truth-makers for relational claims, showing that Positionalism provides a more satisfactory account. Chapter 3 critiques contemporary theories of structural universals and demonstrates how Positionalist relations overcome (...) these critiques by abstracting structural universals from complex states of affairs constructed through Positionalist relations. Chapter 4 defends the abstract nature of Positionalist relations, showing that Positionalism possesses greater explanatory power in addressing the problems of multiple realizability, order, and converse relations. (shrink)

Inferentialism is a theory in the philosophy of language which claims that the meanings of expressions are constituted by inferential roles or relations. Instead of a traditional model-theoretic semantics, it naturally lends itself to a proof-theoretic semantics, where meaning is understood in terms of inference rules with a proof system. Most work in proof-theoretic semantics has focused on logical constants, with comparatively little work on the semantics of non-logical vocabulary. Drawing on Robert Brandom’s notion of material inference and Greg Restall’s (...) bilateralist interpretation of the multiple conclusion sequent calculus, I present a proof-theoretic semantics for atomic sentences and their constituent names and predicates. The resulting system has several interesting features: (1) the rules are harmonious and stable; (2) the rules create a structure analogous to familiar model-theoretic semantics; and (3) the semantics is compositional, in that the rules for atomic sentences are determined by those for their constituent names and predicates. (shrink)

One of the main ontological challenges posed by quantum mechanics is the problem of the indistinguishability of so-called “identical” particles, that is, particles that share the same state-independent properties. In the framework of this philosophical problem, a quasi-set theory was formulated to provide a proper metalanguage to deal with quantum indistinguishability; this theory included certain Urelemente called m-atoms, representing essentially indistinguishable objects. In turn, over the last two decades, the Modal Hamiltonian Interpretation proposed an ontology of properties, totally devoid of (...) objects, where quantum systems are bundles of instances of universal properties. Therefore, the original quasi-set theory, with its m-atoms, does not adequately reflect the structure of an ontology devoid of objects. The purpose to the present article is to introduce a new quasi-set theory that does not include atoms at all: elementary items correspond to properties and are also represented by quasi-sets, which can be only numerically different. The final aim is to apply this new quasi-set theory to the MHI ontology. (shrink)

The testimonia concerning weight in early Greek atomism appear to contradict one another. Some reports assert that the atoms do have weight, while others outright deny weight as a property of the atoms. A common solution to this apparent contradiction divides the testimonia into two groups. The first group describes the atoms within a κόσμος, where they have weight; the second group describes the atoms outside of a κόσμος, where they are weightless. A key testimonium for proponents of this (...) solution is Aëtius 1.3.18. It apparently denies weight as a property of the atoms, and supposedly describes the atoms when they are outside of a κόσμος. I argue against this interpretive solution by demonstrating, first, that Aëtius 1.3.18 does not deny that weight is a property of the atoms. Second, I argue that the report does not describe the atoms when they are outside of a κόσμος. Although these are largely negative conclusions, I contend that we are not left without a solution to the present interpretive difficulty. Once our testimonia concerning weight in early Greek atomism are examined thoroughly, it is clear that there is no conflict among them. (shrink)

Persistent, essentially loss-free currents emerge at two vastly different scales: (i) macroscopic superconducting loops carrying tens of kiloamperes for decades and (ii) microscopic quantum orbits where bound electrons circulate without radiative decay. Classical textbooks treat these as disjoint miracles—BCS condensation versus Bohr–Sommerfeld quantization—yet both can be viewed as the same ontological maneuver: a suppression of the temporal decay vector ∇T and a simultaneous locking of spatial concentration ∇S inside the unified tension field ∇U posited by Meta-Monism. We review the historical (...) record—from Bohr’s 1913 postulate through Büttiker–Landauer–Imry’s 1983 prediction of persistent currents to the 28-year niobium gravimeter loop—and reinterpret each milestone via the Conflictof-Potencies framework A = A′ + (−A′0). Finally, we outline an experimental roadmap whose success would elevate the Chaos-Polytope to a “periodic table” of metastable forms. (shrink)

Abstract Despite being composed of atoms—fundamental particles of matter—human beings have developed the capacity to create extraordinarily advanced technologies. This paper explores how such a transformation is possible, linking the evolution of individual and collective intelligence to a universal formula grounded in natural laws. The argument emphasizes three foundational principles: the law of balance, the law of karma understood as system integrity, and the law of natural feedback. The interplay of these laws, as outlined by Angelito Malicse, offers a unifying (...) perspective on the emergence of intelligence and its technological outputs. This framework connects basic material constituents with higher-order functions, providing insights into how intelligence, morality, and innovation can be harmonized. -/- . (shrink)

The main goal of this paper is to defend so-called _atomist_ approaches to concept individuation against the threat presented by what I will refer to as _Frege’s Problem Psychologized_ (FPP): difficulties presented by putative cases of co-referring but distinct concepts. The discussion will provide an opportunity to highlight the virtues of a particularly austere, reference-based version of Concept Atomism and to draw attention to some broader morals, notably that even a radical version of atomism is consistent with embracing (...) various features of cognition that are of interest to psychologists and empirically oriented philosophers. (shrink)

In a companion article, “Terrible Knowledge And Tertiary Trauma, Part I: Japanese Nuclear Trauma And Resistance To The Atomic Bomb” (this issue), I argue that we need to teach about the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, even though the material is difficult emotionally as well as intellectually. Because of the nature of the information, this topic can be as difficult for graduate students (and their professors!) as for younger students. Teaching about the atomic bombings, however, demands special treatment if (...) we are to prevent a sense of isolation, immobilization, or helplessness in students. We can do this by building a strong community of learning, offering students as much control over their learning as possible, and helping them find ways to connect to larger social and political processes and movements that make sense of an endangered world. Here I offer some thoughts on how to teach it, along with discussion questions, applicable to K-graduate school. Since middle-school students are becoming keenly aware of the larger world through the Internet, and middle school teaching can be (comparatively) easy to adapt for other age groups, I also offer some suggestions of some materials and projects appropriate for use with that age group. (shrink)