Perceptual and recursion-based faculties have long been recognized to be vital constituents of human (and, in general, animal) cognition. However, certain faculties such as the visual and the linguistic faculty have come to receive far more academic and experimental attention, in recent decades, than other recognized categories of faculties. This paper seeks to highlight the imbalance in these studies and bring into sharper focus the need for further in-depth philosophical treatments of faculties such as especially hearing, touch, and proprioception, besides (...) other faculties such as the olfactory and gustatory ones. It also seeks to bring to bear the debate on the role of qualia in perception and overall in cognition in its thesis of the significance of these other modular faculties for genuine insights into cognition as a (now) technologically expanded domain. (shrink)

Context: Contemporary consciousness science remains in a state of methodological crisis, perpetually reproducing the "hard problem" and traditional dichotomies. This work proposes an alternative approach by analyzing the limits of cognition and mapping the structure of the cognizable. Approach: The work argues that the "hard problem" arises from a categorical error — an attempt to locate consciousness among objects, when consciousness is in fact logically bound to the immanent limit of the act of cognition itself. A conceptual apparatus is introduced (...) that distinguishes structural information (I₊) from negative information (I₋), where I₋ operates as the active aspect of indeterminacy. A minimal ontological model is proposed: the Question-Answer cognitive cycle. Findings: The "hard problem" is reinterpreted as a particular manifestation of universal gnoseological constraints. Consciousness is defined both structurally — as the limit mode of cognition, wherein a system operates with maximal I₋/I₊ ratio — and procedurally — as the outcome of cognitive cycle intensification that engenders proactive self-reference. The model provides solutions to classical paradoxes (Mary's room, the Chinese room, philosophical zombies), derives the irreducible properties of consciousness as logically necessary, and engages in productive dialogue with several contemporary theories. Conclusion: This approach furnishes a conceptual framework that redirects focus from static neural correlates to the dynamics of uncertainty generation and resolution, thereby opening new perspectives for interdisciplinary consciousness research. (shrink)

This text is an extended abstract of the full text: Kolomytsev D. Consciousness as the Limit Mode of Cognition (Reframing the Hard Problem). The "hard problem" is treated as a specific manifestation of universal gnoseological constraints. Consciousness is defined structurally—as a limit mode of cognition in which a system operates under maximized indeterminacy—and procedurally—as the outcome of an intensified cognitive cycle that gives rise to proactive self‑reference. The model offers unified treatments of classical thought experiments (Mary’s room, the Chinese (...) room, philosophical zombies), derives the irreducible properties of consciousness as logically necessary, and situates them within a structured dialogue with several leading contemporary theories. (shrink)

This article considers distinct ways of understanding the world, referred to in psychology as Functions of Consciousness or as Cognitive Modes, having as the scope of interest epistemology and natural sciences. Inspired by C.G. Jung's Simile of the Spectrum, we consider three basic cognitive modes associated to: (R) embodied instinct, experience, and action; (G) reality perception and learning; and (B) concept abstraction, rational thinking, and language. RGB stand for the primary colors: red, green, and blue. Accordingly, (...) a conceptual map between cognitive modes and primary and secondary colors is built based on the physics and physiology of color perception and epistemological characteristics of the aforementioned cognitive modes, leading to logical relations structured as an Hexagon of Opposition. Finally, this model of cognitive modes is applied to the analysis and interpretation of some important episodes in the historical development of physics and technology. (shrink)

In this article, I argue that a capacity for mindreading conceived along the line of simulation theory provides the cognitive basis for forming we-centric representations of actions and goals. This explains the plural first personal stance displayed by we-intentions in terms of the underlying cognitive processes performed by individual minds, while preserving the idea that they cannot be analyzed in terms of individual intentional states. The implication for social ontology is that this makes sense of the plural subjectivity (...) of joint actions without making group agents require either a corporate body or the unity of consciousness. (shrink)

Four modes of language acquisition and communication are presented translating ancient Indian expressions on human consciousness, mind, their form, structure and function clubbing with the Sabdabrahma theory of language acquisition and communication. The modern scientific understanding of such an insight is discussed. . A flowchart of language processing in humans will be given. A gross model of human language acquisition, comprehension and communication process forming the basis to develop software for relevantmind-machine modeling will be presented. The implications of such (...) a model to artificial intelligence and cognitive sciences will be discussed. The essential nature and necessity of a physics, communication engineering , biophysical and biochemical insight as both complementary and supplementary to using mathematical and computational methods in delineating the theory of language processing in humans is put forward. (shrink)

Contemporary cognitive science offers limited conceptual tools for describing systematic variation in how individuals maintain coherence under conditions of high informational load. While existing models address attention, working memory, predictive processing, and cognitive style, they do not adequately capture deeper structural differences in how minds compress, integrate, and stabilize representations of reality. This paper proposes a conceptual framework of cognitive compression styles: distinct information-processing architectures that organize perception, meaning-making, and coherence through different compression strategies. The framework identifies (...) seven compression styles. Pattern-sensitive, associative, immersive, sequential, narrative, social-reflective, and integrative. Examining how each exhibits characteristic failure modes under conditions of environmental overload, optimization pressure, and constraint loss. The model is descriptive rather than diagnostic and is intended as a theoretical lens for understanding differential cognitive stability in contemporary high-noise digital environments. (shrink)

Abstract -/- This paper unifies four previously independent works into a single operational system: a dataless AI architecture that does not depend on large proprietary datasets, persistent memory, or opaque embeddings as its primary substrate. Instead, the system operates on constructs—explicit operators such as recursion, entropy, correction, watchers, constraints, and role identity—as its core data-management layer. -/- The architecture combines: 1. Dynamic Entropy AGI Lens (DEAL) for inference-time control without retraining 2. A lightweight semantic crawler/indexer that samples dictionaries, thesauri, safe (...) cloud sources, and constrained web endpoints without persistent corpus ingestion 3. A bridge-language formalism (“Shape of Truth”) that replaces metaphysical claims with constraint-stable recursion 4. A modular mode-switching AI architecture that governs behavior, ethics, and narrative depth without altering the base model -/- The result is a portable, low-data, low-risk AI system suitable for regulated markets, IP-sensitive environments, and emerging economies where data ownership, safety, and controllability dominate over raw scale. -/- This is a governance-first inference architecture / specification; not a claim about consciousness or metaphysical truth. -/- ⸻ -/- 1. Problem Statement: Why “Dataless” Matters -/- Modern AI systems are data-hungry, opaque, and brittle. They: • Require massive proprietary datasets • Leak training bias through irreducible embeddings • Conflate stored knowledge with reasoning ability -/- My corpus takes a different stance: -/- Truth is not stored; it is extracted under constraint. -/- In this framing, data becomes optional. What matters instead is: • How uncertainty is managed • How correction is applied • How recursion is stabilized • How constraints dominate narrative drift -/- This paper formalizes that stance as a dataless system, meaning: • No long-term corpus ingestion • No hidden memory accumulation • No authority from scale alone . (shrink)

In this article, we develop a new approach to integrating philosophical phenomenology with qualitative research. The approach uses phenomenology’s concepts, namely existentials, rather than methods such as the epoché or reductions. We here introduce the approach to both philosophers and qualitative researchers, as we believe that these studies are best conducted through interdisciplinary collaboration. In section 1, we review the debate over phenomenology’s role in qualitative research and argue that qualitative theorists have not taken full advantage of what philosophical phenomenology (...) has to offer, thus motivating the need for new approaches. In section 2, we introduce our alternative approach, which we call Phenomenologically Grounded Qualitative Research (PGQR). Drawing parallels with phenomenology’s applications in the cognitive sciences, we explain how phenomenological grounding can be used to conceptually front-load a qualitative study, establishing an explicit focus on one or more structures of human existence, or of our being in the world. In section 3, we illustrate this approach with an example of a qualitative study carried out by one of the authors: a study of the existential impact of early parental bereavement. In section 4, we clarify the kind of knowledge that phenomenologically grounded studies generate and how it may be integrated with existing approaches. (shrink)

This paper develops a unified metaphysical-cognitive framework that reconceives universals and particulars as scale-relative, contrast-generated, and mode-dependent structures. Against both nominalism and Platonism, I argue that particulars depend on universals for intelligibility, universals depend on particulars for recognition, and both depend on contrast relations. Universals emerge as structural invariants across contrastive clusters of particulars, and at higher scales they themselves function as particulars, generating an indefinitely nested ontology. I introduce the novel concept of Reality-Mode Perception (RMP): the thesis that (...) human cognition does not perceive objects as they exist across their full modal range, but only the mode of reality accessible through our sensory-cognitive apparatus. Redness, for example, is a mode-specific universal derived from our visual system, not the underlying wavelength structure; similarly, 'water' is a mode-unified universal compressing multiple physical states (ice, liquid, vapor). Integrating RMP with predictive processing (Friston, 2010; Clark, 2016), coarse-graining (Wimsatt, 2007), and categorization research (Rosch, 1978), I argue that the universal-particular binary is a genuine cognitive limitation arising from our restricted access to the modal structure of reality. The result is a Reality-Mode Ontology: a relational, scale-relative, and mode-relative metaphysics that integrates phenomenology, analytic metaphysics, structural realism, and cognitive science into a coherent account of intelligibility. (shrink)

Some have defended a Fregean view of perceptual content. On this view, the constituents of perceptual contents are Fregean modes of presentation (MOPs). In this paper, I propose that perceptual MOPs are best understood in terms of object files. Object files are episodic representations that store perceptual information about objects. This information is updated when sensory conditions change. On the proposed view, when a subject perceptually represents some object a under two distinct MOPs, then the subject initiates two object (...) files that both refer to a. My defense of this view appeals to its satisfaction of four constraints that I argue theories of perceptual MOPs should satisfy. Furthermore, I show that some existent accounts of perceptual MOPs fail to satisfy them. The defended constraints also indicate what is unique about perceptual, as opposed to linguistic or cognitive, MOPs. (shrink)

Introduction: the objective of the investigation is to analyse the informational operating-mode of the brain and to extract conclusions on the structure of the informational system of the human body and consciousness. Analysis: the mechanisms and processes of the transmission of information in the body both by electrical and non-electrical ways are analysed in order to unify the informational concepts and to identify the specific essential requirements supporting the life. It is shown that the electrical transmission can be described by (...) typical YES/NO (all or nothing) binary units as defined by the information science, while the inter and intra cell communication, including within the synaptic junction, by mechanisms of embodiment/disembodiment of information. The virtual received or operated information can be integrated in the cells as matter-related information, with a maximum level of integration as genetically codified info. Therefore, in terms of information, the human appears as a reactive system changing information with the environment and between inner informational subsystems which are: the centre of acquisition and storing of information (acquired data), the centre of decision and command (decision), the info-emotional system (emotions), the maintenance informational system (matter absorption/desorption/distribution), the genetic transmission system (reproduction) and info-genetic generator (genetically assisted body evolution). The dedicated areas and components of the brain are correlated with such systems and their functions are specified. Result: the corresponding cognitive centres projected into consciousness are defined and described according to their specific functions. The cognitive centres, suggestively named to appropriately include their main characteristics are detected at the conscious level respectively as: memory, decisional operation (attitude), emotional state, power/energy status and health, associativity and offspring formation, inherited predispositions, skills and mentality. The near-death and religious experiences can be explained by an Info-Connection pole. Conclusion: consciousness could be fully described and understood in informational terms. (shrink)

This treatise proposes the Êtresophologique Socio-Intellectual Hierarchy (ESIH), a novel framework for understanding human personality configurations that supersedes the pseudo-psychological socio-sexual hierarchy (SSH) popularized in internet culture. Drawing upon Jung’s (1921) original typological system—rather than its diluted derivatives such as the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator—and integrating the Êtresophologie framework and the PsyPhi Helix model H(t) = [Φ(t) × Ψ(t)]^DH, this work introduces seven primary personality configurations, each designated with formal êtresophologique nomenclature and each paired with its binary opposite, yielding a fourteen-point (...) dimensional model of human being-in-the-world. The treatise argues that the SSH’s reduction of human complexity to Greek-letter hierarchies predicated upon sexual market value represents an intellectually impoverished and empirically unsupported account of social organization. In its place, the ESIH reconceptualizes personality through the lens of philosophical-psychological consilience, assessing individuals not by their position in a dominance hierarchy but by their mode of engagement with existence itself. Central to this framework is the Chameleon configuration—formally designated the Être-Masqué—which draws upon the phenomenology of narcissistic adaptation. The Van Gogh Curve’s core insight—that statistical deviation represents cognitive specialization rather than deficit—provides the epistemological foundation, while the Van Gogh Compass supplies the dimensional architecture. This work constitutes an original contribution to philosophical psychology and personality theory at the intersection of existential phenomenology and empirical science. (shrink)

In our previous discussions, we focused primarily on visual intuition, which is, of course, a form of sensuous intuition. In this section, we will turn to non-visual forms of sensuous intuition. In phenomenology, “intuition” (Anschauung) should not be understood as a merely visual activity. The core of intuition does not lie in which sensory organ is employed, but rather in the manner in which an object is given to consciousness in its own way. Wherever an object can present itself to (...) consciousness with a certain originary givenness (originäre Gegebenheit), this presentation may be called intuition. Accordingly, experiences constituted through vision, hearing, touch, smell, and bodily movement all belong to different forms of sensuous intuition. Different sensory organs do not merely provide different channels of information; rather, they correspond to different modes of givenness of the object and thus participate, at the level of meaning-structure, in the constitution of the object. Therefore, through the participation of various sensory organs, we are not only able to obtain the content-meaning of an object, but also to acquire many other sensuous meanings. However, we must recognize that positing (Setzung) itself depends on the cognitive system of the transcendental ego. Consequently, all meaning-constitution depends on the cognitive system of the transcendental ego. Different transcendental egos, by virtue of having different cognitive systems, obtain different object-meanings. Moreover, Husserl does not restrict intuition to the sensuous level. In his phenomenology, there also exist non-sensory forms of intuition, most notably eidetic intuition (Wesensanschauung). Eidetic intuition is not realized through sensory organs but rather through the imaginative activity of free variation, by which the invariant structures of objects are grasped. Thus, the phenomenological call to “return to intuition” does not amount to a return to sensory empiricism, but rather to a return to the domain in which all meanings can receive originary givenness. In this section, however, we confine ourselves to a discussion of sensuous intuition. -/- . (shrink)

The concept of ‘distributed cognition’ is routinely invoked to unify heterogeneous collective epistemic systems, including prediction markets, open-source software development, deliberative bodies, digital platforms, and regulatory institutions. These systems are often treated as interchangeable instances of ‘crowd wisdom’, whose epistemic virtues are presumed to arise naturally from decentralisation and aggregation. This article argues that this assumption rests on a category error: it conflates epistemic coordination architectures with epistemic closure architectures and treats descriptive claims about cognitive distribution as if they (...) entailed claims about epistemic reliability. Distributed cognition is not a unitary epistemic good but a family of structurally distinct socio-technical systems that perform different epistemic functions under different closure mechanisms, incentive structures, and governance-mediated conditions. The article develops a formal taxonomy of distributed epistemic systems and shows that each class distributes a different epistemic resource, stabilises closure in a different locus, and exhibits characteristic failure modes. Through a paradigm contrast between prediction markets and open-source communities, the article demonstrates that epistemic failures in distributed systems are governance-mediated distortions of closure and salience rather than merely cognitive accidents. Distributed cognition is therefore best understood as an engineered epistemic infrastructure whose reliability depends on architectural design rather than on decentralisation alone. (shrink)

In this section, I would like to discuss the functional super-existential meaning of objects. This is also one of the most important kinds of super-existential meaning that an object can have. Although the functions of certain objects cannot be intuited—for example, the function of the heart, which we discussed earlier—there are objects whose functions can be intuited. When the transcendental ego intuits a situation in which an object is being used, it thereby obtains the object’s functional super-existential meaning. Of course, (...) it is hardly surprising that when the transcendental ego observes an object being used, it must inevitably already possess a cognitive system; moreover, the transcendental ego must recognize all the relevant objects involved in the object’s use. It is unclear whether Husserl ever discussed the intuition of an object’s function, but it is evident that function is what truly matters for many objects. Once we speak of importance, we must inevitably refer to human beings. The importance of an object’s function is entirely dependent on humans; apart from humans, discussing the importance of an object’s function has little meaning. That is to say, the ultimate meaning of an object’s function must be related to human beings. Take a chair as an example. Aside from its color—which we may or may not care about—its function is what we care about most. Its function is to allow us to sit comfortably. It is precisely because of this function that we deliberately manufacture chairs, and this is also the fundamental reason why a chair is a chair. Therefore, in my view, the functional super-existential meaning of an object is the most important super-existential meaning for certain objects. Clearly, however, Heidegger was deeply interested in the function of objects, and he may also have believed that function constitutes the most important mode of an object’s being. He discussed the functions of many objects and connected these functions with human beings and with the world. The function of an object seems to go beyond our ordinary pragmatic understanding and is instead regarded as a bridge that brings together humans, the world, and Being. I personally find this perspective quite novel, even though the connection seems somewhat forced. (shrink)

This dissertation reconceptualizes psychopathology through a synthesis of Heidegger’s existential analytic and contemporary enactivist cognitive science. It argues that dominant models in psychiatry, particularly biomedical and representationalist frameworks, remain constrained by Cartesian assumptions and fail to account for the embodied, relational, and world-disclosing nature of mental illness. Drawing on Heidegger’s distinction between ready-to-hand and present-at-hand, this work reinterprets breakdowns in practical coping not as internal dysfunctions but as disruptions in the existential structure of being-in-the-world. The lived body, rather than (...) being a mechanistic substrate, is revealed through its participatory role in world constitution. When illness emerges, it signals not a failure of bodily function but a collapse in the integration of self, body, and world. Using comparative phenomenological analysis, the dissertation integrates concepts from ecological and developmental psychology, pragmatism, phenomenology, and enactivist theory, particularly autopoiesis and participatory sense-making, to explore how Dasein’s identity is enacted through embodied interaction and relational responsiveness. It develops a non-dualistic account of selfhood in which psychopathology is understood as a failure of adaptive equilibration rather than as a deviation from normativity. Mental illness is thus reframed as a transformation in the structure of affordances and world-relation; it often reveals the fragile, recursive nature of identity and its dependence on meaningful engagement. Central to this project is a reinterpretation of Heidegger’s concept of authenticity. Rather than being a normative ideal, authenticity is presented as an existential dynamic; a mode of regaining coherence through the confrontation with fragility, fallenness, and temporal rupture. Authenticity allows for reintegration into everyday life not by transcending inauthenticity but by making it visible as a necessary horizon for sense-making. Drawing on both phenomenological and enactivist perspectives, the work shows how Dasein’s existential freedom is situated, embodied, and contingent upon its capacity to maintain ontological flexibility in the face of crisis. The thesis concludes by arguing for a therapeutic model rooted in the restoration of existential orientation rather than the elimination of symptoms. Health is reframed as the capacity for world re-engagement, not as equilibrium or normality. Illness discloses the limits and possibilities of sense-making; it exposes the constitutive role of fragility in selfhood. This approach calls for a hermeneutic and relational understanding of psychopathology, attentive to the embodied structures of mood, care, and temporality. By bridging Heidegger’s ontology with enactivist models of cognition, the dissertation offers a conceptual foundation for a phenomenologically grounded, ethically responsive, and clinically relevant account of mental illness. In doing so, it contributes to ongoing debates in philosophy of psychiatry and cognitive science while challenging reductive assumptions that obscure the lived meaning of suffering. (shrink)

This paper examines the cognitive architecture underlying the smile in Leonardo da Vinci’s Mona Lisa, arguing that its aesthetic force arises not from the visual surface alone but from a deliberate manipulation of perceptual structures. Building on an analysis of sfumato, I show that the painting orchestrates a form of attention design—a subtle asymmetry in contour clarity that continuously redirects the viewer’s perceptual field from the face to the hands and back again. This mechanism produces an “aesthetic of acceptance”: (...) a smile that is not merely seen but recognized as a structural gesture of receptivity toward the observer. -/- I contend that the expression encoded in the Mona Lisa is not psychologically ambiguous but structurally precise. It evokes a form of acceptance attainable only when the observer is perceived without judgment—a mode of reception rarely accessible in ordinary interpersonal relations. Through this lens, da Vinci’s portrait becomes a reconstruction of a smile he sought but seldom encountered: a micro-expression that acknowledges human contradiction without negating it. -/- By reframing the Mona Lisa as a work of cognitive aesthetics, this paper clarifies how da Vinci embedded phenomenological insight into visual form. The smile’s enduring power, I argue, lies in its ability to enact a stable perceptual structure of acceptance, sustained by the viewer’s own shifting attention. This synthesis of perceptual design and emotional intelligibility constitutes the painting’s unique and still-unmatched aesthetic achievement. (shrink)

Two lines of evidence indicate that there exists a reciprocal inhibitory relationship between opposed brain networks. First, most attention-demanding cognitive tasks activate a stereotypical set of brain areas, known as the task-positive network and simultaneously deactivate a different set of brain regions, commonly referred to as the task negative or defaultmode network. Second, functional connectivity analyses show that these same opposed networks are anti-correlated in the resting state. Wehypothesize that these reciprocally inhibitory effects reflect two incompatible cognitive (...) class='Hi'>modes, each of which may be directed towards understanding the external world. Thus, engaging onemode activates one set of regions and suppresses activity in the other.Wetest this hypothesis by identifying two types of problem-solving task which, on the basis of prior work, have been consistently associated with the task positive and task negative regions: tasks requiring social cognition, i.e., reasoning about the mental states of other persons, and tasks requiring physical cognition, i.e., reasoning about the causal/mechanical properties of inanimate objects. Social and mechanical reasoning tasks were presented to neurologically normal participants during fMRI. Each task type was presented using both text and video clips. Regardless of presentation modality, we observed clear evidence of reciprocal suppression: social tasks deactivated regions associated with mechanical reasoning and mechanical tasks deactivated regions associated with social reasoning. These findings are not explained by self-referential processes, task engagement, mental simulation,mental time travel or external vs. internal attention, all factors previously hypothesized to explain default mode network activity. Analyses of resting state data revealed a close match between the regions our tasks identified as reciprocally inhibitory and regions of maximal anti-correlation in the resting state. These results indicate the reciprocal inhibition is not attributable to constraints inherent in the tasks, but is neural in origin. Hence, there is a physiological constraint on our ability to simultaneously engage two distinct cognitive modes. Furtherwork is needed tomore precisely characterize these opposing cognitive domains. (shrink)

Shutaleva A. Neuroscience and phenomenology of religion. In Modes of the religious in the context of philosophy, science, and culture: the monograph. Ekaterinburg: Delovaya Kniga, 2021. Pp. 137-165. This chapter aims to study the neurophenomenological perspective of the mutual influence of culture and religion in the experience of consciousness and the development of the human brain. The concept of “consciousness” and the ways of its relationship with the outside world are presented from the cognitive and cultural neurophenomenological approaches. (...) The phenomenon of “embodiment” is addressed both to the subjective experience of the body as a living, empirical structure and as a context or environment of cognitive mechanisms. Neurophenomenological analysis from a cross-cultural perspective shows the relationship between consciousness, emotions, the brain, and the nervous system. (shrink)

Shutaleva A. Neuroscience and phenomenology of religion. In Modes of the religious in the context of philosophy, science, and culture: the monograph. Ekaterinburg: Delovaya Kniga, 2021. Pp. 137-165. -/- This chapter aims to study the neurophenomenological perspective of the mutual influence of culture and religion in the experience of consciousness and the development of the human brain. The concept of “consciousness” and the ways of its relationship with the outside world are presented from the cognitive and cultural neurophenomenological (...) approaches. The phenomenon of “embodiment” is addressed both to the subjective experience of the body as a living, empirical structure and as a context or environment of cognitive mechanisms. Neurophenomenological analysis from a cross-cultural perspective shows the relationship between consciousness, emotions, the brain, and the nervous system. (shrink)

In the preceding sections, we examined the functional super-existential meaning of objects and introduced what I termed functional eidetic intuition in correspondence with Husserl’s eidetic intuition. In Section 23, I further introduced the notion of functional accompaniments of an object. In the present section, I introduce what may be called the accompanying functional eidetic intuition of objects. The introduction of this concept further extends the domain of functional intuition. It can be observed that in the exhibition of an object’s function, (...) in addition to the object whose function is manifested, other objects are typically required in order for this functional performance to occur. These auxiliary objects may be termed the accompanying objects of the functional act. By carrying out free imaginative variation (freie phantastische Variation) with respect to these accompanying objects, we arrive at the accompanying functional eidetic intuition of the object. Through this procedure, further possible modes of functional manifestation are disclosed. At this stage, five forms of intuition concerning objects can be distinguished: intuition of the object itself, intuition of its function, eidetic intuition of the object, functional eidetic intuition, and accompanying functional eidetic intuition. These expand upon Husserl’s classical distinction between perceptual intuition and eidetic intuition. In this sense, the present analysis broadens Husserl’s phenomenological field. (shrink)

I suggest that the main aim Recanati proposes to achieve in Perspectival Though—that a moderate relativist should adopt a Kaplanian framework with three levels of content, rather than a Lewisian framework with only two— seems insufficiently motivated, and the arguments offered do not settle the issue. I suggest furthermore that the claim that subjects’ mental states and cognitive situations can determine parameters or indices in circumstances of evaluation is an original and very interesting contribution. It is also an important (...) one, since it sets further apart the radical from the moderate relativist, and it is relevant in the current relativism debate, where truth is deemed to be relative to parameters other than worlds, times, places and individuals. I also offer a few objections to some of the reasons Recanati puts forward in support of this latter claim; I object in particular to those that depend on some considerations about psychological modes. (shrink)

Philosophy is the study of the most general and fundamental problems of human life. The main areas of study in philosophy includes metaphysics, epistemology, logic, ethics and aesthetics etc. there are other several branches of philosophy which characterize different branches of knowledge. Philosophy being a very abstract branch of study, has not much scope of using equipment on a large scale to supplement the normal lecture schedules. However, in some papers/areas there are comparatively better scope to make the lectures more (...) concrete and interesting through proper use of various teaching aids and modes. We include logic, philosophy of science, applied philosophy, applied ethics, social and political philosophy, philosophy of mind, philosophy of cognitive science and history of philosophy etc., we can use various modern aids. In this article my attempt is to draw out an outlines of aids and modes for effective philosophy teaching. (shrink)

We present a specific elaboration and partial defense of the claims that cognition is enactive, embodied, embedded, affective and (potentially) extended. According to the view we will defend, the enactivist claim that perception and cognition essentially depend upon the cognizer’s interactions with their environment is fundamental. If a particular instance of this kind of dependence obtains, we will argue, then it follows that cognition is essentially embodied and embedded, that the underpinnings of cognition are inextricable from those of affect, that (...) the phenomenon of cognition itself is essentially bound up with affect, and that the possibility of cognitive extension depends upon the instantiation of a specific mode of skillful interrelation between cognizer and environment. Thus, if cognition is enactive then it is also embodied, embedded, affective and potentially extended. (shrink)

Examining imagination, 4E cognition and the arts together expands our understanding of them all. 4E cognition is a framework that comprises the theories separately known as embodied, enactive, embedded, and extended cognition. This paper draws on research in cognitive science (including 4E and recent predictive processing approaches), ideas in phenomenology, and artworks from The Extended Mind exhibition (2019–20). The artworks offer diverse reflections on 4E cognition, as well as revealing personal, political and ethical benefits and issues predicated on a (...) 4E cognition perspective. This approach further provides a way of defending the epistemic value of the imagination and of unpacking the four key puzzles associated with its relationship with the arts regarding its production of emotional response, imaginative resistance, and moral persuasion, and the paradox of our attraction towards horror and tragedy. The arts are a valuable mode of inquiry into the nature of cognition and neglect of their relevance negatively impacts understandings of the mind. (shrink)

Based on the analysis of the accumulated experimental data and on the informational concepts of the Informational Model of Consciousness (IMC), in this article is presented an informational modeling of the operability of the posterior cingulate cortex (PCC). Examination of the experimental results obtained with the modern non-destructive, high spatial resolution investigation tools to study the functional characteristics of the PCC and associate metabolic processes, shows mainly that this is involved in the large scale default mode network (DMN), composed primarily (...) by PCC, medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC), and the inferior parietal lobe (IPL), displaying an increased activity under passive task conditions (i.e. negative mode). This operability mode is in an opposing balance with attention and task performances mode, acting thus as a disruption process. One of the main conclusions is that the PCC cognitive orientation is primarily focused on the self person or on the “self” (I) projected from others, in “daydreaming” or “mind-wandering" wakeful rest, involved in present or future virtual projects. In spite of these advances, the particular role and specific functions of PCC are not yet fully understood, PCC remaining an enigmatic/contradictory structure of the brain, not included up to date in any brain model, so the PCC informational modeling presented here in terms of IMC covers this lack. IMC assigns to the brain the fundamental role of informational processor, composed by various operating structures according to specific objectives synthetically expressed by seven main cognitive centers of “self" (I) as: Iknow (memory), Iwant (decision), Ilove (emotions), Iam (self-status), Icreate (genetic transmission), Icreated (genetic inheritance), Ibelive (info-selection), assuring the info-connectivity with the body and external/internal world, the adaptability (learning process) and survival. It is deduced in this way that the specific behavior of PCC according to its intermediary architectural position between the vital central region of the brain, connecting the mind with the external/internal reality, is that of a moderator/integrator hub/informational YES/NO switcher from the external/awake captured focusing information to the internal accumulated experience of life, used as a valid reference. Therefore, the specific operability of PCC in terms of cognitive centers is that of an informational switcher, mainly operating with Iknow/Iwant to explore the self-status reflected in Iam, within day-dreaming/imaginary virtual sceneries. (shrink)

Abstract The Default Mode Network (DMN) is commonly described in neuroscience as a brain network active during rest, introspection, and self-referential cognition. While empirical research has extensively characterized its neural correlates, a unifying explanatory framework for why such a network must exist remains underdeveloped. This paper presents a systems-theoretic reinterpretation of the DMN using four universal laws: (1) the law of Karma or system freedom from error or defect, (2) the Universal Law of Balance in Nature, (3) the Universal Feedback (...) Loop Mechanism, and (4) Universal Interconnected Nodes. Within this framework, the DMN is understood as a natural-law enforcement mechanism required for maintaining internal coherence, adaptive decision-making, and system stability in conscious agents. This model further extends to collective cognition, educational systems, governance, artificial general intelligence (AGI), and the long-standing philosophical problem of free will. -/- . (shrink)

.The Default Mode Network (DMN) is a critical neural system underlying internal thought, self-reflection, and decision-making. This paper explores the DMN’s role in consciousness, sleep, and the exercise of law-governed free will. We argue that free will is not the absence of constraints but the ability to make decisions within natural laws, particularly the universal law of balance. Sleep and dreaming, particularly REM sleep, are presented as mechanisms for homeostatic correction of cognitive and emotional imbalances. Implications for educational systems (...) and societal problem-solving are discussed, emphasizing the role of knowledge in optimizing decision-making and minimizing collective suffering. (shrink)

A number of researchers have focused on the distinction between upward counterfactuals that simulate a better reality and downward counterfactuals that simulate a worse reality. In this chapter the authors will discuss the important aspects of a model (Markman and McMullen 2003) that attempts to explain how the very same counterfactual can engender dramatically different affective reactions. According to the model, the consequences of simulation direction are moderated by what we have termed simulation mode--relatively stronger tendencies to engage in reflective (...) versus evaluative processing. In turn, the authors will describe how the interaction between simulation direction and mode produces important consequences for affect, motivation, and behavior. (shrink)

It appears that indexicals must have fine-grained senses for us to explain things involving human action and emotions, and we typically identify these different senses with different modes of expression. On the other hand, we also express the very same thought in very different ways. The first problem is the problem of cognitive significance. The second problem is what Branquinho (1999) has called the problem of cognitive dynamics. The question is how we can solve both of those (...) problems at the same time. Vojislav Božičković (2021) offers one solution in which the cognitive dynamics runs through the objects of the attitudes. I discuss this solution and offer an alternative in which the theory of cognitive dynamics has no use for the objects of the attitudes to unify expressions of attitudes. When we say or believe “the same thing” using different modes of expressions, it is by virtue of our deploying a dynamic theory of attitude expression. Like Lewis Carrol’s Red Queen, we must run to stay in place. (shrink)

Commonsense reasoning is one of the main open problems in the field of Artificial Intelligence (AI) while, on the other hand, seems to be a very intuitive and default reasoning mode in humans and other animals. In this talk, we discuss the different paradigms that have been developed in AI and Computational Cognitive Science to deal with this problem (ranging from logic-based methods, to diagrammatic-based ones). In particular, we discuss - via two different case studies concerning commonsense categorization and (...) knowledge invention tasks - how cognitively inspired heuristics can help (both in terms of efficiency and efficacy) in the realization of intelligent artificial systems able to reason in a human-like fashion, with results comparable to human-level performances. (shrink)

Guided by key insights of the four great philosophers mentioned in the title, here, in review of and expanding on our earlier work (Burchard, 2005, 2011), we present an exposition of the role played by language, & in the broader sense, λογοζ, the Logos, in how the CNS, the brain, is running the human being. Evolution by neural Darwinism has been forcing the linguistic nature of mind, enabling it to overcome & exploit the cognitive gap between an animal and (...) its world by recognizing environmental structures. Our work was greatly influenced by Heidegger’s lecture notes on metaphysics (Heidegger, 1935). We found agreement with recent progress in neuroscience, but also mathematical foundations of language theory, equating Logos with the mathematical concept of structure. The mystery of perception across the gap is analyzed as radiation and molecules impinging on sensory neurons that carry linguistic information about gross environmental structures, and only remotely about the physical reality of elementary particles. The most important logical brain function is Ego or Self, guiding the workings of the brain as a logos machine. Ego or Self operates from neurons in frontopolar cortex with global receptive fields. The logos machine can function only by availing itself of global context, its internally stored noumenal cosmos NK, and the categorical-conceptual apparatus CCA, updated continually through the neural default mode network (Raichle, 2005). In the Transcendental Deduction, Immanuel Kant discovered that Ego or Self is responsible for conscious control in perception relying on concepts & categories for a fitting percept to be incorporated intoNK. The entire CNS runs as a “movie-in-the-brain” (Parvizi & Damasio, 2001), at peak speed processing simultaneously in a series of cortical centers a stack of up to twelve frames in gamma rhythm of 25 ms intervals. We equate global context, or NK, with our human world, Heidegger’s Dasein being-in-the-world, and are able to demonstrate that the great philosopher in EM parallels neuro-science concerning the human mind. (shrink)

Frege held that indexical thoughts could be retained through changes of context that required a change of indexical term. I argue that Frege was partially right in that a singular mode of presentation can be retained through changes of indexical. There must, however, be a further mode of presentation that changes when the indexical term changes. This suggests that indexicals should be regarded as complex demonstratives; a change of indexical term is like a change between 'that φ' and 'that ψ', (...) where 'φ' and 'ψ' pick out relational properties that may nonetheless be conceived of by the thinker as intrinsic. (shrink)

Spontaneous activity levels prior to stimulus presentation can determine how that stimulus will be perceived. It has also been proposed that such spontaneous activity, particularly in the default-mode network (DMN), is involved in self-related processing. We therefore hypothesised that pre-stimulus activity levels in the DMN predict whether a stimulus is judged as self-related or not. Method: Participants were presented in the MRI scanner with a white noise stimulus that they were instructed contained their name or another. They then had to (...) respond with which name they thought they heard. Regions where there was an activity level difference between self and other response trials two seconds prior to the stimulus being presented were identified. Results: Pre-stimulus activity levels were higher in the right temporoparietal junction (RTPJ), the right temporal pole (RTP), and the left superior temporal gyrus in trials where the participant responded that they heard their own name than trials where they responded that they heard another. Conclusion: Pre-stimulus spontaneous activity levels in particular brain regions, largely overlapping with the DMN, predict the subsequent judgement of stimuli as self-related. This extends our current knowledge of self-related processing and its apparent relationship with intrinsic brain activity in what can be termed a rest-self overlap. (shrink)

Participants in the cognitive phenomenology debate have proceeded by (a) proposing a bifurcation of theoretical options into inflationary and non-inflationary theories, and then (b) providing arguments for/against one of these theories. I suggest that this method has failed to illuminate the commonalities and differences among conscious intentional states of different types, in the absence of a theory of the structure of these states. I propose such a theory. In perception, phenomenal-intentional properties combine with somatosensory properties to form P-I property (...) clusters that serve as phenomenal modes of presentations of particulars. In imagination, somatosensory properties are replaced with phenomenal-intentional properties whose intentional objects are somatosensory properties, thus resulting in imaginative facsimiles of perceptual P-I property clusters. Such structures can then be used as phenomenal prototypes that pick out individuals and kinds. Sets of such prototypes constitute a subject’s conception of individuals and kinds. Combined with a few additional elements, these imaginative P-I property clusters serve as the building-blocks of conscious cognitive states. Different ways of carving up theoretical space classify my theory either as inflationary or as non-inflationary. I conclude that the theory is anti-inflationary in letter but inflationary in spirit. (shrink)

This inquiry seeks to understand how the original form of writing in Mesopotamia—the small pictures and conventions of protocuneiform—became cuneiform, a script that could not be read without acquiring the neurological and behavioral reorganizations understood today as literacy. The process is described as involving small neurological and behavioral changes realized, accumulated, and distributed to new users through interactions with and concomitant incremental changes in the material form of writing. A related inquiry focuses on why and how numerical notations differ from (...) other written signs. Crucially, numerical signs instantiate their meaning, a representational mode that contrasts with the signification used to represent non-numerical language and which makes numerical notations contiguous with their unwritten precursors, technologies like fingers, tallies, and counters. Instantiation is related to the perceptual system for quantity; this so-called number sense influences the function and form of numerical signs. Reading is then discussed as a cognitive activity that necessarily involves a material form, a plausible example of extended cognition. Because numerical notations share function and often form with precursor technologies, if the former participate in extended cognition, the latter likely do as well. In conjunction with the contiguity between numerical notations and their unwritten precursors, this complicates the idea that (all) writing is (just) language. Finally, potential follow-on research is suggested. (shrink)

This paper reconstructs the evolution of human cognition as a trajectory of frame transitions—shifts in the dominant epistemic architectures that define how reality is perceived, narrated, and navigated. From mythic participation and theological authority to rational abstraction and metacognitive self-reflection, the timeline reveals consciousness not as a fixed faculty, but as a recursive, frame-sensitive process. Each epoch is analyzed through its mode of sense-making: narrative embedding, textual revelation, axiomatic modeling, and finally, frame-awareness. The emergence of Pure Reason—defined here not as (...) Kantian idealism, but as reflexive cognition—is positioned as the threshold where thought becomes self-modifying. This timeline is both historical and structural: a map of how reflexivity emerges through the breakdown and recomposition of cognitive systems. It offers a framework for understanding the epistemic architecture required for both human and artificial systems capable of conscious self-revision. (shrink)

Bayne and McClelland (2016) raise the matching content challenge for proponents of cognitive phenomenology: if the phenomenal character of thought is determined by its intentional content, why is it that my conscious thought that there is a blue wall before me and my visual perception of a blue wall before me don’t share any phenomenology, despite their matching content? In this paper, I first show that the matching content challenge is not limited to proponents of cognitive phenomenology but (...) extends to cases of cross-modal perception, threatening representationalism about consciousness in general. I then give two responses to the challenge, both of which appeal to intentional modes. The difference in intentional mode between a thought and a visual perception can either explain why we should not expect any phenomenal overlap between the two experiences, or it can make it clear why the phenomenal overlap is easy to overlook. I show that these responses are available to the representationalist about perceptual consciousness, as well as the proponent of cognitive phenomenology. The upshot is that, when it comes to the matching content challenge, both perceptual representationalism and cognitive representationalism stand on equal dialectical footing. (shrink)

This paper introduces compression-state cognition as a lawful, phase-aligned intelligence mode that emerges during high symbolic saturation. Distinct from flow, IQ, or creative ideation, this state represents a convergence of internal structural tension into recursive coherence. Framed within the CODES architecture and implemented in systems like RIC and VESSELSEED, this cognition type is reclassified not as mystical or pathological, but as a deterministic phase state. The paper traces its historical misclassification, outlines its system requirements, and proposes a new paradigm of (...) resonance-aligned intelligence. (shrink)

Meaning formation changes under cognitive and emotional load. This paper presents a structural account of how gradients, thresholds, and stabilization dynamics behave when a cognitive system is under pressure. Under load, signals intensify, thresholds rise, symbolic translation becomes distorted, and coherence becomes harder to reach. These shifts produce characteristic failure modes: premature stabilization, narrative distortion, overcompression, and collapse into noise. -/- The paper analyzes these dynamics across domains—affect, attention, symbolic processing, and perceptual closure—and shows that meaning under (...) load follows the same formation sequence as meaning in baseline conditions, but with altered thresholds and redistribution patterns. Meaning formation is treated here as a downstream, domain‑agnostic process governed by Objects 1–3; relational and multi‑system effects are addressed elsewhere in the architecture. -/- This model provides a structural foundation for understanding misinterpretation, overwhelm, and coherence failure as predictable outcomes of load dynamics rather than psychological or semantic anomalies. (shrink)

Between 2025 and 2026, a complete philosophical system—Metamonism—was created in nine months by an individual without formal training in philosophy, physics, or mathematics, using AI as a cognitive partner in real-time dialogical exploration. This paper examines this case as a precedent for understanding how artificial intelligence fundamentally transforms not just the speed of knowledge production, but its very mode. We argue that AI enables a new epistemological paradigm: dialogical crystallization, where learning, discovery, and systematization occur simultaneously rather than sequentially. (...) The implications extend beyond philosophy to all forms of foundational knowledge creation. (shrink)

Perceptual modalities have been traditionally considered the product of dedicated biological systems producing information for higher cognitive processing. Psychological and neuropsychological evidence is offered which undermines this point of view and an alternative account of modality from the enactive approach to understanding cognition is suggested. Under this view, a perceptual modality is a stable form of perception which is structured not just by the biological sensitivities of the agent, but by their goals and the set of skills or expertise (...) which they are deploying at a given time. Such a view suggests that there is no such thing as an experience that is purely visual, auditory, or otherwise modal and that our attempts to understand consciousness and the mind must be conducted within a framework that provides an account of embodied, goal-directed adaptive coping with the world. (shrink)

The famous advaitic expressions -/- Brahma sat jagat mithya jivo brahma eva na apraha and Asti bhaati priyam namam roopamcheti amsa panchakam AAdya trayam brahma roopam tato dwayam jagat roopam -/- will be analyzed through physics and electronics and interpreted. -/- Four phases of mind, four modes of language acquisition and communication and seven cognitive states of mind participating in human cognitive and language acquisition and communication processes will be identified and discussed. -/- Implications and application of (...) such an identification and analysis to the fields of cognitive sciences, mind-machine modeling, natural language comprehension field of artificial intelligence and physiological psychology will be hinted. A comprehensive modern scientific understanding of human consciousness, mind and mental functions will be presented. (shrink)

Crossing a cognitive event horizon—defined as the transition to regulation by temporally stable integrated abstract structures—does not by itself yield fully mature high-level cognition. This paper examines the post-horizon maturation dynamics that unfold after the horizon has been crossed. We argue that mature post-horizon cognition is characterized by global structure–first cognition: a mode in which a largely correct and task-relevant global structure is available at the outset of problem solving, such that structurally irrelevant alternatives fail to activate to any (...) meaningful degree. We propose that post-horizon cognition undergoes a process of meta-structural convergence toward a structurally optimal configuration within the post-horizon regime. Convergence is not learning, not accelerated pruning, and not a further phase transition. Rather, it is driven by recognition of structural non-optimality in a previously viable post-horizon mode of cognition. Once such recognition occurs, the earlier mode becomes dynamically unstable. From that point onward, ordinary problem-solving interactions necessarily shift cognition toward the optimal configuration, as the recognized non-optimal structure can no longer function as a stable attractor. Convergence may proceed slowly through repeated engagement or be sharply accelerated by meta-level insight, but it cannot be skipped or instantiated instantaneously. It reflects a necessary, irreversible alignment of cognitive dynamics toward the only configuration that avoids systematic activation of irrelevant structure. This account explains how post-horizon cognition approaches its full potential without reverting to exploratory competition or requiring additional control layers. (shrink)

This paper formalizes planning and insight as emergent phenomena arising from structural reconfiguration within finite, dynamically constrained cognitive spaces. Departing from representational, search-based, and optimization-centric accounts, it advances a non-teleological framework in which planning is understood as pre-stabilized trajectory biasing and insight as a topological discontinuity in the navigable configuration space of a system. Rather than modeling cognition as symbol manipulation or utility maximization, the framework treats intelligent behavior as the modulation of constraint weights governing accessible transitions. -/- The (...) paper introduces a geometric account of insight in which sudden problem-solving breakthroughs correspond to discrete changes in connectivity—specifically, the emergence or dissolution of connected components within the system’s effective constraint graph. These transitions are not gradual accumulations of information but phase-like reconfigurations driven by internal constraint relaxation, reweighting, or resonance alignment. This explains the phenomenology of “Aha” moments, their abruptness, and their resistance to introspective reconstruction. -/- Planning, on this account, is not foresight over an objective future state space but the stabilization of local directional bias under bounded uncertainty. Plans are temporary constraint alignments that shape near-term trajectories without implying global optimality, convergence, or teleological direction. The paper demonstrates how planning failure, rigidity, and overcommitment arise when constraint weights become prematurely stabilized, reducing navigable volume and suppressing adaptive reconfiguration. -/- The framework yields multiple falsifiable predictions distinguishing it from dominant models, including discontinuous signatures in behavioral latency distributions, measurable changes in topological invariants of neural or behavioral state-space reconstructions surrounding insight events, and characteristic failure modes under artificially induced constraint fixation. By grounding planning and insight in constraint geometry rather than representational content, the paper provides a unified, non-teleological account of intelligent discontinuity consistent with finite physical substrates and open-ended exploration. (shrink)

This programmatic paper introduces a novel ontological and epistemological framework rooted in the concept of Phase Ontology, fundamentally re-envisioning the nature of knowledge, reality and consciousness. Departing from traditional representational, probabilistic and inferential models, we propose that meaning and order emerge not from static correspondence, but from asymptotic phase coherence-a dynamic process of resonant alignment between observer and observed. Drawing upon insights from quantum theory, the philosophy of mind and advanced systems theory, the paper synthesizes key concepts from previous works, (...) including the epistemic vector, phase-operated curvature, cyclical cognition and modularity as a topological principle. We argue that cognition is a recursive, four-phase process (recursion, iteration, asymptotic stabilization, reinitiation) where time is understood as a dynamic field of resonance rather than a linear progression. Central to this framework is the re-evaluation of modularity. We introduce the anthropic modularity function M(x) and the concept of a modular golden mean (M(x)≈σ/2), proposing that optimal system stability and intelligibility reside within a "quasi-crystalline" state of unstructured integration. This state, characterized by long-range order without translational symmetry, represents a critical "overload limit" for conventional, binary modes of understanding, yet it constitutes a highly coherent and adaptive form of organization, empirically suggested by the intricate structure of neural networks. Ultimately, this paper posits that any finite, perceived meaning is an inherently asymptotic and "binary" projection onto an underlying reality that exists "beyond any limits." It calls for a fundamental shift in scientific and philosophical inquiry, advocating for a new logic and mathematics capable of grasping phase relations and non-periodic orders. This approach fosters an epistemology of humility, acknowledging that knowledge is not a descriptive endpoint but a continuous, dynamic alignment within the resonant tapestry of existence. (shrink)

Focusing on the 'today'/'yesterday' case, I argue that Perry is wrong in accounting for and explaining indexical belief states in terms of Kaplanian characters and in taking these states to be internal (narrow) mental states inside the subject's mind. It is shown that this view is at odds with Perry's own reliance on remembering a past day as a necessary condition for retaining a belief about it. As a better tool for explaining appropriate indexical beliefs, I offer an alternative which (...) is neo-Fregean in that it takes senses or modes of presentation as playing only a cognitive, not a semantic role. It, however, takes remembering a past day as necessary for retaining a belief about it, rather than keeping track of time as urged by Evans. I also consider unfeasible Evans's further requirement which he takes over from Frege: that in order to retain a belief about a certain past day we need to think of it now under the same mode of presentation as we did on that very day. (shrink)

The Australian philosopher Philip Gerrans ambitiously tries to provide a general theory about the formation of delusions that should enclose neuronal, cognitive and phenomenological levels of description. His theory is defined as narrative and it is grounded on the so called “default thoughts”, that consist in simulations, autobiographical narrative fragments produced by the Default Mode Network (DMN). The DMN is a powerful simulation system that evolved to allow humans to simulate and imagine experiences in the absence of an eliciting (...) stimulus. Such imaginative/simulative process is precariously disciplined by the Self’s demands of narrative coherence. The Author’s aim is to waive the notion of belief and the causal role played by the impairments of fixation-beliefs system in the onset of delusions, as predicted by the principle doxastic theories. (shrink)

What does it mean to be an embodied thinker of abstract concepts? Does embodiment shape the character and quality of our understanding of universals such as 'dog' and 'beauty', and would a non-embodied mind understand such concepts differently? I examine these questions through the lens of Thomas Aquinas’s remarks on the differences between embodied (human) intellects and non-embodied (angelic) intellects. In Aquinas, I argue, the difference between embodied and non-embodied intellection of extramental realities is rooted in the fact that embodied (...) and non-embodied intellects grasp different kinds of universals by means of different kinds of intelligible species (intellectual likenesses), which elicit in them different “modes” of understanding. By spelling out what exactly it means to be an embodied knower, on Aquinas’s account, I argue, we can also shed new light on his mysterious claim that the embodied intellect “turns to phantasms”—the imagination’s likenesses of individuals—in its acts of understanding. (shrink)