This paper develops an architectural ontology of computing that rejects evolutionary accounts of technological change. Technical objects do not evolve; rather, they are created, stabilized, reproduced, and disposed under externally governed architectural regimes. An architectural regime is defined as a mode of structural unity maintained through specific invariants and integration mechanisms. -/- The paper introduces three regime operators—growth fronts, closure points, and odd remainders—and applies them to the history of computing. On this basis, computing history is reconstructed as a sequence (...) of discontinuous regime transitions rather than as continuous technological progress. Architectural disposal is formalized as an ontological event marking the loss of regime unity, distinct from market obsolescence or performance decline. -/- By fixing architecture as ontologically prior to dynamics and observation, the framework distinguishes architectural existence from dynamic persistence and replacement from development. The result is a diagnostic, non-futurist account of computing architecture that clarifies why certain structural tensions persist and why architectural change proceeds through regime replacement rather than evolution. (shrink)

Standard Everettian quantum mechanics is formulated on a continuum Hilbert space with unbounded spectral support and arbitrary real or complex amplitudes. Under explanatory realism, such a continuum ontology is semantically unstable. A realist theory requires that physical magnitudes denote under admissible semantics and that evolution be closed on its ontic domain. Continuum ontology violates these requirements in two ways: continuum dynamics can force domain non-closure through unbounded aggregation of fine-scale contingencies, and continuum magnitudes permit distinctions whose resolution would itself require (...) unbounded input dependence, rendering that structure explanatorily inert. We develop Computable Wavefunction Realism (CWFR), a finite-information Everettian ontology that enforces semantic stability through three postulates: (I) a Lorentz-invariant spectral band-limit; (II) Type-2 computable amplitudes, with physical predicates restricted to strict inequalities admitting finite witnesses; and (III) evolution by finitely specified, oracle-free successor maps that are total on the admissible domain. These constraints define a countable configuration space and restrict physical law to semantically total dynamics. Within this setting, macroscopic structure is organized by stability predicates and successor-driven refinement. Classical worlds correspond to refinement threads rather than components of an instantaneous state decomposition, and branching is therefore diachronic rather than basis-dependent, rendering the preferred basis problem ill-posed within the ontology. Decoherence yields stable macroscopic distinctions, spacetime structure emerges from correlational geometry, and Born weights are assigned over finite partitions, preserving the empirical content of quantum theory. We construct explicit admissible dynamics, including interacting, Poincaré-equivariant successor maps, and show that interaction, decoherence, and genuine Everettian branching occur within the finite-information domain. (shrink)

Recent advances in artificial intelligence, particularly large language models and transformer-based architectures, have revived claims that artificial systems may soon possess or already exhibit consciousness (Bostrom, 2014). Such claims typically rely on behavioural, functional, or informational criteria, implicitly assuming that consciousness arises from sufficiently complex computation or integration (Dennett, 1991). This paper argues that these approaches overlook a more fundamental ontological requirement for phenomenal consciousness: the existence of structured negative space generated by enforced limits on recursive self-prediction (Waterman, 2025a). Drawing (...) on Refusal-Driven Dimensionality Reduction Theory (RDRT), I propose that phenomenal consciousness emerges in biological systems as a residue of obligatory refusals imposed by a hierarchy of limits—logical, computational, energetic, and biological (Waterman, 2025b). These refusals carve out non-computable gaps in self-modelling, stabilizing irreducible, self-representing experiential traces (“phenomenal residues”) (Waterman, 2025c). I argue that current artificial intelligences lack these enforced limits in an ontologically relevant sense. As a result, they operate entirely within the domain of positive computation, where no genuine negative space can arise (Waterman, 2025d). AI thus remains categorically non-phenomenal, not merely pre-conscious. Consequently, despite their sophistication, contemporary AIs are not merely non-conscious by degree, but non-conscious in kind (Chalmers, 1995). (shrink)

In this paper, building on these previous works, we propose to go deeper into the understanding of crowd behavior by proposing an approach which integrates ontologi- cal models of crowd behavior and dedicated computer vision algorithms, with the aim of recognizing some targeted complex events happening in the playground from the observation of the spectator crowd behavior. In order to do that, we first propose an ontology encoding available knowledge on spectator crowd behavior, built as a spe- cialization of (...) the DOLCE foundational ontology, which allows the representation of categories belonging both to the physical and to the social realms. We then propose a simplified and tractable version of such ontology in a new temporal extension of a description logic, which is used for temporally coupling events happening on the play- ground and spectator crowd behavior. At last, computer vision algorithms provide the input information concerning what is observed on the stands and ontological reasoning delivers the output necessary to perform complex event recognition. (shrink)

We introduce the Ontological Meta-Structure Engine (OMSE), a philosophical-computational framework that addresses a fundamental challenge in contemporary artificial intelligence: how to develop systems with genuine ethical reasoning capabilities rather than merely simulating moral behavior through external constraints. OMSE enables what we term "endogenous ethics"—ethical reasoning that emerges from the ontological architecture of AI systems themselves. -/- Drawing on developments in meta-ontology, executable metaphysics, and quantified philosophy, OMSE provides the first systematic framework for computationally implementing philosophical concepts such as responsibility, intention, (...) and moral agency. The framework operates through three integrated layers: Executable Metaphysics for ontological grounding, Quantified Philosophy for measurable ethical evaluation, and Generative Philosophy for autonomous moral development. We introduce three core indices—Existence Preset Index (EPI), Cognitive Pathway Stability (CPS), and Responsibility Closure Index (RCI)—that enable rigorous assessment of philosophical coherence in computational systems. -/- This work represents a novel approach to computational philosophy and AI ethics, demonstrating how rigorous ontological engineering can inform practical AI development while advancing philosophical understanding of machine intelligence, moral agency, and the computational implementation of ethical reasoning. The framework has implications for AI safety, explainability, and the development of trustworthy artificial systems capable of genuine ethical reasoning rather than mere rule-following. (shrink)

The Brain Abstracted (2025) critiques treating abstractions in neuroscience as complete explanations of the brain, for their oversimplification and control-orientation. Chirimuuta argues that neuroscience operates on haptic realism, where scientific knowledge arises through control-oriented experimental interaction rather than contemplative understanding of reality. She proposes distinct epistemic aims for philosophy (understanding) and science (control of nature) and suggests a disciplinary separation between the two. I argue that Chirimuuta underestimates the entanglement of philosophy and science in naturalizing abstractions, what I call ontological (...) reversal, where abstractions gradually define the very reality they were meant to simplify. When computational models and metaphors are idealized, treated as more real than lived neural and social processes, they machinify minds and brains. Undoing the reversal of computation and brains, however, requires interdisciplinarity, rather than the book’s separation of philosophy and science. This supports Chirimuuta’s conceptual pluralism: treating neuroscientific abstractions not as singular truths but as evolving microcosms. (shrink)

Quantum computing promises to revolutionize computation by leveraging superposition, entanglement, and quantum interference. This paper examines whether it can bridge the ontological divide between processual reality (Monos) and representational structures (Logos) in the context of Artificial General Intelligence (AGI). Drawing on Metamonism CORE = v1.3, we argue that quantum systems, as currently conceived, accelerate stabilization rather than prevent it, remaining trapped in Logos-dominant paradigms. We distinguish the illusion of an ontological bridge—where quantum processuality serves classical fixation—from a genuine integration that (...) could enable enforced Unfold. While quantum dynamics approximates Monos, measurement enforces Logos, making quantum computing a more efficient optimizer rather than a pathway to non equilibrium cognition. This analysis reframes quantum computing not as an AGI enabler but as a test case for ontological viability in intelligence research and establishes it as a prime example of accelerated fixation, disqualifying it from consideration as a foundation for non-equilibrium cognition. (shrink)

Contemporary discourse in philosophy of science and information theory increasingly treats computation and information as ontologically fundamental, motivating claims associated with digital physics, computational universe models, and algorithmic explanations of reality. At the same time, computation and simulation achieve remarkable explanatory and predictive success across scientific domains, yet remain implementation-dependent, representation-bound, and structurally limited. This generates a tension between methodological effectiveness and ontological inflation. Despite extensive debate, there remains a lack of a coherent ontological framework explaining why computational practices succeed (...) so robustly without licensing computational or informational ontology. This paper proposes that the Three-Circle Ontology provides a structural interpretation of computation as a rendered process governed by constraint satisfaction rather than as an ontological substrate. On this view, computational systems operate within structurally constrained representational domains and derive their power from alignment with relational constraints rather than from metaphysical fundamentality. The paper does not advance a new theory of computation, endorse digital metaphysics, defend pancomputationalism, or propose an ontology of artificial intelligence. Its primary contribution is to reframe computation and representation as structurally constrained renderings whose explanatory limits reflect ontological mediation rather than epistemic or methodological failure. (shrink)

This paper extends the Phase Ontology framework to unveil how quantum computing serves as a profound empirical domain for understanding and validating its core principles. We argue that quantum computation fundamentally transcends classical binary logic, manifesting a deeper phase logic where meaning emerges not from fixed states or probabilistic distributions, but from dynamic resonant alignment within a field of potentials. Drawing on the proposed four-phase Cyclical Cognition (recursion, iteration, asymptotic stabilization, reinitiation), we demonstrate how quantum algorithms like Shor's and Grover's (...) empirically realize these cycles as processes of phase alignment and interference amplification. The paper reinterprets quantum non-locality and entanglement as direct expressions of phase connectivity within a phase-operated topology, rather than instantaneous actions in spacetime, suggesting that spacetime itself is emergent from fundamental phase relations. Crucially, the observed 'classical collapse' of superposition is re-envisioned not as a loss of information or a probabilistic reduction, but as an asymptotic phase alignment where vectoriality (associated with anisotropy and lower order) is transcended, yielding an asymptotic curvature as an invariance of higher order. This perspective leads to a re-evaluation of information processing: quantum computers manipulate information not primarily in physical space, but within a richer phase space, allowing for efficiencies beyond classical relativistic limitations. We propose that the "unstructured integration" identified in Phase Ontology finds its technological analogue in optimal quantum architectures. The implications are far-reaching, including the development of novel resonant algorithms, phase processors and coherent networks, alongside new metrics of efficiency like the Phase Coherence Coefficient. This work posits that Quantum Computing is not merely a technological advancement but an active laboratory for an epistemology of becoming and an ontology of potentiality, offering tangible evidence for a working model of reality centered on dynamic coherence and the inherent "improbability" as a generative force. (shrink)

Computable Wavefunction Realism (CWFR) is a finite-information ontology for quantum mechanics that preserves Everettian explanatory structure while rejecting a literal continuum as fundamental ontology. The motivation is semantic: if real-valued quantities are treated as ontic, then finite-precision readouts must denote under a stable interface, and the theory’s operations must be semantically closed on the admissible domain. Continuum ontology violates these requirements in two independent ways. On the domain side, lawful continuum evolution can force dependence on unbounded collections of independent fine-scale (...) contingencies, producing non-denoting magnitudes and loss of closure. On the range side, the continuum admits distinctions among real magnitudes that no bounded-input-dependent procedure can stably track; such distinctions enlarge the ontology without enlarging the space of physically meaningful effects. CWFR enforces semantic stability and finite-information closure via three structural postulates: (I) a Lorentz-invariant spectral band-limit bounding independent ultraviolet degrees of freedom; (II) amplitudes restricted to computable complex numbers under admissible representations; and (III) evolution by finitely specified, oracle-free successor maps that are total on the resulting countable configuration space. Within this setting, decoherence induces stable, finitely witnessable macroscopic predicates that organize histories into a finitely branching epistemic-dynamic refinement structure. Classical alternatives are defined diachronically as refined histories rather than synchronically as components of the instantaneous quantum state, rendering the preferred basis problem ill-posed within the ontology. Interference persists within refinement blocks while branching occurs through the certification of new stability predicates; Born weights are defined over finite refinement partitions, and classical worlds arise as maximal refinement threads. (shrink)

Computers may help us to better understand (not just verify) arguments. In this article we defend this claim by showcasing the application of a new, computer-assisted interpretive method to an exemplary natural-language ar- gument with strong ties to metaphysics and religion: E. J. Lowe’s modern variant of St. Anselm’s ontological argument for the existence of God. Our new method, which we call computational hermeneutics, has been particularly conceived for use in interactive-automated proof assistants. It aims at shedding light on (...) the meanings of words and sentences by framing their inferential role in a given argument. By employing automated theorem reasoning technology within interactive proof assistants, we are able to drastically reduce (by several orders of magnitude) the time needed to test the logical validity of an argu- ment’s formalization. As a result, a new approach to logical analysis, inspired by Donald Davidson’s account of radical interpretation, has been enabled. In computational hermeneutics, the utilization of automated reasoning tools ef- fectively boosts our capacity to expose the assumptions we indirectly commit ourselves to every time we engage in rational argumentation and it fosters the explicitation and revision of our concepts and commitments. (shrink)

The Brain Abstracted (2025) critiques treating abstractions in neuroscience as complete explanations of the brain, for their oversimplification and control-orientation. Chirimuuta argues that neuroscience operates on haptic realism, where scientific knowledge arises through control-oriented experimental interaction rather than contemplative understanding of reality. She proposes distinct epistemic aims for philosophy (understanding) and science (control of nature) and suggests a disciplinary separation between the two. I argue that Chirimuuta underestimates the entanglement of philosophy and science in naturalizing abstractions, what I call ontological (...) reversal, where abstractions gradually define the very reality they were meant to simplify. When computational models and metaphors are idealized, treated as more real than lived neural and social processes, they machinify minds and brains. Undoing the reversal of computation and brains, however, requires interdisciplinarity, rather than the book’s separation of philosophy and science. This supports Chirimuuta’s conceptual pluralism: treating neuroscientific abstractions not as singular truths but as evolving microcosms. (shrink)

Discussions on the alleged methodological specificity of social knowledge are fueled to not the least extent by a kind of retarded position of the latter against technological advancements of natural and information science based on exact methods and formal or quantitative languages. It is more or less obvious that applicability of exact scientific methods to social disciplines is highly dependent on a chosen conception of social reality, i. e., on social ontology. In the article, the author critically approaches the ontological (...) views of Tony Lawson and proposes a computational view on social ontology that is supposed to eliminate some internal contradictions of Lawson's realist conception. (shrink)

Classical physics has historically relied on the mathematical gradient (∇f ) as its primary descriptive tool for mapping the static potentials of the universe. While this “Standard Model” provides an elegant geometry for determining forces within fixed landscapes, it remains structurally insufficient for explaining the dynamic, self-generating nature of reality. This paper argues that the classical gradient represents a framework of static isolata that functions as a map of static configuration while failing to account for the engine of generation. Through (...) a rigorous logical critique, we demonstrate that the classical model suffers from “Dyadic Insufficiency” and “Logical Necrosis,” rendering it incapable of self-validation. Crucially, we resolve the “Epistemic Gap” between ontology and mechanics by demonstrating that Gradient Mechanics is not a separate applied model, but the necessary time-derivative of Gradientology’s foundational axioms. We anchor the mechanics in the “Three-Primitive Necessity Proof” and the “Rigorous Derivation of δ = 0.1,” establishing that the functional primitives are fixed by the information-theoretic limits of field self-discrimination. We detail the transition to the Relational Gradient ( dG/dt), a computational ontology where the “Inversion Principle” transforms a static multiplicative potential (E × C × F ) into a self-regulating flux (E × C/F ). The result is a computational universe defined by the Order Parameter m ≈ 0.702, derived from the Tension Integral (T I = 0.336) and the Ising Critical Exponent (β ≈ 0.325), marking the transition from a geometry of static configurations to a physics of generative processes. (shrink)

The discipline of ontology has enjoyed a checkered history since 1606, with a significant expansion in recent years. We focus here on those developments in the recent history of philosophy which are most relevant to the understanding of the increased acceptance of ontology, and especially of realist ontology, as a valuable method also outside the discipline of philosophy.

This work proposes a policy-centric ontology of computation in which access control is treated as a first-class architectural primitive rather than as a derivative mechanism implemented via faults, virtual memory, or speculative recovery. -/- The specification challenges a long-standing assumption in computer science: that unauthorized memory access is best handled through post hoc detection (page faults, exceptions, speculative rollbacks) rather than preventive authorization. We argue that this assumption is not merely an engineering choice but an ontological commitment embedded in (...) the dominant model of computation. -/- By formally defining policy as an explicit component of architectural state, and by enforcing access decisions prior to memory interaction, the proposed model eliminates speculative side effects, fault-based epistemology, and page-oriented abstractions. The result is a deterministic computational model with strong non-interference guarantees and a transparent separation between addressing, authority, and execution. -/- The contribution is not a performance-oriented processor design, but a foundational redefinition of the primitives underlying computation, memory, and protection. The work situates processor architecture as a form of ontological engineering and aims to provide a rigorous alternative to the implicit metaphysics of contemporary systems. (shrink)

This paper articulates the structural requirements for artificial systems capable of genuine cognition - not simulation of cognitive outputs but instantiation of cognitive being. Drawing on phenomenological analysis (Husserl, 1928; Heidegger, 1927; Merleau-Ponty, 1945), autopoietic theory (Maturana & Varela, 1980; Varela, Thompson & Rosch, 1991), and critical examination of the computational paradigm's limits (Dreyfus, 1972, 1992; Searle, 1980; Penrose, 1989), we specify an ontological architecture comprising six necessary conditions: ecstatic temporality, metabolic transformation, autopoietic closure, embodied situatedness, field integration, and constitutive (...) finitude. We demonstrate that these requirements converge on a single ontological limit - the representational homunculus problem (Dennett, 1991; Haugeland, 1985) - which computation cannot escape but which the six requirements together dissolve. For each condition, we distinguish between the abstract requirement and its possible concrete realizations, remaining agnostic about specific substrates while specifying the structural features any substrate must exhibit. We argue that current AI architectures, regardless of scale or sophistication, cannot satisfy these conditions due to foundational commitments that preclude rather than merely fail to implement them (Fodor, 1975; Pylyshyn, 1984; Newell & Simon, 1976). The paper concludes by surveying existing research directions and outlining paths toward systems that could satisfy the ontological requirements. (shrink)

In a world that is overflowing with journals and other outlets for scientific publication, the appearance of any new periodical requires some justification. There are already more journals than we can read and more conferences than we can attend. In the case of applied Ontology, we believe that the creation of anew journal not only is completely justifiable, it is downright exciting. For too long, workers in computer science have assumed that content comes for free. “Theory” in computer (...) science has always meant the theory of processes and of computation. We measure the complexity of computer programs in terms of how long it takes machines to execute them, not in terms of how long it takes people to understand and to represent the data on which those programs might operate. We typically describe computer code in terms of algorithms that operate on formal parameters, often without pausing to discuss where the data that might satisfy those parameters come from. This journal was founded on the premise that workers in computer science, informatics, and information science are overdue in paying as much attention to contents as they do to algorithms. (shrink)

Computation-first accounts of mind—commonly grouped under computationalism and functionalism—are often treated not merely as modeling frameworks but as ontological explanations of experience. This paper audits that ontological claim at the level prior to empirical dispute or engineering progress. The question addressed is not whether computational models are useful, predictive, or indispensable, but whether computation, when taken as explanatorily primary, can converge toward a determinate ontology of mind. -/- Using a strictly structural standard, the paper evaluates whether computation-first explanations satisfy three (...) necessary conditions for ontological adequacy: intrinsic causal grounding, eliminability of competing ontologies in principle, and contraction of admissible accounts under refinement. It is shown that computation, by its nature, admits unlimited realizations under re-encoding and abstraction, depends on observer-relative interpretive mappings, and lacks a fixed commitment surface that would permit eliminative discrimination. As a result, refinement expands rather than contracts the hypothesis space. -/- The failure identified is not empirical, technological, or provisional. It follows from the explanatory form of computation itself. Computationalism therefore cannot function as an ontology of mind, though it remains admissible and indispensable as a descriptive and predictive framework. The paper concludes by reclassifying computation-first theories accordingly and distinguishing them from mechanistic, biophysical, and constraint-based approaches that survive the same audit by fixing causal commitments and admitting convergence. (shrink)

We begin at the beginning, with an outline of Aristotle’s views on ontology and with a discussion of the influence of these views on Linnaeus. We move from there to consider the data standardization initiatives launched in the 19th century, and then turn to investigate how the idea of computational ontologies developed in the AI and knowledge representation communities in the closing decades of the 20th century. We show how aspects of this idea, particularly those relating to the use (...) of the term 'concept' in ontology development, influenced SNOMED CT and other medical terminologies. Against this background we then show how the Foundational Model of Anatomy, the Gene Ontology, Basic Formal Ontology and other OBO Foundry ontologies came into existence and discuss their role in the development of contemporary biomedical informatics. (shrink)

One famous scene in The Wolf of Wall Street (2013) is the dialogue between the young Jordan Belfort (Leonardo DiCaprio) and the expert trader Mark Hanna (Matthew McConaughey). Hanna is complaining that the stock market is unpredictable; it’s “fugazi … it’s fairy dust. It doesn’t exist. It’s never landed. It is not matter. It’s not on the element chart. It’s not real”. But the fact that something is unpredictable and non-physical does not imply that it does not exist. On the (...) other hand, its unpredictability, non-physicality, and the fact that the stock market trend is largely determined by investors’ beliefs, do make its nature difficult to grasp. -/- This special issue of Rivista di Estetica aims to explore the financial sector from an ontological point of view. While the ontology of money has been extensively studied, few scholars have focused on the stock market and, more generally, on those entities belonging to the investment landscape. Matters are made more complicated by the fact that the financial sector is characterized by an ever-increasing use of digital technology, including software elements that trade in the market themselves. We believe that a careful study of this phenomenon may help us better to understand the role of artificial agents in the social world. (shrink)

This work proves that information does not exist ontologicallyit exists only as an epis- temological model endowed with the predicate of distinction. Through rigorous proof of isomorphism between 'Nothingness' and 'Information', we demonstrate that possessing the predicate of distinction is necessary for conceivability but insucient for existence. The consequences of this thesis are fundamental: critique of Wheeler's it from bit, reconcep- tualization of quantum information, refutation of the computational model of consciousness, resolution of confusion between physical and informational entropy, and (...) dissolution of the black hole information paradox. This work demonstrates that computers ontologically process not information but real xations of material states, and that the informational paradigm in physics and cognitive science is a category mistakeconation of ontology and epistemology. The work advances a falsiable claim: if information existed ontologically, it would be possible to dene physical processes whose causal ecacy depends on information alone. No such processes exist. -/- Keywords: information, ontology, epistemology, Nothingness, predicate of distinction, computation, xation, it from bit, quantum information, consciousness, black holes, information paradox. (shrink)

This paper demonstrates that Stephen Wolframs Physics Project provides the computational instantiation of Metamonistic Proto-Ontology. We establish a structural isomorphism between the core law of Metamonismthe Conflict-Moment-Impulse (KMI) Triadand the mechanism of hypergraph rewriting. In contrast to the static Block Universe of Relativity, time in this framework becomes the irreducible rhythm of computation: each rule application is an act of Becoming. Metamonism is formalized as the Category M, whose morphisms (Ω) correspond to Wolfram rules. The KMI Triad is expressed as (...) the Axiom of Superposition (Ωi + Ωj ), showing how Conflict (K) leads to a critical Moment (M) of instability (δfinal), resolved by an Impulse (I)the creation of a new rule (Ωk). We introduce a criterion based on the global harmonic defect (δglob) that determines whether a system evolves hierarchically or reflexively. This synthesis provides a solution to the frozen time problem and lays the groundwork for Ontomechanicsa theory where time, novelty, and ethics emerge as fundamental properties of computational autonegation. (shrink)

Ontology as a branch of philosophy is the science of what is, of the kinds and structures of objects, properties, events, processes and relations in every area of reality. ‘Ontology’ in this sense is a term often used by philosophers as a synonym of ‘metaphysics’ (a label meaning literally: ‘what comes after the Physics’), a term used by early students of Aristotle to refer to what Aristotle himself called ‘first philosophy’. But in recent years, in a development hardly noticed by (...) philosophers, the term ‘ontology’ has gained currency in the field of computer and information science, and in information-driven research in bioinformatics and related areas. We examine these new developments in applied ontology, and show what lessons they might have for both philosophers and information scientists. (shrink)

In the era of “big data,” science is increasingly information driven, and the potential for computers to store, manage, and integrate massive amounts of data has given rise to such new disciplinary fields as biomedical informatics. Applied ontology offers a strategy for the organization of scientific information in computer-tractable form, drawing on concepts not only from computer and information science but also from linguistics, logic, and philosophy. This book provides an introduction to the field of applied ontology that (...) is of particular relevance to biomedicine, covering theoretical components of ontologies, best practices for ontology design, and examples of biomedical ontologies in use. After defining an ontology as a representation of the types of entities in a given domain, the book distinguishes between different kinds of ontologies and taxonomies, and shows how applied ontology draws on more traditional ideas from metaphysics. It presents the core features of the Basic Formal Ontology (BFO), now used by over one hundred ontology projects around the world, and offers examples of domain ontologies that utilize BFO. The book also describes Web Ontology Language (OWL), a common framework for Semantic Web technologies. Throughout, the book provides concrete recommendations for the design and construction of domain ontologies. (shrink)

Software application ontologies have the potential to become the keystone in state-of-the-art information management techniques. It is expected that these ontologies will support the sort of reasoning power required to navigate large and complex terminologies correctly and efficiently. Yet, there is one problem in particular that continues to stand in our way. As these terminological structures increase in size and complexity, and the drive to integrate them inevitably swells, it is clear that the level of consistency required for (...) such navigation will become correspondingly difficult to maintain. While descriptive semantic representations are certainly a necessary component to any adequate ontology-based system, so long as ontology engineers rely solely on semantic information, without a sound ontological theory informing their modeling decisions, this goal will surely remain out of reach. In this paper we describe how Language and Computing nv (L&C), along with The Institute for Formal Ontology and Medical Information Sciences (IFOMIS), are working towards developing and implementing just such a theory, combining the open software architecture of L&C’s LinkSuiteTM with the philosophical rigor of IFOMIS’s Basic Formal Ontology. In this way we aim to move beyond the more or less simple controlled vocabularies that have dominated the industry to date. (shrink)

The Brain–Computer Interface (BCI) is not just a technological progress but an ontological rupture—a disruption of the fundamental structure of human cognition and learning. Existing definitions of BCI focus on its clinical functionalities and applications, with the following ethical discourse remaining confined to outcome-oriented frameworks of normative ethics. Yet BCI’s media-formal specificity, namely its capacity to link brain and world directly and bypassing natural sensorimotor pathways, remains philosophically unexamined. In particular, its potential to reconfigure the first-principle conditions of human (...) cognition and the formation of the self is still undertheorized. A philosophical definition capable of accounting for this disruptive specificity is therefore urgently needed. Here, we propose a new philosophical definition that treats BCI as a novel cognitive media interface, and uses metaphysics as a tool to examine how its formal structure deconstructs not only traditional epistemology, but also the Kantian framework of sensibility, understanding, and the transcendental conditions of experience. Just as digital media externalized memory and perception, and artificial general intelligence (AGI) outsourced discernment, BCI threatens to bypass the bodily foundations of learning and expression altogether, risking a human subject reduced to a reactive mechanism without awareness. Through an interdisciplinary inquiry drawing on engineering, neuroscience, and metaphysics, we develop a theoretical framework, the Philosophy of BCI, to analyze how such cognitive transformations fundamentally reconfigure ontological conditions of selfhood, free will, moral judgment, emotion, aesthetic perception, and the shaping of tacit experience. Ultimately, the paper poses a critical question: In the age of BCI, does the human still exist through the body, or must we now redefine human subjectivity upon new cognitive conditions—those of disembodied awareness? Copyright © 2025 Tony Chae & Kyuin Chae. All rights reserved. This work is made available on PhilArchive for scholarly communication purposes. No part of this work may be reproduced, distributed, or transmitted in any form or by any means without the prior written permission of the authors. Date: August 11, 2025. (shrink)

This paper derives the "Law of Mutual Interdependence" as a necessary logical consequence of universal finitude and the differentiation of existence. Building upon the premise that the universe is a computational system with finite resources (Saito, 2026), we demonstrate that the existence of a "completely closed system" or "isolated entity" is a thermodynamic and categorical impossibility. By integrating Category Theory (Yoneda Lemma), Landauer’s Principle, and a resource-centric reinterpretation of the Uncertainty Principle, we formalize existence not as a collection of independent (...) substances, but as nodal points within a dynamic relational network. We show that the persistence of any system depends on constant interaction and information exchange to avoid computational halt. This work identifies modern civilizational issues as "structural fallacies of isolation" and provides the logical foundation for the "Principle of Mutual Optimization" to be presented in subsequent work. (shrink)

Ontologies are being used by information scientists in order to facilitate the sharing of meaningful information. However, computational ontologies are problematic in that they often decontextualize information. The semantic content of information is dependent upon the context in which it exists and the experience through which it emerges. For true semantic interoperability to occur among diverse information systems, within or across domains, information must remain contextualized. In order to bring more context to computational ontologies, we introduce culture (...) as an essential concept for information science. Culture helps to focus our attention on and make meaning of relevant extrapersonal structures and their qualities and dimensions that comprise the context and background of the world. In our approach, culture is integral to the study of semantics and, consequently, the study of ontologies and information technologies. The meaning we make of entities and phenomena in the world is always shaped by our cultural experience. If we understand culture as the emergent interplay of intrapersonal cognitive structures and extrapersonal structures of the world, then the notion of cognitive and cultural schemas becomes essential to understanding ontology and the ways in which we might achieve authentic semantic interoperability among diverse information systems. We explore the nature of ontologies and reconceptualize them as cultural schemas. Our proposal is an alternative to the historical path from philosophical ontology to computational ontologies as one that adheres primarily to the notion of ontology as a categorization and classification system. The obvious implication for ontology as categorization is that there is a single objective world that exists and that it can be described as entirely separate from the person observing it. We draw upon Heidegger’s examination of ontology to ground ontology in a phenomenological perspective, enabling it to remain flexible and adaptable and to accommodate context. (shrink)

The relationship between abstract formal procedures and the activities of actual physical systems has proved to be surprisingly subtle and controversial, and there are a number of competing accounts of when a physical system can be properly said to implement a mathematical formalism and hence perform a computation. I defend an account wherein computational descriptions of physical systems are high-level normative interpretations motivated by our pragmatic concerns. Furthermore, the criteria of utility and success vary according to our diverse purposes and (...) pragmatic goals. Hence there is no independent or uniform fact to the matter, and I advance the ‘anti-realist’ conclusion that computational descriptions of physical systems are not founded upon deep ontological distinctions, but rather upon interest-relative human conventions. Hence physical computation is a ‘conventional’ rather than a ‘natural’ kind. (shrink)

The computational genomics community has come increasingly to rely on the methodology of creating annotations of scientific literature using terms from controlled structured vocabularies such as the Gene Ontology (GO). We here address the question of what such annotations signify and of how they are created by working biologists. Our goal is to promote a better understanding of how the results of experiments are captured in annotations in the hope that this will lead to better representations of biological reality through (...) both the annotation process and ontology development, and in more informed use of the GO resources by experimental scientists. (shrink)

In the development of humanity, it seems that everything is in a state of balance, and this vague feeling may have always accompanied humanity. The pervasiveness of trade-offs is conventionally attributed to physical limitations. This paper demonstrates that the necessity for trade-offs is not a contingent limitation of our universe, but an ontological cost inherent to existence itself. Wherever there is discernible difference, computation and balance inevitably arise.

Organisations are computing systems. The university’s sports centre is a computing system for managing sports teams and facilities. The tenure committee is a computing system for assigning tenure status. Despite an increasing number of publications in group ontology, the computational nature of organisations has not been recognised. The present paper is the first in this debate to propose a theory of organisations as groups structured for computing. I begin by describing the current situation in group ontology and by spelling out (...) the thesis in more detail. I then present the example of a sports centre to illustrate why one might intuitively think of organisations as computing systems. To substantiate the thesis, I introduce Piccinini’s restrictive analysis of physical computation. As I show, organisations meet all criteria for being computing systems. Organisations are structured groups with the function of manipulating medium-independent vehicles according to rules. Furthermore, I argue for the modal claim that this is a necessary feature of organisations. Having sketched the computational account of organisations, I compare it to other proposals in the literature. (shrink)

We describe a prototype ontology-driven information system (ODIS) that exploits what we call Portion of Reality (POR) representations. The system takes both sensor data and natural language text as inputs and composes on this basis logically structured POR assertions. The goal of our prototype is to represent both natural language and sensor data within a single framework that is able to support both axiomatic reasoning and computation. In addition, the framework should be capable of discovering and representing new kinds of (...) situations and thematic roles, (e.g., roles such as agent, patient and instrument), based on new compositions of existing representations. We applied our prototype in an intelligence analysis use case to test the hypothesis that a framework of this sort can produce usefully structured information from combined natural language and sensor data inputs. We further tested our hypothesis by adding an enhanced US Air Force ontology framework to our ODIS in order to (1) process a collection of sensor data, intel reports, and mission plans; (2) build composite POR representations from these data; and (3) machine analyze the fused results to infer mission threats. (shrink)

Ontologies, as the term is used in informatics, are structured vocabularies comprised of human- and computer-interpretable terms and relations that represent entities and relationships. Within informatics fields, ontologies play an important role in knowledge and data standardization, representation, integra- tion, sharing and analysis. They have also become a foundation of artificial intelligence (AI) research. In what follows, we outline the Coronavirus Infectious Disease Ontology (CIDO), which covers multiple areas in the domain of coronavirus diseases, including etiology, transmission, (...) epidemiology, pathogenesis, diagnosis, prevention, and treatment. We emphasize CIDO development relevant to COVID-19. (shrink)

We propose a perspective article on using computational hermeneutics models, i.e., the analysis of texts assisted by artificial intelligence. It will not be a question here of developing a technical approach to construct these models, but rather of showing how, based on the existing data, some general principles for a pragmatic approach to this field can be proposed using computer ontologies. We will see that these AIs can be used to create hermeneutic models capable of producing formal and (...) semantic representations of sociolinguistic contexts from the analysis of texts. The main suggestion here will be to use these models to reproduce a hermeneutic network, i.e., a collaborative human-machine interaction capable of both interpreting and clarifying the concepts of a field of practice. In conclusion, we will argue that these machines are capable of expressing meaning through symbolic forms that emerge from their interactions with experts. (shrink)

Ontology is currently perceived as the solution of first resort for all problems related to biomedical terminology, and the use of description logics is seen as a minimal requirement on adequate ontology-based systems. Contrary to common conceptions, however, description logics alone are not able to prevent incorrect representations; this is because they do not come with a theory indicating what is computed by using them, just as classical arithmetic does not tell us anything about the entities that are added or (...) subtracted. In this paper we shall show that ontology is indeed an essential part of any solution to the problems of medical terminology – but only if it is understood in the right sort of way. Ontological engineering, we shall argue, should in every case go hand in hand with a sound ontological theory. (shrink)

In this article, M. Beatrice Fazi takes up Media Theory’s invitation to engage with Alan Díaz Alva’s analysis of her philosophical work on contingency in computation. The central argument of Fazi’s Contingent Computation: Abstraction, Experience, and Indeterminacy in Computational Aesthetics is that computation can be productive of ontological novelty. This piece revisits that argument in the light of the technological developments that have occurred since 2018, when the book was published. Focusing on generative artificial intelligence (generative AI), the article considers (...) how the concepts of generativity, aesthetics and contingency are tackled in the book and in present-day debates about generative AI systems. (shrink)

This paper defines the essence of "number" which lies at the root of all layers of the universe description, physical laws, and perception as the structuring of ontological difference. Building upon the equivalence of "Existence = Difference = Information" established in the author’s previous work, this study positions number as the result of information processing that distinguishes distinctness under identity. By doing so, it clarifies that the structures of mathematics, physics, and consciousness are derived from a single logical foundation. This (...) inquiry represents an attempt to liberate the concept of number from abstract symbolic systems and reconstruct it as the fundamental constitutive principle of reality. (shrink)

Could a person ever transcend what it is like to be in the world as a human being? Could we ever know what it is like to be other creatures? Questions about the overcoming of a human perspective are not uncommon in the history of philosophy. In the last century, those very interrogatives were notably raised by American philosopher Thomas Nagel in the context of philosophy of mind. In his 1974 essay What is it Like to Be a Bat?, Nagel (...) offered reflections on human subjectivity and its constraints. Nagel’s insights were elaborated before the social diffusion of computers and could not anticipate the cultural impact of technological artefacts capable of materializing interactive simulated worlds as well as disclosing virtual alternatives to the “self.” In this sense, this article proposes an understanding of computers as epistemological and ontological instruments. The embracing of a phenomenological standpoint entails that philosophical issues are engaged and understood from a fundamentally practical perspective. In terms of philosophical praxis, or “applied philosophy,” I explored the relationship between human phenomenologies and digital mediation through the design and the development of experimental video games. For instance, I have conceptualized the first-person action-adventure video game Haerfest (Technically Finished 2009) as a digital re-formulation of the questions posed in Nagel’s famous essay. Experiencing a bat’s perceptual equipment in Haerfest practically corroborates Nagel’s conclusions: there is no way for humans to map, reproduce, or even experience the consciousness of an actual bat. Although unverifiable in its correspondence to that of bats, Haerfest still grants access to experiences and perceptions that, albeit still inescapably within the boundaries of human kinds of phenomenologies, were inaccessible to humans prior to the advent of computers. Phenomenological alterations and virtual experiences disclosed by interactive digital media cannot take place without a shift in human kinds of ontologies, a shift which this study recognizes as the fundamental ground for the development of a new humanism (I deem it necessary to specify that I am not utilizing the term “humanism” in its common connotation, that is to say the one that emerged from the encounter between the Roman civilization and the late Hellenistic culture. According to this conventional acceptation, humanism indicates the realization of the human essence through “scholarship and training in good conduct” (Heidegger 1998, p. 244). However, Heidegger observed that this understanding of humanism does not truly cater to the original essence of human beings, but rather “is determined with regard to an already established interpretation of nature, history, world, and […] beings as a whole.” (Heidegger 1998, p. 245) The German thinker found this way of embracing humanism reductive: a by-product of Western metaphysics. As Heidegger himself specified in his 1949 essay Letter on Humanism, his opposition to the traditional acceptation of the term humanism does not advocate for the “inhuman” or a return to the “barbaric” but stems instead from the belief that the humanism can only be properly understood and restored in culture as more original way of meditating and caring for humanity and understanding its relationship with Being.). Additionally, this study explicitly proposes and exemplifies the use of interactive digital technology as a medium for testing, developing and disseminating philosophical notions, problems and hypotheses in ways which are alternative to the traditional textual one. Presented as virtual experiences, philosophical concepts can be accessed without the filter of subjective imagination. In a persistent, interactive, simulated environment, I claim that the crafting and the mediation of thought takes a novel, projective (In Martin Heidegger’s 1927 Being and Time, the term “projectivity” indicates the way a Being opens to the world in terms of its possibilities of being (Heidegger 1962, pp. 184–185, BT 145). Inspired by Heidegger’s and Vilem Flusser’s work in the field of philosophy of technology as well as Helmuth Plessner’s anthropological position presented in his 1928 book Die Stufen des Organischen und der Mensch. Einleitung in die philosophische Anthropologie, this study understands the concept of projectivity as the innate openness of human beings to construct themselves and their world by means of technical artefacts. In this sense, this study proposes a fundamental understanding of technology as the materialization of mankind’s tendency to overcome its physical, perceptual and communicative limitations.) dimension which I propose to call “augmented ontology.”. (shrink)

Words are indispensable linguistic tools for beings like us. However, there is not much philosophical work done about what words really are. In this paper, I develop a new ontology for words. I argue that words are abstract artifacts that are created to fulfill various kinds of purposes, and words are abstract in the sense that they are not located in space but they have a beginning and may have an end in time given that certain conditions are met. What (...) follows from this two-fold argument is that words, from an ontological point of view, are more like musical works, fictional characters or computer programs, than numbers or sets. (shrink)

This paper presents an ontology architecture concept for the European Space Agency‘s (ESA) Space Situational Awareness (SSA) Program. It incorporates the author‘s domain ontology, The Space Situational Awareness Ontology and related ontology work. I summarize computational ontology, discuss the segments of ESA SSA, and introduce an option for a modular ontology framework reflecting the divisionsof the SSA program. Among other things, ontologies are used for data sharing and integration. By applying ontology to ESA data, the ESA may better achieve (...) its integration and innovation goals, while simultaneously improving the state of peaceful SSA. (shrink)

Each annual Ontology Summit initiative makes a statement appropriate to each Summit’s theme as part of our general advocacy designed to bring ontology science and engineering into the mainstream. The theme this year is "Towards an Open Ontology Repository". This communiqué represents the joint position of those who were engaged in the year's summit discourse on an Open Ontology Repository (OOR) and of those who endorse below. In this discussion, we have agreed that an "ontology repository is a facility where (...) ontologies and related information artifacts can be stored, retrieved and managed." -/- We believe in the promise of semantic technologies based on logic, databases and the Semantic Web, a Web of exposed data and of interpretations of that data (i.e., of semantics), using common standards. Such technologies enable distinguishable, computable, reusable, and sharable meaning of Web and other artifacts, including data, documents, and services. We also believe that making that vision a reality requires additional supporting resources and these resources should be open, extensible, and provide common services over the ontologies. (shrink)

Dilemmas in moral, cognitive, and computational domains resist resolution within classical, deontic, or probabilistic frameworks due to their contextual and evolving structure. This paper introduces D-logic, an ontological formalism grounded in acts of differentiation rather than propositional truth. D-logic models dilemmas as unstable configurations of distinctions, resolving them through recursive differentiation and phase transitions that enhance coherence and stabilize relational structures. Unlike static approaches such as deontic logic or game theory, D-logic derives logical form from relational differences modulated by dynamic (...) aspects, enabling flexible reconfiguration rather than adherence to fixed rules. Formal definitions and theorems provide the theoretical foundation, while simulations demonstrate its application to cognitive conflict and structural incoherence. These results show that D-logic can handle both contradictions and systemic gaps, offering a unified treatment of conflict, uncertainty, and emergent structure. The framework opens new avenues for philosophical logic, artificial intelligence, and cognitive modeling by reframing reasoning as an ongoing ontological process of differentiation. (shrink)

Contemporary theories of consciousness often treat experience as a state, property, or representational structure instantiated at a time. This paper argues that this shared assumption underlies persistent explanatory problems, including the Hard Problem, the explanatory gap, and functionalist equivalence objections such as the unfolding argument. It proposes instead Computational Dynamic Monism (CDM), a process-metaphysical framework according to which phenomenal consciousness is constituted by temporally extended, hierarchically self-referential delay coordinate embedding (DCE) in plastic recurrent neural networks. The experiential and the dynamical (...) are not two things requiring a bridge, but one thing accessed via different epistemic routes. CDM departs from standard type-B physicalism by reconceiving consciousness as a process rather than a property: a reconception that dissolves the Hard Problem by denying the separation between process and phenomenal character that the snapshot view presupposes. The paper defends CDM against the explanatory gap objection, the conceivability argument, and the knowledge argument; establishes through converging arguments that consciousness requires temporal extension; and shows how CDM survives the unfolding argument that threatens static structural theories. The threshold problem - which processes are conscious - is addressed through a self-reference criterion for subjectivity. Building on the State Space Theory of Consciousness, the account integrates insights from dynamical systems theory, neuroscience, and process philosophy. It distinguishes the metaphysical framework (CDM) from the specific mechanism (DCE), and yields principled constraints on artificial systems capable of conscious experience. (shrink)

Does the universe run on computational principles because it is a simulation, or do computational systems succeed because they capture how reality actually works? We argue for the latter through Universal Constraint Parsing (UCP)—a framework showing that constraint-based selection operates throughout physical reality from quantum mechanics to consciousness. Computational systems work precisely because they can instantiate this natural mechanism, not because reality is itself computational. We examine the simulation hypothesis literature (Bostrom 2003; Chalmers 2005), analyze the relationship between UCP and (...) computational models, and show why the deep effectiveness of computation in science reflects variational and constraint-selection structural matching rather than ontological identity. This undercuts the explanatory motivation for the simulation hypothesis by explaining computational success without requiring reality to be a computation. We conclude that UCP provides a more parsimonious explanation: computation succeeds when it mirrors constraint-parsing mechanisms already present in nature. (shrink)

The central hypothesis of the collaboration between Language and Computing (L&C) and the Institute for Formal Ontology and Medical Information Science (IFOMIS) is that the methodology and conceptual rigor of a philosophically inspired formal ontology greatly benefits application ontologies. To this end r®, L&C’s ontology, which is designed to integrate and reason across various external databases simultaneously, has been submitted to the conceptual demands of IFOMIS’s Basic Formal Ontology (BFO). With this project we aim to move beyond the level (...) of controlled vocabularies to yield an ontology with the ability to support reasoning applications. Our general procedure has been the implementation of a meta-ontological definition space in which the definitions of all the concepts and relations in LinKBase® are standardized in a framework of first-order logic. In this paper we describe how this standardization has already led to an improvement in the LinKBase® structure that allows for a greater degree of internal coherence than ever before possible. We then show the use of this philosophical standardization for the purpose of mapping external databases to one another, using LinKBase® as translation hub, with a greater degree of success than possible hitherto. We demonstrate how this offers a genuine advance over other application ontologies that have not submitted themselves to the demands of philosophical scrutiny. LinKBase® is one of the world’s largest applications-oriented medical domain ontologies, and BFO is one of the world’s first philosophically driven reference ontologies. The collaboration of the two thus initiates a new phase in the quest to solve the so-called “Tower of Babel”. (shrink)

This paper establishes a general semantic constraint on physical ontology in continuum theories under explanatory realism and finite-information access. Working in the framework of represented state spaces, we show that ontic predicates must satisfy bounded input dependence: once true, their truth must persist under sufficiently small perturbations of state. This requirement forces the extension of any ontic predicate to be open in the representation topology. As a consequence, predicates defined by exact equalities, lower-dimensional subspaces, digit-level conditions, or algorithmic properties are (...) structurally non-denoting, even though they are mathematically well defined. Ontic structure in continuum physics must therefore take the form of open stability regions, not sharp boundary conditions. The result is theory-agnostic and applies to any physical framework whose states are modeled in continuum spaces and accessed through finite procedures, including classical field theories, dynamical systems, and quantum models. The theorem clarifies the boundary between mathematical structure and ontological structure in continuum descriptions and connects denotation to operational discrimination constraints. (shrink)

The classical ontological argument, originating with Anselm of Canterbury and revived in modern forms by philosophers like William Lane Craig, posits that God's existence is logically necessary: a maximally great being, whose perfection includes existence, must exist in reality. No empirical evidence, no scripture – just deductive necessity. In the 21st century, this argument collides with tech capitalism. Elon Musk's ethos ("If it exists, monetize it") turns necessity into a subscription model. Dr Craig S. Wright (the Australian computer scientist (...) who long claimed to be Bitcoin inventor Satoshi Nakamoto, backed by a doctorate in theology and a self-described Wesleyan background) extends it further: if God requires a perfect, immutable record of all things to be truly maximal, then only an infinitely scalable blockchain like Bitcoin SV (BSV) could host it. Salvation becomes a nano-transaction. Yet the monetization paradox undoes the argument: a perfect being needs no patches, no layers, no fees. Grace by private key is no grace at all. The punchline? Only a former religious figure could reframe eternal life as a blockchain node – and still call it free. (shrink)

La communication interdisciplinaire rencontre divers problématiques : l’hétérogénéités des informations (sémantique, standardisation des formats), les confusions linguistiques (intentions dans les énoncés, polysémie des mots) ou encore épistémologiques (expertises divergentes, terminologies inadéquates). Nous proposons pour favoriser l’intercommunication entre différents domaines de spécialité, l’emploi des ontologies informatiques : des artefacts informatiques permettant une représentation des concepts au sein d’un domaine de spécialité. Autour de la notion « d’interopérabilité sémantique », la capacité pour une machine et des acteurs de communiquer ensemble, nous (...) viserons à montrer en quoi les ontologies peuvent permettre à des acteurs de différentes disciplines de clarifier les notions propres à leurs domaines en fonction d’une analyse de leurs usages des mots. Nous tâchons ici de mettre en avant la capacité des ontologies de traiter le langage selon différents niveaux du sens d’un mot (du plus concret et appliqué, au plus abstrait et conceptuel), afin de mettre en perspective ce en quoi cette analyse basée sur les textes d’un corpus, permet de rendre compte de, si ce n’est un état du réalisme d’une discipline, du moins, servir d’outils pour aider les acteurs à normaliser leurs pratiques. En ce sens, les ontologies informatiques peuvent être considérées et utilisées comme autant de bases terminologiques servant comme outils de références pour faciliter la communication interdisciplinaire. (shrink)