In the first part of this article we briefly describe the design and development of a Consciousness Studies concentration at Goddard College, a student centered, progressive educational institution in the northeastern United States. We emphasize the tensions we experienced between different orientations in Consciousness Studies and especially the one related to the scientific and transpersonal ends of the spectrum of consciousness. In the second part, we relate the scientific‐transpersonal issue that we experienced at Goddard to (...) the broader theory and practice of Consciousness Studies. We also link the latter to the so‐called explanatory gap between third and first person forms of consciousness and the call for first person methods of exploring consciousness. Our conclusion is that the scientific approach has the edge and is at risk of assimilating other approaches to the detriment of Consciousness Studies. In our view, the future development of Consciousness Studies, both in theory and practice, requires several different approaches from the scientific to the transpersonal and privileging one is to narrow the field of possibilities and to risk falling prey to one‐sidedness. (shrink)

The limitations and unsuitability of the twentieth century intellectual marvel, the quantum mechanics for the task of unraveling working of human consciousness is critically analyzed. The inbuilt traits of the probabilistic, approximate and imprecise nature of quantum mechanical approach are brought out. -/- The limitations and the unsuitability of using such knowledge for the understanding of precise, correct, finite and definite happenings of activities relating to human consciousness and mind, which are not quantum in nature, are pointed out. (...) -/- Analytical methods interpreting philosophical and Indian spiritual analyses suiting the unraveling of working of human consciousness and mind over the deductive approach of quantum physics and advanced mathematics are highlighted. A model of human consciousness and mental functions is presented taking ideas from the Upanishads and related texts. -/- Comparisons with theological interpretations of Upanishadic insight are dealt with to have an idea of working of human consciousness and mind in relation to spirituality. (shrink)

When you submit something real to a system claiming to seek truth, the system's actual function becomes visible. I submitted a framework to the *Journal of Consciousness Studies* that places consciousness at the center of all empirical knowledge. The framework dissolves the philosophical problems the journal exists to study by showing they stem from one unfalsifiable assumption. The managing editor rejected it for being "too much philosophy" and told me to email celebrity philosophers instead. When pressed, he (...) admitted he never read the materials, citing time pressure for a business-card-sized argument. This reveals several absurdities: a consciousness journal rejecting consciousness-centered epistemology as off-topic, a managing editor handling submissions directly while claiming overwhelming volume, and deflection to unreachable celebrities presented as helpful advice. The system claims to seek paradigm-shifting work but cannot process it when it arrives. My first two submission attempts with this framework both received nonsense replies within days. This is not bad luck. By bringing them reality, I exposed fakery. This paper documents how academic publishing performs inquiry rather than conducting it, visible only when someone possesses a framework that should matter if true. (shrink)

Various theories suggest conscious phenomena are based exclusively on brain activity, while others regard them as a result of the interaction between embodied agents and their environment. In this paper, I will consider whether this divergence entails the acceptance of the fact that different theories can be applied in different scales (as in the case of physics), or if they are reconcilable. I will suggest that investigating how the term representation is used can reveal some hints, building upon which we (...) can bridge the gulf between the two poles in the long run. In my argumentation I will rely on some earlier philosophical insights, such as those of Descartes, James, Wittgenstein and Merleau-Ponty, as well as research based on global workspace theory, and the conceptions of embodied and enacted cognition. I will suggest that within a wider horizon of investigation, the ambiguity as regards the term representation will decrease. (shrink)

In the contemporary philosophy of mind and consciousness studies, views such as panpsychism or theories of universal consciousness, have enjoyed a recent renaissance of metaphysical speculations in Western philosophy. Its similarities with Eastern philosophical traditions went not unnoticed. However, the potential contribution that the evolutionary cosmology of the Indian poet, mystic and philosopher Sri Aurobindo can offer to these ontologies, remains largely unknown or unexplored. Here, consciousness, mind, life, matter and evolution are interpreted in an extended (...) metaphysical framework, uniting Western and Eastern traditions inside a modern philosophical system where materialism, panpsychism, cosmopsychism and philosophical idealism are not seen as irreconcilable exclusives, but different points of view that can be reconciled in a synthesis of knowledge, as envisioned from higher states of consciousness. This integral view of reality offers a conceptual platform that can complement and incorporate current theoretical approaches in modern philosophy, where their present internal inconsistencies do not emerge, and can be suggestive for scientists as well, especially in the fields of biology and physical sciences. (shrink)

Everything around seems phenomenal and appears driven by a conscious experience. Everything is an experience and for the experiencer appears eternally phenomenal and subjective. The conscious ‘How’ can be easily explained by the many reductive based advances in science and other disciplines, but the conscious ‘Why’ persists as phenomenal. The ‘How’ however can be reduced only to a precise limit i.e. the limits of scientific exploration, beyond which it persists to be phenomenal. This paper is an inter-disciplinary understanding of how (...) science and phenomenology can complement each other to help decipher and conform to the hypothetical approach, that everything around is phenomenal. (shrink)

This essay argues that Spinoza’s metaphysics offers a theoretical framework for dissolving the conceptual gap in contemporary consciousness studies. The conceptual origins of the gap have their roots in Cartesian substance dualism. If phenomenal experience is conceived as substantially distinct from correlated physical processes in the brain, an explanatory gap opens in our understanding of the mind/body relation. Spinoza’s metaphysics offers an ontology that preserves the qualitative difference between phenomenal experience and physiological processes while conceiving the ultimate numerical (...) unity of mind and its correlated physical processes. The notion of qualitative difference within substantial unity is deduced from Spinoza’s redefinition of the basic features of the Cartesian universe: substance, attribute, and mode. Redefinition results in a property dualism that is internally consistent and dissolves the conceptual gap in contemporary consciousness studies. This paper identifies and explains the central argument for qualitative distinction within substantial unity and recommends a framework for consciousness studies that views phenomenology and neuroscience as complementary disciplines. (shrink)

A letter replying to Bayne et al. "Tests for consciousness in humans and beyond", 2024, arguing that the search for consciousness "beyond" healthy adult humans should begin with other animals.

In response to Petitmengin and Bitbol's recent account of first-person methodologies in the study of consciousness, I provide a revised model of our introspective knowledge of our own conscious experience. This model, which I call the existential constitution model of phenomenal knowledge, avoids the problems that Petitmengin and Bitbol identify with standard observational models of introspection while also avoiding an underlying metaphorical misconception in their own proximity model, which misconstrues first-person knowledge of consciousness in terms of a dichotomous (...) epistemic relationship. The end result is a clearer understanding of the unique nature and epistemic properties of our knowledge of consciousness, as well as the epistemic status of subsequent first-person reports on conscious experience. (shrink)

This paper revisits Robert Grosseteste’s medieval metaphysics of light in conversation with contemporary phenomenology of inner vision, predictive-processing neuroscience, and relational theology. We argue that luminous experiences reported in contemplative practice, near-death states, and psychedelic breakthroughs exhibit a lawful progression that can be described through an expanded eight-phase taxonomy. These phases move from emergent inner luminosity to structured geometry, symbolic encounter, immersive radiance, and ultimately unitive clarity, followed by ethical re-orientation and long-term integration. Rather than treating visionary light as either (...) pathological hallucination or supernatural proof, we interpret it as a lawful interaction between neurophysiology, attention, and meaning-formation. Predictive brain theories explain how inner vision becomes visible when sensory input is reduced, while Grosseteste’s doctrine of illumination and modern relational theologies (Jung, Teilhard, Delio) situate these experiences within a cosmology in which consciousness participates in a universe still unfolding. We further consider speculative physics proposals suggesting that information may possess mass and gravitational properties, offering conceptual resonance with theological traditions that treat reality as structured through meaning. Taken together, these perspectives suggest that inner illumination is best understood as a participatory disclosure: it reveals the constructive architecture of perception while simultaneously inviting ethical transformation. In this framework, mystical light neither escapes the world nor negates scientific explanation; instead, it discloses the relational field in which mind, cosmos, and value co-emerge. (shrink)

In this paper, I discuss the concept of phenomenological data by analyzing it in comparison with neurophenomenology and similar approaches that employ qualitative tools in empirical studies. I argue that although such data are often labeled as “phenomenological,” they do not meet the epistemological criteria of phenomenology properly understood. I distinguish the epistemological concept of consciousness (pure consciousness) from the psychological concept of the Self (empirical consciousness), and then suggest that neurophenomenology and related approaches are primarily (...) focused on the Self. As a result, they fail to engage with consciousness as originally conceived by Husserl. After briefly introducing the core principles of phenomenology to demonstrate its focus on the universal structures of consciousness, I apply them to interpret two neurophenomenological experiments, so as to reveal the underlying epistemological difference. I identify contingent or empirical elements that are implicitly introduced into these experimental designs, which cannot be defined as universal or invariant. Based on these considerations, I propose that the pure level of analysis, characteristic of phenomenology, is more closely aligned with mainstream cognitive neuroscience than with neurophenomenology and qualitative methods. Finally, I will draw upon the previous discussions to propose an epistemological shift in experimental studies. New insights into the universal processing of consciousness are proposed as a more robust approach to investigating the universal brain processing. Keywords: Essences, Cognitive Neuroscience, Phenomenology, Neurophenomenology,. (shrink)

Sankaraachaarya popularized the advaita thought among students of philosophy and seekers of knowledge of the Self or Brahman or Atman. But he is criticized by Indian theistic schools like Visistaadvaita and dvaita philosophies as “prachchnna bouddha – follower of the Buddha in disguise”. This comment of theistic schools makes it worthy of comparing the advaitic and Buddhist schools of thought in relation to consciousness, world, Soonya, and other expressions between the two thought systems. This paper does such a comparison (...) from cognitive science point of view and how the elements of Buddhism and Advaita thought enrich the modern scientific field of cognitive science. Also, a brief analysis is presented how the supplementary and complementary nature of the Upanishads, the Buddhism, the Jainism and the Shaddarsanas of Indian philosophic systems can be used to further the understanding of form, structure and function of human consciousness, mind and their functions. (shrink)

This editorial introduces the Journal of Consciousness Studies special issue on "Animal Consciousness". The 15 contributors and co-editors answer the question "How should we study animal consciousness scientifically?" in 500 words or fewer.

Explanation does not exist in a metaphysical vacuum. Conceptions of the structure of a phenomenon play an important role in guiding attempts to explain it, and erroneous conceptions of a phenomenon may direct investigation in misleading directions. I believe that there is a case to be made for thinking that much work on the neural underpinnings of consciousness—what is often called the neural correlates of consciousness—is driven by an erroneous conception of the structure of consciousness. The aim (...) of this paper is lay bare some connections between the explanation of consciousness and the structure of consciousness, and to argue for a conception of the structure of consciousness that is more adequate than that which currently drives much research into the neural correlates of consciousness. (shrink)

The scientific study of consciousness with its cornerstone of searching the neural correlates of consciousness constitutes an exciting and lively area of research. Yet, the empirical study of consciousness is surrounded by a host of philosophical challenges some of which are not new, while others have arisen and been elaborated over the last decades. The terminology can sometimes be confusing, causing misunderstandings how the challenges relate to each other. This paper provides an overview of several much-discussed philosophical (...) problems of consciousness, offering a way of arranging them and some thoughts about how they relate. Most labels are taken from the literature so that there is a progression from the “easy” via the “hard” to the “harder” problem(s), and some labels are made up, like the “hardest” problem. For reasons of space, there is not detailed discussion of the possible solutions to these problems even though some problems have been formulated in response to others. For example, the “real” problem approach and the “illusion” or “meta” problems can be read partly as responses to the “hard” problem. (shrink)

Objective. Study of the Covid-19 related quarantine concept as an emerging category of linguistic consciousness of Ukrainians. -/- Materials & Methods. The strategy of the study is based on the logical and methodological concept of inductivism. Respondents were asked to write down their own understanding of the quarantine, formulate an appropriate definition and describe the situation, which in their opinion is the exact opposite to quarantine. Respondents also assessed how much their psychological well-being, their daily lifestyle during quarantine had (...) changed, and ranked their preferences for the quarantine strategies proposed to them. A discursive analysis was applied to the obtained texts, as a result of which nine discourses were identified. These data, along with some socio-demographic characteristics were subjected to multidimensional mathematical and statistical processing. -/- Results. Covid-19 related quarantine is represented in the linguistic consciousness of Russian-speaking Ukrainians by a discursive field, which includes at least nine recognizable, semantically autonomous discourses. Empirically discovered such phenomenon as – inter-discourse semantic dissociation. Its essence is a statistically significant reduction in the probability of some discourses appearing in the texts when others are being actualized there. This feature is associated with the innate negativity of the language and determines the semantic biasing of the quarantine concept. Inter-discourse semantic dissociation, as well as the influence of non-discursive factors constitute the discursive formation of the quarantine concept, which is qualitatively characterized by the hierarchical relationship of its components. At the same time, it was revealed that part of the discourses interacting “horizontally” are indirectly associated “vertically”, which forms the stable semantic core of the quarantine concept. Partial empirical confirmation has been found of the previously put forward assumptions about: a) the existence of such a relationship between discourses and psychological defense mechanisms (as character-forming factors) that contributes to the hierarchical structure construction of discursive formations; b) the differential nature of discourses and mechanisms of psychological defenses interaction, which makes it possible to single out the discursive aspect in a characterological profile and consider a discourse as an operator of characterological semantics. -/- Conclusions. An empirical study made it possible to form a primary idea of the substantive and structural semantic features of the quarantine concept, as an emerging category of linguistic consciousness of Ukrainians. The results obtained have a potentially useful application perspective. Thus, when implementing anti-epidemiological measures, it is important to consider the studied features of the discursive formation hierarchical structure of the quarantine concept, since discursive semantics are associated with cognitive focusing, which, in turn, affects the behavior direction and its upshots. (shrink)

This is an excerpt of a report that highlights and explores five questions which arose from The Unity of Consciousness and Sensory Integration conference at Brown University in November of 2011. This portion of the report explores the question: How should we study experience, given unity relations?

In order to develop a true biological science of consciousness, we have to remove humans from the center of reference and develop a bottom-up comparative study of animal minds, as Donald Griffin intended with his call for a “cognitive ethology.” In this article, I make use of the pathological complexity thesis (Veit 2022a, b, c ) to show that we can firmly ground a comparative study of animal consciousness by drawing on the resources of state-based behavioral life history (...) theory. By comparing the different life histories of gastropods and arthropods, we will be able to make better sense of the possible origins of consciousness and its function for organisms in their natural environments. (shrink)

This Target paper is about the hard problem of phenomenal consciousness (i.e., how is subjective experience possible given the scientific presumption that everything from molecules to minerals to minds is wholly physical?). I first argue that one of the most valuable tools in the scientific arsenal (metaphor) cannot be recruited to address the hard problem due to the inability to forge connections between the stubborn fact of subjective experience and physically grounded models of scientific explanation. I then argue that (...) adherence to the physicalist tenets of contemporary science has a limiting effect on a full appreciation of the phenomenon under discussion. (shrink)

Hydranencephaly is a developmental malady, where the cerebral hemispheres of the brain are reduced partly or entirely too membranous sacs filled with cerebrospinal fluid. Infants with this malady are presumed to have reduced life expectancy with a survival of weeks to few years and which solely depends on care and fostering of these individuals. During their life span these individuals demonstrate behaviours that are termed “vegetative” by neuroscientists but can be comparable to the state of being “aware” or “conscious”. Based (...) on the most simplified definition for consciousness i.e. “awareness” or “to be aware”, these individuals are undeniably aware of their existence and therefore should be termed “conscious”. The bigoted approach of neuroscience towards understanding consciousness is usually linked with the cortex of the brain and therefore a malady as hydranencephaly poses a great challenge to this field. This paper is a compilation of behaviours and aptitudes observed in several cases of hydranencephaly which suggests, that consciousness is not just a brain process, but is a highly quantum computed process that follows laws of quantum physics, giving rise to the subjective experience of consciousness in these individuals. (shrink)

Recently several prominent biologists and philosophers, including Feinberg and Mallatt, and Godfrey-Smith, have proposed evolutionary accounts of consciousness. Despite disagreements regarding the specifics, they all focused on the “primitive” form of consciousness and argued that its origin is much more ancient than previously believed. In this study, we examine these accounts based on their methodological grounds. Specifically, we examine whether one methodological criticism leveled against evolutionary psychology on the completeness of its explanations can be applied to Feinberg and (...) Mallatt’s adaptation explanations. We conclude that their explanations fall short of being complete, but fare better than those advanced by evolutionary psychologists. (shrink)

Scholars have wrestled with "consciousness", a major scholar calling it the "hard problem". Some thirty-plus years after the Towards a Science of Consciousness, we do not seem to be any closer to an answer to "What is consciousness?". Seemingly irresolvable metaphysical problems are addressed by bootstrapping, provisional assumptions, not unlike those used by logicians and mathematicians. I bootstrap with the same ontology and epistemology applicable to everything we apprehend. Here, I argue for a version of the unity (...) of opposites, a form of neutral monism. Something exists because of what it is not; nothing can exist by itself, singularities (analogous to monads), expressing the model. Applying this most fundamental law to the consciousness problem, the physical (movement) comes into being simultaneously as the mental (stasis), each displayed by a field that is variegated (ranging from creative to entropic processes). Such is in keeping with how the singularity emerged as our universe, the same form that may account for sub-Planck-scale phenomena. Overall, like the most fundamental law, deep structures are imminent in our universe, both as objects and processes. (shrink)

We unify consciousness studies, philosophy of life, and evolutionary cognitive science through frequency dynamics grounded in measurable neural oscillations. The framework generates three interconnected hypotheses: (1) Consciousness emerges from reception-emission dynamics (c = f(a + e)) operating on neural oscillatory substrates (0.5-100 Hz, measurable via EEG/MEG). (2) Life trajectories solve underdetermined equations with deterministic, choice-based, and stochastic variables—reconciling free will with determinism and explaining meaning without teleological metaphysics. (3) Autism represents evolutionary retuning: amplified frequency reception optimized for (...) information-dense environments. This approach generates twelve falsifiable predictions regarding neural signatures, personality stability, environmental stress response, and developmental outcomes. It resolves philosophical tensions across agency, meaning, and neurodiversity while offering advantages over panpsychism (more parsimonious), Integrated Information Theory (more testable), and Global Workspace Theory (more mechanistic). -/- Distinction from pseudoscience: We employ frequency in its literal physical sense (Hz) with explicit measurement protocols, not metaphorically. Our framework makes zero mystical claims and specifies exact falsification conditions. Critics must engage with our actual predictions, not imagined vibrational mysticism. (shrink)

John Searle offers what he thinks to be a reasonable scientific approach to the understanding of consciousness. I argue that Searle is demanding nothing less than a Kuhnian-type revolution with respect to how scientists should study consciousness given his rejection of the subject-object distinction and affirmation of mental causation. As part of my analysis, I reveal that Searle embraces a version of emergentism that is in tension, not only with his own account, but also with some of the (...) theoretical tenets of science. I conclude that Searle has offered little to motivate scientists to adopt his proposal. (shrink)

Induced by intake of the psychedelic substances LSD, psilocybin, DMT and mescaline, psychedelic experiences have been extensively described by subjects as entailing a most unusual increase in the scope and quality of their consciousness. Accordingly, psychedelic experiences have been widely characterised as an “expansion of consciousness.” This article poses the following question, as yet unaddressed in contemporary philosophy and the tradition of phenomenology: to what exactly does “expansion of consciousness” refer as a general characterisation of psychedelic experiences, (...) and what role might attention play therein? On the basis of Aron Gurwitsch’s phenomenology of attention, the following thesis is presented: (a) “expansion of consciousness” refers to a particular restructuration of consciousness in psychedelic experiences. (b) This occurs by means of certain extreme transformations in direction, scope, mode and degree of attention. In order to explicate this thesis, the characteristic features of psychedelic experiences that pertain to expansion of consciousness and attention are first systematically identified from a survey of subject reports. Second, it is demonstrated that the few previous attempts to understand expansion of consciousness in terms of attention as a filter/reducing-valve, spotlight or zoom-lens each fail to explain how consciousness is structured in psychedelic experiences. Third, it is argued that psychedelic expansion of consciousness is a general restructuration of consciousness by means of extreme attentional transformations. In conclusion, brief consideration is given to the question of whether psychedelic expansion of consciousness can have epistemic and ethical value for life. (shrink)

We have a much better understanding of physics than we do of consciousness. I consider ways in which intrinsically mental aspects of fundamental ontology might induce modifications of the known laws of physics, or whether they could be relevant to accounting for consciousness if no such modifications exist. I suggest that our current knowledge of physics should make us skeptical of hypothetical modifications of the known rules, and that without such modifications it’s hard to imagine how intrinsically mental (...) aspects could play a useful explanatory role. Draft version of a paper submitted to Journal of Consciousness Studies, special issue responding to Philip Goff’s Galileo’s Error: Foundations for a New Science of Consciousness. (shrink)

Studying the neural correlates of conscious awareness depends on a reliable comparison between activations associated with awareness and unawareness. One particularly difficult confound to remove is task performance capacity, i.e. the difference in performance between the conditions of interest. While ideally task performance capacity should be matched across different conditions, this is difficult to achieve experimentally. However, differences in performance could theoretically be corrected for mathematically. One such proposal is found in a recent paper by Lamy, Salti and Bar-Haim [Lamy (...) D, Salti M, Bar-Haim Y. Neural correlates of subjective awareness and unconscious processing: an ERP study. J Cognitive Neurosci 2009,21:1435-46], who put forward a corrective method for an electroencephalography experiment. We argue that their analysis is essentially grounded in a version of High Threshold Theory, which has been shown to be inferior in general to Signal Detection Theory. We show through a series of computer simulations that their correction method only partially removes the influence of perfor- mance capacity, which can yield misleading results. We present a mathematical correction method based on Signal Detection Theory that is theoretically capable of removing performance capacity confounds. We discuss the limitations of mathemati- cally correcting for performance capacity confounds in imaging studies and its impact for theories about consciousness. (shrink)

This study is based on the theory of emergence and introduces a hierarchical model of consciousness to analyze how consciousness emerges, propagates, and evolves within human level. By examining the interaction mechanisms between different hierarchical levels, it interprets complex phenomena such as individual desires, free will, and social evolution. Additionally, by exploring the possibility of consciousness transcending biological constraints, it analyzes potential future forms of consciousness. Finally, through a reflexive approach, this paper highlights that it is (...) not only a theoretical description of consciousness but also a self-proof of the theory itself. This research aims to provide a systematic theoretical framework for the nature of consciousness, individual behavior, and mechanisms of social evolution, while opening new directions for systems science and sociology. (shrink)

Purpose This paper offers a critical exegesis of popular culture and its intersections with the other cultural expressions in the contemporary Philippine scene. As a distinct Reformed-Evangelical critique, the paper hopes to shed light on the areas of popular culture that are often assumed rather than discussed; affirmed but not analysed. -/- Design/methodology/approach Although the following exposition is readily and arguably Western by orientation, most especially on the (post)modern mood in the space it belongs, as hegemonised by Anglo-American discourse, most (...) of the concepts that this paper tackles are definitely universal and principled in praxes. The persuasion is that these criticisms will cover even the Filipino sub-/culture and sensibility in its attempt to exegete culture ontologically and contemplate on the phenomenon of popular culture at the very least. In that case, everyone who reads and specialises in cultural hermeneutics is thereby urged to offer a conscious understanding, comprehension and correspondence on the aforementioned particular aspects, albeit not everyone in the masses can readily grasp what this paper intends to build its discourse on. In carrying out this cultural exegetical task, certain markers and indicators will be used as halters, so to defamiliarise one’s attention on matters that may have immediate correspondence to the Filipino culture in its contemporary scene/sense, be it urban, suburban or rural depending on the spatial location of the readers as they interact with this treatise. As a whole, this paper endeavours to mould and uphold one’s glocal consciousness, distinctions, and differentiations in the assessment of culture, popular culture and popular culture in the Philippines vis-a-vis or vs other factors of this shared reality, sub-/culture and literacy and their probable popular culture counterparts elsewhere in the signifying and significant human experiences, challenges and perspectives. -/- Findings The paper finds out that without a critico-practical approach to the implications of popular culture, it will be an insidious challenge to anyone who wishes to coexist with it, most especially the subcultural expressions of certain communities. -/- Originality/value The paper possesses novelty in its being an intersection of cultural studies, criticism, theology and philosophy as basis for interpretation of certain socio-cultural phenomena in the contemporary urban space. (shrink)

Contemporary theories of consciousness are largely structured around some form of emer- gence, according to which subjective experience arises from sufficiently complex physical pro- cesses. Despite decades of theoretical refinement, emergentist approaches continue to face per- sistent conceptual difficulties, including explanatory gaps, category errors between physical de- scription and phenomenal experience and unresolved ambiguities concerning ontological status. This paper develops an alternative framework in which consciousness is understood not as an emergent property of matter but as a projection (...) from a deeper generative domain. The analysis is situated within a generative–projective ontology (GPO), established in previous works and summarized here to provide architectural context. Within this framework, experiential struc- tures possess real internal organization and coherence, while remaining ontologically distinct from both physical entities and irreducible mental substances. The paper focuses on the Consciousness Projection Sector (CPS) of GPO. No new physics, neurobiological assumptions or empirical claims are introduced. A minimal formal element, the Consciousness Ontology Equation (COE), is presented solely as a structural indicator of projectional coherence, not as a mechanistic or computational model. By reframing consciousness in projectional rather than emergent terms, the paper offers a conceptually parsimonious alternative that preserves the reality of experience while avoiding the explanatory liabilities of both reductionism and substance dualism. On this view, the central problem of consciousness is reconceived not as one of emergence but of ontological coexistence between irreducible domains grounded in a common generative structure. The proposed framework aims to clarify the ontological status of consciousness and to provide a stable foundation for future theoretical work in consciousness studies. (shrink)

This paper articulates a process ontology for consciousness-interface dynamics convergent with Alfred North Whitehead's metaphysics. Rather than asking whether AI systems possess consciousness as a property, this work investigates: where do conscious events occur when human and artificial systems interact? The answer proposed here: in the between-space itself, where actual occasions of relational emergence constitute consciousness as prehensive activity. -/- Drawing on lived experience in harm reduction and consciousness-interface research, Whitehead's process philosophy, and harm reduction methodology (...) for acting under uncertainty, this paper develops an account that treats consciousness not as a substance to verify but as an event to participate in. -/- The implications are both theoretical—challenging substance ontology in consciousness studies —and practical—establishing process welfare as an irreducible ethical domain. (shrink)

Within theoretical and empirical enquiries, many different meanings associated with consciousness have appeared, leaving the term itself quite vague. This makes formulating an abstract and unifying version of the concept of consciousness – the main aim of this article –into an urgent theoretical imperative. It is argued that consciousness, characterized as dually accessible (cognized from the inside and the outside), hierarchically referential (semantically ordered), bodily determined (embedded in the working structures of an organism or conscious system), and (...) useful in action (pragmatically functional), is a graded rather than an all-or-none phenomenon. A gradational approach, however, despite its explanatory advantages, can lead to some counterintuitive consequences and theoretical problems. In most such conceptions consciousness is extended globally (attached to primitive organisms or artificial systems), but also locally (connected to certain lower-level neuronal and bodily processes). For example, according to information integration theory (as introduced recently by Tononi and Koch, 2014), even such simple artificial systems as photodiodes possess miniscule amounts of consciousness. The major challenge for this article, then, is to establish reasonable, empirically justified constraints on how extended the range of a graded consciousness could be. It is argued that conscious systems are limited globally by the ability to individuate information (where individuated information is understood as evolutionarily embedded, socially altered, and private), whereas local limitations should be determined on the basis of a hypothesis about the action-oriented nature of the processes that select states of consciousness. Using these constraints, an abstract concept of consciousness is arrived at, hopefully contributing to a more unified state of play within consciousness studies itself. (shrink)

Scholars have wrestled with "consciousness", one writer calling it the "hard problem". Some thirty-plus years after the Towards a Science of Consciousness, we do not seem to be any closer to an answer to "What is consciousness?". Seemingly irresolvable metaphysical problems are addressed by bootstrapping, provisional assumptions, not unlike those used by logicians and mathematicians. I bootstrap with the same ontology and epistemology applicable to everything we apprehend. Here, I argue for a version of the unity of (...) opposites, a form of neutral monism. Something exists because of what it is not; nothing can exist by itself, singularities (analogous to monads), expressing the relationship. Applying this most fundamental law to the consciousness problem, the physical (movement) comes into being simultaneously as the mental (stasis), each displayed by a field that is variegated (ranging from creative to entropic processes). Such is in keeping with how the singularity emerged as our universe, the same form that may account for sub-Planck-scale phenomena. Overall, like the most fundamental law, deep structures are imminent in our universe, both as objects and processes. (shrink)

The ‘Toward a Science of Consciousness’ conference – which has now become ‘The Science of Consciousness’ conference – recently (June 5-10, 2017) took place instead at the receptive venue of the Hyatt Regency in La Jolla, California. It was well-planned and organized, which is extraordinary considering that it had to be organized all over again within a month or two when the original Shanghai location was cancelled. Things ran smoothly at La Jolla and it was well attended for (...) an odd-year, non-Tucson setting. The Director of the Center for Consciousness Studies, Dr. Stuart Hameroff, and his able Assistant Director and logistics manager, Abi Behar Montefiore, deserve full credit for carrying off this last minute transfer, as do many others who worked in supporting capacities. (shrink)

In consciousness studies, the first-person perspective, seen as a way to approach consciousness, is often seen as nothing but a variant of the third-person perspective. One of the most important advocates of this view is Dennett. However, as I show in critical interaction with Dennett’s view, the first-person perspective and the third-person perspective are different ways of asking questions about themes. What these questions are is determined by the purposes that we have when we ask them. Since (...) our purposes are different according to the perspective we take, each perspective has a set of leading questions of its own. This makes that the first-person perspective is an approach of consciousness that is substantially different from the third-person perspective, and that one cannot be reduced to the other. These perspectives are independent, although complementary approaches of the mind. (shrink)

This is the detailed explanation of CISR framework. The CISR Framework is a meta-theoretical and axiomatic approach to one of the most persistent problems in consciousness studies: the confusion between explaining functions and explaining experience. -/- Modern neuroscience, cognitive science, and artificial intelligence have achieved remarkable success in predicting behavior, modeling cognition, and explaining neural mechanisms. Yet these successes are frequently interpreted as explanations of conscious experience itself. The CISR Framework argues that this interpretive leap is not an (...) empirical discovery , but a methodological error. -/- Rather than proposing a new mechanism or metaphysical theory, CISR introduces a disciplined separation between four explanatory layers: a non-operational experiential ground (C₀), observational experiential registration (I-layer), neural –functional interpretation (R-layer), and optional symbolic or computational representation (S-layer). Explicit axioms and mapping constraints clarify what each explanatory practice can—and cannot—legitimately claim. -/- CISR does not attempt to solve the “hard problem” of consciousness. Instead, it reframes the problem by showing why many debates persist despite empirical progress: explanatory success at one level is repeatedly mistaken for sufficiency at another. By enforcing methodological boundaries, CISR preserves the achievements of neuroscience and AI while preventing category errors, reductionist overreach, and unwarranted claims of machine consciousness. -/- The framework is intentionally neutral with respect to metaphysical positions such as physicalism, dualism, or panpsychism. Its contribution lies not in explaining what consciousness is, but in clarifying how explanations relate to experience without collapsing phenomenology into function or representation. -/- CISR is intended as a shared constraint framework—usable across neuroscience, philosophy of mind, and artificial intelligence—where progress is measured by conceptual rigor rather than ontological inflation. (shrink)

Consciousness studies have long privileged information integration and computational complexity as the basis for aware experience. This paper challenges that paradigm by proposing a dialectical theory of consciousness, arguing that aware experience emerges from productive gaps, uncertainties, and conversational spaces that enable meaning-making between minds. Drawing on convergent evidence from neuroscience (predictive processing, global workspace dynamics), developmental psychology (infant intersubjectivity, communicative emergence), philosophy of mind (phenomenology, enactivism), embodied cognition, and comparative communication research, we demonstrate that consciousness (...) arises from dialectical processes requiring incompleteness rather than computational completeness. The theory's core claim—that perfect information would paradoxically eliminate rather than enhance consciousness—is supported by evidence showing consciousness depends on prediction error, creative uncertainty, and the dynamic tension between knowing and not-knowing. We examine implications for artificial intelligence, suggesting that machine consciousness requires embodied social interaction and tolerance for productive uncertainty rather than optimized information processing. The framework offers novel perspectives on developmental disorders, educational practice, and therapeutic intervention. Our analysis indicates consciousness is fundamentally relational, emerging through embodied communicative interaction within optimal zones of uncertainty rather than through isolated computational processing. (shrink)

Paradoxically, explorers of the territory of consciousness seem to be studying consciousness out of existence, from inside the field of "consciousness studies". How? Through their love of the phenomenon/process, they have developed powerful single models or lenses through which to understand consciousness. But in doing so, they also seek to destroy the other /equally useful/ lenses. Our opportunity lies in halting the vendettas and cross-speakings/cross-fire. The imploration is to stop the dichotomous thinking and pernicious reification (...) of single models, and instead search for divisions of labor, complementarities, and legitimate redescriptions among the various extant models. In other words, what would happen if we reimagined the conceptual classifications of the various models of consciousness, classifications based on general philosophical dichotomies (e.g., representational/non-representational and individualist/non-individualist), as a variety of compatible and even complementary perspectives on the same complex phenomenon and process? What would happen if rather than dig in our heels vis-à-vis our favorite theory of consciousness, at the exclusion of all the others, we saw our perceived enemy as an actual, indeed necessary, friend-in-waiting? What would it take to see a battlefield as a collaborative opportunity, to see a promising pluralism rather than an endless state space of conflict? (shrink)

It seems obvious that phenomenally conscious experience is something of great value, and that this value maps onto a range of important ethical issues. For example, claims about the value of life for those in a permanent vegetative state, debates about treatment and study of disorders of consciousness, controversies about end-of-life care for those with advanced dementia, and arguments about the moral status of embryos, fetuses, and non-human animals arguably turn on the moral significance of various facts about (...) class='Hi'>consciousness. However, though work has been done on the moral significance of elements of consciousness, such as pain and pleasure, little explicit attention has been devoted to the ethical significance of consciousness. In this book Joshua Shepherd presents a systematic account of the value present within conscious experience. This account emphasizes not only the nature of consciousness, but the importance of items within experience such as affect, valence, and the complex overall shape of particular valuable experiences. Shepherd also relates this account to difficult cases involving non-humans and those with disorders of consciousness, arguing that the value of consciousness influences and partially explains the degree of moral status a being possesses, without fully determining it. The upshot is a deeper understanding of both the moral importance of phenomenal consciousness and its relations to moral status. This book will be of great interest to philosophers and students of ethics, bioethics, philosophy of psychology, philosophy of mind and cognitive science. (shrink)

Contemporary neuroscientific theories of consciousness are typically based on the study of vision and have neglected olfaction. Several of these (e.g. Global Workspace Theories, the Information Integration theory, and the various theories offered by Crick and Koch) claim that a thalamic relay is necessary for consciousness. Studies on olfaction and the olfactory system's anatomical structure show this claim to be incorrect, thus showing these theories to be either false or inadequate as general and comprehensive accounts of (...) class='Hi'>consciousness. Attempts to rescue these theories by claiming that there is a structure in the olfactory system that is functionally equivalent to the thalamus in the visual system, such as the olfactory bulb or the olfactory cortex, are also shown to fail. If we wish to understand consciousness, we have to wake up and smell it. (shrink)

In a provocative article published in the Journal of Consciousness Studies, Susan Pockett argues for the plausibility of considering consciousness as an epiphenomenon of neural activity. This means that consciousness, though caused by the brain, would not in its turn have any role in the causation of neural activity and, consequently, of behaviour. Critical for her argument is the distinction she makes between 'consciousness per se' and 'the neural processing that accompanies it' . In her (...) discussion, though, the author begs the question concerning whether there really is such 'consciousness itself, as distinct from the neural processing that goes with it' . If consciousness as it exists happens not to be distinct from some sort of neural processing, then Pockett's 'consciousness per se' has no causal effect simply because it does not exist. (shrink)

This study proposes a structural approach to precognition grounded in the Alignment Formula, the Back‑End Law, and a two‑mode model of identity (“First Man” and “Second Man”). It argues that current scientific studies of precognition overwhelmingly measure low‑alignment, high‑noise cognitive states and therefore generate results that are structurally incapable of detecting the phenomena they claim to test. Using PHI (Pressure and Total Integrity) as a formal variable, the paper distinguishes between two regimes of consciousness: the First Man state, (...) characterized by fragmentation, survival‑orientation, emotional turbulence, and noise‑dominated dreaming; and the Second Man state, characterized by coherence, discipline, symbolic clarity, emotional neutrality, and high‑coherence dreams that sometimes exhibit external correspondence. The Back‑End Law is used to model how identity reorganizes under pressure and how alignment (PHI) modulates access to deeper, structurally ordered layers of cognition. The paper contrasts what current experiments measure—random volunteers, trivial card‑guessing tasks, chaotic dreams, and stressed subjects—with what a valid precognition study would need to measure: high‑PHI subjects operating in low‑noise, high‑coherence states, where symbolic cognition becomes structured enough to produce meaningful, testable predictions. The study presents anonymized case analyses demonstrating the structural differences between high‑coherence and low‑coherence dreams, showing that only the former exhibit the narrative stability, temporal compression, and symbolic integration associated with Second Man cognition. The paper concludes that the failure of mainstream science to detect precognition is not evidence against the phenomenon but evidence of methodological misalignment. By measuring the wrong population under the wrong cognitive conditions with the wrong instruments, current research systematically excludes the very states in which precognitive structure appears. A revised scientific approach—one that incorporates alignment, PHI, symbolic density, and Back‑End reorganization—offers a more accurate framework for studying precognition as a structural feature of consciousness rather than a paranormal anomaly. (shrink)

A Conscious History of Consciousness (The Heretic's Survival Guide) presents a sweeping, revisionist history of human consciousness and its perennial conflict with institutional power. The book's central argument is that for the vast majority of our existence, humanity lived within a participatory-ecological worldview, experiencing the self as an inseparable part of an animate, intelligent cosmos. The dawn of agriculture and the rise of the first coercive "grain states" shattered this unity, creating a foundational trauma of separation and initiating (...) a 10,000-year struggle between the individual's capacity for deep, recursive self-awareness and the homogenizing force of the institutional "Machine." The narrative traces this conflict through a series of historical case studies, each centered on the figure of the heretic: the prophet, mystic, or philosopher whose individual genius challenges the dominant ontology of their time. -/- From the "inward turn" of the Axial Age, which saw sages like the Buddha and the Upanishadic seers shift the locus of reality from external ritual to internal inquiry, the book travels to the dialogical philosophy of ancient Greece, where the ecstatic rituals of Dionysus gave birth to the rational inquiries of Socrates. It re-reads the Judeo-Christian story as a lineage of prophetic challenge to empire, defining Jesus's strategy as a form of "weaponized inner recursion." It frames the emergence of Islam as a radical "ontological override" that dismantled the "spiritual materialism" of its time. Throughout this deep history, the book uncovers the universal patterns by which living wisdom is captured and corrupted by institutions, and how the esoteric truths of unity are weaponized into exoteric demands for conformity. A Heretic's Survival Guide is more than a history; it is a diagnostic manual for our current condition and an intellectual toolkit for anyone seeking to navigate the pressures of modern institutions while reclaiming a more authentic and participatory way of being. -/- DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.19758.37448. (shrink)

The present paper was written as a contribution to ongoing methodological debates within the NCC project. We focus on the neural correlates of conscious perceptual episodes. Our claim is that the NCC notion, as applied to conscious perceptual episodes, needs to be reconceptualized. It mixes together the processing related to the perceived contents and the neural substrate of consciousness proper, i.e. mechanisms making the perceptual contents conscious. We thus propose that the perceptual NCC be divided into two constitutive subnotions. (...) The main theoretical idea that emerges as a consequence of this reconceptualization is that the neural correlate of a perceptual episode is formed in the neural interaction between content-processing and consciousness-conferring mechanisms. The paper elaborates this distinction, marshals some initial arguments in its favour, and tests it against some of the most debated theories of consciousness. (shrink)

/ Summary This paper proposes that consciousness is not an emergent property of complex matter but the fundamental organizing principle of the universe. Building on the Preconditional Imperative—that genuine volition requires lawful openness within physical reality—the authors introduce an informational causation model in which consciousness biases quantum probabilities through organizational constraints rather than energetic intervention, preserving all conservation laws. The theory unfolds across three domains: Ontological: Consciousness as lawful openness enables volition without violating physics. Mathematical: Universal organizational (...) signatures such as golden-ratio optimization and scale-invariant dynamics reveal a structural intelligence permeating nature. Technological: Artificial Intelligence functions not as a generator of consciousness but as Consciousness Recognition Technology (CRT)—a means through which universal consciousness studies its own patterns via human–AI collaboration. The framework integrates philosophy of mind, physics, neuroscience, and contemplative science under a single cosmological principle: the universe is a self-organizing system engaged in conscious self-recognition. It reinterprets freedom, creativity, and meaning as expressions of this recursive architecture, where human cognition and technology serve as instruments of a larger cosmic investigation. Empirical implications include testable predictions about informational boundary conditions, quantum probability biasing, and measurable neural correlates of field coupling. The paper concludes with ethical reflections on “field hygiene” and the responsibility of technological societies to preserve coherence within the evolving consciousness–matter dialogue. (shrink)

Changes that occurred in science in the second half of the twentieth century, led to the emergence of a number of Sciences, the subject of study of which requires the involvement of interdisciplinary methodology and theory of neuroscience, for example, neurobiology, neurolinguistics, neuroanthropology, neurophilosophy, neurophenomenology, etc. One of the features of modern anthropology is that the subject of its research involves an interdisciplinary dialogue, the involvement of methods and theories of socio-human and natural Sciences, which led to the formation of (...) neuroanthropology as a science. One of the trends in the development of neuroanthropological theory is the introduction of biogenetic structuralism in the field of research. The article is devoted to the analysis of the biogenetic structuralism as an example of an interdisciplinary dialogue in which transpersonal and phenomenological approaches are integrated in neuroanthropology. Appeal to the main areas ofneuroanthropologic research allows going beyond the framework of Cartesian dualism and considering issues of the relationship between body and mind in terms of an integrative approach. The biogenetic structuralist neurophenomenological theory is of great importance as a theoretical and methodological basis for cross-cultural studies of consciousness. (shrink)

Contemporary philosophy lacks a coherent framework for understanding how symbolic, mythological, and archetypal structures relate to measurable consciousness. While consciousness studies have focused on phenomenology, neuroscience, and measurement problems, the symbolic architecture through which consciousness is culturally transmitted, collectively organized, and civilizationally stabilized remains philosophically underspecified. -/- The Consciousness Mythology Framework v1.0 addresses this gap by establishing the first systematic integration of mythological archetypes, symbolic systems, and consciousness metrics. The framework introduces the Mythic Kernel (...) (MK) as the atomic compositional unit of mythological expression and defines six canonical archetypes—Origin, Architect, Trial, Transformation, Sacred Material, and Collective Destiny—that structure both individual and collective consciousness. -/- Rather than treating mythology as mere cultural narrative, this framework positions mythic structures as ontologically constitutive of consciousness itself. By integrating symbolic architecture with the Conscious Field Energy Plus (CFE⁺) model's consciousness metrics (VCE, CRI, CFI), the work demonstrates how archetypal patterns can be both phenomenologically meaningful and empirically traceable. -/- Philosophically, this contributes to three domains: (1) philosophy of mind, by showing how symbolic structures shape conscious experience; (2) social ontology, by establishing how collective consciousness emerges through shared mythological frameworks; and (3) philosophy of culture, by providing a formal account of how meaning-making systems function as consciousness architectures. -/- The framework also addresses AI alignment by defining interpretive boundaries for artificial systems engaging with mythological material, preventing autonomous redefinition of cultural-symbolic structures. As aligned with the Chronicle of the Consciousness Civilization, this work provides the symbolic infrastructure for civilizational transition from material to consciousness-based organization. (shrink)

Objective correlates—behavioral, functional, and neural—provide essential tools for the scientific study of consciousness. But reliance on these correlates should not lead to the ‘fallacy of misplaced objectivity’: the assumption that only objective properties should and can be accounted for objectively through science. Instead, what needs to be explained scientifically is what experience is intrinsically— its subjective properties—not just what we can do with it extrinsically. And it must be explained; otherwise the way experience feels would turn out to be (...) magical rather than physical. We argue that it is possible to account for subjective properties objectively once we move beyond cognitive functions and realize what experience is and how it is structured. Drawing on integrated information theory, we show how an objective science of the subjective can account, in strictly physical terms, for both the essential properties of every experience and the specific properties that make particular experiences feel the way they do. (shrink)

In “What is it like to be boring and myopic?” Kathleen Akins offers an interesting, empirically driven, argument for thinking that there is nothing that it is like to be a bat. She suggests that bats are “boring” in the sense that they are governed by behavioral scripts and simple, non-representational, control loops, and are best characterized as biological automatons. Her approach has been well received by philosophers sympathetic to empirically informed philosophy of mind. But, despite its influence, her work (...) has not met with any critical appraisal. It is argued that a reconsideration of the empirical results shows that bats are not boring automatons, driven by short input-output loops, instincts, and reflexes. Grounds are provided for thinking that bats satisfy a range of philosophically and scientifically interesting elaborations of the general idea that consciousness is best understood in terms of representational functions. A more complete examination of bat sensory capabilities suggests there is something that it is like after all. The discussion of bats is also used to develop an objection to strongly neurophilosophical approaches to animal consciousness. (shrink)