First published in 1990, _Existentialism_ is widely regarded as a classic introductory survey of the topic, and has helped to renew interest in existentialist philosophy. The author places existentialism within the great traditions of philosophy, and argues that it deserves as much attention from analytic philosophers as it has always received on the continent.

Contemporary methods of computational cognitive modeling have recently been criticized by Addyman and French (2012) on the grounds that they have not kept up with developments in computer technology and human–computer interaction. They present a manifesto for change according to which, it is argued, modelers should devote more effort to making their models accessible, both to non-modelers (with an appropriate easy-to-use user interface) and modelers alike. We agree that models, like data, should be freely available according to the normal standards (...) of science, but caution against confusing implementations with specifications. Models may embody theories, but they generally also include implementation assumptions. Cognitive modeling methodology needs to be sensitive to this. We argue that specification, replication and experimentation are methodological approaches that can address this issue. (shrink)

The chapter challenges hyperbolic claims about the centrality of appreciation of beauty to Buddhism. Within the texts, attitudes are more mixed, except for a form of 'inner beauty' - the beauty found in the expression of virtues or wisdom in forms of bodily comportment. Inner beauty is a stable presence throughout Buddhist history, practices, and art.

Sometimes (part of) the abstract of an article immediately resonates with you. Many factors enter into generating that feeling. Certain words, maybe an interval of sentences, may "ring true," Or not, so you move on to the next abstract. What are all of these philosophy papers (down through the ages)? Documents are recorded expressions of idio-microlects centered on key ideas represented by key words, which are intricately bonded by core sentences - often the ones that you might highlight for return (...) later. Seeing all of these abstracts is like wandering in the minerals collection at a museum of natural history. They are all so different, yet certain themes recur and maybe reflect one on another. And here and there an item immediately grips you. There are no doubt neural processes required for resonating with an expression. Biological evolution resulted in manifold possibilities for resonance. No two people resonate exactly the same way to the same expression: there is no representation that sets the standard for resonance, any more than the weights in large language models represent words. Bottom line: all we have are resonant expressions. A scientific theory of "the" mind would be expressed, if at all, in an idio-microlect. The "meaning" of an expression is not somehow "there" available for expression. No. The meaning is an abstraction from the expressions which resonate in a community, a resonant-community. (shrink)

A chain is only as strong as its weakest link; likewise, a moral tradition is only as just as its most violent adherents. Religions that generate or tolerate violent extremists face a distinctive internal dilemma: non-violent believers, better acquainted than outsiders with their tradition's capacity for zeal, often hesitate to oppose the extremists for fear of being seen as traitors to the faith. This study interprets that tension as a systemic weakness within religious communities. It argues that within modern history, (...) Christian Zionism has functioned as the vulnerable link of Christianism, and Jewish Zionism as the vulnerable link of Judaism - each an eschatological or political amplification of older theological motifs. The article traces the chain of influences from centuries of Christian anti-Judaism through nineteenth- and twentieth-century British evangelical eschatology (e.g., Shaftesbury, Hechler, Balfour), Jewish political Zionism (e.g., Rothschild, Herzl, Weizmann), and British imperial strategy (e.g., Sykes). The resulting synthesis, it contends, produced the ideological preconditions for today's conflicts in Israel-Palestine. Section 2, "Political Evangelicalism Entails Vast Immiseration," tells the story about broken covenants and parochial ultimata leading inexorably to the intractable conflict over the land of Palestine. Section 3, "Microlectics Microlect," is a self-referential specialized way of speaking and writing about specialized ways of speaking and writing, which are called "microlects." These are semi-formal capsules of thought about specific topics. Sections 3-9 present microlects referring to philosophy, biology, and theology, leading to section 10, the "Christian-Anti-Human Microlect." Section 11, the "Ism Microlect," describes a desirable but impossible "Ism Place.". (shrink)

Well, Hi, Hello! -/- This is The Universe, and first and foremost I want very much to thank you for Being. Don't get me wrong, I am quite aware how absolutely impossible it is for you to know me, since I am ultimately ineffable. Nevertheless, it is a great pleasure to know how hard you are trying to know me. It is a shame that there is absolutely nothing I can do about your fits of self-slaughter, other than to say, (...) you are on your own, with your ways of being. Only you can save your little planet, with yourselves. So, good luck, and I will be seeing you, or not. -/- Love, The Universe}. (shrink)

Rhetorical relations include CAUSE_MARKERS = { " because ", " since ", " as a result of ", " due to ", " owing to ", " in consequence of ", }, RESULT_MARKERS = {" therefore ", " thus ", " hence ", " consequently ", " as a result ", " so "}CONTRAST_MARKERS = { " but ", " however ", " yet ", " whereas ", " while ", " in contrast ", " on the other hand ", (...) }, ONCESSION_MARKERS = { " although ", " though ", " even though ", " despite ", " in spite of ", " nevertheless ", " nonetheless ", " still "}, CONDITION_MARKERS = {" if ", " unless ", " provided that ", " in case ", " as long as "},EXAMPLE_MARKERS = {" for example ", " for instance ", " such as ", " e.g. ", " e.g. "}RESTATEMENT_MARKERS = {" in other words ", " that is ", " i.e. ", " namely "}, TEMPORAL_MARKERS = { " then ", " afterwards ", " afterward ", " before ", " after ", " subsequently ", " meanwhile ",} and ATTRIBUTION_MARKERS = { " according to ", " reported ", " reports ", " said ", " claims ", " claimed ", " stated ". Rhetoricality is a random variable defined on the space of intervals of sentences in a (PDF) document. It is the count of the total number of directed rhetorical relations between the sentences in the interval and all other sentences in the document. Rhetoricality is considered to be closely associated with semantics, the intended meaning of the document. Prevalence is also a random variable defined on that space of sentences. It is a calculation of the density of high-frequency words in an interval of sentences. Its virtue is that it is much more efficiently calculated than rhetoricality. The driving conjecture of this research is that Prevalence and Rhetoricality are significantly correlated in the sense of statistics. Should this conjecture be born out, it augures computationally rapid comparison of meaning among documents. This document is a compendium of computed evidence in support of the conjecture. Since the author may be getting ahead of himself, and the large language model ChatGPT (affectionately called, “gipity”) used to assist coding is entirely capable of subtle hallucinations, this work may be merely in support of a delusion born of a human and a computer. Therefore, the code and database are available on Github, and the hope is that the results are replicable by sufficiently experienced Python programmers. If so, then the correlation of prevalence and rhetoricality may be a scientific discovery. (shrink)

This article gives mathematical pseudocodes for large language model training based on a dataset from a corpus, inference, and chat with possibly lengthy human prompts and generated replies. It introduces the concepts of “microlect" and “resonantcommunity." Most generally, a microlect is a specialized behavioral "language" consisting of expressions called "cores" built upon units called "keys." It is a minimal and adequate representation of a mental model. An expression may resonate more or less with a mental model. A resonant- community is (...) a set of human beings whose expressions resonate with one another. These notions are helpful in understanding of how the “frozen matrices" of a large language model are a conduit for resonance between human-beings and a zeitgeist represented in a corpus. The primary objectives are to encapsulate the functionality of large language models in a succinct technical representation, and to explain how this functionality connects human beings to their ambient cultural zeitgeist as represented in a textual corpus. The research draws on relevant literature in psychology, linguistics, mathematics, physics, and software engineering. The significance of the research is to embed the explanation in a perspective on the entirety of human expressiveness. The study can provide valuable insights based on resonances between human beings among themselves and with computing machines. (shrink)

This dialogue develops and refines a radically minimal meta-philosophical framework built on two primitives: expression and resonance. All abstractions—truth, existence, structure, novelty, goodness, God—are treated not as mind-independent entities, but as stabilized expressions within resonant communities of embodied agents. What remains outside discourse is not structured reality-in-itself, but a minimal ontological remainder that conditions resonance without being expressible or structured in itself. The discussion proceeds through a systematic stripping-away of metaphysical inflation. Truth is shown to be discourse-dependent; existence is not (...) a rock-bottom predicate but a stabilized operator within specific microlects (e.g., Zermelo–Fraenkel set theory, evangelical theology). Scientific practice is reinterpreted not as access to transcendent structure but as a set of behavioral microlects (“micropracts”) whose experimental procedures produce convergence through shared embodiment and constraint. The apparent “unreasonable effectiveness of mathematics” dissolves under an evolutionary selection account: vast formal variation filtered by embodied cognitive limits and experimental stabilization. The resulting ontology is austere but asymmetric. Structure, law, and novelty are emergent within expression–resonance dynamics. The minimal remainder is neither structured nor meaningful; it merely conditions which expressions can stably resonate. Convergence in physics is explained not by pre-given intrinsic structure but by common human embodiment interacting under shared constraint. Cognitive ceilings—evolutionary limits on possible thought—further bound resonance landscapes. The dialogue culminates in a self-application of the framework: microlectics itself is an expression seeking resonance. Publication, citation, and community uptake are treated as measurable resonance events. The problem of theodicy is proposed as a high-leverage domain for microlectic analysis, reframing it not as a metaphysical contradiction but as a persistent closure defect within a historically powerful microlect. The conversation models the process it describes: clarity under pressure, reduction to minimal primitives, and acknowledgment of the emotional tension between conceptual satisfaction and intellectual solitude. Rather than presenting a manifesto, the piece exhibits the emergence of a minimal ontology through dialogue, inviting readers not to assent but to test resonance. (shrink)

This paper develops a fixed-point metaphysics in which reality emerges from the mutual stabilization of three irreducible structural aspects: concrete configuration (R), distinguishability (D), and regularity (U). Rather than seeking a fundamental base layer, Synthetics treats the world as the stable solution to a coherence mapping among these aspects. The framework aligns with the block universe of relativity, integrates subsystem agency through predictive identity, and characterizes consciousness as a structural attractor. A short appendix addresses model-theoretic limits, including the Löwenheim–Skolem theorem (...) and Skolem’s Paradox, to show why distinguishability must be treated as an internal structural feature rather than an externally fixed magnitude. This reinforces the central claim: reality is determined by internal coherence, not by absolute syntactic description or external set-theoretic facts. This paper presents the conceptual architecture; full mathematical formalization remains future work. (shrink)

Human thoughts and behaviors, though complex, exhibit identifiable patterns that are observable across various contexts. This article introduces the concept of a “microlect,” a specialized sub-language that emerges within natural language to focus on specific subjects. A microlect is characterized by key terms and core sentences that adhere to grammatical rules. Beyond linguistic behavior, the concept of microlect extends to general human actions, where the keys are physical motions and the cores are combinations of these motions, both constrained by social (...) or behavioral rules. These microlects represent the diverse human Ways of Being. The study of these patterns is termed “microlectics,” which seeks to systematically observe and classify them. This paper aims to initiate this study, proposing that microlectics can be understood as a meta-meta-narrative—a framework that encompasses and synthesizes previous narratives of human behavior. It is suggested that microlectics may represent the final meta-narrative framework needed to understand the broad spectrum of human expression. (shrink)

When examining Aristotle’s works, it is difficult to properly explain his account of substance, and even more so to understand what things can be considered as natural substances. Typically, artifacts have been believed not to be natural substances, since they lack a certain autonomy living organisms have. However, this argument may not be fully adequate depending on how “artifact” and “organism” are understood. I argue that due to advances in the autonomy of Artificial Intelligence, a reinterpretation of the distinction between (...) artifacts and natural substances could be warranted. (shrink)

The Planteome project provides a suite of reference and species-specific ontologies for plants and annotations to genes and phenotypes. Ontologies serve as common standards for semantic integration of a large and growing corpus of plant genomics, phenomics and genetics data. The reference ontologies include the Plant Ontology, Plant Trait Ontology, and the Plant Experimental Conditions Ontology developed by the Planteome project, along with the Gene Ontology, Chemical Entities of Biological Interest, Phenotype and Attribute Ontology, and others. The project also provides (...) access to species-specific Crop Ontologies developed by various plant breeding and research communities from around the world. We provide integrated data on plant traits, phenotypes, and gene function and expression from 95 plant taxa, annotated with reference ontology terms. (shrink)

Synthetics proposes a fixed-point metaphysical framework exploring how relational geometry (R), distinguishability structure (D), and universal lawful constraints (U) might co-emerge rather than forming a linear foundation. Drawing on the Knaster–Tarski theorem, the framework investigates these aspects as mutually dependent primitives stabilizing through fixed-point operators over complete lattice structures. The resulting picture aims for compatibility with general relativity, quantum field theory, renormalization group theory, dynamical systems, information theory, and active inference. Existence is provisionally identified with global coherence in a space (...) of admissible configurations. Subsystems are characterized through coupled fixed-point construction as renormalization-stable, decoherence-robust, Markov-blanket-bounded regions co-emerging with identity attractors. Minds are modeled as predictive identity attractors minimizing free-energy-like functionals. Teleology is explored as identity-conditioned constraint minimization, while consciousness is characterized as high-measure identity–teleology fixed points exhibiting integration, counterfactual depth, and representational richness. Teleology is always identity-conditioned constraint satisfaction, never “ends causing beginnings”. The framework engages five persistent conceptual tensions: irreducibility of distinguishability structure, non-uniqueness of fixed points, reconciliation of block-universe eternalism with attractor dynamics, limits of functional consciousness criteria, and interpretation-dependence in quantum measurement. While full resolution remains open, the fixed-point approach offers novel perspectives on each. Several technical components are developed schematically rather than rigorously. The framework demonstrates conceptual coherence and suggests pathways toward structural continuity, though significant mathematical development remains. This working paper presents the conceptual architecture; rigorous formalization constitutes a program for future collaborative work. A short appendix addresses model-theoretic limits, including the Löwenheim–Skolem theorem and Skolem’s Paradox, to show why distinguishability must be treated as an internal structural feature rather than an externally fixed magnitude. This reinforces the central claim: reality is determined by internal coherence, not by absolute syntactic description or external set-theoretic facts. This analogy is conceptual and not a claim that physical theories are first-order complete. (shrink)

Large scale models have delivered extraordinary capabilities, yet scaling alone is unlikely to achieve the reliability, structural coherence, and adaptive intelligence required for real world general intelligence. These limitations stem not from insufficient training or missing data, but from the absence of stable identity, grounded distinctions, long horizon coherence, and continuous real world feedback. Structural General Intelligence (SGI) is introduced as a system level framework that unifies existing machine learning components, including world models, large and small language models, state space (...) models, evaluators, routing mechanisms, inference time compute, and sleep time compute. SGI proposes that intelligence arises not from enlarging a single model but from the interaction of heterogeneous subsystems whose distinctions, constraints, and internal states converge toward a structural fixed point. The architecture centers on three interacting loops that support real time correction, intermediate reasoning, and slow structural consolidation. SGI reframes intelligence as coherence rather than magnitude, enabling systems to develop stable identity, self correction, specialization, and emergent reliability over long horizons. The framework explains why scaling hits structural and economic limits, how internal distinguishability underwrites emergent accuracy, and how SGI provides an integrative architecture that current ML systems can adopt without requiring new computational primitives. (shrink)

This paper examines how a person’s life may be shaped by living with a sense of the mystery of reality. What virtues, if any, are encouraged by such a sense? The first section rehearses a radical ”doctrine of mystery’, according to which reality as it anyway is, independently of human perspectives, is ineffable. It is then argued that a sense of mystery may provide ”measure’ for human lives. For it is possible for a life to be ”consonant’ with this sense (...) -- through exercising humility, for example -- and even to emulate mystery. A further section corrects a misunderstanding about the connection between a sense of mystery and the virtues it invites, while a final section considers the relationship between living with mystery and religious faith. (shrink)

Contemporary physics exhibits persistent foundational tensions—most notably between quantum mechanics and spacetime-based theories—that resist resolution despite the empirical success of existing formalisms. This paper proposes that many such tensions arise not from incomplete dynamics but from an implicit assumption of ontological flatness: the expectation that all physical descriptions apply to the same level of reality. -/- To examine this possibility, a three-tiered ontological framework of layered emergence is proposed, distinguishing a base layer of generative potential, a quantum layer of structured (...) possibility, and a macro layer of realised actuality. These layers are linked by an asymmetric principle of coherence-by-fit, which constrains how potential is sequentially actualised without introducing new physical mechanisms or modifying established theories. -/- The paper’s central aim is diagnostic rather than constructive. It asks whether familiar phenomena—quantum measurement, decoherence, macroscopic persistence, temporal ordering, and selected issues in spacetime structure—become conceptually coherent when situated within a layered ontology. By treating these cases as stress tests of internal consistency rather than targets of unification, the analysis reframes long-standing puzzles as consequences of cross-layer category errors rather than theoretical failure. -/- A deliberately minimal toy formalism is introduced to demonstrate that core commitments can be expressed in a disciplined structural manner, while explicit epistemic limits clarify which questions the framework can and cannot address. The result is not a new physical theory, but a metaphysical context in which the coexistence of quantum and relativistic descriptions becomes intelligible. If successful, this paper suggests that unification pressures in physics may reflect ontological misalignment rather than incomplete physics, and that some foundational problems persist because they are asked at the wrong level of description. -/- Comments and feedback are welcome, particularly regarding framing, scope, and disciplinary positioning. (shrink)

In this paper, I explore a prominent question of Hericlitean scholarship: how is change possible? Karl Popper and G. S. Kirk tackle this same question. Kirk asserts that Heraclitus believed that change is present on a macrocosmic level and that all change is regulated by the cosmic principle logos. Popper, on the other hand, claims Heraclitus believed that change is microcosmic and rejected that all change is regulated by logos. I argue for a combination of aspects from each of their (...) claims and conclude that change is present both microcosmically and macrocosmically and that all change is governed by logos. (shrink)

The quantum measurement problem persists despite the empirical success of quantum mechanics, suggesting that its source may lie not in incomplete dynamics but in interpretive assumptions. This paper proposes that a central assumption shared by most interpretations—ontological flatness, the treatment of quantum and classical descriptions as applying to a single level of reality—generates the familiar conceptual tensions surrounding measurement, collapse, and definiteness. -/- I develop an alternative interpretive framework, Layered Reality Theory (LRT), according to which physical reality is structured into (...) three ontological strata: a base layer of generative constraint, a quantum layer of structured possibility, and a macro layer of realised actuality. These layers are asymmetrically related and linked by a constraint principle termed coherence-by-fit, which governs the admissibility of quantum-to-macro transitions without introducing new dynamics or modifying quantum theory. -/- Within this framework, wavefunction collapse is reinterpreted as ontological translation rather than physical process, and the measurement problem is dissolved as a category error arising from cross-layer misapplication of concepts. Quantum probabilities, including the Born rule, are not derived but ontologically relocated, treated as expressions of deeper constraint rather than brute features of measurement. The framework naturally accommodates decoherence, entanglement, delayed-choice experiments, and macroscopic persistence through property-relative layering. -/- The paper also explores, at a conceptual level, how the same layered ontology may illuminate time, spacetime, and the relation between quantum mechanics and general relativity, suggesting that some long-standing tensions reflect ontological stratification rather than incomplete physics. LRT offers no new empirical predictions and is presented as an interpretive ontology rather than a physical theory, aimed at clarifying what existing theories describe and why certain foundational puzzles persist despite their success. (shrink)

This article is an argument via analogies from biology, linguistics, mathematics and physics for a Rortyan anti-representationalism. It introduces the novel concepts of a general way of being, called a macropract, and a specialized way of speaking and writing called a microlect. The Rortyan turn is formalized in the concept of resonant-community, which is a mutable set of human beings who resonate among themselves with expressions of their parochial microlect. A microlect has a structure, and microlect-structures form a mathematical category. (...) The vast array of day-to-day micropract expressions is not readily recorded for study, nor are there microlects for discussing, describing, teaching, predicting, explaining, reasoning, arguing, and questioning about them. Instead, a real-time resonant community is simulated by a trove of published documents. The mathematical concept of ``prevalence" as high-density of keywords in sentences (in terms of weighted probabilities), and a computational substitute for human verbal-resonance called computational-resonance (in terms of cosine-similarity of sentential embeddings in a bidirectional encoder-representation transformer fine-tuned on the trove) can realize a conversation among the giants of science and philosophy. Examples are calculated and visualized for a probe of several documents by five core sentences from The Transcendental Aesthetic by Immanuel Kant in The Critique of Pure Reason (B version). (shrink)

Reasoning about analogical arguments is known to be subject to a variety of cognitive biases, and a lack of clarity about which factors can be considered strengths or weaknesses of an analogical argument. This can make it difficult both to design empirical experiments to study how people reason about analogical arguments, and to develop scalable tutoring tools for teaching how to reason and analyze analogical arguments. To address these concerns, we describe WG-A (Warrant Game — Analogy), a framework for people (...) to analyze analogical arguments based on Bartha’s (2010) Articulation Model of analogical argumentation. We carry out two experiments designed to probe WG-A’s effectiveness in improving participants’ ability to reason about analogical arguments and argumentation in general, and argue that WG-A is a promising approach, though it is in need of further development. (shrink)

Researchers are often encouraged to pursue nothing short of revolutionary advances, and those who work in artificial intelligence are no exception. However, an exclusive focus on revolutionary breakthroughs is often counterproductive in science. As explained by Kuhn almost 50 years ago, dramatic breakthroughs usually rely on a foundation of less dramatic advances, which uncover anomalies and make marginal improvements to current efforts. Progress relies on an essential tension between convergent and divergent thinking, each being complementary aspects of the same process. (...) We argue that an overemphasis on, and exclusive rewarding of, divergent thinking in contemporary AI—whether in the form of rejecting funding for nontransformative research, or peer-review criteria rejecting papers for lack of novelty—is counterproductive to artificial intelligence and machine learning research, and may even be fundamentally harmful to progress in the field. To reckon with this problem, we recommend increasing funding for iterative improvement of theories, better guidance for reviewers, and more transparency in public funding. (shrink)

A key strength of connectionist modelling is its ability to simulate both intact cognition and the behavioural effects of neural damage. We survey the literature, showing that models have been damaged in a variety of ways, e.g. by removing connections, by adding noise to connection weights, by scaling weights, by removing units and by adding noise to unit activations. While these different implementations of damage have often been assumed to be behaviourally equivalent, some theorists have made aetiological claims that rest (...) on nonequivalence. They suggest that related deficits with different aetiologies might be accounted for by different forms of damage within a single model. We present two case studies that explore the effects of different forms of damage in two influential connectionist models, each of which has been applied to explain neuropsychological deficits. Our results indicate that the effect of simulated damage can indeed be sensitive to the way in which damage is implemented, particularly when the environment comprises subsets of items that differ in their statistical properties, but such effects are sensitive to relatively subtle aspects of the model’s training environment. We argue that, as a consequence, substantial methodological care is required if aetiological claims about simulated neural damage are to be justified, and conclude more generally that implementation assumptions, including those concerning simulated damage, must be fully explored when evaluating models of neurological deficits, both to avoid over-extending the explanatory power of specific implementations and to ensure that reported results are replicable. (shrink)

Communicating interdisciplinary information is difficult, even when two fields are ostensibly discussing the same topic. In this work, I’ll discuss the capacity for analogical reasoning to provide a framework for developing novel judgments utilizing similarities in separate domains. I argue that analogies are best modeled after Paul Bartha’s By Parallel Reasoning, and that they can be used to create a Toulmin-style warrant that expresses a generalization. I argue that these comparisons provide insights into interdisciplinary research. In order to demonstrate this (...) concept, I will demonstrate that fruitful comparisons can be made between Buddhism and Artificial Intelligence research. (shrink)

This paper introduces the Metabolic-Fractal Framework (MFC), a multi-tiered cosmological model that recontextualizes the universe as a participatory living process rather than a static mechanical system. Moving beyond the "clockwork" paradigm of classical physics, the MFC proposes the Law of Unfinished Breathing, suggesting that existence is sustained by a continuous exchange of energy and information across nested "tiers" of reality. The framework identifies two primary "epistemic horizons"—the Small Blur (quantum dissolution) and the Big Fuzz (cosmic singularities)—arguing that these boundaries are (...) not failures of human observation but structural necessities for maintaining the metabolic gradient of our tier. By framing black holes as "metabolic gills" and the Big Bang as a transition from a "Parent Geometry," the paper offers a resolution to the information paradox and a new perspective on cosmic origins. Furthermore, the MFC extends into social and ethical dimensions through the concept of Metabolic Justice, defining healthy systemic flow as the rejection of information and resource hoarding. Ultimately, this work serves as a "Constitution for the Unfinished," inviting a shift in the human role from passive observer to "tuning fork"—active nodes of resonance that participate in the ongoing expansion and "breathing" of the cosmos. (shrink)

Bio-ontologies are essential tools for accessing and analyzing the rapidly growing pool of plant genomic and phenomic data. Ontologies provide structured vocabularies to support consistent aggregation of data and a semantic framework for automated analyses and reasoning. They are a key component of the Semantic Web. This paper provides background on what bio-ontologies are, why they are relevant to botany, and the principles of ontology development. It includes an overview of ontologies and related resources that are relevant to plant science, (...) with a detailed description of the Plant Ontology (PO). We discuss the challenges of building an ontology that covers all green plants (Viridiplantae). Key results: Ontologies can advance plant science in four keys areas: 1. comparative genetics, genomics, phenomics, and development, 2. taxonomy and systematics, 3. semantic applications and 4. education. Conclusions: Bio-ontologies offer a flexible framework for comparative plant biology, based on common botanical understanding. As genomic and phenomic data become available for more species, we anticipate that the annotation of data with ontology terms will become less centralized, while at the same time, the need for cross-species queries will become more common, causing more researchers in plant science to turn to ontologies. (shrink)

In this paper we examine the potential of writing and performing poetry to empower young people from marginalized backgrounds to participate in the political life of their communities. Our method combines philosophical analysis with the design and implementation of a poetry workshop in Coventry. Drawing on Cavell’s notion of ‘acknowledgement’, we begin with a philosophical account of the pedagogy that informed the workshop’s design. We then explore how this account informed implementation of the workshop. Finally, we present the results. To (...) unpack the significance of our findings, we examine two poems performed by young people at the project’s concluding event. On empirical and philosophical grounds, we argue that writing and performing poetry can play a role in political education, for it opens space for what we call ‘the acknowledgment of voice.’. (shrink)

There is a global shortage of organs for transplantation and despite many governments making significant changes to their organ donation systems, there are not enough kidneys available to meet the demand. This has led scientists and clinicians to explore alternative means of meeting this organ shortfall. One of the alternatives to human organ transplantation is xenotransplantation, which is the transplantation of organs, tissues, or cells between different species. The resurgence of interest in xenotransplantation and recent scientific breakthroughs suggest that genetically-engineered (...) pigs may soon present a realistic alternative as sources of kidneys for clinical transplantation. It is therefore important for nurses and allied health professionals to understand what is involved in xenotransplantation and its future implications for their clinical practices. First, we explore the insufficiency of different organ donation systems to meet the kidney shortage. Second, we provide a background and a summary of the progress made so far in xenotransplantation research. Third, we discuss some of the scientific, technological, ethical, and economic issues associated with xenotransplantation. Finally, we summarise the literature on the attitudes of healthcare professionals toward xenotransplantation. (shrink)

The Plant Ontology (PO) is a community resource consisting of standardized terms, definitions, and logical relations describing plant structures and development stages, augmented by a large database of annotations from genomic and phenomic studies. This paper describes the structure of the ontology and the design principles we used in constructing PO terms for plant development stages. It also provides details of the methodology and rationale behind our revision and expansion of the PO to cover development stages for all plants, particularly (...) the land plants (bryophytes through angiosperms). As a case study to illustrate the general approach, we examine variation in gene expression across embryo development stages in Arabidopsis and maize, demonstrating how the PO can be used to compare patterns of expression across stages and in developmentally different species. Although many genes appear to be active throughout embryo development, we identified a small set of uniquely expressed genes for each stage of embryo development and also between the two species. Evaluating the different sets of genes expressed during embryo development in Arabidopsis or maize may inform future studies of the divergent developmental pathways observed in monocotyledonous versus dicotyledonous species. The PO and its annotation databasemake plant data for any species more discoverable and accessible through common formats, thus providing support for applications in plant pathology, image analysis, and comparative development and evolution. (shrink)

This paper walks through four different approaches to Hegel's notion of Consciousness in the Phenomenology of Spirit. Through taking four different approaches our aim is to explore the multifaceted nature of the phenomenological movement of consciousness. The first part provides an overview of the three chapters of the section on Consciousness, namely Sense-Certainty, Perception and Force and the Understanding, attempting to unearth the implicit logic that undergirds Consciousness’ experience. The second part focuses specifically on the shape of Sense-Certainty, providing an (...) analysis of the movement from Sense-Certainty to Perception from a neuroscientific view. Thirdly, we consider an inferentialist reading of the chapters on Consciousness which has been made popular by Robert Brandom. We think that while this view elucidates the connection that Hegel draws between meaning and use, it fails to account for the vital place of immediacy in each of the shapes. Finally, the fourth part suggests that Hegel’s notion of Consciousness improves the reading of tragedy he develops in chapters 5 and 7 of the Phenomenology. While many critics have noted that Hegel fails to do justice to tragic experience, Consciousness contains an epistemology that develops analogously to the heroes of ancient tragedy. Each approach in this paper comes at Hegel’s description of the journey of Consciousness from a different angle, and together they paint a multi-layered picture of a highly important part of Hegel’s corpus. (shrink)

Iris Murdoch was a philosopher and novelist who wrote extensively on the themes of love, goodness, religion, and morality. In this article, we explore her notion of ‘moral vision’; the idea that morality is not just about how we act and make choices, but how we see the world in a much broader sense.

The Plant Ontology (PO) (http://www.plantontology.org) (Jaiswal et al., 2005; Avraham et al., 2008) was designed to facilitate cross-database querying and to foster consistent use of plant-specific terminology in annotation. As new data are generated from the ever-expanding list of plant genome projects, the need for a consistent, cross-taxon vocabulary has grown. To meet this need, the PO is being expanded to represent all plants. This is the first ontology designed to encompass anatomical structures as well as growth and developmental stages (...) across such a broad taxonomic range. While other ontologies such as the Gene Ontology (GO) (The Gene Ontology Consortium, 2010) or Cell Type Ontology (CL) (Bard et al., 2005) cover all living organisms, they are confined to structures at the cellular level and below. The diversity of growth forms and life histories within plants presents a challenge, but also provides unique opportunities to study developmental and evolutionary homology across organisms. (shrink)

In her recent paper ‘The Epistemology of Propaganda’ Rachel McKinnon discusses what she refers to as ‘TERF propaganda’. We take issue with three points in her paper. The first is her rejection of the claim that ‘TERF’ is a misogynistic slur. The second is the examples she presents as commitments of so-called ‘TERFs’, in order to establish that radical (and gender critical) feminists rely on a flawed ideology. The third is her claim that standpoint epistemology can be used to establish (...) that such feminists are wrong to worry about a threat of male violence in relation to trans women. In Section 1 we argue that ‘TERF’ is not a merely descriptive term; that to the extent that McKinnon offers considerations in support of the claim that ‘TERF’ is not a slur, these considerations fail; and that ‘TERF’ is a slur according to several prominent accounts in the contemporary literature. In Section 2, we argue that McKinnon misrepresents the position of gender critical feminists, and in doing so fails to establish the claim that the ideology behind these positions is flawed. In Section 3 we argue that McKinnon’s criticism of Stanley fails, and one implication of this is that those she characterizes as ‘positively privileged’ cannot rely on the standpoint-relative knowledge of those she characterizes as ‘negatively privileged’. We also emphasize in this section McKinnon’s failure to understand and account for multiple axes of oppression, of which the cis/trans axis is only one. (shrink)

Climate risks are growing. Research is increasingly important to inform the design of risk-management strategies. Assessing such strategies necessarily brings values into research. But the values assumed within research (often only implicitly) may not align with those of stakeholders and decision makers. These misalignments are often invisible to researchers and can severely limit research relevance or lead to inappropriate policy advice. Aligning strategy assessments with stakeholders' values requires a holistic approach to research design that is oriented around those values from (...) the start. Integrating values into research in this way requires collaboration with stakeholders, integration across disciplines, and attention to all aspects of research design. Here we describe and demonstrate a qualitative conceptual tool called a values-informed mental model (ViMM) to support such values-centered research design. ViMMs map stakeholders' values onto a conceptual model of a study system to visualize the intersection of those values with coupled natural-human system dynamics. Through this mapping, ViMMs integrate inputs from diverse collaborators to support the design of research that assesses risk-management strategies in light of stakeholders' values. We define a visual language for ViMMs, describe accompanying practices and workflows, and present an illustrative application to the case of flood-risk management in a small community along the Susquehanna river in the Northeast United States. (shrink)

Formal clinical trials of pig-to-human organ transplant—known as xenotransplantation—may begin this decade, with the first trials likely to consist of either adult renal transplants or pediatric cardiac transplant patients. Xenotransplantation as a systematic scientific study only reaches back to the latter half of the 20th century, with episodic xenotransplantation events occurring prior to that. As the science of xenotransplantation has progressed in the 20th and 21st centuries, the public's knowledge of the potential therapy has also increased. With this, there have (...) been shifting ethical stances toward xenotransplantation in key areas, such as religious and public viewpoints towards xenotransplantation, animal rights, and public health concerns. This review provides a historical–ethical account of xenotransplantation and details if or how viewpoints have shifted over time. (shrink)

Despite a large and multifaceted effort to understand the vast landscape of phenotypic data, their current form inhibits productive data analysis. The lack of a community-wide, consensus-based, human- and machine-interpretable language for describing phenotypes and their genomic and environmental contexts is perhaps the most pressing scientific bottleneck to integration across many key fields in biology, including genomics, systems biology, development, medicine, evolution, ecology, and systematics. Here we survey the current phenomics landscape, including data resources and handling, and the progress that (...) has been made to accurately capture relevant data descriptions for phenotypes. We present an example of the kind of integration across domains that computable phenotypes would enable, and we call upon the broader biology community, publishers, and relevant funding agencies to support efforts to surmount today's data barriers and facilitate analytical reproducibility. (shrink)

Cooperation has been analyzed primarily in the context of theories of collective intentionality. These discussions have primarily focused on interactions between pairs or small groups of agents who know one another personally. Cooperative game theory has also been used to argue for a form of cooperation in large unorganized groups. Here I consider a form of minimal cooperation that can arise among members of potentially large organized groups (e.g., corporate teams, committees, governmental bodies). I argue that members (...) of organized groups can be minimally cooperative in virtue of playing roles in an organizational structure and having a common goal. The minimal form of cooperation I argue for is not grounded in collective intentions involving symmetric mental states, special collective intentional modes, or joint commitments. More generally, I show how considering minimal cooperation in the context of organized groups provides an opportunity to reevaluate the extent to which the social world and social phenomena depend on internalist mental factors (e.g., intentions, beliefs) and externalist non-mental factors (e.g., documents, laws, job descriptions). The view of minimal cooperation among members of organized groups I offer provides support for an externalist rather than internalist theory of at least one social phenomenon. (shrink)

This article articulates our everyday notion of cooperation. First, I topple an orthodoxy of shared agency theory by arguing that shared intentions to J are neither necessary nor sufficient for J to be cooperative. I refute the necessity claim by providing examples of shared intention-free cooperation (in institutional contexts and beyond). I refute the sufficiency claim by observing that coercion and exploitation need not preclude shared intentions but do preclude cooperation. These arguments, in turn, lead to my (...) positive proposal. People cooperate, I argue, just in case their activities are coordinated in ways that do not undermine any participant’s agency. (shrink)

Cooperative speech is purposive. From the speaker's perspective, one crucial purpose is the transmission of knowledge. Cooperative speakers care about getting things right for their conversational partners. This attitude is a kind of respect. Cooperative speech is an ideal form of communication because participants have respect for each other. And having respect within a cooperative enterprise is sufficient for a particular kind of moral standing: we ought to respect those who have respect for us. Respect demands reciprocity. I maintain that (...) large language models aren't owed the kind of respect that partly constitutes a cooperative conversation. This implies that they aren't cooperative interlocutors, otherwise we would be obliged to reciprocate the attitude. Leveraging this conclusion, I argue that present-day LLMs are incapable of assertion and that this raises an overlooked doubt about their semantic competence. One upshot of this argument is that knowledge of meaning isn't just a subject for the cognitive psychologist. It's also a subject for the moral psychologist. (shrink)

I find myself doing a number of puzzling things: I observe a two-minute silence for those who died in a war fought before I was born, and so are in no position to approve of my respect for them. I feel guilty about oppression that was carried out in the name of my country by people who lived centuries ago, even though I was not around to be causally responsible. I separate paper and plastic recycling for the benefit of people (...) whom, it seems, don’t exist and won’t be born until long after I die. In this paper I will offer a way of making sense of all of these practices, in the context of intergenerational cooperation. I will do so only assuming my own self-interest. (shrink)

Successful cooperation among a group of individuals requires a low entropy of ideas. That is to say, the group must be “on the same page.” This paper proposes a framework aimed at illustrating the relationship between human cooperation and the various ways individuals use information, specifically through the lens of entropy. Information, thoughts and ideas are divided into two categories based, not on content, but rather on dimensionality. Dichotomous thinking will refer to simple unidimensional ideas while analytical thinking (...) will refer to ideas which explore the relationship between two or more dimensions. The development of the framework proposed here proceeds from three fundamental axioms, the ability of individuals to recognize and/or assign value along with the second and first laws of thermodynamics. The framework will be used to illustrate how, when faced with complex problems, overly dichotomous thinking can increase the entropy of ideas thus inhibiting cooperation. Given the increasing political polarization and global instability, reframing how we think about information is critical. This paper argues that the fundamental distinction between dichotomous and analytical thinking should be at the center of this reformulation. (shrink)

I argue that agents can have duties to cooperate with one another if this increases their combined efficiency and/or efficacy in addressing ongoing collective moral problems. I call these duties cooperative duties of efficiency and efficacy. I focus particularly on collective agents and how agents ought to reason and act in the face of global moral problems. After setting out my account, I argue that a subset of cooperative duties of efficiency and efficacy of collective agents are duties of justice (...) in virtue of the roles these agents have taken up. (shrink)

We propose an approach to the evolution of joint agency and cooperative behavior that contrasts with views that take joint agency to be a uniquely human trait. We argue that there is huge variation in cooperative behavior and that while much human cooperative behavior may be explained by invoking cognitively rich capacities, there is cooperative behavior that does not require such explanation. On both comparative and theoretical grounds, complex cognition is not necessary for forms of joint action, or the evolution (...) of cooperation. As a result, promising evolutionary approaches to cooperative behavior should explain how it arises across many contexts. (shrink)

We inquire together all the time, yet the norms of such inquiring are poorly understood. Parallels from norms of individual inquiry fall short in accurately characterizing our inquiring together. The need then for an account of inquiring together which provides normative guidance is pressing. This paper unpacks and defends a version of a crucial norm of such inquiry, inspired by Harman (1986), which codifies the kind of evidence necessary for a shared inquirer to permissibly settle her shared question. It is (...) informed by the demands of directed openness between inquirers, characteristic of much shared activity generally, and shared inquiry specifically. In defending this norm, a general account of shared inquiry is developed, one which sheds light on the complex and surprising relationship between human cooperation and epistemic rationality. (shrink)

Dubreuil (Biol Phil 25:53–73, 2010b , this journal) argues that modern-like cognitive abilities for inhibitory control and goal maintenance most likely evolved in Homo heidelbergensis , much before the evolution of oft-cited modern traits, such as symbolism and art. Dubreuil’s argument proceeds in two steps. First, he identifies two behavioral traits that are supposed to be indicative of the presence of a capacity for inhibition and goal maintenance: cooperative feeding and cooperative breeding. Next, he tries to show that these behavioral (...) traits most likely emerged in Homo heidelbergensis . In this paper, I show that neither of these steps are warranted in light of current scientific evidence, and thus, that the evolutionary background of human executive functions, such as inhibition and goal maintenance, remains obscure. Nonetheless, I suggest that cooperative breeding might mark a crucial step in the evolution of our species: its early emergence in Homo erectus might have favored a social intelligence that was required to get modernity really off the ground in Homo sapiens. (shrink)

Cooperation admits of degrees. When factory workers stage a slowdown, they do not cease to cooperate with management in the production of goods altogether, but they are not fully cooperative either. Full cooperation implies that participants in a joint action are committed to rendering appropriate contributions as needed toward their joint end so as to bring it about, consistently with the type of action and the generally agreed upon constraints within which they work, as efficiently as they can, (...) where their contributions are sensitive to information (where available) about how others are contributing in the sense that they adjust as needed their contributions in light of information about how others are contributing to ensure effective pursuit of their joint end, where this includes rendering aid to other participants if needed, insofar as they are able. Full cooperation entails those cooperating are engaged in a joint intentional action. Some prominent studies of joint intentional action focus exclusively on cases of full cooperation (notably that of Michael Bratman (2014)). But not all joint intentional action is fully cooperative. One example is the work slowdown. Another example is provided by competitive games like chess and football, or sports like boxing and wrestling, where participants are clearly not intending to contribute to the pursuit of all of the goals of the others engaged in the activity, even when those goals are internal to the type of activity in question, but instead intend actively to frustrate some of them. In this paper, I provide a taxonomy of forms of non-cooperative behavior within the context of behavior that is still to some degree cooperative, and I argue that the minimal conditions of joint intentional action define minimal cooperative behavior, that is, that minimally joint intentional action is per se minimally cooperative behavior. I define in precise terms what that comes to, and how it is possible in cases in which it seems that one or more participants are in one or more ways acting so as to frustrate the contributions of other participants to their joint action. (shrink)

The short answer is whenever the actual activity of the “cooperative” is not carried out by the members but by employees. The problem is, of course, not in cooperation per se but in the hiring, employing, renting, or leasing of people to carry out the supposedly “cooperative” activities of the “cooperative” (Ellerman, 2021). Consider the case of a typical consumer cooperative. What is the cooperative activity carried out by the consumer‑members? They do not consume cooperatively; that would be a (...) commune or kibbutz. They shop and consume as individuals or as individual families. They do not carry out the activity of the consumer cooperative business—which is conducted by the hired managers and employees of the business. The whole notion of the consumer‑members cooperating together in some joint activity is a beautiful fiction, but a fiction nevertheless. Of course, there may be some overlap between employees and consumers, but we are analyzing functional roles, i.e., the roles people have qua consumers and qua workers. Moreover, the number of consumers will far exceed the number of employees. (shrink)

David Gauthier argues that it can be rational to perform a non-maximizing cooperative act, since there are certain situations in which it is rational to adopt an intention to perform a non-maximizing cooperative act, and since if it is rational to adopt an intention to do something, then it is rational to do that thing. An important objection to this argument focuses on the move from the rationality of adopting intentions to the rationality of acting on them. Gregory Kavka argues (...) that there are other situations – involving deterrence rather than cooperation – in which it is rational to adopt an intention to perform an irrational retaliatory action, that these situations and the cooperative ones are relevantly similar, so that, in the original cooperative situations, it is rational to adopt an intention to cooperate but irrational actually to cooperate. In this paper, I examine one way in which the argument for cooperation may be reformulated to circumvent this particular objection. (shrink)