The idea of a synthesis was already made apparent in Kant's argument from geometry in the Aesthetic. The perception of geometry is made possible by the pre-conceptual, intuitive synthesis carried out by imagination under the condition of sensibility itself. Kant's famous note at B160-1 seems to smuggle a synthetic unity of understanding into the very unity of space and time. But the difference is that the pre-conceptual, intuitive synthesis carried out by imagination under the condition of sensibility itself is, as (...) it implies, non-conceptual, and is carried out by the imagination with no pure concepts involved whatsoever. (shrink)

Several metaphysical/philosophical concepts are developed as tools by which we may further understand the essence, structure, and events/symbols of “Complex” Synchronicity, and how these differ from “Chain of Events” Synchronicity. The first tool is the concept of Astronomical vs Cultural time. This tool is to be the basis of distinguishing Simple from Complex Synchronicity as Complex Synchronicities are chunks of time that have several coincidences in common with each other. We will also look at the nature of the perspective of (...) the time being quantized. The next tool is a particular case study of two movies, The Matrix and Black Swan, that may be viewed as an example of a Complex Synchronicity in the collective conscious of popular culture (as opposed to Simple Synchronicity or a single coincidence). And the final tool is the concept of “Chain of Events” synchronicity as a separate concept from Simple or Complex synchronicities. This 3rd tool is developed using a mathematical metaphor of foreshadowing (an element of storytelling) in the seemingly random pattern of prime numbers. The purpose of this paper is to distinguish and develop these concepts and to lay a foundation for the further study of the concept of Synchronicity first illuminated by Carl Jung as an acausal connecting principle between coincidences. (shrink)

SELF - CONSCIOUSNESS IS A FIELD OF RESONANCE -/- In the stillness between breath and thought, the human spirit awakens—not as a solitary flame, but as a co-creator of worlds. Through our hands and words, through temples and tools, we give birth to forms. These artefacts, these institutions, are not inert—they pulse with the memory of our longing, our reason, our dreams. As we move through them, and they through us, we shape what we know and become what we create. (...) The mind is not a mirror, cold and exact. It is a sea that reflects the sky, but the sky it reflects is one it has painted. In each reflection lies a paradox: the world appears as an objective truth, yet it is carved from the substance of subjectivity. The spirit is doubled—at once the dreamer and the dream, the builder and the house, the question and the answer. -/- Thus, Hegel names two streams of the Spirit: the Subjective and the Objective. Like the pulse of a star that beats with light and shadow, these are not two but one—dancing in and out of form. The subjective is the whisper within, the soul’s gaze upon itself, the spark of inner intuition. The objective is the echo made manifest, the structures of law, of language, of shared existence. Each is the breath of the other; their fusion is the Absolute Spirit, where time becomes meaning and history becomes truth. And yet, always, there is a dissonance—a sacred tension between the spirit’s infinite longing and its finite forms. The world we make does not always echo the world we are. This distance births a telos, a purpose, a spiral of becoming. Hegel saw it not as failure, but as destiny—a journey of the spirit through the dialectic of self and world. In the realm of Subjective Spirit, the soul rises in solitude. It learns to know, to will, to feel—thefragile architecture of awareness built from intuition ascending into concept. But this "self" is never isolated. It is an abstraction, a silhouette against the sky of the Absolute. Alone, it is a hollow echo. Only in the context of culture, history, and shared time does it become real. Hegel teaches us that the sovereign self—the thinker of Kant, the "I" of Descartes —is not the origin, but the child of time. The self is not given; it is earned, through the alchemy of relation. In every heartbeat of history, consciousness emerges not alone, but in communion—with the world it shapes and the others who shape it. Self-consciousness, then, is not a mirror—it is a field of resonance. It arises when thought bends back upon itself and sees its own becoming. Yet what it sees is not abstract—it sees its deeds, its creations, its loves, its laws. The objective world is not other, but the reflection of our inward stars. Hegel speaks of two motions of becoming. One flows from intuition to idea, where the soul lifts its gaze to theory and act. The other moves from concept to world, where thought incarnates in law and language. These are the twin wings of the spirit, and only in their flight does the self find its truth. So we arrive at a cosmic understanding: the self is the world made aware of itself. It is not bound by skin or skull. It is the meeting point of memory and possibility, a star within the Absolute Spirit’s constellation. -/- THE SONG OF LABOUR AND DESIRE: A JOURNEY THROUGH BECOMING -/- Not only the cities we dwell in, not only the thoughts we hold in the hush of midnight, but even the rhythm of our hearts, the fire in our gaze, the shape of our hands—all are children of labour. Across the ages, through silence and song, the human being has woven themselves from the threads of work and want, from longing and shaping. Look into the world, and you see yourself. Not in reflection as in glass, but in a mirror that breathes and pulses—the world does not echo us passively. No, the world responds to us in kind. We reach, and it reshapes. We take, and it takes hold of us. Thus begins the dance, the dialectic—not of cold theory, but of desire and labor, of need and becoming. In the beginning, we did not know we were separate. We touched the world as we touched our skin. Nature cradled us, and we did not yet say “I” or “you.” The child, like the early soul of humankind, is fused with the earth and sky. But with each grasp, each hunger, each satisfaction, the line grows clearer. In the meeting of hand and fruit, eye and fire, breath and word, we awaken to a truth: there is me, and there is not-me. -/- Thus the world is not found—it is made. Bit by bit, in reaching and shaping, the soul imprints itself upon stone and wind. Tools arise—not only from wood and bone, but from the needs they answer and the dreams they foreshadow. And the body itself, molded by time and touch, becomes an artefact of the soul’s desire. The hand shapes the tool, but the tool reshapes the hand. The mind speaks in symbols, and the symbol teaches the mind to see. This is not a process that ends. In each generation, the artefacts of the old become the cradle of the new. The child born to digital light navigates the city of screens as once the hunter read the forest path. Their thoughts do not move as ours did; their inner life is coded in circuits and swipes. Yet this too is labour—subtle, symbolic, silent. The mastery of interface becomes the extension of the self. The map is not known, but it is lived. These artefacts—stone, script, software—are not only objects. They are soul made visible. They are the dialectical traces of subjectivity, externalized spirit. And in using them, in navigating the forest of symbols, the subject internalizes the world anew. In every movement, the self becomes more fully itself. Self-consciousness is not born from thought alone, but from this long arc of interaction, from the sacred practice of shaping and being shaped. Before we recognize one another, before we gaze into the eye of the other and know our own reflection, we must first become. Before recognition, there must be something to be recognized. Self-consciousness is not given—it is forged in the fire of need and creation. Ethical life, that higher flame of human existence, does not appear from nothing. It grows from the roots of pre-ethical life, from the rhythm of doing and making. And so, in the great unfolding of spirit, the dialectic of desire and labour precedes the mirror of the other. The first consciousness is solitary—not in loneliness, but in purity. It does not yet know the other, but it knows the world, and knows that it is not the world. That knowing is the seed of all future becoming. In time, another light will rise. Another subject, another gaze. And then begins the second movement—the dialectic of recognition, where I become for you, and you become for me. But even this communion rests on the silent, ancient groundwork of labour—on the stones we laid, the words we shaped, the tools we held in trembling hands. The journey is one. Fragmented only for our understanding. In truth, the self, the world, and the other spiral together in a single cosmic breath. (shrink)

An action-oriented perspective changes the role of an individual from a passive observer to an actively engaged agent interacting in a closed loop with the world as well as with others. Cognition exists to serve action within a landscape that contains both. This chapter surveys this landscape and addresses the status of the pragmatic turn. Its potential influence on science and the study of cognition are considered (including perception, social cognition, social interaction, sensorimotor entrainment, and language acquisition) and its impact (...) on how neuroscience is studied is also investigated (with the notion that brains do not passively build models, but instead support the guidance of action). A review of its implications in robotics and engineering includes a discussion of the application of enactive control principles to couple action and perception in robotics as well as the conceptualization of system design in a more holistic, less modular manner. Practical applications that can impact the human condition are reviewed (e.g., educational applications, treatment possibilities for developmental and psychopathological disorders, the development of neural prostheses). All of this foreshadows the potential societal implications of the pragmatic turn. The chapter concludes that an action-oriented approach emphasizes a continuum of interaction between technical aspects of cognitive systems and robotics, biology, psychology, the social sciences, and the humanities, where the individual is part of a grounded cultural system. (shrink)

In this paper we examine the genealogy and transmission of moral duty in Western ethics. We begin with an uncontroversial account of the Stoic notion of the kathēkon, and then examine the pivotal moment of Cicero’s translation of it into Latin as ‘officium’. We take a deflationary view of the impact of Cicero’s translation and conclude that his translation does not mark a departure from the Stoic ideal. We find further confirmation of our deflationary position in the development of the (...) notion of ‘duty’ in Germany between the 16th and 18th centuries. We examine Pufendorf’s critique of ancient eudaimonism and his appropriation of officium, and claim that it foreshadows Kant’s rejection of Garve’s Ciceronian ethics. We demonstrate the undeniable parallels between Kant’s Groundwork and Garve’s influential translation of Cicero’s De Officiis, thereby indicating a novel way in which we should understand Cicero’s contribution to the development of modern moral philosophy. (shrink)

This essay explores Iris Murdoch’s unique image-based moral-philosophical methodology. Drawing on Murdoch’s early, middle, and late work, it illustrates how her early writings on metaphor and philosophical images foreshadows her later pluralist pictorial metaphysics. With this pictorial metaphysics – her wide-ranging collection of philosophical, religious or artistic images – Murdoch aims to provide us with the representations to guide and illuminate the moral life, serving as open sources for the continuous processes of moral orientation and interpretation.

Stoicism was one of the major Hellenistic philosophies, renowned not only for its ethical teachings but also for pioneering work in logic and epistemology. The Stoic school, particularly under Chrysippus of Soli (c. 279–206 BCE), developed a formal propositional logic that in some ways foreshadowed aspects of modern logical systems. This paper provides a rigorous comparative examination of Stoic reasoning and logic vis-à-vis modern logic traditions. We focus on the structure of Stoic logic (including its syllogistic forms and inference rules; (...) the Stoics’ treatment of logical paradoxes such as the Sorites (the “heap” paradox) and the Liar, and the philosophical presuppositions underlying Stoic logic (notably its integration with ontology and determinism). In contrast, modern logic—particularly as developed by Frege, Russell, and the logical positivists of the 20th century—emphasizes formal abstraction and symbolic rigor. The analysis highlights how Stoic logic, though formulated over two millennia ago using ordinary language, anticipates certain ideas found in modern symbolic logic, while nevertheless differing significantly in purpose and context. In doing so, we shall see how key Stoic logicians like Chrysippus innovated logical theory, and how these innovations compare to the work of modern figures such as Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, and the logical positivist school. Throughout the paper, a formal academic tone is maintained. Where appropriate, we include footnote references for further explication or sources, and a complete bibliography is provided at the end. It should be noted that our knowledge of Stoic logic comes from fragmentary sources and later reports, since no complete Stoic logical texts survive from antiquity. Nevertheless, scholarship has reconstructed a coherent picture of Stoic logical theory which we draw upon. The goal is to illuminate both the continuities and divergences between the Stoic logical tradition and the modern logical paradigms that dominate contemporary philosophical logic. (shrink)

Both before and after the publication of Isaac Newton’s particulate theory of light, numerous wave theories of light were advanced by both philosophers and scientists (e.g., René Descartes, Thomas Hobbes, Robert Hooke, Francesco Grimaldi, and Christiaan Huygens). What is peculiar about this list, as frequently found in the scholarly literature on light, is that it refers to individuals who do not extend much further back than the seventeenth century. A close examination of Aristotle’s account of color and light in comparison (...) to Christiann Huygens’ theory of color and light, however, reveals that Aristotle deserves to be recognized as one who antedates and foreshadows these modern wave theorists. Indeed, we shall argue that Aristotle offered the first wave theory of color and light. On Aristotle’s theory, light is the actualization of a transparent medium such as air or water that makes possible the dissemination of color through the medium in a manner analogous to the dissemination of sound through air or water. (shrink)

Beauvoir discusses various kinds of personal love in her work, including maternal love, lesbian love, friendship, and heterosexual love. In her portrayal of heterosexual love, she draws a distinction between two main types, inauthentic and authentic. Authentic love is “founded on mutual recognition of two liberties,” always freely chosen and sustained. It requires that the lovers maintain their individuality, while at the same time acknowledging each other’s differences. Inauthentic love is founded on inequality between the sexes, on submission and domination. (...) It prevents both women and men from experiencing freedom, comradeship and the joy of loving. This distinction is, I argue, applicable also to other types of love. Unlike Sartre, Beauvoir believes authentic love is possible. I contrast their respective views. Towards the end, I consider Beauvoir’s idea of authentic love in light of her concept of moral freedom, and argue that Beauvoir’s authentic love foreshadows feminist notion of “relational autonomy.”. (shrink)

Where does the Born Rule come from? We ask: “What is the simplest extension of probability theory where the Born rule appears”? This is answered by introducing “superposition events” in addition to the usual discrete events. Two-dimensional matrices (e.g., incidence matrices and density matrices) are needed to mathematically represent the differences between the two types of events. Then it is shown that those incidence and density matrices for superposition events are the (outer) products of a vector and its transpose whose (...) components foreshadow the “amplitudes” of quantum mechanics. The squares of the components of those “amplitude” vectors yield the probabilities of the outcomes. That is how probability amplitudes and the Born Rule arise in the minimal extension of probability theory to include superposition events. This naturally extends to the full Born Rule in the Hilbert spaces over the complex numbers of quantum mechanics. It would perhaps be satisfying if probability amplitudes and the Born Rule only arose as the result of deep results in quantum mechanics (e.g., Gleason’s Theorem). But both arise in a simple extension of probability theory to include “superposition events”–which should not be too surprising since superposition is the key non-classical concept in quantum mechanics. (shrink)

Many interpreters argue that irrational acts of exchange can count as rational and civic-minded for Hegel—even though, admittedly, the persons who are exchanging their property are usually unaware of this fact. While I do not want to deny that property exchange can count as rational in terms of ‘mutual recognition’ as interpreters claim, this proposition raises an important question: What about the irrationality and arbitrariness that individuals as property owners and persons consciously enjoy? Are they mere vestiges of nature in (...) Hegel’s system, or do they constitute a simple yet valid form of freedom that is not only a part of Hegel’s rational system of right, but its necessary starting point? I will argue the latter: The arbitrary, purely egoist self-definition of property owners is the simplest possible type of freedom for Hegel, which he dissects in order to show how the very arbitrary self-definition implicitly relies on an identity between persons, and hence foreshadows the more social forms of freedom Hegel will discuss later in his book. I make this argument by highlighting Hegel’s references to his discussion of atoms and freedom in his Logic of Being. (shrink)

The present paper aims to show that Ibn Sina’s (Avicenna) analysis of existence in modal terms and his theory of concomitance concerning God’s properties can solve the problems faced by those contemporary theories that are committed to a non-nominalistic and non-Platonic realistic framework. In doing so, it first analyzes three contemporary views on abstract objects, namely divine conceptualism, theistic activism and divine simplicity, then addresses the problems that they are confronted with, with a particular focus on the grounding problem of (...) divine attributes in God. Afterwards, it examines a prominent Mu’tazilite theory of predication, namely, the states (ahwāl) theory, as it foreshadows Ibn Sina’s solution to the grounding problem. Finally, it analyzes how Ibn Sina’s account of predication, which bears considerable similarities to the statestheory, can help the theistsolve the grounding problem without violating divine aseity or sovereignty, nor resulting in the bootstrapping problem. (shrink)

When it comes to understanding the genesis and development of Heidegger’s thought, it would be rather difficult to overestimate the importance of the “Aristotle-Introduction” of 1922, Heidegger’s “Phenomenological Interpretations with Respect to Aristotle.” This text is both a manifesto which describes the young Heidegger’s philosophical commitments, as well as a promissory note which outlines his projected future work. This Aristotle-Introduction not only enunciates Heidegger’s broad project of a philosophy which is both systematic and historical; it also indicates, in particular, why (...) a principal (or fundamental) ontology can be actualized only through a destruction of the history of ontology. This text anticipates several central themes of Being and Time (e.g., facticity, death, falling), and also foreshadows some of the issues which were to occupy the later Heidegger (e.g., “truth” as a heterogenous process of unconcealment). There is no doubt that much can – and will – be written on the meaning and implications of this important text. But instead of making my own, early contribution to such a secondary literature, I have decided to limit myself in this “Preface” to a few brief remarks concerning the historical background to Heidegger’s “Phenomenological Interpretations with Respect to Aristotle.”. (shrink)

Given the difficulty of characterizing the quandary introduced in Hume’s Appendix to the Treatise, coupled with the alleged “underdetermination” of the text, it is striking how few commentators have considered whether Hume addresses and/or redresses the problem after 1740—in the first Enquiry, for example. This is not only unfortunate, but ironic; for, in the Appendix, Hume mentions that more mature reasonings may reconcile whatever contradiction(s) he has in mind. I argue that Hume’s 1746 letter to Lord Kames foreshadows a subtle, (...) but significant, shift in Hume’s reasonings regarding the relevance of “real connexions”; that the Enquiry of 1748 provides evidence for this shift; and that this shift obviates Hume’s second thoughts by reconciling the contradiction that he had in mind. In short, Hume’s letter to Kames and Enquiry supply the retrodictive keys to a systematically satisfactory account. (shrink)

In the present essay, I trace the way in which Derrida engages the theme of the destruction of philosophy in his reading of Heidegger’s work in the 1964-65 seminar, Heidegger: The Question of Being and History. Specifically, I focus on a close reading of the first three sessions in order to show the way in which the theme of the destruction of philosophy appears in relation to the posing of three questions, namely, the questions of being, history, and metaphor. In (...) all three sessions, I will show that the questions of being, history, and metaphor allow Heidegger, according to Derrida, to brush against the very limits of philosophy. However, Derrida’s own interpretation reveals an interesting emphasis on the destruction of philosophy that, while definitely inspired by Heidegger, slightly begins to go beyond him. For this reason, I will turn to his more critical appraisal of Heidegger’s trajectory in the final two sessions. In so doing, I claim that Derrida’s positions in these final sessions will show a critical distance vis-à-vis Heidegger that will foreshadow the very question that will remain decisive throughout his nearly 40 year engagement with Heidegger’s work, namely, the question of difference. (shrink)

Diane Vaughan’s popular book, The Challenger Launch Decision: Risky Technology, Culture and Deviance at NASA, advances a thesis that I termed the “cog in the machine manifesto”: since the Challenger disaster was the result of the determined, mechanistic movement of the parts of the organizational system; once the mechanism was set in motion, the disaster was inevitable, and could not have been prevented. In order to expose the fallacies of the cog in the machine manifesto, I consider an alternative umbrella (...) thesis and four sub-theses. The umbrella thesis proposes that the causes of the Challenger disaster were the lack of an overall 'safety first' ethos, and irresponsible choice and poor decision-making practices in the lead up to and including the final risky decision. The four sub-theses are as follows: (1) the widespread justification that one always faces inherent risk when one operates in the realm of risky technology (a thesis foreshadowed by Vaughan’s book) is an illicit and misleading justification when one considers that there is no binding necessity to employ the risky technology; (2) the real culprit is not so much "risky technology," which locates the risk in the technology, but "risky assessment," which locates the risk in the decision to employ technology while not basing that decision on known safe designs and continued use on performance data; (3) the decision to choose an Orbiter without a passenger and crew abort system is proof in and of itself of a lack of a "safety first" management priority; (4) an analysis of the fateful eve of the Challenger launch teleconference launch decision makes it impossible to construe it as a banal, routine and inevitable organizational mistake. A careful examination of the “cog in the machine manifesto” and similar frameworks that purport to explain moral disasters will reveal that the language of risky technology, organizational complexity, and inevitable accidents is deeply pernicious and should thus be avoided at all costs. (shrink)

A Norwegian translation is here offered of Eugenie Ginsberg’s paper «Zur Husserlschen Lehre von den Ganzen und den Teilen» (in Archiv für systematische Philosophie und Soziologie 32, 1929, 108–120). The paper discusses Husserl’s six theorems from Logical Investigations III, §14. Ginsberg provides new proofs for theorems 1 and 3, and also endorses theorem 5. In contrast, a counter example is given to theorems 2, 4, and 6: However, proofs are supplied for a modified version of these theorems. Furthermore, an additional (...) three theorems are defended based upon Ginsberg’s modified theorems. Also, a brief introduction is given discussing Ginsberg’s pioneering role as part of the Lvov-Warsaw school—in spite of her being murdered by the Nazis in 1942—especially her role as the first commentator on Husserl’s third logical investigations, which is a pioneering work on mereology and ontology; but also her later publication from 1931 where she developed several notions of ontological dependence (for instance foreshadowing the work of Roman Ingarden as well as Kit Fine). (shrink)

Vision-Language-Action models (VLAs) promise for embodied agents what the GPT series delivered for language: a scaling-driven leap from clever demos to broadly useful intelligence. Drawing on the historical arc from GPT-2 to GPT-3, the article argues that VLAs now occupy a comparable inflection point for spatial reasoning and control. I examine the Pi family—the first widely available general-purpose VLAs. Pi-0 couples a 3-billion-parameter vision-language backbone with a 300 M-parameter diffusion-based “action expert,” generating 50 Hz trajectories that span seven robot morphologies (...) and 68 manipulation tasks after pre-training on 10 000 h of data. Pi-0.5 extends this foundation with a heterogeneous co-training regime that mixes only ~400 h of mobile-manipulation logs with laboratory, cross-embodiment, and web-scale multimodal data, enabling open-world generalisation: the system folds laundry, makes beds, and organises drawers in homes it has never seen before. Performance scales predictably with environment diversity, dataset size, and context length, mirroring early LLM scaling laws and signalling rapid future gains as compute and data rise. Consequently, the bottleneck for ubiquitous household robotics shifts from core intelligence to hardware cost and deployment tooling, foreshadowing a “robotics revolution” akin to the 2023 generative-AI wave. The article closes by outlining research and investment opportunities that could democratise VLA integration and accelerate the arrival of capable spatial agents. (shrink)

The scientific revolution began with an exclusion. To make nature mathematically tractable, Galileo stripped the scientific model of the world of its qualities—colors, sounds, tastes, feels—leaving only what admits of numerical characterization. Four centuries later, the qualities remain unexplained. They are the “hard problem” of consciousness: the enigma of why and how physical processing gives rise to felt experience. The Quantification Horizon Theory of Consciousness (QHT) proposes that this enigma arises from a structural necessity of mathematical description itself. Quantitative models (...) can only capture quantifiable features of reality. Where there is nothing, a model assigns zero; where there is something quantifiable, it assigns a value; but where there is something unquantifiable—a quale—the model degenerates: it produces a singularity. QHT identifies singularities in the information geometry of neural dynamics as the mathematical fingerprint of phenomenal experience: a quantification horizon beyond which quantitative description cannot reach. From this basis, QHT derives the hallmark properties of consciousness—ineffability, privacy, subjectivity, unity, and causal efficacy—and provides substrate-independent criteria for determining which systems are conscious. The theory avoids panpsychism, makes testable predictions, and offers concrete implications for artificial intelligence and artificial consciousness. Its core intuition—that singularities correspond to felt experience—may have been foreshadowed by Srinivasa Ramanujan. (shrink)

The broad aim of this inquiry is to use a close reading of the text to explore Herodotus' interest in "human nature", in other words to measure him by the standard offered by the contemporary Sophistic movement and by Thucydides, who shares the same preoccupation. "Human nature" is taken to include human psychology at all levels from individuals to city states, nations and empires. The focus is on Herodotus' sensitivity to the psychological complexities of individuals, in particular to the contradictions (...) and paradoxes in their behaviour; his interest in the mechanisms of social and political life; and his examination of the phenomenon of empire and how he shares with Thucydides a concern with its psychological motivation, with particular attention to his foreshadowing of Athenian empire. The study concludes by placing Herodotus firmly within the Sophistic (and Hippocratic) intellectual milieu and identifying him as an active participant in the major debates of the late 5thc. Central to the inquiry is the detailed analysis of extended contexts, exploring how large sections of text are put together, with consideration not merely of the structure and literary presentation but also Herodotus' use of his sources and the intentionality of the narrative. The fundamental hypothesis is that Herodotus is a complex and sophisticated writer with a developed critical acumen in his use of sources, such that he uses his material much more than his material uses him. (shrink)

The influential physicist Richard Feynman became interested in the relationship between religion and science during a mid-career phase. He proposed that their interface was embroiled in unresolvable difficulties. He felt that science demanded an attitude of uncertainty for its claims, while religion contrarily required certain belief in its core doctrines. Though possessing several non-contradictory dimensions, Feynman felt that the nature of the truth claims of science and religion suffered from insurmountable elemental conflicts. This was by contrast to Karl Popper, the (...) leading critical rationalist of the 20th century, who argued that there could be no tension between science and religion. This paper will argue that the ‘Feynman Problem’ is not as insoluble as it appears. Rather, several solutions exist within critical rationalism. Two will be presented-the first revolves around the conjectural basis of knowledge and is already a well characterised critical rationalist notion. The second is a novel solution based on the separate categorisation of psychological, pragmatic, and epistemological attitudes to religion and science. Karl Popper’s view of religion-science dissimilarity was a minimalist point of departure for critical rationalists, who have developed increasingly sophisticated frameworks for investigating the relationship between faith and reason. Critical rationalism represents an equally inspirational methodology for the pursuit of scientific and religious truth. Though both Feynman and Popper’s views on religion were underdeveloped, they foreshadowed the religion-science frameworks advocated by many late 20th century scientists, especially in the form of New Atheism and Gould’s NOMA theory. (shrink)

Lev Shestov was one of the prominent philosophers of the XX. century. Shestov due to his adogmatic views on religion, science, and reason has foreshadowed the rise of the postmodernist philosophy. In this regard, the fine distinction drawn by Shestov between rationality and irrationality is important. Shestov has put an effort to find new meanings in religion and philosophy of religion in the context of the conflict of rationality and irrationality. According to Lev Shestov, the human freedom can be examined (...) through the conflict of rationality and irrationality. Shestov has considered the Bible and Christianity as the source of human freedom. According to Shestov, individual liberation from earthly, strings of rational thinking and Ananke lies through obtaining faith. Through experiencing pain and despair, an individual comes closer to freedom and faith. Shestov named severe existential pain and desperation as the state of “groundlessness”. The state of “groundlessness” is what pushes one to the “leap of faith”. Ananke and rational thinking strive to pull away a person from the state of “groundlessness” and from the “leap of faith”. In the philosophy of Lev Shestov, Athens symbolizes rational thinking. Jerusalem symbolizes religious devotion, irrationalism and faith. According to the philosopher, Athens and Jerusalem are in a constant tension. (shrink)

This paper on feminism was given at a public lecture in Spain. The author speaks from the perspective of contemporary Catholicism, represented in the magisterial teachings of St John Paul II, foreshadowed in the works of St. Edith Stein, and amplified and developed by contemporary Catholic scholars such as Prudence Allen, Michelle Schumacher, Leonie Caldecott and Cardinals Angelo Scola, Walter Kasper and Karl Lehmann.

This essay attempts to identify the various qualities that made Frederick II of Prussia’s just appellation ‘the Great’. Frederick employed a completely new type of rule, which was not only unique in the eighteenth century but also prefigured modern governance in many respects. Frederick personified the "raison d’etat" and came to exemplify the rational use of state power for the creation of a completely new standard of judicious kingship. As a visionary ruler of his day, Frederick foreshadowed modern principles of (...) the state. To highlight Frederick’s innovations, the essay not only shows Frederick’s brilliant leadership in the scene of eighteenth-century Europe, but it also refers to rarely quoted contemporary sources; by doing so, the essay contrasts the prodigious divide between the crumbling culture of the "Ancien régime" and that of Frederick’s Prussia—the former still feudal and the latter possessing a vision that rulers are the ‘first servants of the state’. (shrink)

Reaching back more than a century, suspension cultures have provided major insights into processes of histogenesis; e.g., cell communication, distinction of self/nonself, cell sorting and cell adhesion. Besides studies on lower animals, the vertebrate retina served as excellent reaggregate model to analyze 3D reconstruction of a complex neural laminar tissue. Methodologically, keeping cells under suspension is essential to achieve tissue organisation in vitro; thereby, the environmental conditions direct the emergent histotypic particulars. Recent progress in regenerative medicine is based to a (...) large extent on human induced pluripotent stem cells (hiPSCs), which are cultured under suspension. Following their genetically directed differentiation into various histologic 3D structures, organoids provide excellent multipurpose in vitro assay models, as well as tissues for repair transplantations. Historically, a nearly fully laminated retinal spheroid from avian embryos was achieved already in 1984, foreshadowing the potential of culturing stem cells under suspension for tissue reconstruction purposes. (shrink)

Oscar Wilde's The Critic as Artist is shown to foreshadow some key concepts of poststructuralist interpretive theory - such as the necessary interplay of blindness and insight in criticism (Lacan, Paul de Man), or the retroactive effect of interpretation in the construction of the work. More specifically, Wilde's reading of the riddle of the Sphinx in a passage of this work both theorizes and dramatizes the paradoxical relationship between blindness and insight, in the shape of an ironic prophecy which can (...) be read as Wilde's announcement of his own tragic downfall - in which there is an element of compulsive acting out that has been noted by a number of previous critics. That is, Wilde's Sphinx is used as the vehicle of a riddle about Wilde himself, and is an emblem of his own ambivalent attitude toward the public revelation of his homosexuality. (Note: Downloadable file is in Spanish). (shrink)

There is no mention of Kafka in Heidegger's work. Did Heidegger ignore him, or pretend to? It's possible that he didn't read anything by Kafka until 1945. In 1933, Kafka was still little-known in Germany; then the Nazis banned and destroyed publications by Jews. From 1945 onwards, Kafka became a fashionable author. Heidegger didn't care about fashion. In 1950, Hannah Arendt, who had renewed her acquaintance with Heidegger, gave him the gift of a collection of Kafka's works. Hannah Arendt wrote (...) two articles on Kafka, in 1944 and 1948. The first was published in Germany in 1948 (Heidelberg), in a collection entitled Sechs Essays. Heidegger must have read it, sooner or later. It's possible that he discovered Kafka after 1950, but we can't be sure. Yet Kafka's work, the one which he did not publish himself, foreshadows that of Heidegger. In particular, if Heidegger read A Dog’s search, he must have received a shock. He said nothing about it. (shrink)