In this paper I review how the notion of gender is understood in psychiatry, specifically in the fifth edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM-5). First, I examine the contraposition between sex and gender, and argue that it is still retained by DSM-5, even though with some caveats. Second, I claim that, even if genderqueer people are not pathologized and gender pluralism is the background assumption, some diagnostic criteria still conceal a residue (...) of gender dualism and essentialism. Third, I consider gender dysphoria, which is characterized by an incongruence between one’s experienced or expressed gender and one’s assigned gender; since this condition pertains to distress and disability, not to the incongruence per se, it does not pathologize transgender people. Still, I contend that it should be removed from DSM-5 for theoretical reasons. (shrink)

Academic freedom is under attack, both in authoritarian democracies, such as Hungary and Turkey, and in liberal Western democracies, such as the United States, the UK, France and Germany. For example, Gender Studies are being targeted by right-wing governments in Eastern Europe, and in France President Emmanuel Macron has attacked post-colonial and critical theories as “Islamo-gauchisme“, portraying them as a danger to the Republic. However, dominant discourses about academic freedom and free speech in the global north, lately especially in (...) France and Germany, focus on an alleged threat to academic freedom through “political correctness” and “cancel culture”, that, under scrutiny, often turn out to be exactly the opposite, namely defences of plurality and critical voices. (shrink)

There is already a long history of conversation between feminism and deconstruction, feminist theorists and Derrida or Derrideans. That conversation has been by turns fraught and constructive. While some of these interactions have occurred in queer feminism, to date little has been done to stage an engagement between deconstruction and transfeminism. Naysayers might think that transfeminism is too recent and too identitarian a discourse to meaningfully interact with Derrida’s legacy. On the other hand, perhaps Derrida’s work was too embedded in (...) second wave feminism, and in some cases implicit misogyny and transphobia, to meet transfeminism on its own playing field. And yet, I think both suspicions shortchange these discourses. In this article, I stage a conversation between Derrida and two writers working in the area of trans feminism: Paisley Currah and Julia Serano. I explore, in particular, how their conceptions of gender neutrality or gender pluralism are complementary and together change the so-called “question of woman,” from a philosophical and political perspective. (shrink)

According to Sider, a question is metaphysically substantive just in case it has a single most natural answer. Recently, Barnes and Mikkola have argued that, given this notion of substantivity, many of the central questions in the metaphysics of gender are nonsubstantive. Specifically, it is plausible that gender pluralism—the view that there are multiple, equally natural gender kinds—is true, but this view seems incompatible with the substantivity of gender. The goal of this paper is to (...) argue that the notion of substantivity can be understood in a way that accommodates gender pluralism. First, I claim that gender terms (at least as used in the ontology room) are referentially indeterminate, where referential indeterminacy holds in virtue of the way the world is. Second, I propose a degree-theoretic (or scalar) account of metaphysical substantivity; genders are substantial to the degree that they are determinate. I conclude that gender is relatively, although not absolutely, substantial. (shrink)

What is gender and on what should gender classification be based? Dembroff (2018) has recently claimed that, for reasons of social justice, gender classification should not track extant gender kinds. They further argue for ontological pluralism—the existence of many gender kinds, and recommend that we combat oppression by imitating the gender kinds and classification practices in non-oppressive communities. Contra Dembroff, I argue that the analysis is subject to a number of internal problems, including (...) a misguided self-characterization and a tension between ontological pluralism and imitation. In addition, I sketch a different perspective on the relation between gender kinds and gender classification practices that upholds Dembroff’s intended goal but ameliorates the unintended complications. (shrink)

Insert abstract text here. This paper examines discrimination in the United States in 2025 as a structurally normalized mode of governance rather than a residual failure of liberal democracy. It argues that contemporary hierarchies of race, religion, gender, class, age, and identity are increasingly produced through formally neutral legal regimes, administrative practices, and security logics that preserve the appearance of equality while generating substantive harm. Drawing on international human rights law, comparative political ethics, and global philosophical scholarship, the analysis (...) situates the United States within a widening international critique concerning its treatment of its own population. The paper foregrounds external perspectives—United Nations treaty bodies, special rapporteurs, regional human rights institutions, and non-U.S. scholars—to examine how racism, Islamophobia, immigration enforcement, gendered governance, and cultural marginalization are interpreted beyond the American moral frame. Particular attention is given to the racialized use of immigration enforcement, the persistence of racial terror and impunity in the southern United States, and the symbolic politics surrounding Puerto Rico and Latino representation, revealing how colonial residues and cultural hierarchy continue to structure inclusion and exclusion. The overturning of Roe v. Wade is analyzed as a critical inflection point, signaling the re-localization of bodily autonomy and the fragility of substantive rights under conditions of moral federalism. This development is treated not as an isolated legal event but as a precursor to broader contests over bodily sovereignty, gender regulation, and state authority. The paper further examines classism, ageism, and economic stratification as intersecting mechanisms of disposability, extending prior analyses of structural neglect into the terrain of discrimination. Finally, the paper addresses internal fractures within contemporary rights movements, including emerging separations between gay and transgender advocacy, framing these divisions as both governance dilemmas and ethical questions of pluralism rather than as disputes over legitimacy or identity. Drawing on secular moral philosophy and diverse religious ethical traditions, the paper argues that forced moral convergence can undermine democratic pluralism while simultaneously weakening collective resistance to structural injustice. By situating U.S. discrimination within international legal norms and moral theory, this paper contends that contemporary American inequality reflects not merely social division but an ethical misalignment between democratic ideals and institutional practice. Discrimination in 2025 is shown to function less as overt exclusion than as managed hierarchy—legible to global observers, normalized domestically, and increasingly resistant to redress through formal law alone. (shrink)

In recent years, Islamic feminism has become a prevalent and controversial topic among scholars from Muslim countries and Western feminists. While respecting the efforts of Muslim activists, this paper argues that because Islamic perspective is inherently anti-pluralist, it is not conducive to feminism and even at odds with it. Since it is impossible to make any generalizations about Muslim countries, this paper focuses on the debate of Islam and feminism as it relates to Iran. Islamic laws that are the ground (...) for constitutions in many Muslim countries treat men and women unequally. In countries with a theocracy, Islam becomes a political system where the power of the ruling elite, which are the clerics, becomes an important obstacle on the way of reforms. As a worldview, Islam provides a fixed identity of women and men that is irreconcilable with any liberating theory. The significance of this discussion lies in the potential of celebration of “Islamic feminism” for reinforcing the fusion of religion and politics in a country such as Iran, which has a religious state. (shrink)

This paper examines the rollback of reproductive rights in the United States as a manifestation of state power over bodily sovereignty rather than as a moral dispute over life. Situating the post–Roe v. Wade legal landscape within political philosophy, feminist ethics, and international human rights law, the analysis argues that abortion restrictions function as instruments of governance that discipline bodies, regulate gender, and reproduce structural inequality. The paper demonstrates how compelled pregnancy disproportionately burdens women, the poor, racialized communities, and (...) those already subject to social surveillance, while reframing autonomy as conditional rather than inherent. Drawing on global ethical frameworks and comparative religious traditions, it challenges the selective use of theology and morality in state legislation, highlighting the tension between moral pluralism and imposed belief. The analysis further situates U.S. reproductive policy within a broader international context, where forced continuation of pregnancy is increasingly recognized as a violation of human rights and bodily integrity. By treating the body as a political site, the paper argues that reproductive coercion represents a broader authoritarian drift in contemporary governance, revealing how rights once grounded in privacy and autonomy can be reconstituted as privileges subject to state control. (shrink)

Today, the notion of identity is usually linked with ethical-political discussions like multiculturalism, gender or sexual diversity, recognition of plurality, etc. Nevertheless, the flourishing of this vision that interprets “identity” mainly in its plural form (as “identities”) contrasts sharply with the sense that “identity” has had during most of the history of philosophy (in which identity was understood in connection with “unity” or “selfsameness”, not with “diversity” or “otherness”). In order to explain the passage from one notion of identity (...) to the other (a passage mainly made in the last third of the 20th century), we will focus on the reflections made by Ludwig Wittgenstein towards the middle of that century. Our contention is that these reflections open the way to a more plural understanding of human identity, against the many interpreters of Wittgenstein that defend the opposite: that he offered a strong notion of common human identity in his writings, a notion based on the idea of “human nature”. In order to sustain our thesis, we will have to give an interpretation of some key terms of Wittgenstein’s philosophy (like “forms of life” or “natural history”) from a pluralistic point of view; this is the only way of understanding to what extent he is a predecessor of contemporary discussions about plural identities. (shrink)

Whereas intersectionality presents a fruitful framework for theoretical and empirical research, some of its fundamental features present great confusion. The term ‘intersectionality’ and its metaphor of the crossroads seem to reproduce what it aims to avoid: conceiving categories as separate. Despite the attempts for developing new metaphors that illustrate the mutual constitution relation among categories, gender, race or class keep being imagined as discrete units that intersect, mix or combine. Here we identify two main problems in metaphors: the lack (...) of differentiation between positions and effects and the problem of reification. We then present a new metaphor that overcomes these two problems: a basket of apples. We argue that considering social positions as the diverse properties of different apples avoids reification by considering categories as properties and not as objects themselves, and at the same time it allows us to think about the effects dimension from a plural and contextual approach. With this shift, we propose a reframing of the discussion in debates on intersectionality theory on the relation among categories, their in/separability and fragmentation. (shrink)

The author analyzes the origin and meaning of the expression ‘Ethics of Sexual Difference’ (ESD), contextualising it in the paradigm ‘thought of Sexual Difference’, in which the potentiality and aporias arising from the debate within the feminist movement are highlighted. Possible interpretations of these ethics, developed in the Italian philosophical context, are illustrated and evaluated. The author proposes a critical comparison with other models, for example, the queer theories, and attempts to show how the ‘Thought of Sexual Difference’ (TSD) opens (...) itself to destabilization produced by the emergence of new subjects (gay and lesbian, transgender, intersex) and their corresponding scientific knowledge. The author therefore proposes an update to the plural, ‘Ethics of Sexual Differences’ (ESDs), listing the possible methodological and content assumptions (including the development of a relational model in all scientific disciplines) and the disciplinary implications (also in the psychoanalytic field) of an ethics so defined. A reference is made to the discussion of socalled "gender ideology", in which the protagonists have often showed a certain difficulty in implementing an ESDs. (shrink)

This reflective essay explores the Notting Hill Carnival as a living expression of epistemic justice and political aesthetics. Drawing on personal observation and philosophical analysis, it examines how Carnival transforms Britain’s social margins into its centre, granting visibility and voice to those historically unseen. The essay traces the event’s roots in post-war resistance, its inversion of racial and gender hierarchies, and its contemporary tensions between celebration and commodification. Integrating insights from Fricker, Fanon, Rancière, and Kahl (2025), it argues that (...) Carnival enacts a fiduciary form of recognition—a collective moment of trust, dignity, and belonging. Through feathers, music, and movement, the streets become a stage for democracy itself: loud, plural, and imperfect, yet profoundly alive. (shrink)

Chapter 1st of the book. This chapter explores the fundamental ambiguity of the concept of plasticity – between openness and determination, change and stabilization of forms. This pluralism of meanings is used to unpack different instantiations of corporeal plasticity across various epochs, starting from ancient and early modern medicine, particularly humouralism. A genealogical approach displaces the notion that plasticity is a unitary phenomenon, coming in the abstract, and illuminates the unequal distribution of different forms of plasticities across social, (...) class='Hi'>gender, and ethnic groups. Taking a longer view of the plastic body as a ubiquitous belief in traditions predating and coexisting with modern medicine will help contextualize the seeming radicalism of today’s turn to permeability and the exceptionalism of Western findings. By highlighting the complex biopolitical usages of plasticity in the past, the chapter warns against simplistic appropriations of the term in contemporary body/world configurations driven by findings in neuroscience, epigenetics and microbiomics. (shrink)

According to the DP hypothesis, the merger of a determiner and a noun yields a determiner phrase (DP) rather than a noun phrase (nP). Focusing on Spanish, I defend the DP hypothesis but reject the notion that argumenthood is contingent upon a DP layer. Instead, I maintain that arguments can be as small as nP provided that they are c-commanded by a verb or a preposition, in which case the variables that they introduce are bound through a last-resort operation of (...) existential closure. I then consider the ways in which functional projections above nP shape the denotation of nominal arguments and adopt Borer’s (2005) view that a division phrase (DivP) is responsible for countability. Nonplural indefinite expressions can either have mass or singular readings depending on the determiner ("mucho tomate" 'much tomato' versus "un tomate" 'a tomato'), whereas nonplural definite expressions can have both mass and singular readings no matter the determiner ("el/este/mi tomate" 'the/this/my tomato'). I attribute the systematic ambiguity of nonplural definite expressions to the absence of DivP in their structure and the maximality operator that is a component of definiteness. -/- Throughout the thesis, I explore the formal representation of φ-features and how their semantic behaviour is conditioned by their syntactic position. I propose that gender features have consequences for interpretation when they are hosted by Panagiotidis’s (2019) animacy phrase (AnimP) but not by nP and extend this argument to number features on DivP versus nP, thereby eliminating the need for "interpretable" and "uninterpretable" versions of the same feature. As for pronouns, it is not immediately apparent where they are generated in Spanish because they are not mutually exclusive with the definite article ("nosotros los cocineros" 'we the chefs'). After upholding Höhn’s (2016, 2017) claim that pronouns originate in a dedicated person phrase (πP) in languages that use the definite article in pronoun-noun constructions, I address the issue of the third-person gap ("*ellos los cocineros" 'they the chefs') and argue that third-person pronouns are forms that realize π, D, Div, Anim, and n, a configuration that prevents other material from occupying these same heads. (shrink)

Amartya Sen argues that sectarian discord and violence are fueled by confusion about the nature of identity, including the pervasive tendency to see ourselves as members of singular social groups standing in opposition to other groups (e.g. Democrat vs. Republican, Muslim vs. Christian, etc.). Sen defends an alternative model of identity, according to which we all inevitably belong to a plurality of discrete identity groups (including ethnicities, classes, genders, races, religions, careers, hobbies, etc.) and are obligated to choose, in any (...) given context, which among our multiple affiliations to prioritize. While Sen’s model of discrete identity prioritization is a clear advance over single-factor accounts, it overlooks significant lessons about identity from over 150 years of scholarship by feminists of color. In ignoring the experiences of women of color, Sen’s model falsely assumes that identities are in-principle separable for the purposes of practical deliberation; and, in obligating individuals to make such identity-based “reasoned choices,” Sen’s model forces those with multiply marginalized identities to choose from a set of externally defined identity options, none of which sufficiently captures their experiences. (shrink)

In recent years, large language models (LLMs) such as GPT-4 have transcended their status as computational tools to emerge as collaborators in intellectual tasks such as theory construction, critique, and simulation. This paper investigates the evolving epistemic role of LLMs in social theory, arguing that they represent a paradigmatic shift: from modeling society to modeling thought about society itself. Drawing on textual simulations where LLMs replicate the argumentative styles of classical theorists such as Marx, Durkheim, and Weber, we explore how (...) these technologies can not only preserve theoretical syntax but also generate novel syntheses and post-disciplinary dialogues. Introducing the concept of the meta-theorist machine—an artificial intelligence that engages reflexively with the production of theory—we critically examine the ability of LLMs to engage with core dimensions of social theory: normativity, reflexivity, and historicity. Can an LLM meaningfully simulate dialectical reasoning? Can it reflect on ideology, or merely reproduce inherited patterns of knowledge? Using a mixed-methods approach, including prompt-based simulations, critical AI analysis, and textual experimentation, the paper explores whether LLMs can be considered agents of theoretical production rather than passive assistants. Nevertheless, this emergent potential raises urgent epistemological and ethical questions. LLMs are trained on corpora that reproduce colonial, gendered, and ideological biases, thereby risking the reinforcement of dominant paradigms under the guise of novelty. We interrogate whether AI-generated theory can be steered toward decolonial, feminist, and post-humanist innovations, and whether LLMs can participate meaningfully in the pluralization of theoretical discourse. Finally, the paper examines the ontological boundary between tool and thinker: if LLMs engage in theory-building, how must concepts of authorship, intellectual labor, and epistemic agency be redefined? By positioning LLMs as emergent epistemic actors, we invite social theorists, AI developers, and epistemologists to collaboratively rethink the boundaries of theoretical practice in the twenty-first century. Rather than treating AI as a mere computational convenience, this paper argues for its recognition as a participant in the co-creation of future social theory. (shrink)

This contribution unfolds an existential-ontological response to the question of sexual difference in the context of Heidegger’s formally indicative concept of “Dasein.” The question of Dasein’s “neutrality” concerns how formal indication formalizes, empties, and neutralizes the givenness of factical human existence. Ostensibly “given” biological and anthropological facts, such as sexual difference, are interpreted from an emptied and neutralized perspective that appears abstract and fictional to Heidegger’s critics. How, then, is the “neutrality” of formalizing emptying related to the “facticity” of in (...) each case factically existing as a sexual and gendered being? The answer lies in Heidegger’s elucidation of the existential-ontological structure of Dasein: Dasein is always relationally instituted in its factical entangled life through “being-with.” The sexual difference of human existence is not merely biologically or anthropologically given, but disclosed and enacted according to one’s relations with others, the environment, and oneself. The formally indicating concept “Dasein” indicates, accordingly, the concrete diversity and plurality of individuated sexual and gendered ways of being. (shrink)

Education fundamentally focuses on 'individuals', whose human value is rooted in the expression of 'self-identity'. This process is influenced by their social rank and linguistic culture, and within varied discourses and ideological communities, different 'self-identity values' emerge. This applies to all individuals, whether they are citizens or women, and encompasses complex social metaphysical questions. For instance, how do we define social identities such as poverty, disability, privilege, or femininity? 'Intuition' and 'common sense' often fail in such definitions, especially in recognizing (...) exceptions like gender identification, which challenges the distinctions between biological sex and gender identity. The paper analyzes 'Social Historical Structuralism' and ' Performative Theory' to see if they address the challenges of 'Essentialism'. It assesses both pluralism and monism and the autonomy of the 'true self' in educational philosophy's core concepts, grounded in the philosophy of self-identity. This study starts from female community perspectives, addressing women's disadvantaged status in social and linguistic structures and the impact of individualism on gender mainstreaming. This paper concludes by re-evaluating monistic approaches and considering the equitable recognition of community members' autonomy, underscoring the importance of self-identity in educational philosophy amidst the growing influence of identity politics in Western education. -/- Keywords: Self-Identity and Educational Philosophy, Social Metaphysics, Class and Identity, Ideology and Autonomy . (shrink)

Education fundamentally focuses on 'individuals', whose human value is rooted in the expression of 'self-identity'. This process is influenced by their social rank and linguistic culture, and within varied discourses and ideological communities, different 'self-identity values' emerge. This applies to all individuals, whether they are citizens or women, and encompasses complex social metaphysical questions. For instance, how do we define social identities such as poverty, disability, privilege, or femininity? 'Intuition' and 'common sense' often fail in such definitions, especially in recognizing (...) exceptions like gender identification, which challenges the distinctions between biological sex and gender identity. The paper analyzes 'Social Historical Structuralism' and ' Performative Theory' to see if they address the challenges of 'Essentialism'. It assesses both pluralism and monism and the autonomy of the 'true self' in educational philosophy's core concepts, grounded in the philosophy of self-identity. This study starts from female community perspectives, addressing women's disadvantaged status in social and linguistic structures and the impact of individualism on gender mainstreaming. This paper concludes by re-evaluating monistic approaches and considering the equitable recognition of community members' autonomy, underscoring the importance of self-identity in educational philosophy amidst the growing influence of identity politics in Western education. -/- Keywords: Self-Identity and Educational Philosophy, Social Metaphysics, Class and Identity, Ideology and Autonomy . (shrink)

This dissertation investigates ancient ecological and indigenous cultural forms in response to contemporary crises of ecology and psychology—"an alienation that haunts the modern soul while increasingly choking the biosphere." Lady Raglan's (1939) documentation of foliate masks carved into churches throughout much of Europe is taken as a starting place: faces where "oak leaves grow from the mouth and ears, and completely encircle the head" (p. 45). Another data point: excavation beneath Notre Dame Cathedral uncovers a Roman-era stone block dedicated to (...) Cernunnos ("The Horned One"), demonstrating literal encasement of pre-Christian fertility traditions in stone (Evans, 1988). The inquiry examines such documented traditional forms alongside Classical, Roman, Greek, Sumerian, and Near-East archeological and textual sources, exploring how historical patterns of human-earth relationality might inform contemporary crises through the rediscovery of autochthonous creativity: the natural human capacity to reconnect with body, symbol, ancestry, memory, and ecological life-worlds. The study introduces the method of epistrophic hermeneutics: a novel synthesis of hermeneutics with Hillmanian therapeia and epistrophē—defined by Hillman (2007/2016o) as "the reversion or return of soul phenomena to the archetype, according to the principle of likeness or analogy" (p. 153). The term hermeneutic of hospitality is introduced as an alternative to hermeneutics of faith or suspicion, respectively – a practice of epistemic humility at depth, rooted in what Hillman (1981/2013a) termed a "poetic basis of mind"(p. 31). The method embraces Hillman's dictum that "we can never be purely phenomenal or truly objective" because "one is never beyond the subjectivism given with the soul's native dominants of fantasy structures" (Hillman, 1981/2013a, p. 32). Archetypes, in this sense, are understood as "the primary forms that govern the psyche" (p. 13): participatory lenses of the epistemic eye. A hermeneutic of hospitality thus protects epistemological pluralism that includes cultural diversity yet continues deeper, beyond tokenism and into a celebration of pluralism at epistemic depth: that is, a protection of the living ecosystem of mind and image. Concretely, this reading stance follows Hillman's (1986/2016f) therapeutic attitude: "Instead of inquiry: interest, respect, welcome, praise—even attachment. To greet… even mythic presences that may be unpopular or demonized."(p. 96) This epistrophic work aims to "release the mind into its originality beyond the old entrapped condition" (Hillman, 1986/2016d, p. 295), aligning with the work’s principle of autochthonous creativity. The argument proceeds via case-rich exegesis. In Classical Greece, Dionysian masks give the Green Man civic expression; Dionysus appears as “a horned god… crowned with serpents” (Euripides, Bacchae, trans. 1996, p. 34), binding horns, snakes, and vegetation to ecstatic ritual. This vegetal–animal fusion has deep Mesopotamian precedent: Enki of the Sumerian wetlands was “the Wild Bull of Eridu” whose iconography shows “two streams, the Euphrates and the Tigris, flowing out of his shoulders” (Kramer, 1961, p. 76), while Damu embodied “the power in the rising sap” (Jacobsen, 1976, p. 39)—both figures conjoining fertility, water, and vegetal renewal. The parallel is explicit in Greek cult: Dionysus Limnaios, “Dionysus of the Swamps,” inhabited Athens’ oldest sanctuary where “water pours abundantly from under the rocks” (Pausanias, Description of Greece, 1.20.3), mirroring the Sumerian Dumuzi-abzi, “the power to renew life in the watery deep” (Katz, 2003, p. 35). Wild Bull Dumuzi is at once bull and cowherd—divine animal and shepherd—whose “bitter laments when he dies as the dry heat of summer yellows the pastures” (Wolkstein & Kramer, 1983, p. 64) mark the seasonal transition toward death and dormancy. The archetypal union of Goddess and God appears again in Baal and Baalath, “the male power identified especially with water” meeting “earth,” whose union makes “plants and trees, animals and men… the offspring” (Patai, 1990, p. 45)—a cosmogony of ecological reciprocity. These figures also share the power of metamorphosis. Humbaba’s “seven splendours” enable constant transformation—“Humbaba’s face keeps changing!” (George, 2003, p. 37)—a capacity echoed in Dionysus, who is “a lion, a bull, a boar, a bear, a panther, a snake, and now a tree, fire, water” (Euripides, Bacchae, trans. 1996, p. 101). In Near Eastern vegetal–arboreal myth, Adonis is born from the trunk of his mother-tree Myrrha, which “split open to allow the birth” (Graves, 1960, p. 74); Osiris is enclosed within a tree’s girth, Isis crafting his wooden phallus for resurrection (Graves, 1960, p. 60). Likewise, Ningishzida’s “winding roots, embodiments of living supernatural power, free themselves from the trunk and become live serpents entwined around it” (Black & Green, 1992, p. 136), a precise analogue to Dionysus Perikonis who “twines himself around the column” (Pausanias, Description of Greece, 10.19.3). Taken together, these scenes form a coherent archetypal grammar: a horned-vegetal deity mediating between water and earth, embodying seasonal death and renewal, uniting the powers of plant, animal, and human through metamorphosis, and returning life to the land through sacred union. This grammar repeats across Sumerian, Levantine, and Greek worlds, providing the imaginal architecture that will later be carved into the foliate heads of Medieval Europe. By tracing – text by text, altar by altar, mask by mask – how these symbolic forms have historically mediated human–earth relationship, the study demonstrates that epistemic pluralism at depth is precisely the restoration of a type of human culture capable of ecological harmonization. This is not a dynamic that can be simulated through instrumental control; it depends on the cultivation of consciousness that lives in participatory reciprocity with the more-than-human world: an epistemic eye that glints green. A hermeneutic of hospitality, in this sense, is not merely a method of interpretation but a protection of epistemological pluralism capable of return to the imagination of the Earth. The image of the Green Man describes just this: a dynamic bridge mediating between the many worlds of participatory and epistemic possibility. His mythic dance, rooted in water and leaf, horn and mask, death and return, is the precise form through which the restoration of the living Earth and the living soul become an indivisible act. Published January 2023. DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.2.18447.50089. (shrink)

When we participate in political debate or protests, we are judged by how we look, which clothes we wear, by our skin colour, gender and body language. This results in exclusions and limits our freedom of expression. The Politics of Becoming explores radical democratic acts of disidentification to counter this problem. Anonymity in masked protest, graffiti, and online de-bate interrupts our everyday identities. This allows us to live our multiple selves. In the digital age, anonymity becomes an inherent part (...) of everyday communication. Through our smart devices we express our selves differently. As cyborgs, our identities are disrupted and reassembled. We curate self-representations on social media, create avatars, share selfies and choose the skin colour of our emojis. The Politics of Becoming encourages us to engage in a revolution of the self. Democratic pluralism is not only a matter of institutional design but also about how we express our identities. Inner revolutions change our personal realities and plant a seed for democratic futures. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:130 Feminist Studies 46, no. 1. © 2020 by Feminist Studies, Inc. Laura Bisaillon, Alana Cattapan, Annelieke Driessen, Esther van Duin, Shannon Spruit, Lorena Anton, and Nancy S. Jecker Doing Academia Differently: “I Needed Self-Help Less Than I Needed a Fair Society” A great deal of harm is being done by belief in the virtuousness of work. — Bertrand Russell, “In Praise of Idleness” We are committed to doing (...) academia in particular ways, and not in others. — Brocher Foundation Feminist Collective I had decided that becoming a university professor might be a good fit; friends and colleagues had suggested that I would be valuable to a university, so I prepared for a restructuring of my family life.1 I read Tokarczyk and Fay’s Working-Class Women in the Academy and Babcock and Laschever’s Women Don’t Ask to gather understandings of the milieu I was entering. I now see that my preparations had not shined sufficient light on the social and structural factors that organize the contemporary university.... As it turns out, the restructuring of our lives within the working conditions, priorities, and rationalities of this professional milieu triggered unanticipated and painful effects.... Had Mountz published her article “Women on the Edge” before I decided on a career migration into the university system and, had I been fortunate enough to discover it, I would have made other career choices.2 1. The authors, who describe themselves as the Brocher Foundation Feminist Collective, indicate their personal narratives in this text using italics. 2. Michelle M. Tokarczyk and Elizabeth A. Fay, eds., Working-Class Women in the Academy: Laborers in the Knowledge Factory (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1993); Linda Babcock and Sara Laschever, Women Don’t Ask: Negotiation and the Gender Divide (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Bisaillon et al. 131 Introduction: Personal, Professional, and Political We are seven women who met at the Brocher Foundation in Hermance, Switzerland, in July 2017, where we had been selected to spend a few months as research fellows. This competitively awarded opportunity is open to persons fluent in English, from graduate students to senior scholars, with or without academic appointment, whose scholarship advances knowledge about the ethical, legal, and social implications of health and biotechnologies.3 When we found ourselves on the shores of Lake Leman with the gift of time, we began opening up to each other in unexpected, compelling ways. Whatever our vantage point in the hierarchy of the university system, we discovered that there was remarkable overlap in our experiences as women in academia. When we began writing, our authoring team was composed of two graduate students, four faculty members at the assistant professor rank, and one full professor, residing in Canada, the Netherlands, Romania, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Our plural subject position led us to underexplored and imaginative responses to broader social issues, which we share in this article as the “Brocher Foundation Feminist Collective.” We analyze our experiences from our standpoint as women health researchers laboring in the academy. Our similarities and differences were exciting entry points for discussion and analysis: we are all of eastern or western European descent. We have different countries of birth, mother tongues, ages, disciplinary training and career trajectories, relationships to chronic illness and disability, marital status, and experiences with parenthood. We bring the troubles and contradictions we experience as academics into conversation with each other. We seek to productively illustrate and emphasize that the tensions we see around us, and also feel within us, arise as a result of how the academic system is organized, produced, and sustained across time, place, and space. Press, 2003); Alison Mountz, “Women on the Edge: Workplace Stress at Universities in North America,” The Canadian Geographer 60, no. 2 (2016): 205–18. 3. We experienced this fellowship as a valuable opportunity. But we also recognized that our access to it was mediated by social, economic, or other obligations. As countries in the global north continue to tighten their national border regimes, marginalized academics, especially those from the global South, were less likely to succeed in getting a Swiss visa or securing relevant temporal and economic resources. 132 Bisaillon et al. The promise here, we posit... (shrink)

It is my pleasure to present you the first issue of the Argument: Biannual Philosophical Journal, published by the Department of Philosophy and Sociology, Pedagogical University of Cracow. This is a peer-reviewed journal founded to facilitate dialogue between Polish and international scholars and, on the other hand, to build bridges between professional philosophers and a wider educated public. We are open to the publishing of scholarly studies in history of philosophy as well as papers reporting the on-going debates in contemporary (...) philosophy, representing various currents in philosophical inquiry, including continental, analytic, non-Western traditions and comparative perspectives. We also publish polemical papers, responses and interviews, book reviews and notices from professional philosophers. Besides, we are open to critical and innovative suggestions concerning teaching methods and the purposes of up-to-date philosophical education. As the name itself suggests, the Argument is intended to provoke rational argument, encourage clear and precise reasoning, and enhance the essential philosophical need for justification and well-founded argument that support the presented views and clarify the accepted positions. the Argument is also intended to serve as a forum for dedicated philosophical debate, polemics and dispute implied by the plurality of the methods and possible interpretations developed within contemporary philosophy. Being aware of the variety of socio-epistemic dimensions of scholarship we also encourage critical, inter-disciplinary and creative articles on topics of traditional and emerging interest. Therefore, we welcome papers on such varied specialisations as: metaphysics, ontology, epistemology, axiology, logic, philosophy of religion, philosophy of mind, political philosophy, philosophy of science, as well as philosophical education, gender and feminist thought, bioethics, environmental philosophy, etc. Favouring methodological and thematic plurality we also want to present philosophy as a rich field of great cultural and social value. (shrink)

The British government's current educational policy for England draws on E.D. Hirsch's writings on 'cultural literacy'. This paper aims to uncover the roots of Hirsch’s influential views through a genealogical critique. Hirsch admired the Scottish Enlightenment educator Hugh Blair as a model architect of a hegemonic culture to unite disparate members of a nation. Following Hirsch, the government Department for Education in England called for ‘shared appreciation of cultural reference points’ and ‘a common stock of knowledge on which all can (...) draw and trade’. Consequently, the literature curriculum in England increasingly disenfranchises a significant component of the population in terms of both gender and cultural heritage. Recent ‘culture wars’ have highlighted the legacy of colonialism and have led educators to decolonise the curriculum and prioritise social justice. Continuing racism within civil society demonstrates the need for a general recognition that cultures are desirably diverse and internally plural. (shrink)

Abstract: The present paper seeks to explore the emotional structures that make human beings afraid of death in solitude, the feelings that necessitate the imagining of a peopled death, a death accompanied by fellow humans, gods, or God. In order to do this I take up the works of two great thinkers of the East and the West, and place them on a comparativist spectrum. The discussion covers many areas, including the polytheistic imaginations of ancient Greece and eighth century India, (...) in the context of the complex interface of beauty and death in the thought of Shankaracharya, the great proponent of Advaita Vedanta in India, and Socrates, who, in the Platonic dialogues, presents a monism Shankara could have recognized well. I try to investigate the tension between decay and beauty which leads these philosophers towards a strict ascetic impulse. At the same time, I also argue that neither of them could exclude the beauty of this world altogether from their thought. Finally, I explore the ways in which we can imagine a beauty greater than death that does not let us logocentrically negate death but rather encompasses it. Rather than taking death as the closure of all possible beauty, as ultimate nothingness, can we envisage a beauty that drowns death in the sea of kalon envisioned by Diotima in the Symposium, or in the saundaryalahari, the flood of majestic beauty radiated by Shankaracharya’s Goddess? To explore these areas and to understand the interconnected issues of plurality, impermanence, beauty and truth, I draw on the twentieth century philosophers like Iris Murdoch and Sri Aurobindo as well as Socrates and Shankara. This paper finally embarks on an imaginative journey towards a peopled or crowded death, where gods or divinized humans accompany the dying person in the process of death as his/her “necessary others”(a la Adriana Cavarero). Author’s bio-note: Anway Mukhopadhyay is a doctoral research scholar at the Department of English, Banaras Hindu University, Varanasi, India. He is the author of Do You Love Me, Master?, The Place of Eros in the Master Slave Dialectic(Saarbrucken, Germany: Lambert Academic Publishing, 2010),and Bloom Again in Autumn, The Move towards an Empathetic Temporality in Yuri Medvedev’s “The Bride’s Room” (Munich: Grin Verlag, 2012) and has been published in reputed international journals in India, the USA and Australia. His areas of interest include Indian and Western philosophy, gender and literary and cultural theory. His current research centres round the polyvalent nuances of ‘planetary’ feminisms in our time. Email id: [email protected], [email protected] . (shrink)

The social reality of contemporary Muslims is characterized by the dominance of the social system of capitalism. As a reality, this system forces every individual or group of Muslims to live on the mechanisms of capitalism. The events of September 11, 2001, identified as being carried out by certain Islamist movements, are a tangible product of the mechanism, along with the response of other Islamic movements to Islamism itself. The social system of capitalism has contrasted the dynamics of Islamic movements, (...) both radical, moderate, and liberal. The dominance of the social system of capitalism and the dynamics of the Islamic movement are problems as well as triggers for the existence of Progressive Islam. These problems are the basis for the author to assume that Tan Malaka's Islamic thought has a Progressive Islamic character. In addition, Tan Malaka's Islamic thinking is also by progressive Islamic agendas, namely, formulating reality-based thinking methods, reconceptualizing tawhid, creating social justice, upholding Human Rights (HAM), gender equality, pluralism, and reviving the unity of the people. To prove this assumption, the author formulates two main problems, namely, what is the external reality of Tan Malaka Progressive Islam? What is the process of objectivization and internalization of Tan Malaka's Islamic ideas? This is answered using two theories, namely, the Progressive Islamic theory and the sociology of knowledge theory. The first theory is used to target Tan Malaka's Islamic ideas. While the second theory functions as an analytical approach (externalization, objectivization, and internalization). The conclusions of this study are: First, Tan Malaka's progressive Islamic externalities are the social system of capitalism, the dynamics of Modern Political Islam, and Marxism. Second, Tan Malaka's progressive Islamic objectivization process took place within the government institutions of the Dutch East Indies, the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), the Communist International (Comintern), and the United Struggle (PP). Third, Tan Malaka's progressive Islamization is MADILOG as a method of Progressive Islamic thought, tawhid as the foundation of social justice, social justice as the foundation of Human Rights (HAM), gender equality, pluralism, and the unity of the people. (shrink)

This book's core is exploring Islam Tan Malaka, later characterized as progressive Islamic thought. To demonstrate this, the author uses the theory sociology of knowledge formulated by Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, as well as the philosophy of science of critical realism formulated by Roy Bhaskar, as an approach to analysis. The result is the concept of Madilog as a progressive Islamic method that gave birth to the concept of monotheism as the foundation for the existence of social justice, (...) which later became the foundation for Human Rights (HAM), gender equality, pluralism, and unity of ummah. These concepts are conditionally interconnected based on the principle of causality and the laws of dialectics. This conceptual construction is what the author calls progressive Islam Tan Malaka. (shrink)

This paper explores an emerging sub-field of both empirical bioethics and experimental philosophy, which has been called “experimental philosophical bioethics” (bioxphi). As an empirical discipline, bioxphi adopts the methods of experimental moral psychology and cognitive science; it does so to make sense of the eliciting factors and underlying cognitive processes that shape people’s moral judgments, particularly about real-world matters of bioethical concern. Yet, as a normative discipline situated within the broader field of bioethics, it also aims to contribute to substantive (...) ethical questions about what should be done in a given context. What are some of the ways in which this aim has been pursued? In this paper, we employ a case study approach to examine and critically evaluate four strategies from the recent literature by which scholars in bioxphi have leveraged empirical data in the service of normative arguments. (shrink)

Review of a solid and argumentative book that explains what "social justice" is (and "wokism" and related topics).

This paper sketches a brief account of multiculturalism in order to distinguish it from other positions that have been under attack recently. Following this, we address two prevalent and diametrically opposed criticisms of multiculturalism, namely, that multiculturalism is relativistic, on the one hand, and that it is absolutist, on the other. Both of these criticisms, we argue, simply mask liberal democratic theory's myth- begotten attempt to resolve the tension between the one and the many. Multiculturalism challenges the myths of meritocracy (...) and abstract individualism which underlie liberalism; properly understood, it evades the criticisms often hurled at it. (shrink)

Ontological pluralism is the view that there are different fundamental ways of being. Trenton Merricks has recently raised three objections to combining pluralism with a generic way of being enjoyed by absolutely everything there is: first, that the resulting view contradicts the pluralist’s core intuition; second, that it is especially vulnerable to the charge—due to Peter van Inwagen—that it posits a difference in being where there is simply a difference in kind; and, third, that it is in tension (...) with various historically influential motivations for pluralism. I reply to each of these objections in turn. My replies will help to bring out the true nature of the pluralist’s basic commitments. (shrink)

It is well‐recognized in the sciences that a multitude of nonequivalent models are used by researchers to fulfill a range of goals, even for the same target system, a result known broadly as model pluralism. The possibility of the same form of pluralism occurring in logic, however, has not been adequately considered. This is a surprise, given that both logical pluralism and methodological anti‐exceptionalism about logic (AEL), the view that the methods of theory‐choice in logic are similar (...) to those in the sciences, are now prominent topics. This paper makes the case for four distinct forms of model pluralism in logic, each widely found in the sciences, based upon logical practice. The result is not only interesting in itself but also serves to further support the claims of both methodological AEL and the logic‐as‐modeling view that we should understand the role of logics (at least sometimes) as akin to scientific models. (shrink)

This book is a defense of modal realism; the thesis that our world is but one of a plurality of worlds, and that the individuals that inhabit our world are only a few out of all the inhabitants of all the worlds. Lewis argues that the philosophical utility of modal realism is a good reason for believing that it is true.

Logical pluralism is the view that there is more than one logic. Logical normativism is the view that logic is normative. These positions have often been assumed to go hand-in-hand, but we show that one can be a logical pluralist without being a logical normativist. We begin by arguing directly against logical normativism. Then we reformulate one popular version of pluralism—due to Beall and Restall—to avoid a normativist commitment. We give three non-normativist pluralist views, the most promising of (...) which depends not on logic’s normativity but on epistemic goals. (shrink)

Pluralism about truth is the view that there are many properties, not just one, in virtue of which things are true. Pluralists hope to dodge the objections that face traditional monistic substantive views of truth, as well as those facing deflationary theories of truth. More specifically, pluralists hope to advance an explanatorily potent understanding of truth that can capture the subtleties of various realist and anti-realist domains of discourse, all while avoiding the scope problem. I offer a new objection (...) to pluralism that challenges its fundamental commitment to there being a set of alethic properties in virtue of which claims are true. In its place I offer an alternative view that merges standard truthmaker theory with a primitivist conception of truth. This combination of views satisfies the theoretical desires that pluralists claim for themselves, but without taking on pluralism's host of challenges and problems. (shrink)

This paper defends 'plural reference', the view that definite plurals refer to several individuals at once, and it explores how the view can account for a range of phenomena that have been discussed in the linguistic literature.

I formulate a theory of groups based on pluralities and counterparts: roughly put, a group is a plurality of entities at a time. This theory comes with counterpart-theoretic semantics for modal and temporal sentences about groups. So this theory of groups is akin to the stage theory of material objects: both take the items they analyze to exist at a single time, and both use counterparts to satisfy certain conditions relating to the modal properties, temporal properties, and coincidence properties of (...) those items. (shrink)

This paper introduces and defends an account of model-based science that I dub model pluralism. I argue that despite a growing awareness in the philosophy of science literature of the multiplicity, diversity, and richness of models and modeling practices, more radical conclusions follow from this recognition than have previously been inferred. Going against the tendency within the literature to generalize from single models, I explicate and defend the following two core theses: any successful analysis of models must target sets (...) of models, their multiplicity of functions within science, and their scientific context and history and for almost any aspect x of phenomenon y, scientists require multiple models to achieve scientific goal z. (shrink)

Anecdotal pluralism (AP) is the claim that, when two individuals disagree on the truth of a religious belief, the right move to make is to engage in a communal epistemic process of evidence sharing and evaluation, motivated by the willingness to learn from each other, understand the adversary's views and how these challenge their own, and re-evaluate their own epistemic position in regards to external criticisms. What I will do in my paper is to provide a presentation of AP (...) and give a few reasons in support. I will begin with showing how pluralism can be promoted by religious experiences inhering in any (historical) tradition. To this regard, my purpose is to analyse such experiences as conducive to the assumption of the two main principles defining any pluralist view. Subsequently, I will construe AP by seven claims, and I will focus my efforts on justifying its superiority both to exclusivism/inclusivism and other varieties of pluralism. My next and final move is to list a few reasons which support my view. (shrink)

Courtesy of its free energy formulation, the hierarchical predictive processing theory of the brain (PTB) is often claimed to be a grand unifying theory. To test this claim, we examine a central case: activity of mesocorticolimbic dopaminergic (DA) systems. After reviewing the three most prominent hypotheses of DA activity—the anhedonia, incentive salience, and reward prediction error hypotheses—we conclude that the evidence currently vindicates explanatory pluralism. This vindication implies that the grand unifying claims of advocates of PTB are unwarranted. More (...) generally, we suggest that the form of scientific progress in the cognitive sciences is unlikely to be a single overarching grand unifying theory. (shrink)

Innovative modes of collaboration between archaeologists and Indigenous communities are taking shape in a great many contexts, in the process transforming conventional research practice. While critics object that these partnerships cannot but compromise the objectivity of archaeological science, many of the archaeologists involved argue that their research is substantially enriched by them. I counter objections raised by internal critics and crystalized in philosophical terms by Boghossian, disentangling several different kinds of pluralism evident in these projects and offering an analysis (...) of why they are epistemically productive when they succeed. My central thesis is that they illustrate the virtues of epistemic inclusion central to proceduralist accounts of objectivity, but I draw on the resources of feminist standpoint theory to motivate the extension of these social -cognitive norms beyond the confines of the scientific community. (shrink)

Ontological pluralism is the view that there are different ways to exist. It is a position with deep roots in the history of philosophy, and in which there has been a recent resurgence of interest. In contemporary presentations, it is stated in terms of fundamental languages: as the view that such languages contain more than one quantifier. For example, one ranging over abstract objects, and another over concrete ones. A natural worry, however, is that the languages proposed by the (...) pluralist are mere notational variants of those proposed by the monist, in which case the debate between the two positions would not seem to be substantive. Jason Turner has given an ingenious response to this worry, in terms of a principle that he calls ‘logical realism’. This paper offers a counter-response on behalf of the ‘notationalist’. I argue that, properly applied, the principle of logical realism is no threat to the claim that the languages in question are notational variants. Indeed, there seems to be every reason to think that they are. (shrink)

According to alethic pluralism, there is more than one way of being true: truth is not unique, in that there is a plurality of truth properties, each of which pertains to a specific domain of discourse. This paper shows how such a plurality can be represented in a coherent formal framework by means of a Kripke-style construction that yields intuitively correct extensions for distinct truth predicates. The theory of truth we develop can handle at least three crucial problems that (...) have been raised in connection with alethic pluralism: mixed compounds, mixed inferences, and semantic paradoxes. (shrink)

Shutaleva A.V. Ontological pluralism and epistemological hypotheticality of George Northoff's neurophilosophical approach. In Ontology of the post-era: technologies, sociality and image of the future: Collective monograph / Ed. and compiled by A.V. Shutaleva - Petrozavodsk: MCNP "NEW SCIENCE", 2025. pp. 153-170. [Шуталева А. Онтологический плюрализм и эпистемологическая гипотетичность нейрофилософского кабинета Георга Нортхоффа // Онтология эпохи пост: технологии, социальность и образ будущего : Коллективная монография / Отв. ред. и сост. А.В. Шуталева — Петрозаводск : МЦНП «НОВАЯ НАУКА», 2025. С. 153-170] (...) This chapter focuses on the problems of the heterogeneous field of neurophilosophy from G. Northoff's perspective. The consideration of the self-reference problem, which arises in connection with the application of philosophical theories to neurophysiological hypotheses, leads to an exploration of G. Northoff's point of view on the need to develop special principles of cross-disciplinary methodology that adequately reflect the connection between philosophical theories and neurophysiological hypotheses, which allow G. Northoff to avoid «logical closure». It is shown that the principle of epistemic primacy clarifies the problem of epistemic conditions for the possibility of ontological assumptions. An analysis of the methodological foundations of G. Northoff's ontological pluralism legitimizes various types of ontological assumptions about reality and being. (shrink)

In this paper I investigate how differences in approach to truth and logic (in particular, a deflationist vs. a substantivist approach to these fields) affect philosophers’ views concerning pluralism and normativity in these fields. My perspective on truth and logic is largely epistemic, focusing on the role of truth in knowledge (rather than on the use of the words “true” and “truth” in natural language), and my reference group includes Carnap (1934), Harman (1986), Horwich (1990), Wright (1992), Beall and (...) Restall (2006), Field (2009), Lynch (2009), and Sher (2016a).1 Whenever possible, I focus on positive rather than negative views on the issues involved, although in some cases this is not possible. (shrink)

This brief commentary has three goals. The first is to argue that ‘‘framework debate’’ in cognitive science is unresolvable. The idea that one theory or framework can singly account for the vast complexity and variety of cognitive processes seems unlikely if not impossible. The second goal is a consequence of this: We should consider how the various theories on offer work together in diverse contexts of investigation. A final goal is to supply a brief review for readers who are compelled (...) by these points to explore existing literature on the topic. Despite this literature, pluralism has garnered very little attention from broader cognitive science. We end by briefly considering what it might mean for theoretical cognitive science. (shrink)

Pragmatism and the correspondence theory of truth are longtime foes. Nevertheless, there is an argument to be made that pragmatists must embrace truth as correspondence. I show that there is a distinctive pragmatic utility to taking truth to be correspondence, and I argue that it would be inconsistent for pragmatists to accept the utility of the belief that truth is correspondence while resisting the premise that this belief is correct. -/- In order to show how pragmatists can embrace truth as (...) correspondence, I develop a kind of alethic pluralism, which treats pragmatist truth as theoretically fundamental to truth as correspondence. This theoretical fundamentality of pragmatist truth allows the pragmatist to conditionally accept truth as correspondence for certain discourses without falling prey to the typical pragmatist objections to correspondence. This pluralist account of truth thus allows pragmatists to concede that, for certain domains of discourse, truth is correspondence, without thereby betraying their pragmatist principles. (shrink)

Pluralism is relevant to conceptual engineering in many ways. First of all, we face the issue of pluralism when trying to characterise the very object(s) of conceptual engineering. Is it just concepts? Could concepts be pluralistically conceived for the purposes of conceptual engineering? Or rather, is it concepts and other representational devices as well? Second, one may wonder whether concepts have only one function in our mental life (representation) or, rather, a plurality of functions (including non-representational ones). Third, (...) it is a contended question whether conceptual engineering projects should pursue only one set of values and goals (epistemic ones) or, rather, a variety of values and goals, including non-epistemic ones. Finally, the engineering of a concept may result in a form of “local” conceptual pluralism, which gives rise to its own ontological and semantic challenges. Having explored the various ways in which pluralism becomes important for conceptual engineers, this contribution presents and summarizes the articles published in this special issue. (shrink)

Grounding pluralism is the view that there are multiple kinds of grounding. In this essay, I motivate and defend an explanation-theoretic view of grounding pluralism. Specifically, I argue that there are two kinds of grounding: why-grounding—which tells us why things are the case—and how-grounding—which tells us how things are the case.